General Ecology: The New Ecological Paradigm by unknown
General Ecology
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   1 11/01/2017   14:28
ALSO AVAILABLE IN THE THEORY SERIES
Conflicting Humanities, edited by Rosi Braidotti and Paul Gilroy
ALSO AVAILABLE FROM BLOOMSBURY
Eco-Aesthetics, Malcolm Miles
Environmental Ethics, Marion Hourdequin
The Three Ecologies, Félix Guattari
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   2 11/01/2017   14:28
General Ecology
The New Ecological Paradigm
EDITED BY ERICH HÖRL 
WITH JAMES BURTON
Bloomsbury Academic 
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Conflicting 
Humanities
EDITED BY 
ROSI BRAIDOTTI AND 
PAUL GILROY
Bloo sbury Acade ic 
An i print of Bloo sbury Publishing Plc
THEORY
9781474237543_txt_print.indd   3 03/02/2016   11:419781350014701_txt_print.indd   3 11/01/2017   14:28
Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway
London New York
WC1B 3DP NY 10018
UK USA
www.bloomsbury.com
BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
First published 2017
© Erich Hörl and contributors, 2017
Erich Hörl has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be 
identified as Editor of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any 
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or 
any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from 
the publishers.
No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining 
from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury 
or the author.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN: HB: 9781350014701
PB: 9781350014695
ePDF: 9781350014688
ePub: 9781350014718
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Series: Theory series
Copyright the artists
Courtesy the artists and Koeing & Clinton, New York. Photo: Ulrik Heltoft, Copenhagen.
Milijohn Ruperto & Ulrik Heltoft, Voynich Botanical Studies, Specimen 50r, Zima, 2014, 
silver gelatin print on fiberbased paper, Sheet: 19 3/4 x 15 1/2 in (50.2 x 39.4 cm), 
Image: 19 1/4 x 15 in (48.9 x 38 cm), Frame: 25 1/4 x 21 1/4 in (64.1 x 54 cm)
Typeset by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN
Printed and bound in Great Britain
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   4 11/01/2017   14:28
CONTENTS
List of Contributors vii
Acknowledgments xii
Series Preface xiv
1 Introduction to general ecology: The ecologization of 
thinking 1
Erich Hörl
2 Computational logic and ecological rationality 75
Luciana Parisi
3 Elements for an ecology of separation: Beyond ecological 
constructivism 101
Frédéric Neyrat
4 General ecology, economy, and organology 129
Bernard Stiegler
5 The modern invention of nature 151
Didier Debaise
6 Deep times and media mines: A descent into ecological 
materiality of technology 169
Jussi Parikka
7 Planetary immunity: Biopolitics, Gaia theory, the 
holobiont, and the systems counterculture 193
Bruce Clarke
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   5 11/01/2017   14:28
vi CONTENTS
8 Ecologizing biopolitics, or, What is the “bio-” of 
biopolitics and bioart? 217
Cary Wolfe
9 Ecologies of communion, contagion, &c, especially 
Bataille 235
David Wills
10 Metafiction and general ecology: Making worlds with 
worlds 253
James Burton
11 An ecology of differences: Communication, the Web, and 
the question of borders 285
Elena Esposito
12 Specters of ecology 303
Timothy Morton
13 Devastation 323
Matthew Fuller and Olga Goriunova
14 Virtual ecology and the question of value 345
Brian Massumi
Index 375
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   6 11/01/2017   14:28
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
James Burton is a Lecturer in Cultural Studies and Cultural History at 
Goldsmiths, University of London. He has previously taught in the areas 
of cultural theory, the history and philosophy of art, and media and 
communications. From 2014–16 he was a research fellow at the ICI Berlin: 
Institute for Cultural Inquiry. From 2011–13, he was an Alexander von 
Humboldt research fellow at the Institut für Medienwissenschaft at the 
Ruhr University, Bochum. Working across the fields of cultural/media 
theory, philosophy, and literature, his current research looks at non- and 
posthuman approaches to error and the role of (meta)fiction in the context 
of modern technologized culture and ecology. He is the author of The 
Philosophy of Science Fiction: Henri Bergson and the Fabulations of Philip 
K. Dick (Bloomsbury, 2015), and several articles on the philosophy of 
memory, theories of fiction, ecology and science fiction.
Bruce Clarke is Paul Whitfield Horn Professor of Literature and Science 
in the Department of English at Texas Tech University. His research 
focuses on systems theory, narrative theory, and ecology. In 2015 he was 
Senior Fellow at the Erlangen Center for Literature and Natural Science 
(ELINAS), Friedrich Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg. In 2010–11 
he was Senior Fellow at the International Research Institute for Cultural 
Technologies and Media Philosophy, Bauhaus University Weimar. Clarke 
edits the book series Meaning Systems, published by Fordham University 
Press. His authored books include Neocybernetics and Narrative (Minnesota 
University Press, 2014), Posthuman Metamorphosis: Narrative and Systems 
(Fordham University Press, 2008), and Energy Forms: Allegory and Science 
in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics (University of Michigan Press, 
2001). His edited volumes include Earth, Life, and System: Evolution 
and Ecology on a Gaian Planet (Fordham University Press, 2015); with 
Manuela Rossini, The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the 
Posthuman (Cambridge 2016); and with Mark B. N. Hansen, Emergence 
and Embodiment: New Essays in Second-Order Systems Theory (Duke 
University Press, 2009).
Didier Debaise is a research professor at the Fonds National de la 
Recherche Scientifique (FNRS) and the Free University of Brussels (ULB), 
where he teaches contemporary philosophy. His main areas of research are 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   7 11/01/2017   14:28
viii LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
contemporary forms of speculative philosophy, theories of events, and links 
between American pragmatism and French contemporary philosophy. He is 
the director of a collection in Presses du réel and a member of the editorial 
boards of the journals Multitudes and Inflexions. He has written two 
books on Whitehead’s philosophy—Un empirisme spéculatif (2006) and 
Le vocabulaire de Whitehead (2007); edited volumes on pragmatism (Vie 
et experimentation [2007]) and the history of contemporary metaphysics 
(Philosophie des possessions [2011]); and has published numerous papers 
on Bergson, Tarde, Souriau, Simondon, and Deleuze. His most recent book 
is L’appât des possibles (2015).
Elena Esposito is Professor of Sociology at the University Bielefeld and 
at the University of Modena-Reggio Emilia. Working in a systems theory 
framework, she studies problems of time in social systems, including memory 
and forgetting, fashion and transience, probability calculus, fiction, and the 
use of time in finance. Her current research projects focus on the possibility 
and forms of forgetting on the Web, on a sociology of algorithms, and 
on the proliferation of rankings and ratings for the management of infor-
mation. Esposito’s recent publications include The Future of Futures: The 
Time of Money (2011), Die Fiktion der wahrscheinlichen Realität (2007), 
Die Verbindlichkeit des Vorübergehenden: Paradoxien der Mode (2004), 
Soziales Vergessen: Formen und Medien des Gedächtnisses der Gesellschaft 
(2002), “The Structures of Uncertainty. Performativity and Unpredictability 
in Economic Operations,” Economy and Society, 42 (2013), and a debate 
with David Stark on Observation Theory in Sociologica, 2 (2013).
Matthew Fuller is Professor of Cultural Studies and Head of the Centre 
for Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths, University of London. He has published 
widely on media theory, software studies, critical theory and cultural 
studies, and contemporary fiction, and has worked with the artist groups 
I/O/D, Mongrel, and YoHa, as well as independently. He is the author of 
Behind the Blip: Essays on the Culture of Software (Autonomedia, 2003), 
Elephant and Castle (Autonomedia, 2011), Media Ecologies: Materialist 
Energies in Art and Technoculture (MIT Press, 2005), and (with Andrew 
Goffey) Evil Media (MIT Press, 2012), among other titles. His edited 
books include Unnatural: Techno-theory for a Contaminated Culture 
(Underground, 1994) and Software Studies: A Lexicon (MIT Press, 2008).
Olga Goriunova is a senior lecturer at Royal Holloway, University of 
London. She is the author of Art Platforms and Cultural Production on the 
Internet (Routledge, 2012), editor of Fun and Software: Exploring Pleasure, 
Pain and Paradox in Computing (Bloomsbury, 2014), and co-editor, with 
Alexei Shulgin, of Readme: Software Art and Cultures (University of 
Aarhus Press, 2004). She is a co-founder and co-editor of Computational 
Culture, A Journal of Software Studies (computationalculture.net). She has 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   8 11/01/2017   14:28
 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS ix
also worked as a curator, co-organizing, among others, Readme, software 
art festivals, 2001–05 and Runme.org software art repository. In 2015, she 
was a fellow at the University of Leuphana’s Digital Cultures Research Lab. 
In 2014–16 she has been part of the Posthumanities research network and 
member of the Visual Social Media Lab, working on the project Picturing 
the Social. She is currently working on a monograph on digital subjects and 
on a co-authored book on environmental ethico-aesthetics.
Erich Hörl is Professor of Media Culture at the Institute of Culture and 
Aesthetics of Digital Media (ICAM) at Leuphana University of Lüneburg. 
His research concerns problems of a general ecology of media and 
technology, the critique of cyberneticization of all modes of existence, and 
the history of fascination with non-modernity. He publishes widely on the 
contemporary technological condition. He is author of Die heiligen Kanäle: 
Über die archaische Illusion der Kommunikation (Diaphanes, 2005), editor 
of Die technologische Bedingung (Suhrkamp, 2011), and co-editor, with 
Michael Hagner, of Die Transformation des Humanen (Suhrkamp, 2008). 
His articles include “The Technological Condition” (Parrhesia, 2015), 
“A Thousand Ecologies: The Process of Cyberneticization and General 
Ecology” (in The Whole Earth: California and the Disappearance of the 
Outside, Sternberg, 2013), and “Luhmann, the Non-trivial Machine and 
the Neocybernetic Regime of Truth” (Theory, Culture and Society, 2012). 
He was invited fellow at the IKKM, Bauhaus University Weimar (2010–11), 
Leuphana’s Institute for Advanced Study Media Cultures of Computer 
Simulation (mecs) (2013–14) and at the Insitute for Advanced Study of the 
University of Konstanz (2016).
Brian Massumi teaches in the Communication Sciences Department at the 
Université de Montréal. His research crosses the fields of art, architecture, 
political and cultural theory, and philosophy. His works include Parables 
for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Duke University Press, 2002), 
What Animals Teach Us About Politics (Duke University Press, 2014), 
Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception (Duke University 
Press, 2015), Politics of Affect (Polity Press, 2015), and The Power at the 
End of Economy (Duke University Press, 2015). He is also the translator 
into English of a number of works of contemporary French philosophy, 
including (with Geoffrey Bennington) Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus.
Timothy Morton is Rita Shea Guffey Chair in English at Rice University. 
He gave the Wellek Lectures in Theory in 2014 and has collaborated with 
Björk, Haim Steinbach, and Olafur Eliasson. He is the author of Dark 
Ecology: For a Logic of Future Coexistence (Columbia, 2016), Nothing: 
Three Inquiries in Buddhism (Chicago, 2015), Hyperobjects: Philosophy 
and Ecology after the End of the World (Minnesota, 2013), Realist Magic: 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   9 11/01/2017   14:28
x LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Objects, Ontology, Causality (Open Humanities, 2013), The Ecological 
Thought (Harvard, 2010), Ecology Without Nature (Harvard, 2007), eight 
other books and 170 essays on philosophy, ecology, literature, music, art, 
design, and food. He blogs regularly at http://www.ecologywithoutnature.
blogspot.com.
Frédéric Neyrat is Assistant Professor in Comparative Literature at 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is a French philosopher with expertise 
in the environmental humanities, contemporary theory, and image studies. 
He has been Program Director at the Collège International de Philosophie 
and a fellow at Cornell’s Society for the Humanities. He is a member of 
the editorial board of the journals Multitudes, Lignes, and Les Cahiers 
Philosophiques de Strasbourg. He is the author of several books, including 
Le communisme existentiel de Jean-Luc Nancy (2013), Atopies (2014), and 
Homo Labyrinthus (2015), his last book, offers an analysis of dominant 
Anthropocene discourses (http://atoposophie.wordpress.com).
Jussi Parikka is Professor of Technological Culture and Aesthetics at the 
Winchester School of Art (University of Southampton) and Docent of Digital 
Culture Theory at the University of Turku. His publications in the fields of 
new media theory, media archaeology, and continental philosophy include 
Insect Media: An Archaeology of Animals and Technology (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), The Anthrobscene (University of Minnesota Press, 
2014), and A Geology of Media (University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
In 2015, Parikka co-edited with Joasia Krysa the collection Writing and 
Unwriting (Media) Art History: Erkki Kurenniemi in 2048 (MIT Press, 
2015). Together with Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Anna Tuschling, he 
is co-editor of the series Recursions: Theories of Media, Materiality, and 
Cultural Techniques (Amsterdam University Press).
Luciana Parisi is Reader in Cultural Theory, Chair of the PhD program 
at the Centre for Cultural Studies, and co-director of the Digital Culture 
Unit, Goldsmiths University of London. Her research draws on continental 
philosophy to investigate ontological and epistemological transforma-
tions driven by the function of technology in culture, aesthetics, and 
politics. Her writings address the technocapitalist investment in artificial 
intelligence, biotechnology, nanotechnology. She draws on cybernetics, 
information theory, and computation, and aims to develop a natural-
istic approach to technology. Her publications include Abstract Sex: 
Philosophy, Biotechnology and the Mutations of Desire (Continuum 
Press, 2004) and Contagious Architecture: Computation, Aesthetics and 
Space (MIT Press, 2013). She is currently researching the history of 
automation and the philosophical consequences of logical thinking in 
machines.
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   10 11/01/2017   14:28
 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS xi
Bernard Stiegler is currently Head of the Institut de recherche et d’innovation 
du Centre Pompidou and president of the Ars Industrialis association. 
He is an external tutor at the Université de technologie de Compiègne 
and Distinguished Professor at Nanjing University. Starting with his 
ground-breaking work La technique et le temps I–III [Technics and Time] 
(1994–2001) he has published thirty books, which have been translated 
into eight different languages. Among his recent works are La Société 
Automatique I: L’Avenir du Travail (Fayard, 2015), States of Shock: 
Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century (John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 
Symbolic Misery I: The Hyperindustrial Epoch (John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 
and What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmakology (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2013). In 1996 he became General Director of the Institut national 
de l’audiovisuel (INA), and in 2001, General Director of the Institut de 
recherche et coordination acoustique/musique (IRCAM).
David Wills is Professor of French Studies and Comparative Literature at 
Brown University. His major work on the originary technicity of the human is 
developed in Prosthesis (Stanford University Press, 1995), Dorsality: Thinking 
Back through Technology and Politics (University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 
and Inanimation: Theories of Inorganic Life (University of Minnesota Press, 
2016), and he is completing a book entitled Killing Times: The Temporal 
Technology of the Death Penalty. Wills has translated a number of works by 
Jacques Derrida into English, including The Gift of Death and The Animal 
That Therefore I Am. He is a member of the Derrida Seminars Translation 
Project and an International Fellow of the London Graduate School.
Cary Wolfe is Bruce and Elizabeth Dunlevie Professor of English at 
Rice University, where he is also Founding Director of 3CT: Center for 
Critical and Cultural Theory. His areas of research interest include animal 
studies, posthumanism, biopolitics / biophilosophy, American literature 
and culture, and eco-criticism. He is founding editor of the Posthumanities 
series at the University of Minnesota Press, which has published works 
by Donna Haraway, Michel Serres, Isabelle Stengers, Roberto Esposito, 
and Vilém Flusser, among many others. His books include Animal Rites: 
American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory 
(University of Chicago Press, 2003), What is Posthumanism? (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009) and Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals 
in a Biopolitical Frame (University of Chicago Press, 2012). He is also the 
editor of The Other Emerson (University of Minnesota Press, 2010) with 
Branka Arsić, Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), and Observing Complexity: Systems Theory and 
Postmodernity, with William Rasch (University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   11 11/01/2017   14:28
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
General Ecology: The New Ecological Paradigm began as a project in 
January 2013, during a meeting at Beckmanns Hof at the Ruhr University, 
Bochum, attended by the majority of this volume’s contributors. Back 
then, two-and-a-half intense days of presentations and discussion raised 
the awareness among the participants that the description of the process 
of ecologization must be at the core of a critical evaluation of our contem-
porary situation, and that this exposition is to play an important role for 
the future of thought. This gathering took place within the institutional 
frame of the Bochum Media Studies Colloquium (BKM). We thank the 
Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Foundation, the Alexander von 
Humboldt Foundation, and Evonik Industries for making possible this 
get-together of outstanding thinkers. We are also grateful to Maren Mayer-
Schwieger, who co-organized the event with us, and was instrumental to its 
conception and execution.
The present volume is the third in a series of diagnostic collections 
edited by Erich Hörl, starting with a first volume on the cultural history 
of cybernetics (Die Transformation des Humanen: Beiträge zu einer 
Kulturgeschichte der Kybernetik, Suhrkamp, 2008, co-edited with Michael 
Hagner) and a second on the technological condition (Die technologische 
Bedingung: Beiträge zur Beschreibung der technischen Welt, Suhrkamp, 
2011). The collaboration between Erich Hörl and James Burton goes 
back to the period when the former hosted the latter during a two-year 
Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship (2011 –13) at the Ruhr University. 
This volume is also a late descendant of this cooperation and we thank the 
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for this gift of research time. James 
is also grateful for the support of a recent fellowship granted by the ICI 
Berlin, during which the latter stages of editing were completed. Erich is 
grateful for the inspiring milieu he found in his new working environment 
at Leuphana University of Lüneburg, which has offered him the oppor-
tunity for many vivid discussions about the challenges of general ecology 
and the stakes of the processes of ecologization and cyberneticization with 
his colleagues, collaborators, and students.
All contributions to this book are original, though parts of three of 
the papers have appeared elsewhere in different forms. The original 
French version of Didier Debaise’s contribution has previously appeared 
as a chapter in his book L’appât des possibles: Reprise de Whitehead (Les 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   12 11/01/2017   14:28
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii
Presses du réel, 2015); the abbreviated version that appears here has been 
revised for this volume. Jussi Parikka’s contribution is based on the BKM 
lecture that opened the Bochum meeting in 2013, and uses some material 
that was subsequently also discussed in The Anthrobscene (University 
of Minnesota Press, 2014). The German original of the first part of 
Erich Hörl’s introduction has been published in abbreviated form in the 
Zeitschrift für Medienwissenschaft, 14 (2016).
We are grateful to the translators who have worked with care and 
diligence to provide us with original translations of three of the contribu-
tions: Michael Halewood, translator of Didier Debaise’s paper; Daniel 
Ross, who translated Bernard Stiegler’s contribution; and Nils Schott, who 
translated the introduction by Erich Hörl. Thanks also to Milan Stürmer 
for his careful proofreading of parts of the final text, and conscientious 
preparation of the volume’s index.
We wish to thank Miljohn Ruperto and Ulrik Heltoft for permitting us 
to use one of the prints from their Voynich Botanical Studies for the cover 
of the book, and Margaret Clinton from Koenig & Clinton for providing 
us with the image.
We also wish to thank Liza Thompson from Bloomsbury Academic for 
her enthusiasm for this volume and all her efforts in ensuring its timely 
appearance, and Rosi Braidotti for accommodating it in the Theory Series.
Above all, Erich is deeply grateful to his wife Ksymena and his daughter 
Helen, who arrived somewhere in the middle of this project. This venture 
wouldn’t have turned out well without Ksymena’s patience, understanding, 
and support, and without the love of both that carried him through the 
small hours.
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   13 11/01/2017   14:28
SERIES PREFACE
Theory is back
Critical theorists of the universal, organic or situated kind used to be 
defined by their ethical-political commitment to account for power 
relations at work in the real world, as well as in scientific practice. 
But their prestige waned throughout the 1990s. The “theory wars” in 
the U.S.A. targeted critical theory as an outdated ideological activity, 
dismissing the theorists as “tenured radicals.” They got replaced by new 
“content providers,” experts, and consultants, in a context of increased 
privatization of academic research. By the turn of the millennium, with 
the internet as the only true “content provider,” former theorists were 
relocated to the market-oriented position of “ideas brokers” and, in the 
best cases, “ideas leaders.” By now, we are all entrepreneurs of the mind. 
The cognitive character of contemporary capitalism and its high techno-
logical mediation paradoxically produced a “post-theory” mood and 
intensified attacks on radical thought and critical dissent. This negative 
mood also resulted in criticism of the social and scholarly value of the 
humanities, in a neo-liberal corporate university ruled by quantified 
economics and the profit motive.
And yet, the vitality of critical thinking in the world today is palpable, 
as is a spirit of insurgency that sustains it. Theoretical practice may have 
stalled in the academic world, but it exploded with renewed energy in other 
quarters, in media, society, the arts, and the corporate world. New genera-
tions of critical “studies” areas have grown alongside the classical radical 
epistemologies of the 1970s: gender, feminist, queer, race, postcolonial 
and subaltern studies, cultural studies, film, television, and media studies. 
The second generation of critical “studies” areas includes: animal studies 
and eco-criticism, cultural studies of science and society, religion studies, 
disability studies, fat studies, success studies, celebrity studies, globali-
zation studies, and many more. New media has spawned new meta-fields: 
software studies, internet studies, game studies, digital postcolonial studies, 
and more. The end of the Cold War has generated: conflict studies and 
peace research; human rights studies; humanitarian management; human 
rights-oriented medicine; trauma, memory, and reconciliation studies; 
security studies; death studies; suicide studies; and the list is still growing. 
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These different generations of “studies” by now constitute a theoretical 
force to be reckoned with.
Theory is back!
This series aims to present cartographic accounts of these emerging critical 
theories and to reflect the vitality and inspirational force of on-going 
theoretical debates.
Rosi Braidotti
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction to general ecology
The ecologization of thinking
Erich Hörl
Translated by Nils F. Schott
An ecology properly understood can be nothing other than 
a technology.
JEAN-LUC NANCY1
Ecology: Our new historical semantics
We are witnessing the breakthrough of a new historical semantics: the 
breakthrough of ecology. There are thousands of ecologies today: ecologies 
of sensation, perception, cognition, desire, attention, power, values, infor-
mation, participation, media, the mind, relations, practices, behavior, 
belonging, the social, the political—to name only a selection of possible 
examples. There seems to be hardly any area that cannot be considered the 
object of an ecology and thus open to an ecological reformulation. This 
proliferation of the ecological is accompanied by a shift in the meaning of 
“ecology.” The concept is increasingly denaturalized. Whereas previously 
it was politically-semantically charged with nature, it now practically calls 
for an “ecology without nature.”2 Thus it not only abandons any reference 
to nature, but even occupies fields that are definitively unnatural. At the 
same time, in losing this dimension, the concept sheds an associated and 
constrictive set of immunopolitical connotations by which it was formerly 
bound to dogmas of proximity and immediacy; of the familiar and of 
kinship; of the healthy and the unscathed; of the proper, the house, etc. In 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   1 11/01/2017   14:28
2 GENERAL ECOLOGY
short, it severs its connections with dogmas of authenticity [Eigentlichkeit].3 
These dogmas have haunted and reterritorialized the concept of ecology 
(due to its origin in the Greek oikos and as its problematic logocentric 
heritage) ever since its genesis in the nineteenth century.4
There is something remarkable about this: while, from the perspective of 
the history of concepts and discourses, the concept of ecology designated 
primarily the other side of technics and of mind, it has now begun to switch 
sides within the nature / technics divide, undoing the sutures that bound it 
to nature. And it is doing so—crucially—in parallel with or perhaps even as 
a result of a fundamental unsettling of this very difference: in the twentieth 
century, this difference is no longer comprehended, in the time-honored 
Aristotelian way, from the side of nature. The supplementation of nature 
by technics no longer seems to be inscribed in nature and its guarantee of 
purposes, no longer circumscribed and regulated by nature in the manner 
described in the second book of the Physics, which was fundamental to an 
entire, long-enduring epoch of rationality. While this assigned to technics 
both ends that must be given by some intentional agent and ends taken 
to be always already given in advance, this technics seemed relentlessly to 
obey and implement an instrumental logic of means–end relations, consti-
tuting a “structuration of ends”5—albeit one whose branches increasingly 
multiply and intertwine; in any case, this made it both part and bearer of a 
whole, determinate—that is, a teleological—rationality. Now, in what we 
will shortly describe as the technoecological condition, in contrast, the very 
absence of any given purpose becomes undeniable. Technics emerges as the 
absolute agent of this failure, and nature begins evidently to be subordinate 
to it. Finally, what emerges is nature’s essential technicity: nature will hence-
forth always already have been devoid of all purposes. “Still, it is precisely 
here,” Jean-Luc Nancy tells us, “that technology conveys its lesson: through 
technology nature itself—from which technology is descended—reveals that 
nature is by itself devoid of an end [fin].”6 The technological end of the 
end—that is, the end in every sense, the end as “closure” that prepares an 
end to the end as “aim and purpose” and thereby removes every sense of 
history of the history of sense (a point discussed further below), carrying 
us to an other sense—for Nancy constitutes “our event.”7 In accordance 
with this non-Aristotelian movement of history driven by technology, 
which catapults us out of the Occidental order of teleology, compelling 
us to engage with the thought of another rationality and relationality, 
the concept of ecology is pluralized and disseminated; it is outlined and 
consolidated as the concept of non-natural ecologies; it even mutates into 
technoecology.
In this consequential shift beyond teleology, which will ultimately (to 
follow Nancy) either completely globalize us (leading to an uninhabitable 
“un-world”) or mondialize us (creating a world),8 “ecology” becomes 
a key concept and signal of the non-modern deterritorialization of the 
relationship between technics and nature. Although it is finally in all its 
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 INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL ECOLOGY 3
ambivalence an effect of modernization, this radical deterritorialization 
is one of the salient aspects of non-modernity in general, the always 
already non-modern inscription of modernity. It allows us to decipher the 
history of the fascination with non-modernity, which is recharged by this 
deterritorialization. The concept of ecology finally allies itself with the 
new materialisms that are struggling, at the heart of this contemporary 
fascination, to articulate a non-modern ontology and epistemology. All 
of this is taking place in the wake of the theories of ecologization that 
have proliferated since the 1970s, and which have come to include the 
mind, perception, or the psycho-social, thus testifying to this transfor-
mation of the sense of ecology from an early stage.9 In other words, 
it is as if the comprehensive redescription of all modes of existence,10 
which has been ongoing for a while now, were contracting around the 
concept of ecology, a concept that has itself begun to move. This effort, 
therefore, ultimately turns out to be a general ecologization of thinking 
and of theory, a development to which the new historical semantics of 
ecology testifies.
The concept of ecology thus represents the center of a great trans-
formation of the politics of concepts and theories, but one containing 
elements that are extremely consequential for the history of fascination to 
which we are subjected. It is here, I argue, that the powerful fascination 
with non-modernity, which guides the elaboration of this transformation 
today, finds its perhaps most radical systematization and articulation. 
Above all, it is from here that what I call the history of the fascination 
with non-modernity begins to become legible as such and prepares the 
basis for the examination of our new sense-cultural position. As early as 
the end of the nineteenth century, but all the more so since 1945, the entry 
into the technological condition and a media-technological mobilization 
have bolstered the formation of first a post-, then a non-modernity. In the 
post-humanist present, this non-modernity is most acutely conceptualized 
and integrated in the denaturalized and technologized—and thereby deter-
ritorialized and generalized—concept of ecology, which is critical of all 
anthropocentricism. “Ecology” has started to designate the collaboration of 
a multiplicity of human and nonhuman agents: it is something like the cipher 
of a new thinking of togetherness and of a great cooperation of entities and 
forces, which has begun to be significant for contemporary thought; hence 
it forces and drives a radically relational onto-epistemological renewal. 
That is the premise of this book. On the one hand it seeks to clarify the 
various strata and stakes of this general-ecological transformation. Yet in 
the course of this, it becomes, on the other hand, a matter of uncovering the 
possible contributions of the ecological transformation to the imaginary of 
our age, in particular those arising from the possible entanglement of this 
transformation with the cybernetic paradigms of regulation and control, 
within which looms something like the genesis of a non-modern rationality; 
and indeed ultimately the proximity of this transformation to—if not its 
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total derivation from—the technocapitalistic form of power, which at least 
runs through it, and may well have produced it in the first place.11
It is important to be clear on this point: semantic traditions change 
not only in accordance with “social development,”12 as Niklas Luhmann 
emphasized in his comprehensive Studien zu Gesellschaftsstruktur und 
Semantik.13 The emergence of a new historical semantics of ecologies is not 
only a reflection of society’s shift towards “ecological communication”14 
as it undoubtedly takes place, Luhmann would probably have argued, 
in the age of the Anthropocene and with regard to the various ecological 
crises. Nor does ecology turn out to be merely the “absolute metaphor”15 
employed by our ecologically endangered society to name what it cannot 
fathom, represent, or experience; a metaphor around which our whole 
society might revolve, as it were—one that would reorganize our knowledge 
and our discourses ecologically.
Even if such interpretations, which suppose some kind of great ecological 
unconscious on the part of the epistemes, may seem commonsensical, they 
all adhere to the traditional meaning of ecology. The semantic shift at issue 
here, however, goes much deeper. At the very latest since Friedrich Kittler 
gave the question of media and technics a quasi-transcendental turn,16 we 
have known that at each stage, the dominant technical-medial condition 
sediments, not to say is reflected—however much it may be refracted—in 
semantic traditions. In the end, I think, what is at issue here is the culture of 
sense that depends on—that is given, at least partially, in—media-techno-
logical strata. This culture is integrated into specific historical-semantic 
sedimentations, where it produces its particularities and finds its anchor, 
but where it also finds its idiosyncrasies and fixations. Historical semantics, 
in other words, are the expression of media-cultural, indeed, ultimately 
sense-cultural facts.17 The dissemination of the concept of ecology primarily 
reveals—according to the thesis defended here—a shift in the culture of 
sense provoked by the entry into the technological condition, the shift from 
signifying to technoecological sense.18 This shift, for its part—and here its 
deep ambivalence apparent—is traversed by power: it appears simultane-
ously with a new apparatus of capture which ultimately becomes manifest 
exactly in this movement of ecologization at the level of thought and the 
production of theory. This is a question of the apparatus of capture of 
Environmentality.19
The technological evolution that drives this fundamental re-ecologization 
of thinking and of theory as well as the readjustment of the apparatus of 
capture, unfolds, roughly speaking, along an axis of machine history, a 
line we can today decipher as the history of control, which still directly 
dominates the becoming of the concept of ecology. It has developed, more 
precisely, since the end of the nineteenth century and especially since 
1950 in an ongoing process of cyberneticization, in an environmental 
culture of control that is radically distributed and distributive, manifest in 
computers migrating into the environment, in algorithmic and sensorial 
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environments.20 As we will see below, this environmental culture of control 
undoubtedly constitutes the apex of the cybernetic imaginary of our time, 
the pervasive triumph of the cybernetic hypothesis of universal control-
lability and a corresponding ideal of regulation. It entangles us in a new 
technology of power that has begun to operate in a specific, ecological 
way and has, in any case, environmentalized itself (to follow Foucault 
and Massumi).21 In this process, media-technological “infrastructures of 
distribution”22 render environmental even what used to be called Umwelt 
or “environment.” Thus Environmentality, which is first implemented by 
media technology, is the contemporary form of governmentality.23
At the same time, however, the neoecological determination of capacities 
and modes of subjectification that are offered—indeed, made possible and 
conceivable—by Environmentalization, takes us beyond this neocybernetic 
power. The technoecology of sense, as I call the formation of the culture 
of sense that is newly emerging in this opposition, is the central yet hardly 
understood event in contemporary history, more precisely in the history 
of sense, an event that signals a possible opening of neocybernetic power. 
What is at stake in elucidating the technoecology of sense is not only insight 
into the core of what fascinates the contemporary politics of concepts 
and theory. It also concerns the becoming of the project of critique in 
general. General ecology, as I call it, stands for the critical analysis and 
affirmation of this environmental turn and thereby marks the key content 
of a neocritical project that is no longer negativistic but characterized by a 
non-affirmative affirmation.24
Bringing back the incessantly dismissed concept of sense, carefully taking 
it up once more, is a programmatic move. The insistence of sense—albeit in 
a new guise, as we will see, sense no longer in the sense of meaning, signi-
fication, and the signifier, but an asignificative sense of sense, as developed, 
in particular, by Félix Guattari in his non-linguistic semiotics of collective 
assemblages of enunciation25—resolutely opposes the perfect nihilism of 
technological or cybernetic capitalism, in whose immediate proximity 
thrived, as we observe today, the various dismissals of sense and the very 
successful anti-hermeneutic operations of the second half of the twentieth 
century. What counts instead, from the point of view of a general ecology, 
is precisely to pass through the radical Nothing of technology, to question 
anew the relation between technics and sense, and to reassess this difference 
for the age of the technological condition.26 I will return to this point.
If the semantic shift towards ecology does indeed, as I think it does, mark 
a significant change in the contemporary politics of concepts and theory, 
then it is important to note that alongside the crucial dimension of control, 
as discussed above, there is a further dimension to ecology that concerns the 
history of rationality. Let us go back to Luhmann once more, since he has 
much to offer in terms of observing this trajectory. The systems-theoretical 
difference between system and environment is virtually paradigmatic for the 
early stages of the neo-ecological awakening—and the form of rationality to 
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which it gives rise is itself an effect of this turn. Because it is “the ecological 
difference” as such, Luhmann writes, it opens up “the theoretical structure 
of the ecological question” and brings out “a radical change of view of the 
world,” a “radical break with tradition”;27 in other words, a dimension 
that fundamentally belongs to the history of rationality. After the functional 
rationalization of modernity that had its condition in the printing press, 
Luhmann observed the advent of a new, ecological form of rationality. In 
Luhmann, sociological systems theory, even systems theory as such, which 
has always taken this precise difference between system and environment 
as its guide and conceptual default position and which is itself undoubtedly 
an offspring of cyberneticization and the history of control, goes about its 
business as an expression of “ecological rationality,”28 a rationality thus 
endowed with definite form and made into one of its central programs. 
Systems theory even turns out, I would suggest, to be the first condensation 
of a form of rationality that has turned or is becoming ecological. In the 
very foundation of its conceptual and theoretical architecture, we might 
say, systems theory testifies above all to the general process of ecologi-
zation, a process to which it is itself subject, and which will finally exceed it; 
it testifies, put differently, to the transition from a modernist to a specifically 
non-modern ecological rationality that resolutely contravenes modernist 
rationality’s insufficiencies, simplifications, and distortions. Once again and 
most persuasively, this confirms not only that “in relation to the society that 
employs it, a stock of ideas cannot arbitrarily be varied”;29 it also reveals, 
suddenly and for the first time, the entire scope of the historical movement 
that is at issue here. What Luhmann discovers, at least intuitively, and what 
throughout his oeuvre never ceases manically to spell itself out is, precisely, 
the core of the movement of our age: the birth of an ecological rationality 
and the transition to the age of ecology it operates. Whatever else it may 
be, systems theory is thus above all a symptom of the onto-epistemological 
movement of ecologization we are interested in here, an expression of the 
history of rationality itself. What ultimately appears in systems theory 
is what Dirk Baecker calls “the ecological principle.”30 And that is what 
counts. When Latour later sees in the opposition of modernizing and ecolo-
gizing the decisive opposition of our time, he merely reiterates the caesura 
in the history of rationality which Luhmann had already attested.31
Specifically ecological rationality is characterized by its radical revalu-
ation of relationality. It places a premium on relations and leads to an 
essentially non-philosophical politics of relation. This is evident already 
in the dominance of concepts of relation in neo-ecological thought.32 A 
focus on relationality, talk of the dawn of an age of relational thinking 
and of a relational culture of knowledge can be found throughout the 
twentieth century and has left its trace in the very foundation of its philo-
sophical self-conception. From the beginning—since Cassirer, Whitehead, 
and Bachelard—it has been a question of relational epistemology, ontology, 
and cosmology.33 But from today’s perspective, the intensification and 
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establishment of the great relational switch did not take place until after the 
important elaborations of the beginning of the century. Following a longer 
period of latency, the transition from the paradigm of “being individual” 
to that of “being relational” discussed by Didier Debaise34 began to differ-
entiate itself ecologically. Now that, following Félix Guattari, the process 
of ecologization has begun to take in all the apparatuses of expression of 
our age, and as the new ecological paradigm has come to dominate the 
powers of thinking philosophically, knowing scientifically, acting politi-
cally, as well as, finally, the aesthetic power of feeling, it is no longer the 
site where the other of rationality or of the mind crystallizes. Even if the 
anti-modernism associated with a certain notion of the ecological has long 
held this to be the case, what is emerging here, on the contrary, is a form 
of rationality that rejects the previous forms as too restricted and begins to 
take the real’s excessive wealth of relations into account.35 Ecologization 
comprehends the reconceptualization of modes of existence, faculties, 
and forms of life in terms of relations. According to Latour, modernity 
means “to lose the experience of relations,”36 to reduce the multitude of 
relations to a few essential relations that are moreover said to be secondary, 
whereas he urges, precisely in the name of ecology, a new ontological 
realism of relations. For Latour’s relational enthusiasm, relationalism is 
always already non-modern. Today we have poststructuralist anthropolo-
gists’ elaborations of a “relational perspective” (Tim Ingold), a “relational 
stance” (Alf Hornborg), a thinking of “partial connections” (Marilyn 
Strathern), or a perspectivist “universe that is 100 percent relational,” as 
Viveiros de Castro has it:
Our traditional problem in the West is how to connect and universalize: 
individual substances are given, while relations have to be made. The 
Amerindian problem is how to separate and particularize: relations are 
given, while substances must be defined.37
This, precisely, is the break in the history of rationality at issue here: 
ultimately, and this to me seems to be the apex of the transformation, 
ecologization gives rise to a new, ecological image of thought that assigns 
a fundamentally different value to the question of relation. Far from being 
simply a question, as Latour recently formulated it, of there being more or 
less relations to be considered, it radically reconceptualizes and transvalues 
relationality as such. In contrast to the enduring heritage of scholasticism, it 
does not turn relations into minor and derivative entities but considers them 
to be originary, and precisely as such to represent the central moment of a 
new sense. In so doing, it institutes a non-philosophical politics of relation: 
general ecology is a non-philosophical rethinking of relation.38
Yet one has to take care not to lapse into a political romanticization of 
relation, as so many contemporary invocations of relationality do. Even this 
general-ecological relationism is still inscribed, to a certain extent, within 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   7 11/01/2017   14:28
8 GENERAL ECOLOGY
the history of control and the corresponding rationality of power. Its point 
of departure, in any case, lies in a highly problematic space and should in 
no way be mystified politico-romantically, nor should it be mistaken for the 
merely emancipatory content of a new scientific spirit. For today, we find 
ourselves at a very specific point in the history of relationality that brings 
out the question and the problem of relationality much more radically 
than ever before: relational technologies and an algorithmic governmen-
tality reduce, regulate, control, even capitalize relations to an enormous 
extent, and precisely in so doing, become essential to the form of power of 
Environmentality. Nigel Thrift very appropriately speaks of an “augmented 
relationality”39 that makes this exploitation of relations possible. There is, 
in other words, a neoliberal-capitalist destruction of the relation [Bezug], a 
reduction of relations to calculable, rationalizable, exploitable ratios, in the 
form forcefully wielded by the mathematics of power. The general ecology 
of the relation [Bezug], and the non-philosophical politics of relations 
it promotes, are diametrically opposed to this mathematics of relations. 
Mathematics is unaware of the intensity and originary status of the relation 
as that which establishes the terms of a relation in the first place. It is 
unaware of becoming as a “movement that deterritorializes the two terms of 
the relation it creates, by extracting them from the relations defining them in 
order to link them via a new ‘partical connection,’”40 as Viveiros de Castro 
puts it. It only knows of extensive vectored relations between pre-given terms, 
terms that always precede the relation, terms that are, but do not become. 
The “dominance of the mathematical”41 reterritorializes relations whereas 
the counter-knowledge of recent anthropological work in particular deterri-
torializes relations and drives the elaboration of a real relational ecologism.42
To give an even more precise description of the main features of control 
in the history of general ecologization: the new semantics of ecology reflects 
the cybernetic state of nature already diagnosed by Serge Moscovici.43 
After the organic, followed by the mechanic state of nature, the cybernetic 
state of nature rearranges “the relationships [rapports] between human 
forces and nonhuman forces” by the paradigm of control and information. 
An alert observer of the technological condition in the 1960s, Moscovici’s 
reworking of the difference between technics and nature juxtaposes the 
common conception of a transformation of the natural world into a 
technical world—which, like many phantasmal figures of thought, has had 
a long life and continues to organize innumerable areas of philosophical 
politics and political ecologies to this day—with the evolution of the natural 
world as such.44 This point of view not only opens up the perspective to 
take into account a plurality of states of nature; it also reveals every state of 
nature to be historically specified by a contemporaneous basic technicity. 
The development of the culture of control over the last one hundred years 
or so has differentiated the cybernetic state of nature; from microphysical 
areas via the spheres of the living to human societies, all are subordinated 
to the imperative of control. Today is the “Now of Knowability” (Walter 
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Benjamin) of this development, of which we are able to distinguish three 
major phases. Quickly sketched: the first phase includes the “control 
revolution”45 around 1900 and the expansion of the control paradigm 
by first-order cybernetics immediately following World War II. James 
Beniger has provided a magisterial reconstruction of this first phase of the 
history of control, which equates rationalization with increased control. 
Faced with the “crisis of control” of advanced industrialization triggered 
by the proliferation of flows of commodities, energy, money, and desires, 
control and planning are not just logistic problems; they are problems 
that characterize an age. According to Beniger, the implementation of the 
cybernetic hypothesis as the metaphysical principle of universal regulation, 
the very emblem of a logic of the Ge-stell in which “life itself implies 
control”46 and becomes a control problem, is based on this great crisis 
of distribution.47 In its wake, history itself ultimately appears to be but 
a history of control. In conjunction with the concurrent emergence of an 
entire arsenal of technical media that, as Kittler already noted, marks the 
beginning of our present, “nothing less … than a revolution in societal 
control” takes place.48 The concepts “control,” “information processing,” 
and, finally, “communication” far exceed the horizon of engineering, and 
become the dominant conceptual triad. In this first phase of the history 
of control, to be precise, the main problem was adaptation (particularly 
the question of “adaptive behavior”); its characteristic and to this day 
iconic idea is the control circuit, the feedback loop. The second phase, 
implemented by second-order cybernetics (including Luhmann’s thinking 
in systems) starting in the late 1960s / early 1970s, makes questions of 
manipulative behavior its priority. Learning is now the main problem; 
concretely, it deals with auto-control and autopoiesis. On the whole, both 
cybernetics have a trivial or trivializing conception of the environment 
as environment of a system. Yet the second cybernetics already begins to 
develop a more ecological mode of thinking. It even involves some first 
efforts to extend and transgress the sense and scope of the ecological, 
and attracts attention to the problem of the environment—despite its 
demands for the reduction of complexity or necessary trivializations of 
the environment. Starting around 2000, the third phase, finally, marks the 
neocybernetic facts of our present, which generally ought to be described 
in terms of an explosion of environmental agency.49 This phase witnesses 
the emergence of an environmental culture of control that, thanks to the 
radical environmental distribution of agency by environmental media 
technologies, ranging from sensorial to algorithmic environments, from 
bio- to nano- and geotechnologies, renders environmentality visible and 
prioritizes it like never before. It thus ends the longstanding forgetting and 
denial of the environment and, moreover, raises it to the status of a new 
universal principle. This phase is the first to be genuinely environmental. In 
other words, it is only with this phase that environmentality in the widest 
sense becomes problematic and takes the form of a new problematics of 
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Environmentality as our mode of governmentality; its main problem is the 
capture and the control, the management, the modulation of behavior, of 
affects, of relations, of intensities, and of forces by means of environmental 
(media) technologies whose scope ultimately borders on the cosmic.50 The 
“established powers”51 Deleuze and Guattari speak of are increasingly 
organized eco-, even cosmo-technologically. All these phenomena and 
the diagram of power have now become objects of ecology—and indeed 
the whole contemporary apparatus of capture that begins to appear here 
can only be grasped in ecological terms. This is a result of the history 
of control, in whose third, environmental phase the cybernetic state of 
nature today fully comes into its own. Cyberneticization crystallizes 
as Environmentalization. Media, for their part, are cyberneticized and 
ecologized to the extent that they sustain this movement; they are no 
longer media of communication but turn into “machines of capture of the 
unsayable and unrepresentable.”52 This must be our point of departure 
if we seek to understand the penetrating power of ecological semantics 
(although its significance is by no means exhausted by its being inscribed 
by the history of power), a semantics that in the end—a point that bears 
repeating—serves to operate a fundamental critique of this movement 
of Environmentalization at the level of ontological and epistemological 
theorizing (at least in the conceptually most far-reaching and brightest 
moments of such theorizing).
Finally, and this is the last stratum of the historical-semantic transfor-
mation I want to outline in this first section, we have to conceive of the 
dissemination of the ecological, in the course of which the restricted ecology 
of nature transmutes into a technoecology, as a consequence of the genesis 
of the so-called “technological paradigm,” to take up the name the geologist 
Peter Haff has given to the apex of the history of control. The “techno-
sphere” this new paradigm allows us to describe supplements the previous 
paradigms of geological history, from the lithosphere via the atmosphere and 
hydrosphere to the biosphere. It appears as the most radical and compre-
hensive form of cybernetics, as what is likely to be the most far-reaching 
effect of the control revolution, as a metacybernetics that renders technology 
autonomous and the earth as a whole cybernetic.53 In this transformation, 
technology, inversely, mutates into a geological phenomenon and thereby 
inaugurates a new stage of geological evolution: let’s call it technogeology. 
This also signifies a new stage in the evolution of technicity.54 The collabo-
ration of all spheres might well be the most precise instance to date of what 
Moscovici called the cybernetic state of nature to come.
“The technosphere,” Haff writes, “represents a new stage in the geologic 
evolution of the Earth.”55 The “technosphere” under discussion here is 
more than a totalization of a technical culture of objects. It is an entire 
formation and a global cooperation of natural and non-natural, human 
and nonhuman actors and forces—from all kinds of flows of energy and 
communication, via processes of production, to bureaucracies, states, and 
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human beings—in which technology becomes an autonomous entity and 
matrix:
The proliferation of technology across the globe defines the techno-
sphere—the set of large-scale networked technologies that underlie and 
make possible rapid extraction from the Earth of large quantities of free 
energy and subsequent power generation, long-distance, nearly instanta-
neous communication, rapid long-distance energy and mass transport, 
the existence and operation of modern governmental and other bureau-
cracies, high-intensity industrial and manufacturing operations including 
regional, continental and global distribution of food and other goods, 
and a myriad additional “artifacts” or “non-natural” processes without 
which modern civilization and its present 7 x 109 human constituents 
could not exist … Humans have become entrained within a matrix of 
technology and are now borne along by a supervening dynamics from 
which they cannot simultaneously escape and survive … Technology 
penetrates to nearly every part of the globe through a web of communi-
cation and transportation.56
Gilbert Simondon, another great proponent of the rise of general ecology,57 
emphasizes that a mode of existence proper to technical objects cannot 
be posited without taking the associated technical milieu into account. 
Yet when he, like Canguilhem, seeks to conceive of them no longer 
mechanically but organically, as expressions of life, we may conclude that 
technology in the technosphere becomes the milieu of milieux, a kind of 
meta- or hypermilieu. Seen this way, the technosphere even appears, in 
an extension of Simondon’s schema, after the elements (tools), individuals 
(simple, unattached machines), and the ensembles or nets (open machines), 
as the location of technicity.58 Whereas, to return to Haff, their fixation 
on instruments or rather instrumentality made it seem perfectly obvious 
to human beings, all the way into the twentieth century, that the emerging 
technosphere was to be viewed from the inside, to be understood as a 
human matter, as their invention and their product, and above all as 
something subject to purposes, there is nothing so compelling as the 
consolidation of the technosphere in terms of requiring us to assume 
a radically critical and anti-teleological position on anthropocentrism. 
According to Haff, it is precisely technology that urges us to change 
perspectives completely, to observe from the outside, from the outside of 
technology:
The technosphere is not “just” a human-created phenomenon, because, 
except for simple artefacts like stone tools, humans did not create 
technology independently, but only in the context of existing techno-
logical systems. From the outside, that is, from its own vantage point, 
notwithstanding that its human parts are essential, technology appears 
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to have bootstrapped itself into its present state. This is the same process 
that characterizes all emergent complex systems vis-à-vis their small-
scale components; that is, large-scale dynamics appears spontaneously 
… and define[s] an environment within which small system components 
must operate.59
At least perspectivally, the technosphere in this way even pushes beyond the 
long-enduring fascination with control and the cybernetic hypothesis whose 
manifestation it enables. This is the point at which every vision of control, 
which is, strictly speaking, also inherent to the entire systems-theoretical 
and complexity-theoretical conceptualization of the technosphere Haff 
himself develops, must come to an end. “The technosphere is not a giant 
version of a navy ship,” Haff writes, alluding to the nautical and teleo-
logical background of cybernetic thought. This thought, in his view, is 
“purposefully designed according to engineering specifications to suppress 
as many undesirable degrees of freedom as humans can think of, and in 
the process to provide the captain with specified lines of control.”60 In 
contrast, the technosphere reveals the absolute beyond all purpose; it is the 
very emblem and, ultimately, the geological manifestation of a fundamental 
purposelessness and truncated teleology: “The technosphere resembles the 
biosphere—complex and leaderless.”61 The historical undoing of Western 
teleology mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, which underpins 
the shift in the meaning of the ecological towards a plural technoecology, 
results from the autonomization of the technical as it unfolded in the genesis 
of the technosphere and the enforcement of a technogeological paradigm 
of the earth. Likewise, the incantation of the unforeseeable, the uncontrol-
lable, the ungovernable, which are deposited within the concept in Haff 
and have appeared ceaselessly in various other places since Heidegger 
and then Serres, unquestionably correspond to the contemporary ration-
ality of power, equally characterized by the history of control. The very 
acknowledgment, if not the celebration of the autonomy of the technical, 
possibly culminating in its being assigned a unique mode of existence, may 
ultimately be the outcome of this form of rationality.62
The explosion of agencies—and nowhere is this seen more clearly 
than in the technosphere—disenchants what I call the Anthropocene 
illusion, which has assigned a fantastic monopoly on agency to human 
beings. The concept “Anthropocene illusion” names the central historical 
momentum that unsettles this phantasm: the extent to which the human 
being qua technics turns out to be the central agent of a new era in natural 
history, eventually baptized “Anthropocene,” is also the extent of a 
proliferation and even explosion of environmental agencies [umweltlicher 
Handlungs- und Wirkmächte] that ends up relegating the human being as 
agent and demonstrates the illusionary character of what lies behind the 
human technological achievement, namely, the illusionary character of the 
monopoly on agency in general, and of the privileging of human agency in 
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particular. In contrast, it also discovers the irreducible variety of all possible 
nonhuman agents, a variety that had until now been forgotten where it was 
not outright denied, at least by European modernity and its conceptual-
ization of rationality (in which relations hardly figure and are minoritized). 
At the intersection of the histories of control, rationality, and relationality, 
technoecology turns out to be the radical consequence of the collapse of the 
Anthropocene illusion, a consequence provoked by the entry of the techno-
sphere onto the level of thinking and of theory. Instead of “Anthropocene” 
we should say “Technocene.”63 This is what the new historical semantics of 
ecology finally brings out.
Technoecological sense (after Félix Guattari)
Sense too, sense especially, is subject to historicity. The difference between 
sense and technics, the historical transformation of its heretofore dominant 
aspect and thus the changes in its internal economy are central for under-
standing where we are today in the history of sense. In the first half of the 
twentieth century, Husserl warned against the dangerous shifting of sense 
provoked by increasing technicization and mathematization. He considered 
the threat and horizon of the crisis of Western science to consist in a total 
loss of sense, a scientifically / technically induced crisis and destruction of 
sense. His warning expresses a traditional philosophical politics of sense, 
which, in turn, belongs to a very specific formation in the history of sense 
that cannot be characterized solely by the opposition of sense and technics 
consistently instantiated by philosophical politics.64 What is decisive, rather, 
is that one side of the difference is subjected to the other: technics is always 
subjected to sense and above all to the sense-giving subject; inversely, every 
shift of emphasis toward technics in the end always threatens a collapse 
of sense. Despite his increasing attention and sensitivity to the cultural-
technical constitution of the transcendental subject, which is first of all a 
reading and a writing subject, to the constitution of the ego from the spirit 
of alphabetical writing, Husserl still operated from a moribund formation 
of sense that conceived of itself as counter-technical and could not but deny 
the technicity and mediality that are nonetheless undeniably inherent to it.65
Since then, this philosophical politics of sense, which Deleuze so 
convincingly depicted as the corollary of a dogmatic image of thought 
beholden to representation,66 has increasingly lost its persuasive force. 
The valence expressed in the difference between sense and technics and in 
the subjugation of technics to sense, the valence that organized a philo-
sophical politics of sense fixated on representation and signification, has 
lost its epochal self-evidence. But not because we have entered some kind 
of no-holds-barred nihilism of technicization that would once and for all 
ruin this difference as such. Instead we have, as a result of the general 
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cyberneticization of modes of existence and of faculties, transitioned to a 
different configuration in the history of sense, which in turn is characterized 
by a surprising revaluation of the difference between sense and technics. 
This revaluation runs parallel to the revaluation just described of the 
difference between nature and technics, which it supplements and to which 
it is essentially linked. It is in precisely this intrinsic link, in this twofold fact 
of difference politics, that the technological condition comes to the fore.
Perhaps no one is as clear on this revaluation as Jean-Luc Nancy, who 
writes:
To “inhabit” technology, or to “welcome” it, would be nothing other 
than inhabiting and welcoming the finitude of sense … Rather, it is a 
matter of getting at the sense of “technology” as the sense of existence 
… The “reign of technology” disassembles and disorients the infinite 
feedback of a Sense.67
Sentences like these are almost paradigmatic indicators of the switch at 
issue here, which cancels out all prior philosophical politics of sense. 
Against the traditional notion of the infinity of sense, it is now technology 
itself that appears as the bearer of radical purposelessness and of a finitude 
of sense. Even teleological rationality, which had classically positioned 
technology as a means to an end, is historically dispensed with. These 
sentences thus have nothing of an emphatic rejection of sense about them, 
nothing of the short-sighted anti-hermeneutic daydreams about the end of 
all sense current in the second half of the twentieth century in particular. 
They organize practically all of Nancy’s oeuvre and the revaluation of sense 
it operates, the revaluation that moves from sense in the sense of meaning, 
of referential sense, to a different sense of sense, a sense after the primacy of 
endowing with sense, a sense no longer to be given, no longer lost and to be 
restored, no longer sedimented and no longer to be discovered. The caesura 
this marks in the history of sense is tremendous: where we once found the 
anti-technical bulwark of sense we now all of a sudden see the technicity 
and mediality of sense.68
The switch in the philosophical politics of sense that takes place between 
Husserl and Nancy, ultimately even the transition from a philosophical 
to a non-philosophical politics of sense that is at least announcing itself 
here, marks the emergence of technoecological sense, as I would like to 
call this new formation in the history of sense. In this formation, the sense 
of technics shifts—from technics to technology—and the sense of ecology 
shifts—from a restricted to a general ecology that might ultimately even be 
called non- or anecology. What the generalization of the concept of ecology 
and the emergence of ecology as our new historical semantics spell out is 
precisely the great challenge of the politics of concepts and theory in our 
time: the genesis of the technoecological culture of sense.
Yet this modifies the concept of sense as a whole. The cult of the sign and 
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of meaning that characterizes the traditional culture of sense, most often 
supported by a non-technical, speaking, signifying subject of sense, against 
this background turns out to be an essentially pre-technological illusion. 
To think consistently after the culture of meaning requires renouncing 
once and for all the primordiality of language and the despotism of the 
signifier.69 Félix Guattari has mounted this great challenge to the dominance 
of language, which attacks the core and the evidence of an entire formation 
of the culture of sense. (Today, this attack is carried on in the name of 
“affect.”) He developed it practically in parallel with Nancy, even if this 
simultaneity—a strange simultaneity, given how different their approaches 
and conceptual politics are—has so far not been understood philosophi-
cally. That is why Guattari is, alongside Nancy, one of the central theorists 
of the caesura in the history of sense and of the technoecological culture 
of sense that emerges from it, all the more so since his work leads to an 
ecosophy, which has remained fragmentary. Guattari’s difficult difference 
between signifying and non-signifying semiotics, which he was struggling 
to develop from the late 1970s onward, if not before, and which probably 
constitutes the core of his reformulation of the critical project, may count 
at the very least as a heuristic, a guiding difference for the redescription 
of the culture of sense made necessary by the technoecological condition. 
It is wrested directly from the change in the culture of sense and serves to 
schematize and discover our current position in the history of power and 
rationality. And finally, it also gives a political-economic turn to the techno-
logical condition—which is not the least of the reasons for the importance 
of Guattari’s schema to our reading here.
While this difference between signifying and non-signifying semiotics 
arises from Guattari’s initial focus on the question of a new machinic, 
meaning first of all non-linguistic, model of the unconscious (itself 
undoubtedly a reaction to the implementation of the technological condition 
and the genesis of a technological unconscious),70 it comes to support the 
transversal and heterogenetic reconstellation of subjectivity in which 
Guattari’s project culminates. This difference decenters the subject of the 
culture of meaning from a very precise historical perspective: it forms the 
basis for conceptualizing post-signifying “machines of subjectivation”71 
whose constitution was very much boosted by the development of media 
technologies. This is where Guattari saw the main question, the core 
problem but also the emancipatory potential of the technoecologically 
transformed present. It is the key even to what he explicitly calls his “gener-
alized ecology” or “ecosophy.”72 Generalized ecology—and this, precisely, 
is what its work of generalization consists in—brings together, in an ethical 
and aesthetical way, the three major ecological domains Guattari outlines, 
environment, social relations, and human subjectivity, and thereby takes 
into account the genesis of a new type of rationality, namely what he calls 
“eco-logic.”
Maurizio Lazzarato has recently given a detailed exposition of this 
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central difference in Guattari’s thought, which rearranges the relationship 
between technics and sense in the technological condition. He demonstrates 
just how valuable it is for diagnosing the contemporary situation. We no 
longer live in a “‘logocentric’ world,” he writes in his brilliant study, but 
in a “‘machine-centric’ world”73 that configures the functions of language 
in an entirely new way and even fundamentally reconfigures the very site 
of language.74 “We are faced with an immense machinic phylum,” he 
continues, “that in one way or another affects us and forces us beyond 
logocentrism.”75 This is a crucial and incisive point. One could say that 
Guattari’s entire program arises from this machinocentric turn. Already 
several years before the heyday of the history of control in the first years 
of the twenty-first century, Guattari’s program draws its conclusions with 
great foresight and represents the first figure of this new world:
In the machine-centric universe, one moves from the question of the 
subject to that of subjectivity such that enunciation does not primarily 
refer to speakers and listeners—the communicational version of individ-
ualism—but to “complex assemblages of individuals, bodies, materials 
and social machines, semiotic, mathematical, and scientific machines, 
etc., which are the true sources of enunciation.” The sign machines 
of money, economics, science, technology, art and so on, function in 
parallel or independency because they produce or convey meaning and 
in this way bypass language, significations, and representation.76
In Lazzarato’s persuasive interpretation, Guattari’s elaboration of a 
“general semiotics,” which, precisely, comprises not just signifying speech 
but aesthetic, scientific-technical, biological, and social semiotic machines 
as well—and which can, as I would like to emphasize from the outset, 
reveal its relevance fully only within the framework of a general ecology—
is the semiotics of the machinocentric world. It no longer works within 
the “semiotic triangle: ‘reference, signification, representation’”77 that 
dominates under the logocentric conditions of the age of meaning and 
characterizes the signifying semiotics at issue here. It thus reacts to the 
enunciatory regime of the technological culture of sense—primarily based 
on non-linguistic, different, asignifying semiotics such as software and 
programming languages, algorithms, mathematical equations, diagrams, 
stock market indices, etc.—and ceases to subject it to linguistic universals 
and human language.78 Elsewhere, Guattari describes the move out of the 
house of language, which is prompted, even implemented by the total cyber-
neticization of forms of life and modes of existence, as the implementation 
of the new aesthetic paradigm (aesthetic because it appeals primarily to 
affects and is no longer linguistic) that in turn, as we saw above, is subject 
to an Environmentality now operating affectively.79 We might say that this 
move practically forces the development of the kind of “semiotic theory 
beyond human semiotics”80 he finally sets out to elaborate. Guattari’s efforts 
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at developing a general semiotics no longer based on human language draw 
out the implications of the transition to the technological condition and the 
transformation in the history of sense it operates.
What is at issue here is not the diagnosis of a simple historical transition 
from signifying to asignifying semiotics that would reflect the switch from 
a logocentric to a machinocentric world. According to Guattari, there 
have in principle always been many modes of semiotization that integrate 
themselves into more or less complex assemblages of enunciation in which 
they variously crystallize subjectivity. This reveals them to be closely linked 
to modes of subjectivation and the modes of valuation these correspond to 
and thus, from my perspective, to be the operative key aspects of particular 
structural formations or types of a culture of sense. Yet there are, according 
to Guattari, historical changes in the configuration of various modes of 
semiotization vis-à-vis each other. More precisely—and this is the key 
insight of all of Guattari’s theorizing—there is a becoming, an evolution of 
assemblages of enunciation that, in the second half of the twentieth century 
and largely thanks to the evolution of media technology, are on the verge 
of transitioning to a new formation of interlocking modes of semiotization, 
subjectivation, and valuation, modes for which Guattari himself began 
to provide an ecosophic model in the 1980s. Guattari’s ecosophy is a 
perspectivation of this transition and one of the early interpretations of the 
technoecological culture of sense that was then only just emerging.
For Guattari, the becoming of assemblages of enunciation contains the 
very essence of historicity. Tasked with its description are “speculative maps” 
of subjectivity. Thus, according to his schema, in the first “territorialized 
assemblages of enunciation,” precapitalist and archaic subjectivities were 
constituted by “diverse initiatory, social, rhetorical machines embedded in 
clan, religious, military, corporational, etc. institutions.” Guattari conceives 
of them as “collective apparatuses of subjectification [équipements collectifs 
de subjectivation].”81 In this labor of cartography, the archaic machinism 
appears as a foreboding, as it were, of the machinocentric world imple-
mented by media technologies in the “age of planetary computerization.”82 
Or, inversely, the entry of subjectivity into the machine, the genesis of 
a “machinic subjectivity of a new type”83 that Guattari sees as instanti-
ating itself thanks to recent media technologies in the machinized present, 
strangely repeats or imitates this archaic machinism. Animism and machino-
centrism thus shed light each on each other, which makes rereadings of 
animistic systems relevant to an interpretation of today’s technological 
condition. Between them lies the logocentric world that delimits the variety 
of modes of semiotization, and this world, according to Guattari, is above 
all the world of modernity’s reterritorialized capitalist subjectivity (which is 
based on the age of proto-capitalist European Christianity).84
Essential to a precise understanding of Guattari’s work on the caesura in 
the history of sense and crucial for an appreciation of its great diagnostic 
potential is the fact that it takes place from within the spirit of a critique of 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   17 11/01/2017   14:28
18 GENERAL ECOLOGY
capitalism that Guattari gives a semiotic turn and places in the perspective 
of the history of control. The radical reconceptualization of political 
economy thus enacted reflects the new conditions. And ultimately, this is 
its decisive contribution to outlining a general ecology. For Guattari, capital 
is a “semiotic operator at the service of specific social formations”85 to 
implement control. The extent to which capitalism, in the course of its long 
genesis, breaks into territorialized assemblages of enunciation and deterrito-
rializes them is the extent to which it ultimately subjects them to the general 
equivalent as the emblem and apex of the regime of signification.86 This 
is the central operation that makes capitalism an autonomous formation 
and, according to Guattari, it pushes back all asignifying semiotics—until 
their return, with regained strength, in the machinic couplings of human 
and nonhuman forces in cybernetic capitalism today.87 While it may be 
true, Guattari writes, that most archaic societies featured specific semiotic 
systems for capitalizing power—from prestige capital to the capital power 
embodied magically, individually, in clans or ethnic groups—a general 
mode of semiotization organized around the principle of general equiva-
lence becomes autonomous only in the capitalist mode of production.88 
Guattari thus not only designates capitalism as a major agent of the age 
of meaning, he also suggests a fundamental redefinition of the concept of 
capital as a “general mode of capitalization of the semiosis of power”89—a 
definition that, as we will see shortly, already announces the crisis of the 
age of meaning. Hence capitalism appears as “a power operation before it 
[appears as] a profit operation,”90 and in that sense, it primarily appears as 
a problem of control: “capitalism aims above all at controlling the whole 
of society.”91 This reading from the 1970s, that is to say, from the time 
of the genesis of cybernetic capitalism, is crucial to understanding this 
new formation. In Guattari’s analysis, the capitalist machinery, thanks to 
miniaturized machinic techniques (but also far exceeding these), grafts itself 
onto the “basic functioning of the perceptive, sensorial, affective, cognitive, 
linguistic, etc. behaviors.”92 For Guattari, this is evidence of nothing less 
than a certain “‘machinic direction’ of history.” He writes: “The machinic 
phylum inhabits and orients the historical rhizome of capitalism but without 
ever mastering its fate, which continues to be played out equally with social 
segmentarity and the evolution of economic modes of valorization.”93
Enabled by its alliance with cybernetic media technologies to explicitly 
turn its back on the fixation on signifying semiotics (and above all human 
language), capitalism has greatly contributed to undermining the great 
ciphers of the age of meaning and once again proven its deterritorializing 
force.94 Yet what about the future of the principle of general equivalence 
itself? Under the technological condition, is everything ultimately to be 
brought back once more to general equivalence, the core moment so far of 
capital semiotization? Is it, in spite of the richness of semiotic components, 
general translatability of all local modes of semiotization that will win the 
day? In other words, do the possible technoecological futures end up being 
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colonized once more by the familiar means of the logocentric world, which 
is grafted onto the machinocentric world? Or are there other lines of flight? 
That, to my mind, is the critical question of Guattari’s analysis.95
At first sight, Guattari’s forceful insistence on a semiotics, even if it is 
a general one geared toward rehabilitating non-signifying semiotics, might 
still be regarded as a survival of the age of meaning. But this is far from 
the case. Guattari radically reconceptualizes even the very concept of the 
sign in the terms of the technological condition. The key to this recon-
ception is that signs are no longer seen primarily as representative but as 
operative entities. As Lazzarato has demonstrated, Guattari distinguishes 
the impotentialized signs of the semiologies of meaning, whose entire 
semiotic efficacy depends on their being processed by consciousness and on 
representation, from “power-signs” or “sign-points” that do not represent 
but act directly on the material fluxes.96 “Signs ‘work’ things prior to 
representation. Signs and things combine with one another independently 
of the subjective ‘hold’ that the agents of individuated enunciation claim 
to have over them,” Guattari writes. “With a-signifying semiotics, then, 
the relations of production and of reciprocal engenderment between the 
semiotic machine and material fluxes are radically reorganized.”97 In his 
Anti-Oedipus papers from the early 1970s, there are several longer entries 
on the question of “power-signs” such as: “Power capital = power signs 
allied to primitive territorial machines = power signs allied to despotic 
machines etc. (power signs of state monopoly capitalism, automation and 
computerization).”98 The current constitution of power-signs might best be 
conceptualized in the terms of the digital milieus of the environmentally 
constituted contemporary apparatus of capture.
Guattari’s interest in the regained strength of asignifying semiotics and 
in how they sidestep the general equivalent’s signifying culture of sense, I 
would argue, is central for coming to grips with his ecosophic program 
and at the same time indicates the precise historical position of this 
endeavor. Ecosophy—a title he undoubtedly prefers to “ecology”99—is the 
name Guattari suggests for a fundamentally reformed way of ontological 
modeling on a par with the technologically shifted history of sense and, in 
any case, beyond the traditional schemata of the age of meaning. Down 
to its innermost modes of conceptualization, ecosophy is a direct (even 
if ultimately critical) result of the general process of cyberneticization 
that characterizes the twentieth century. It undertakes a process-oriented 
expansion of ecosystemic thinking, which in turn, viewed from the 
perspective of the history of knowledge and of media, may have been 
profoundly cybernetic and must be considered an integral moment in the 
rise of the ideal of control.100 While the “ecosystemic approach of Fluxes” 
Guattari picks up on in Chaosmosis already “represents an indispensable 
awareness of the cybernetic interaction and feedback involved with living 
organisms and social structures,” the ecosophic approach operates an 
extension by “establishing a transversalist bridge between the ensemble 
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of ontological strata which, each in their own way, are characterised by 
specific figures of chaosmosis.”101 These strata now range from “material 
and energetic Fluxes” via “the strata of organic life, of those of the Socius, 
of the mecanosphere” all the way to “the incorporeal Universes of music, 
of mathematical idealities, of Becomings of desire.”102 Modeling the 
ecosophic object includes the four ontological dimensions of fluxes, terri-
tories, universes, and machinic phyla. Against this background, being must 
be “conceived from a multicomponential and intensive perspective.”103 
This is the ecosophic slogan that ultimately undermines every talk of 
Being as such and instead privileges the description of multiple modes of 
being and existence. Ecosophic mapping or metamodeling is a method for 
describing the various ontological strata and textures that only come into 
view in the technoecological culture of sense—that is, after the signifying 
culture of sense that, precisely, also included the search for the meaning 
of being and the general equivalent, “Being.” “Being,” Guattari writes, 
“becomes the ultimate object of a heterogenesis under the aegis of a new 
aesthetic paradigm.”104 To be more precise: the new ecological paradigm 
both goes beyond and, in the process, transforms the great ciphers of the 
age of meaning: Capital, the Signifier, Being. The ecosophical project—is 
at least if we accept that it is as such on a par with technoecological 
sense culture—is ontological and political at the same time. It is a radical 
political-ontological critique of what one might call the thinking of general 
equivalence—where the latter is understood as having been an integral part 
of the departed sense culture of meaning and having framed the hegemonic-
dogmatic ontological (as well as epistemological) conceptualizations of 
occidental thought from the beginning—and yet one that still does not lie 
behind us, still insists in today’s technoecological sense culture. It insists 
inasmuch as it dominates the manifold reterritorializations implemented by 
today’s cybernetic capitalism. If cybernetic capitalism draws on asignifying 
modes of semiotization, but in the same breath also occupies the (media)
technological deterritorializations of the age of meaning by bringing it 
ceaselessly back to the general equivalent, ecosophical practices in return 
have to experiment with other, therapeutic modes of de- and reterritoriali-
zation that protect us against contemporary capitalism’s general-equivalent 
exploitation of all modes of semiotization and existence. This is ecosophy’s 
general-ecological perspective.
Even in its general machinism, Guattari’s ecosophical project—as 
foreshadowed in its generalized ecosystemic mode of thinking—is deeply 
marked conceptually by the process of cyberneticization. For only this 
process allows for the completely new conception of the machine beyond the 
“fascination with technology”105 for which he never ceases to call. The new 
type of assemblage, the processual machinic assemblage, which paradigmat-
ically supports this machinism with all its ontological and epistemological 
consequences, picks up explicitly on Varela’s and Maturana’s neocybernetic 
concept of autopoeisis, the concept of a self-producing and self-reproducing 
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machine understood as “the ensemble of interrelations and its compo-
nents.” Varela and Maturana, as Guattari notes, reserved this concept for 
living machines, conceiving of all others—from social systems to technical 
machines—in terms of “an allopoiesis in which the machine will search 
for its components outside of itself.”106 Guattari’s general machinism, on 
which the conceptualization of his generalized ecology is based, opts for a 
combination of auto- and allopoiesis. In the late lecture “On Machines,” 
delivered in November 1990 in Valence, this is made explicit:
I would propose a reversal of this point of view, to the extent that the 
problem of technique would now only be a subsidiary part of a much 
wider machine problematic. Since the ‘machine’ is opened out towards its 
machinic environment and maintains all sorts of relationships with social 
constituents and individual subjectivities, the concept of technological 
machine should therefore be broadened to that of machinic agencements. 
This category encompasses everything that develops as a machine in its 
different registers and ontological supports. And here, rather than having 
an opposition between being and the machine or being and the subject, 
this new notion of the machine now involves being differentiating itself 
qualitatively and emerging onto an ontological plurality, which is the 
very extension of the creativity of machinic vectors. Rather than having 
a being as a common trait which would inhabit the whole of machinic, 
social, human and cosmic beings, we have, instead, a machine that 
develops universes of reference—ontological heterogeneous universes, 
which are marked by historic turning points, a factor of irreversibility 
and singularity.107
The machine’s opening to the outside and to the machinic environment 
described here is one of Guattari’s most far-reaching conceptual opera-
tions. It appears not only as a direct inscription of the technoecological 
transformation in his ecosophical program, which renders the project so 
contemporary with ours. It also crystallizes the figure of a different kind 
of technicity that today we seek critically to define under the heading of 
general ecology.
Elements of general ecology
Together, the contributions in this volume disclose what, taking a cue from 
Gilles Deleuze, I would like to call the problematic of general ecology, that 
is, “the ensemble of the problem and its conditions.”108 Rather than provide 
an exhaustive description of the concept, they sketch general-ecological 
plateaus that remain to be elaborated and complemented in a collective 
effort.
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Luciana Parisi’s contribution marks the programmatic beginning of 
the collection. It describes the development of a new “ecological form 
of rationality” (75) that sustains the processes of ecologization and 
Environmentalization. At the same time, Parisi elaborates the speculative 
horizon of the critique of these processes, which appears as a possible new 
horizon of the critical project in the algorithmic age and can thus be understood 
to constitute an essential component of a general ecology. The paradigmatic 
site of the movement of ecologization she examines is the contemporary 
culture of design in architecture, which, as she already showed in her earlier 
work on the “computational turn” in the thinking of design, plays a central 
role in today’s fundamentally transformed conception of computation.109 
The innovative and virulent force of her analysis lies in the discovery that the 
form of rationality as such has begun to ecologize. This is apparent in the 
profound physicalist reconception and naturalization of computation as such 
that takes place here: the deductive rationality of the axiomatic age, whose 
exception, limitation, and abyss was incomputability, has been replaced by an 
inductively constituted computing rationality that calculates with the indeter-
minate and the contingent and thereby fundamentally changes the status of 
the incomputable. This new rationality now follows the indeterminate poten-
tialities, dynamics, and contingencies of physical, biological, and chemical 
behavior and their complex interactions. The computational qualities of 
nature itself are thus absorbed by the logic of computation; they are doubled, 
expanded, and renewed. Materiality and computation—this is the point of 
the development—seem always already to have been integrated. The logic 
of computation is thereby practically congruent with the intrinsic compu-
tation of materiality as such. After the demise of the predominance of formal 
logic and of a pure Symbolic, which had reigned since the late nineteenth 
century, computation now follows the movements of the material.110 And 
materiality, in turn, is now seen to be computational through and through. 
The biophysical world already offers a model of computation, which is 
evident in swarm models. These latter, according to Parisi, merely demon-
strate that “the temporal dynamics intrinsic in the biophysical environment 
of continuous interactions is the motor of computation” (81). Computation 
is thus no longer symbolic but simply material computation. Computation, 
in Parisi’s succinct phrase, corresponds to an “eco-logical order of nature,” 
where ecology means not merely “an (associationist) interaction of parts” but 
instead names “the capacities of an environment, defined in terms of a multi-
plicity of interlayered milieus or localities, to become generative of emergent 
forms and patterns” (83). This approach is as original as it is comprehensive 
in conceptualizing what “ecology” might mean within the framework of its 
general-ecological redefinition.
Yet computation’s turn toward a new nature of material ecologies is also 
the problem to which general-ecological critique must respond. As Parisi 
shows, this development is, in the end, but a symptom of Environmentality, 
of the contemporary power formation that has only recently managed 
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to consolidate itself thanks to new media technologies. The becoming-
environmental of computation thus also appears as a result of the 
becoming-environmental of power, which, according to Brian Massumi, 
characterizes technocapitalist naturalization in general. For if this power, 
under the conditions of Environmentality, is driven by its opening onto the 
unknown and the indeterminate, if it is interested in regulating effects, not 
in causality, and if it focuses on the temporal anticipation of potentialities 
(which is why Massumi calls this power’s operative core “preemption”), 
then it is the occupation and colonialization of becoming thus taking 
place that now exposes itself as the new ecological form of rationality.111 
Ultimately, this form of rationality is the rationality of environmental 
power, as Parisi persuasively demonstrates. In contrast, she calls for a 
critical reconceptualization of computation that rejects precisely this kind 
of ecological rationality, which has been restrained by the history of power. 
The becoming-environmental of computation is to be thought as radically 
artificial, rejecting any attempt at biophysical naturalization (which only 
repeats the spirit of Environmentality). This kind of urgent refoundation of 
a critical theory of automatic reason can only be undertaken by a funda-
mentally speculative concept of reason marked by the spirit of a completely 
new conception of algorithmic processing.112 Only against this background 
will algorithms come to be seen not merely as sets of commands processed 
within an environment (as they were in the axiomatic age) but as generic 
actions, as “an automated elaboration of data followed by an alien episte-
mological production.” (92)
Frédéric Neyrat, too, addresses a problem that concerns ecological 
rationality: the excess of relation. This excess characterizes a now-dominant 
“ecological constructivism” that results from the theoretical-political 
struggle against the limitations imposed on relationality that has been 
waged since the nineteenth century. From the very beginning, ecology 
has been a knowledge of relations—a knowledge of the relations between 
living beings that posits relations themselves to be constitutive—and the 
sweeping ecologization of thinking can be conceived of as the emergence 
and implementation of relational ontologies, of ecologies of being-together, 
of attachments, of entanglements, of cooperation, and even of a new 
collectivism and communism of species and forces. In this process, inter-
connectivity, the connection of everything to everything else, has become 
the “principle of principles of ecology”113 (101) that characterizes our 
now-ecological episteme. This historical-ontological background sheds 
light not only on a central dimension but also on a basic problem of the 
general movement of ecologization: in the immanence of the infinite web 
of relationships that has taken the place of a transcendentalized nature 
and with the total lack of gaps and spacing (espacement) that comes with 
this movement of immanentization, any capacity for discernment and 
any possibility of political decision-making has been lost and a techno-
phile constructivism has come to dominate. By contrast, Neyrat, entirely 
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against the grain, brings separation and detachment into focus, namely as 
ecology’s repressed. At its core, the “ecology of separation” he undertakes 
to outline is a critique of a relationalism that has become phantasmagoric, 
a relationalism that, in the wake of the resolution of modernity’s “Great 
Divide,”114 continues to suppress modernity’s minoritarian element, the 
small separations.
In an earlier work, Neyrat conceptualized this relationalism that has 
become total in terms of “relational excesses”115 and conceived of them 
simply as hypostasizing the technological condition, understood as charac-
terized by “generalized interconnection.” The antidote he suggested was an 
“ontology of the gap [ontologie de l’écart]”116 such as we find for example 
in Nancy’s “existential communism,” according to which existence is 
possible only thanks to an inescapable outside that inheres in each and 
every being and precedes any reference.117 This is where the program-
matic principle of the ecology of separation Neyrat develops is taken up 
in this volume: “Every Relation is founded on a separation” (101). This 
criticism of the ecological fascination with relationality aims at a peculiar 
repositioning of nature and, in consequence, even at conceptualizing a new 
politics of nature that allows for bringing separation back into play. This 
neither substantializes nor sanctifies nature, nor does it reinstall nature 
as a transcendental principle. Instead, it is conceived of as a passage, as 
something we have to pass through again and again, as a strategic detour 
or corrective of thought necessary in the age of the Anthropocene. If our 
“exophobic epoch” (102), as Neyrat has it, has begun to shy away from 
all forms of negativity, distancing, and the outside, a renewed ecological 
theory and practice must reintroduce the gap into the bad immanence 
of the global technological system. This gap, which ecoconstructivism’s 
celebration of interconnectivity had dismissed, is nature.
Neyrat’s destruction goes straight to the heart of an entire phantas-
magoric positioning of contemporary thought, the critique of which 
must generally be considered an eminent objective of a general ecology. 
Ultimately, the anti-constructivist ecology that takes shape here is simply the 
radical consequence of the inversion of the traditional relationship between 
nature and technics arising under the technological condition. In rethinking 
nature the way Neyrat suggests, as detour and separating mediation, nature 
takes on the role of interruptor. When nature was considered the epitome of 
the immediate, continual, and unmediated, this role had been reserved for 
technics, which in turn has now come to support a movement of immedia-
tization: “In the era of generalized connections, of the Internet of Things 
or communication among machines … geo-anthropogenic interconnections 
create a great, seamless tissue of ‘immediations.’ What if nature could 
appear henceforth as that which allows us to re-establish a gap within the 
global technological system?”; nature would then be understood as a means 
of “allowing us to measure the relations we produce and material limits 
belonging to these relations” (121). The point of reintroducing nature as 
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a detour is to establish a cosmotechnological perspective (an integral part 
of a general ecology) from which every technology appears as a cosmo-
technological assemblage, that is, it produces a certain kind of world. 
This perspective demands that we distinguish between desired worlds and 
values, bring technology and the mechanisms it selects back to the world 
it produces, and vote, based on a politics of cooperative technologies, for 
or against introducing or employing it. In contrast, the current inability 
to separate autonomous and heteronomous, closed and open, cooperative 
and autistic technologies, eco-constructivism’s shying away from making 
decisions, is symptomatic of a “unilateral taste for association, putting 
together, attachment” and indicates a “difficulty [with] accessing the 
dimension of separation, of division or opposition” (117).
Bernard Stiegler, too, is ultimately concerned with the cosmotechnological 
question. His chapter situates the general-ecological challenge, historically 
and with systematic precision, within the framework of his redescription of 
the technological condition. This redescription, begun under the heading 
of a “general organology” that takes up the work of Ernst Kapp, Jacques 
Lafitte, and, above all, Georges Canguilhem, is thus extended and specified 
by a cosmotechnological dimension. By general organology, Stiegler means 
the complex assemblage of three organological levels: the level of psycho-
somatic or endosomatic organs of the psychological individual that form a 
psychic system; the level of artifactual or exosomatic organs of the technical 
individual that form a technical system; and social organs, organizations, 
and institutions of all kinds that form a social system. The central task of 
general organology is to conceptualize the intertwined formation processes 
of psychical, technical, and social individuals. It describes their reciprocal 
processes of adaptation and dedaptation that produce concrete appara-
tuses of individuation operative for a given time. General organology, in 
other words, examines the relationships between organic organs, technical 
organs, and social organizations.118 In What Makes Life Worth Living, 
Stiegler based this tripartite structure on the supposition of an essential 
“infidelity of the milieu,”119 which determines Canguilhem’s thinking of life 
as a whole. In this volume, he takes up this definition to serve as backdrop 
for clarifying the relationship between general organology and ecology. 
According to Canguilhem, life for the living being “is discussion or expla-
nation (what Goldstein calls Auseinandersetzung) with an environment 
where there are leaks, holes, escapes and unexpected resistances,” an 
engagement, precisely, with the infidelity of the milieu or environment 
that constitutes “its becoming, its history.”120 For Stiegler, technical life, in 
installing technical milieus, brings a whole new kind of infidelity into play. 
Life—and this is the point—is therefore no longer to be conceived of as 
organic life but as organological life. Organological life henceforth proceeds 
in jumps and draws on technological shocks that impose readjustments of 
the entire organological assemblage. It is always an “epokhal techno-
logical shock” (136) that interrupts a specific organological assemblage 
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and thereby demonstrates, time and again, the inescapable infidelity of the 
milieu. Decisively, these shocks constitute “a phase difference that cannot be 
transindividuated, that is, adopted, in the sense that it must be individuated 
both psychically and socially” (135). The technological shocks of infidelity 
that refuse psychological-collective transindividuation or adoption can 
only be dealt with by new conditions of fidelity that in turn can only be 
provided by a functioning organological assemblage. And it is they that 
force us to think and to continually reconstitute a certain reliability and 
fidelity of the milieu in the first place. This, we might say, is the organo-
logical structure of care, to whose elaboration Stiegler has devoted so much 
attention in recent years. Mere technological becoming must first of all be 
converted into a (desirable) future. According to Stiegler, any understanding 
of being, whose historicity Heidegger pointed out, hinges on the epokhal 
technological shocks from which it receives its particular epokhality. And 
it is here, precisely, that Stiegler provides a first broad definition of general 
ecology: it examines the infidelities of the milieu “inasmuch as it inscribes 
in the cosmos the perspective of a general organology” (132). This is of 
fundamental importance: general ecology extends general organology on 
the cosmological level. General ecology, in other words, is the cosmological 
supplement of general organology, it superimposes, we might say, on the 
tripartite, organological structure the questions of the biological and of the 
geographical, and above all the question of cosmic systems and processes, 
which pervade processes of psychical, technical, and social individuation 
in previously unimaginable ways. It is a general ecology insofar as “this 
‘generality’ is indicative of an attempt to respond to the generality (and to 
the planetary, and as such locally cosmic, globality) of the shock we are 
given to think” (136), and its generality perfectly corresponds to the gener-
ality of general organology as well as that of general economy, as Stiegler 
explicitly points out.
In the end, the general-ecological extension of organology simply obeys 
the technological condition. Its systematic site as indicated by Stiegler 
only makes sense against the historical background of the thermodynamic 
machine. For only since then has the organological assemblage had the 
cosmological reach and perspective that has been debated in recent years 
under the heading “Anthropocene.” That is why Stiegler, in the second 
stratum of his chapter, outlines the pharmacology of the thermodynamic 
machine. Stiegler conforms to the imaginary of the Anthropocene discourse, 
which betrays a certain fixation on the event of the Industrial Revolution 
and the age of combustion,121 insofar as he considers the introduction of 
the thermodynamic machine, along with automatization, to be not only the 
event of modern technology and the Ge-stell in Heidegger’s sense but even 
to be the trigger of a fundamental transformation of cosmology as such. 
Thanks to the thermodynamic machine, the question of entropy and negen-
tropy at the beginning of the nineteenth century became the central problem 
of everyday human life, of life in general, and finally “of the universe as 
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a whole, which once again becomes the kosmos insofar as it invites, hosts 
and in some way houses the negentropic, that is, the living, including noetic 
life, which we therefore call the neganthropological” (134). According to 
Stiegler, all thinking in terms of processes is in a sense only a consequence 
of the thermodynamic turn. Thus, while this cosmologic turn itself is 
implemented technologically, technics becomes a cosmic question thanks 
to this turn—and not earlier, even if the cosmic question of technics today 
goes far beyond any thermodynamic machinism and figures in far-reaching 
transformative inscriptions in the cosmos such as those implemented by 
nanophysics. At least in the epoch of technicity, in which we find ourselves 
since the emergence of thermodynamics, general organology itself, we 
might say, is thus inevitably always already a general ecology. Where 
Guattari spoke of a generalized ecology and the “three ecologies” of mind, 
society, and environment, Stiegler opts for a general-ecological revision of 
this structure in terms of three ecologies of mind, society, and technics that 
are traversed by cosmic processes.
Indeed, in the course of the general ecologization of thought, the 
cosmology of the moderns in particular has become problematic, to say the 
least. The movement of ecologization, as already suggested, is tied in with 
the history of the fascination with non-modernity that breaks out into the 
open here. But what exactly comes to the fore in this becoming-problematic 
of modern cosmology? Is there a contemporary experience of nature that 
contradicts the modern experience of nature and therefore compels us 
to undertake a far-reaching attempt at a reformulation that could be an 
essential moment of general ecology? What, in the first place, constitutes 
the modern experience of nature from which it would differ? By way of a 
reading of the famous phrase Alfred North Whitehead coined in his 1919 
Tanner Lectures on The Concept of Nature, “the bifurcation of nature” (a 
term that names everything Whitehead’s speculative project will ultimately 
oppose), Didier Debaise examines the origin of the modern conception of 
nature that, as Whitehead explains, assumes a division of nature into two 
heterogeneous modes of existence. While the dominant interpretations of 
Whitehead’s phrase consider it merely to be a particularly succinct formu-
lation of the criticism of Cartesian dualism that characterizes his oeuvre 
as a whole—a criticism above all of the dualism of bodies’ primary and 
secondary qualities, and in their wake of dualisms of thought and extension, 
mind and body, reality and appearance in which the bifurcation is said to 
consist—Debaise, by contrast, shows how the concept of bifurcation names 
the process of differentiation as such, which precedes dualistic ontology. 
Far from employing “bifurcation” and “dualism” more or less synony-
mously, Debaise argues, bifurcation in Whitehead names the process that 
produces the various dualisms, which in turn constitute both the modern 
split experience of nature and the monisms that seek to overcome it, in the 
first place and anew, time and time again. On Debaise’s reading, Whitehead 
calls bifurcation the very operation of division, an operation that he sees to 
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be incessantly operative thanks to the modern invention of nature. It is an 
operation that, and this is the point, transforms the immediate experience 
of nature, with which we always have to begin, into a specifically modern 
experience of nature in the first place. The modern invention of nature thus 
does not, as is often claimed, presuppose a specific ontological positing 
that it would then simply parse. Instead, it emerges from permanent “local 
operations of the qualification of bodies” (157), it presupposes “gestures, 
techniques, and operations of division” (157) that reformat immediate 
experience, which so to speak comes first.
The most important of these operations is the great modern abstraction 
that a given piece of matter can only occupy one space–time location. 
Debaise explicates the three premises of modern cosmology that result from 
the bifurcation. The ontology of the moderns, from this vantage point, 
turns out to be an explanation or rationalization of an operation of division 
permanently applied to immediate experience: “Starting with immediate 
experience, bifurcation operates by splitting such experience into two 
regimes of existence” (156), the regimes of real nature and of phenomenal 
nature and of everything that follows from them. It is thus no longer an 
ontological but an operative understanding of the modern conception of 
nature from which Whitehead’s empiricist method ultimately derives—a 
method, Debaise tells us, concerned with a fundamental transfiguration 
of the experience of nature, with subrogating immediate experience once 
more. Finally, Debaise sketches Whitehead’s “alternative thinking of 
nature.” It conceives of nature as an event, more precisely as the “event of 
all events,” as “evental mode of existence” that knows of only “a single 
plane of nature … a single surface without dualism and without differen-
tiation from the outset” (161). “The event takes the place of dualisms and 
separations,” (165) as he also writes, and Whitehead’s statement, “Nature 
is that which we observe in perception through the senses” (161), may serve 
as a neocosmological leitmotiv.
Against this background, we may now propose a more precise statement: 
while general ecology undoes the stitches that have held ecology and nature 
together, it does not imply a rejection or deletion of nature. One possible 
sense of speaking about non-natural ecology or ecology without nature lies 
in assuming an alternative thought of nature that is no longer based on the 
modern operation of division or its monistic overcoming. But can what 
Debaise calls “immediate experience” really serve as the starting point of 
such an alternative conceptualization? It would be necessary to insert an 
additional plateau that asks what “immediate experience of nature” could 
mean. For if the modern experience of nature, for its part, features media-
technological reasons on which even its operation of division (i.e. all of 
the ontological-epistemological gestures of its instauration) is based—if, in 
other words, it relies on symbolic-technological mobilizations of various 
kinds, as Jason Moore insists in his work on the “Capitalocene”—what 
does this mean for the immediate experience brought to bear here? Is this 
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experience indeed unmediated and without cause? Or are there not precise 
media-technological reasons for the decay of the bifurcation of nature and 
for the resurgence of the immediate, so remarkable today in evocations 
of undivided perception and of affect? Such reasons would include, for 
example, twenty-first-century media technologies operating in the micro-
temporal domain, what I have called the media and technology of the third 
cybernetics, which, precisely, drive Environmentalization. The possible 
presuppositions of the appeal to alternative cosmological conceptualiza-
tions must be examined, whereas leaving their technicity and mediality out 
of consideration usually indicates hidden fascinations.
Although general ecologization rests on a certain bracketing of nature, 
the question concerning the elementary-material foundations and problems 
of the contemporary technological condition is by no means settled. Quite 
the contrary. But it is now a matter of how this question, which is actually 
a very pressing question, can be taken up and reframed today, after 
nature. Where once we found nature—where nature once occupied, not to 
say obscured the question concerning the elementary and the material—
we now find, almost as a counter-concept, the earth. How the earth is 
conceptualized in light of the general-ecological effort, or what a general-
ecological conception of this earth might look like, thus takes on decisive 
importance.122 Neyrat’s cosmotechnological reflections are partly situated 
on this very challenging terrain, and Jussi Parikka, too, seeks to engage with 
a fundamentally important complex of problems whose concrete material 
details can be very unsettling indeed. Parikka’s contribution puts a general 
ecology of twenty-first-century technological culture into perspective: it 
examines the “ecological materiality of technology” (169) in terms of a 
neomaterialist critique of media and technology. What is at stake in this 
endeavor is the discovery of a new “nomos of the earth” (Carl Schmitt) 
in which the political core moments of the present and the future might 
contract. The intention of the endeavor is the fundamental critique of the 
“anthrobscene,”123 and Parikka’s very fitting introduction of the obscene 
into the (overall rather dissembling) concept of the Anthropocene expresses 
an ethical qualification of the scientific-judicial-entrepreneurial-govern-
mental exploitation complex on which contemporary digital media- and 
techno-culture in particular is based.124
Parikka takes up Lewis Mumford’s astute emphasis on the essential 
significance of mining for the Industrial Revolution and the techno-capitalist 
evolution125 and speaks of an “‘undergound turn’ in modern technology” 
(170). Now, under the conditions of digital media technologies and despite 
never-ending invocations of these technologies’ alleged immateriality, this 
evolution has reached a preliminary apex (today’s computer chips contain 
more than sixty different chemical elements). It is only coherent, then, for 
Parikka to sketch a media geology of the anthrobscene: conceived of as 
a “media ecology of the non-organic” (177), it narrates the history and 
political economy of materials, metals, chemistry, and trash as the basis of 
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contemporary media technologies in particular, which he situates on the 
“continuum of the biological-technological-geological” (177). To this end, 
he takes Siegfried Zielinski’s archeological concept of the “deep time of 
the media” back to the original geological sense of deep time in order “to 
emphasize the materiality of media as part of Earth durations and Earth 
excavations” (170).126
A political geology of the media, as we might call it, that further 
amplifies the political-economic aspects of Parikka’s geological take on 
media ecology, marks an essential moment of general ecology. It might take 
up, for example, the “law of Cheap Nature”127 articulated in Jason Moore’s 
critique of the Capitalocene. In his great investigation of the “capitalist 
world-ecology,” Moore very succinctly shows that capitalism is centrally 
also a specific way of organizing nature. Capitalism is thus not only based 
on exploiting abstract social labor but also on appropriating abstract 
social nature, which necessarily supplements the accumulation of capital 
through commodified labor. In Moore’s analysis, the value relationship 
that capitalism implements is a bundled relationship of human and extra-
human natures. In his law of Cheap Nature, Moore distinguishes between 
“Four Cheaps,” namely “food, labor-power, energy, and raw materials.” 
He writes:
Capital must not only ceaselessly accumulate and revolutionize 
commodity production, it must ceaselessly search for, and find ways to 
produce, Cheap Natures: a rising stream of low-cost food, labor-power, 
energy, and raw materials to the factory gates (or office doors or…). 
These are the Four Cheaps. The law of value in capitalism is a law of 
Cheap Nature.128
Qualitatively, Cheap Nature allows “technologies and new kinds of nature 
to transform extant structures of capital accumulation and world power.”129 
Every great wave of accumulation comes with the discovery of a new kind 
of Cheap Nature. The appropriation of Cheap Nature is a creative act, as 
it were, based on broad symbolic-technological and scientific mobiliza-
tions, which Moore for his part describes in the case of the long sixteenth 
and the long nineteenth centuries. A political geology of media is a central 
component of an investigation—as yet lacking—into the current phase of 
capitalist world-ecology.
As I remarked at the very beginning of this introduction, the immunity 
paradigm problematically inscribes itself in ecological thought, which often 
moves in proximity to immunopolitical dogmatisms. All these forces seek 
to contain the unparalleled power of ecological thought to deterritorialize 
central elements of (at least) modernity’s fundamental position. What 
stance does general ecology assume vis-à-vis these attempts at restriction? 
Is the basic immunopolitical operation—the ceaseless reiteration of the 
distinction between self and not-self and thus the execution of an ontology 
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of the self and a restricted economy of one’s own—always a threat to 
general-ecological thought? And would this threat persist even if such 
thought took the form of an attempt at sublating the fatal dialectic of 
immunization into an affirmation of life as such that (phantasmatically) 
dedifferentiates the living, such as we find it in the affirmative biocentrism 
of a number of ecologisms?130 To answer the question of the relationship 
between general ecology and the immunity paradigm, a question with 
important implications for the politics of theory, Bruce Clarke’s contri-
bution examines a very surprising scene in the history of knowledge: the 
conceptualization of planetary immunity in the Gaia discourse of the 1970s 
and 1980s demonstrates how general ecology in one of its primal scenes 
emerges precisely thanks to and as a radical deconstruction of the tradi-
tional immunity paradigm. General ecology is thus to be seen as a new way 
of thinking decisively influenced by neocybernetics, a thinking that ecolo-
gizes immunological thought as such. In so doing, it unhinges the core of 
the modern immunity paradigm, the old ontology of the self, and launches a 
fundamental revision of immunology by introducing the general ecological 
principle of symbiosis, which will end up rejecting the traditional immunity 
paradigm and produce an entirely different concept of immunity. Clarke 
thus succeeds in unearthing an archeological key moment in the ecologi-
zation of thought, whose conceptual significance cannot be overstated.
More precisely, Clarke takes us right into the heart of the “systems 
counterculture” of the 1970s and 1980s, of which he is the preeminent 
archivist.131 The journal CoEvolution Quarterly, along with Whole Earth 
Catalog which it succeeded, and William Irwin Thompson’s Lindisfarne 
Association, which regularly brought together leading proponents of 
neocybernetics under the banner of a “Planetary Culture and the New 
Image of Man,” are key sites both of the generalization of ecology and 
of the ecologization of thought, movements that can be traced directly 
from these sites to the present.132 It is within this framework that the 
thoroughly cybernetic reconceptualization of the biosphere—fixated on 
control at first, autopoiesis—takes place, thanks to the Gaia discourse of 
atmospheric chemist James Lovelock and biologist Lynn Margulis. This 
reconceptualization is to be a constitutive component of the new, no longer 
industrial but ecological way of thinking that Thompson sees emerging as 
the great challenge of the present. At the same time, it is in just this context 
that Franciso Varela and Mark Anspach undertake their revolutionary 
ecological reconceptualization of immunology. The previous military model 
of the immune system as a defense mechanism is to be abandoned in favor 
of a Gaia perspective: “Let us transpose the metaphor of immunobiology, 
and suggest that the body is like Earth, a textured environment for diverse 
and highly interactive populations of individuals.”133 Varela and Anspach 
rethink the immunological paradigm in the direction of what they call 
a “reenactment of Gaia inside the body,” as “a microcosmic version of 
Gaia.”134 This is the core of their metaphorological operation. They do not 
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start with an already constituted biological individual constantly engaged in 
a defensive struggle but from coevolutionary somatic processes of individu-
ation that take place in autonomous immuno-networks. Along with the 
clearly cybernetic framing of the Gaia discourse itself, their insistence, time 
and again, that immunological thought is tasked with repeating the shift 
in the cognitive sciences from (digital) computers to a distributive network 
perspective is yet another indication of the extent to which the ecologi-
zation of thought is prompted by the technological condition.
Yet the scene depicted by Clarke, which combines immunology and the 
Gaia discourse within the perspective of a planetary immunity as a central 
moment of general ecology, fully reveals its virulence in today’s estab-
lishment of a radical symbiotic perspective, a process in which symbiosis 
moves from being a marginal to being an omnipresent phenomenon, and 
becomes, we might say with only slight exaggeration, one of the central 
general-ecological relations.135 While the movement back from individuals 
to processes of individuation, which Varela and Anspach call for in a strange 
echo of Gilbert Simondon, probably already finds its most radical expression 
in Margulis’s symbiogenesis theory, in which new forms of life emerge from 
the incorporation or colonization of one or more organisms into or by 
others,136 it is not until today’s science of symbiosis that the ecologization 
of both immunology and biology is completed, as Clarke persuasively 
shows. As we read in a key text of symbiotic thought by Gilbert, Sapp, and 
Tauber, quoted by Clarke: “All classical conceptions of individuality are 
called into question by evidence of all-pervading symbiosis.”137 Symbiosis 
here becomes an “ecological principle” that supports the general-ecological 
transformation. In the end, this important strand of general ecologi-
zation will even go beyond its neocybernetic inscriptions, as indicated by 
Clarke, and lead us to think not in terms of autopoiesis, but in terms of 
“sym-poiesis,” as Donna Haraway has suggested.138
Cary Wolfe, too, addresses the possible immunopolitical implications of 
the ecological paradigm. The first part of his observations perspectivizes 
a general ecologization of the biopolitical paradigm in order to escape 
all forms of vitalism, which has dominated large swaths of the recipro-
cally contaminating biopolitical and ecological domains of thought. In the 
second part of his paper, Wolfe turns to bioart. For it is bioart, precisely, 
that, in the kind of self-observation of society that according to Niklas 
Luhmann is possible (only) through art and very much in keeping with the 
devitalizing ecologization of the biopolitical paradigm, renders visible the 
socially regulative and stabilizing contingencies with which society struc-
tures the question of “life.”
Wolfe begins with a magisterial reconstruction of the two great strands of 
biopolitical thought still dominant today: on the one hand, thanatopolitical 
thought from Foucault to Derrida and Agamben, which is undoubtedly the 
most influential and the most intricate, but which ultimately cannot explain 
why a power that understands itself as precisely a power of life constantly 
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switches to a politics of death;139 on the other, the thinking of an affirmative 
biopolitics that Roberto Esposito has developed as an objection to the 
thanatopolitical fixation on, not to say reduction of, the biopolitical question. 
While life itself must become the subject of immunity protection to prevent 
the more or less automatic switch from biopolitics to a politics of death and 
autoimmune excesses—this is the core of Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics—
there is a high price to be paid, as Wolfe tells us: the price of a neovitalism that 
substantializes “life” in all its forms and reentangles us in the kind of biocen-
tristic dilemmas characteristic of the heyday of deep ecology in the 1970s and 
1980s. Wolfe counters with a demand for an ecologizing biopolitical thought 
that would take us beyond vitalism’s attempts at deriving ethical or political 
principles “from life,” an ecologization that would conform to a “denatu-
ralized understanding of the ecological paradigm that emphasizes form, time, 
and dynamic complexity” (218), and thereby renounce its own biopolitical 
entanglements. And in turn, it is this denaturalizing ecologism that, according 
to Wolfe, is to rid biopolitical thought of both its thanatopolitical fixation 
and all forms of vitalism; this is what, earlier in this introduction, I called, in 
reference to Luhmann, ecological rationality, whose genesis coincides with 
the cybernetic, system- and complexity-theoretical turn of thought, i.e. with 
the process of cyberneticization. Wolfe writes:
what the immunological paradigm of biopolitics and the ecological 
paradigm have in common is that, for both, it is not a question of a 
biological or ecological substrate but rather of thinking the forms and 
processes by which the system / environment relationship is stabilized 
and managed by systems that find themselves in an environment of 
exponentially greater complexity than they themselves possess. (218)
This kind of ecologism, freely adapting Gregory Bateson (who, incidentally, 
was a fellow of the Lindisfarne Association, as Clarke points out, which 
leads us back to systems counterculture), inquires no longer into substances 
but into patterns; it finally demands that we think clearly the relationships 
that exist between an organism and its environment; and it compels us to 
disclose what exactly we mean when we say things like “organism plus 
environment.”140
As for bioart, it is entirely in keeping with such a movement of ecolo-
gization accurately described by Wolfe that the living as the medium of 
bioart becomes the medium of a communication about the non-observa-
bility of “life” in general and as such. What bioart renders visible for the 
self-observation of society are the highly selective codes that are decisive 
for the way in which we today determine the relationship “between what 
we call ‘Life’ and its empirical instantiations in the domain of ‘the living’” 
(230).
Albeit on a historically and systematically different terrain from Clarke 
and Wolfe, David Wills too engages the immunopolitical problem of 
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ecology. He begins by articulating blood and soil as “the two poles of every 
anthropo-ecological impulse and enterprise” (237) and extends the scope of 
this problem all the way to the question of contagion and community. The 
question of the difference between restricted and general ecology that comes 
to the fore here, and that has far-reaching theory-political implications, 
troubles from the very outset the concept I introduced. Wills addresses it 
by going back to the concept’s original constellation in the theoretical and 
poetical works of Georges Bataille. To what extent does ecology repeat the 
difference between restricted and general economy, or to what extent is it 
already inscribed in this difference? For Wills, ecology is intricately linked 
to what Bataille calls the “restricted economy”141 of life—the economy 
of purposes, usefulness, production, and labor, an economy of life that 
“restricts itself to conservation, to circulation and self-reproduction as the 
reproduction of meaning,” as Derrida pointedly puts it.142 Indeed, on this 
reading, ecology is first of all the figuration of this restricted economy, as 
a kind of second oikos, as an ecology of proximity and an ecology of one’s 
own, or, in the most restricted economy, even as an ecology of home, blood, 
and soil. But ultimately, like the economy, it will find that an unstoppable 
movement of generalization catches up to it and realize that it is always 
already and inescapably confronted with a differential interruption and 
disruption of any and all interiority and immediacy, with a transgression of 
all ends and purposes. And while Wills himself in earlier writings described 
precisely this moment of interruption in Derridean terms as prosthetic 
and technological, this disruption now, in the case of ecology, appears to 
him as an “originary environmental rupture” (237) that his text seeks to 
demonstrate.143 But what exactly does that mean? What kind of rupture is 
it and what kind of general-ecological would appear in it? What would the 
originary environmental rupture imply for conceptualizing ecology? And 
does it not perhaps in the end reveal the dependence of general economy 
on ecology, such that the inscription is the inverse of what one may have 
thought at the beginning? Is it possible that, already in Bataille, the general-
ecological question traverses the problem of general economy, such that 
Bataille would have to be regarded as a pioneer of general ecology and as 
an ecological thinker in the strongest possible sense of the term?
Wills conceives of ecology in the original sense, which goes back to Ernst 
Haeckel, as a relationship between an organism and the outside world 
that surrounds it: “It is difficult to conceive of ecology without the idea of 
a relation between a living entity or organism and a more or less defined 
territory; indeed without the sense of an organicity of that relation, the 
living organism organically conforming to the territory in which it lives and 
moves” (237). This, Wills tells us, is one of the central preconditions of all 
ecology, namely “some idea of contiguity and contact” (242)—Haeckel 
already had spoken of a contact, a Berührung.144 The traditional conception 
of ecology—which becomes increasingly problematic in the age of general 
ecologization—without, for all that, being driven out once and for all—“will 
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always have to wrestle with principles of proximity that are determined in 
turn by notions of affect. We are concerned, in ecological terms, by what 
affects, touches (on) something near; on the organism’s organic conformity 
to, or harmony with its territory. Just as the first economics is home 
economics, so the first ecology is … constituted by the idea of the house” 
(242). And this is where Wills sees Bataille intervening: Bataille undertakes a 
“rewriting of contact or contiguity as contagion” that trips up any “egoeco-
logical economy.” Uncontrollable contagion is a key problem for (at least) 
the later Bataille, the thinker of intensive communication who excludes any 
possibility that beings could isolate themselves. In contagion, all autoaf-
fection switches to heteroaffection, indeed, autoaffection turns out to be the 
phantasma par excellence of restricted economology that, in Bataille’s wake, 
an entire line of thinkers from Derrida to Nancy will oppose. Heteroaffection 
is the differential rupture that always already destabilizes the allegedly intact 
and autoaffective closed circuit, shifts it and in all radicalness exposes it to 
the outside that was precisely supposed to remain outside, thereby, in its 
exteriority, introducing the “structure of prosthesis” (243). This differential 
rupture is what Wills calls “originary environmental rupture,” without 
which—this is the point of his rereading of Bataille—there is no thought of 
the ecological. In the end, the thought of the ecological will—qua irreducible 
prostheticity—always be technoecological: “There is no environment without 
that rupture of organicity, its rewriting as prostheticity” (244).
In Theory of Religion, which he propounded shortly before the publi-
cation of The Accursed Share at the Collège philosophique in 1948 and 
which has to be considered within the framework of his work on general 
economy as well, Bataille’s thinking already took a similar direction. 
Written against “the modern insistence that attaches to the individual 
and the individual’s isolation,”145 this theory of religion supposes the 
“immanence of an organism living in the world.” This immanence of the 
animal or the plant, however, is no longer a very strict one and appears 
already to be disrupted when compared to the absolute immanence of 
nitrogen or water molecules that exist “without needing anything from 
what surrounds them,”146 as Bataille explains:
The immanence of a living organism in the world is very different: an 
organism seeks elements around it (or outside it) which are immanent 
to it and with which it must establish (relatively stabilize) relations of 
immanence. Already it is no longer like water in water … the flow (the 
immanence) from outside to inside, from inside to outside, which is 
organic life, only lasts under certain conditions.147
There is already a first environmental rupture and differing here, even if, 
on Bataille’s reading, they are as yet insufficiently articulated. For Bataille, 
the final rupture with immanence only takes place thanks to the human 
being, namely through the “use of tools” that totally disrupt the continuity 
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of immanence and thereby introduce “exteriority”148 in the most rigorous 
sense: “In the first immanence,” we are now told, “no difference is possible 
before the positing of the manufactured tool.”149 Exteriority in the strict 
sense is technics. Against Bataille himself, transitions have to be described 
not as substantial but as gradual: what begins as environmental rupture 
ends in a prosthetic-technological rupture and the promise of an impossible 
immediacy and intimacy, which thereby become the subject of an entire 
history of fascination. If it is true, as Wills writes, that the rupture is the 
general and that it is the breaking open of the restricted economy as such 
that marks generality, not, as is often believed, the moments of expenditure 
and waste, then even my cursory reading of Bataille’s thinking of rupture 
shows that general economy is more likely to arise from general ecology 
than vice versa.150
James Burton, too, inquires into the difference between restricted and 
general ecology. He focuses on the problem of the general and of generali-
zation as such and examines what kind of generalization exactly might be 
at work in the general ecologization of thought, and what the origins, the 
stakes, but also the possible risks of this movement of generalization might 
be. His contribution is organized by a central observation: the generali-
zation developed by general ecologization, much of whose precise meaning 
remains yet to be uncovered (even beyond the possible links with Bataille’s 
thought of rupture, in whose proximity Burton’s analysis is at least 
implicitly situated), is at work in ecology as such from the outset, even in 
the most restricted of contexts: “The pursuit of environmental connections 
will always be expansive,” Burton tells us, “always a proto-generalizing 
tendency that moves any set of phenomena or system into relation with 
what is beyond the initial sphere of its observation or consideration” 
(263). And a couple of paragraphs later we read: “if we conceive a ‘general 
ecology,’ it will always necessarily engender a generalizing tendency that 
is already operative within ecological thinking and ecological systems” 
(264). While Whitehead, in his Adventures of Ideas of 1933, during the 
early stages, that is, of the ecologization of thought, distinguishes between 
two kinds of generalization characteristic of Western thought, namely the 
universalizing generalization of philosophy and the inductive generalization 
of the sciences (with the latter overcoming the former), Burton considers 
the generality that organizes ecological thought and already inherently 
converts this thought from restricted to general ecology to be situated 
right in between those two strands. If there is a historicity of generali-
zation, such an “ecological-general” might perhaps be the next step within 
its framework. Burton, in any case, calls it “associative” or “relational” 
generalization (263), which is characterized by an emphasis on relation-
ality and connectivity that constitutes the basic operation of ecology, as 
we have already seen with Neyrat. This means that the relational-general 
of ecology, a new form of the general or of generalization enters the scene 
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that will seize thought as such and will come to prevail in the course of the 
twentieth century.
The specificity of Burton’s approach is that he brings together, from the 
outset, the question of the general in ecology with the question of metafic-
tionality. While the term “metafiction” was coined by literary critics in 
the 1970s to name a self-conscious, auto-reflexive writing of fiction that 
highlights its own artifactuality and thereby recasts the difference between 
fiction and reality and ruins the representational paradigm, metafiction for 
Burton is no longer merely a specifically literary problem but an “aspect 
of (post)modern culture” (257) generally. Metafiction is inhabited by a 
tendency toward generalization of its own. In the transition from generic 
to general metafiction at issue here, Burton tells us, the emergence of 
metafictional texts directly expresses, acknowledges, and stages a much 
vaster movement that takes place during those same years: “the techno-
logical displacement of sense.”151 Metafictionality names the shift away 
from the categories of hermeneutics and representational thought, a shift 
that mirrors the technological displacement of sense. This is where it 
joins general-ecological thought, which is inscribed in the same historical-
epistemic turn. General ecological thought may indeed be the most 
radical implementation of the historic-epistemic turn of the technological 
displacement of sense. Yet Burton takes his approach of bringing together 
metafictionality and general ecology even further. Undeniably, general-
ecological thought bears the traits of generalized metafictionality: it is not 
representative, nor does its generality represent a general or universal idea, 
that of ecology. First and foremost, it is operative and productive, namely 
“productive of world(s), of ever more and newer relation among things, 
and of ever more ‘things’ emerging from the growth of relations” (266). 
Burton even speaks of “ecological productivity” (267). In precisely this 
fundamental productivity of ecology, the moment of a “general poiesis” 
(278, footnote 47) comes to the fore, which also enjoins us to think (meta)
fictionalization in a generalized way as worldmaking. The “generalized idea 
of metafiction” (269) characterizes our age and pervades the movement of 
ecologization so important to this age.
The wider political horizon of Burton’s approach becomes apparent—and 
Burton here picks up directly on Neyrat’s reflections in this volume—when 
it comes to the choice of the “kinds of worlds we want” (270). The 
problem is readily apparent when Burton emphasizes that even capitalism’s 
imposition of the cybernetic hypothesis in the shape of hyperconnectivity 
and total networking elaborates “its own general-ecological modes” (270), 
which above I described under the heading Environmentality: bringing 
metafictionality and general ecologization together allows us to see that 
the issue is always also one of choice and thus one of a “strategic gener-
alization of ecology” (270) as a task of thinking. It might be useful here 
further to differentiate the question of “worldmaking”—e.g. in the sense of 
Tim Ingold’s distinction between the two fundamentally different modes of 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   37 11/01/2017   14:28
38 GENERAL ECOLOGY
making and worldmaking, a distinction that is at the core of the peculiar 
general-ecological move of his anthropology of life (Ingold himself speaks 
of a “new” rather than a general ecology) and is based on the difference 
between a “building perspective” and a “dwelling perspective.”152 It would 
then not be the “constructive” mode, which, despite the possible multipli-
cation, even explosion, of relations it operates misapprehends the status 
of relationality as such and thus appropriates it, but only the “co-optive” 
mode of making, which imputes an originary relational constitution of 
being and follows the paths of being involved in the world, in which we 
would have to recognize a “worlding” that we can want, as a becoming-
world of the world.153
Elena Esposito conceptualizes the aim of general ecology from the 
perspective of the theory of social systems. For her, the work of general-
izing the concept of ecology might start with the becoming-problematic of 
the environment as such, for the environment now far exceeds the kind of 
simple mode of givenness the traditional thinking of adaptation took it to 
be.154 “Ecology deals with the environment,” she writes, “but here we look 
to a generalization and abstraction of the concept that have been emerging 
more recently (since the 1950s) … We speak of a sharper problematization 
of the idea of environment—not as a ‘given’, to which an organism or system 
must adapt, but as a multifaceted and flexible reference, which changes by 
the way it is observed and with the perspective of the observer” (285). As its 
mode of givenness changes, the environment loses whatever simplicity had 
been imputed to it. Instead, it now appears, in complete agreement with the 
current situation, as a complex manifold of intertwined and supplementary 
environments. Today, as Esposito emphasizes, there are natural, social, and 
psychological environments as well as environments of machines, environ-
ments made up of machines, and media environments. While it is true that 
work on a cybernetic ecology, which takes the becoming-problematic of the 
environment resulting from its twentieth-century exposition into account 
and pursues a rethinking of environmentality in terms of control, has well 
been underway since the Macy Conferences (1946–53),155 the question 
remains as to the exact reasons for which this conceptual attitude, so 
powerful in ecological reflection, continues to be pushed in the direction of 
a general ecology: “What has changed since the Macy Conferences? Why 
do we feel the need to expand the approach to a ‘general ecology’?” (287) 
For Esposito, the reasons for the change in the environment’s mode of 
givenness, which necessitates a redescription, are obvious. They are found 
in computerization. Technological developments from the Web 2.0 via the 
semantic web and the social network explosion to the Internet of Things 
and ambient intelligence, which brings in a new kind of artificial intelligence 
that no longer seeks to imitate human intelligence, indicate that we have 
entered the new phase of an originary environmentality: “All are develop-
ments that call into question the simple distinction between the computer 
and its environment and between machine and user” (287). Above all, it 
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is the simple feedback loop, which has operationalized the environment as 
a problem of control since the 1950s, that just does not suffice any more 
when it comes to giving an account of the explosion of environmental 
complexity that takes place under the technological condition. If the basic 
problem of all ecology is the definition and observation of the distinction 
between system and environment in all its forms—as Esposito puts it, in 
accordance with an entire system-theoretical descriptive tradition, which in 
turn is already a conceptual reaction to a certain exposition and radicali-
zation of environmentality in the twentieth century—the question that 
guides the contemporary generalization of the ecological becomes: “How 
can the ecological approach account for this complexity and produce a 
correspondingly complex concept of environment?” (288)
To outline the problem of environmentality [Umweltlichkeit], general 
ecology—and this, according to Esposito, is its key moment—no longer 
begins with one side of the difference system / environment, and especially 
no longer with the side of the system, as has hitherto been the case. It 
begins with “the distinction itself.” General ecology precisely reflects “the 
difference system / environment and its transformations, with all their 
consequences,” (289) Esposito writes. Whereas recent conceptual opera-
tions, faced with the explosion of environmental complexity, have taken to 
questioning or even simply abandoning the difference system / environment 
in favor of concepts like dispositif, socio-technical apparatuses, or hybrids, 
the task of general ecology as Esposito sees it lies, on the contrary, in 
radicalizing this difference: “I propose instead to make the opposite choice: 
don’t blur the distinction, but radicalize it, sharpen it, so you can use it even 
in circular and reflective configurations” (289).156
From this point of view, environmentality under the technological 
condition, such as we witness it today in the form of intelligent environ-
ments, for example, is first and foremost a question of complex circular 
configurations in which entities are simultaneously subjects and objects, 
simultaneously inside and outside without for all that necessarily implying 
any kind of hybridity. According to Esposito’s thesis, only extending the 
established cybernetic-systems-theoretical approach in the direction of 
an investigation of social systems and their forms can do justice to the 
technological transformation of environmentality. For not only are inter-
laced environments characteristic of social systems theory from the outset; 
“in the approach of social systems theory, individuals (psychic systems or 
consciousness) each have their own environment that also includes society, 
but are themselves in the environment of society” (290). Environmentality 
here takes the form of the so-called problem of double contingency and 
communication, in which communication is thought of as completely 
independent of human communication and meaning and conceived of 
as an operation of the social system that comes to terms with double 
contingency (which, according to Parsons, is characteristic of the basic 
social situation). But web-based forms of intelligence, Esposito argues, 
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significantly transform the traditional problem of communication: from the 
Web 2.0 via the Internet of Things to ambient intelligence, we find a “virtual 
contingency” establishing itself on the part of machines, a contingency that 
“‘feeds’ on user contributions and actively exploits them to increase its 
own complexity—and also the efficiency of communication” (294). Because 
machines, no matter how complex, do not know uncertainty but are always 
determinate, they derive contingency from their users alone. This exploi-
tation of contingency, as we might call it, is paradigmatically obvious in 
the case of Google, and it results in a new kind of communication that, 
more than ever and in keeping with the good old tradition of cybernetics, 
demands to control and to manage the limits of systems. In the end, this 
will have immediate repercussions for a conception of general-ecological 
thought, whose difficult heritage from the history of control is very much 
on display when it is thematized by systems theory, for example when we 
read: “Complexity increases, but because differences increase, not because 
they are erased. The ecological issue becomes increasingly central—not as 
an opening to the environment, but as an understanding and management 
of differences” (296).
Timothy Morton undertakes to expose what he calls ecology’s 
“spectrality.” To think ecologically means opening oneself to ontological 
haunting and thinking an ontology of haunting, an “hauntology”157 even, 
as the core of a veritable “materialism of the encounter.”158 In earlier works 
that made him one of the pioneers of a new ecological image of thought, 
Morton already inquired into the kinds of collectives that appear when we 
dare think “ecology without Nature,” i.e. an ecology without a capitalized 
Nature that marks and always remains on the outside, that is the big 
Outside, a Nature in which “ecologocentrism” encloses and colonializes 
all encounters with an irreducible alterity, any radical coexistence with 
nonhuman beings. What, on the contrary, would a “properly materialist 
ecology” growing out of denaturalized collectives look like?159 At first (and 
in close proximity to Derrida), Morton in his definition of an ecological 
materialism gives pride of place to the figure of the “strange stranger,” the 
absolutely other who must be granted unconditional hospitality, but he 
limits himself in principle to living entities. Not until his more recent specu-
lative-realist work that foregrounds so-called hyperobjects does Morton 
open up the problem; he radicalizes the stakes of ecological materialism and 
resituates the question prior not just to the difference human / nonhuman 
but also prior to the differences real / unreal, sentient / non-sentient, and, 
especially, living / non-living—let’s say, prior to the cluster of correlation-
alist differences.160
In the present chapter, Morton extends his call for an ecological materi-
alism of the encounter toward an “ecocommunism,” a “communism of 
humans and nonhumans alike” (303), which, in his view, can only be founded 
on a radically de-anthropocized thought of Being-together. He asks to what 
image of thought this disarmament of correlationalist convictions manifest 
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in the bracketed differences might correspond. He begins by describing the 
essential spectrality of the ecological that becomes visible in the collapse of 
the anthropocentric regime of differences. He is concerned with uncovering 
the inescapable spectrality of ecological entities that all ecological thinking 
must take into account. Morton’s work on the ecological-spectral culminates 
in the concept of haunting, which he turns into a key concept of ecological 
thought. “To encounter an ecological entity,” he writes, “is to be haunted 
… [H]aunting is a very precise term for what happens in ecological thought” 
(304). Ecological thought turns out to be hauntologically constituted, as a 
matter of an ontology marked by the logic of haunting, and hauntology 
itself at its core turns out to always already be an ecohauntology. And it is 
just this difficult ecohauntological structure that the text seeks to explicate. 
Morton starts with a short phenomenology of ennui in the vein of what he 
calls “the Baudelaire Moment” of modernity, the moment when the arts 
begin to work on questions of spectrality:
Ennui … is the correct ecological attunement … With ennui I find myself 
surrounded, and indeed penetrated, by entities that I can’t shake off 
… Isn’t this just the quintessence of ecological awareness, namely the 
abject feeling that I am surrounded and penetrated by other entities such 
as stomach bacteria, parasites, mitochondria—not to mention other 
humans, lemurs and sea foam? (306)
Ennui here serves as another name for being enveloped, surrounded by 
things. And, as the “abject feeling” of a generalized symbiogenetic consti-
tution intimates, Morton ends with the spectrality of the sciences: “Science 
does not do away with ghosts. Rather, it multiplies them. As the human-
nonhuman boundary and the life-nonlife boundary collapse, more and 
more specters emerge” (309). Finally, the long history of the Anthropocene 
turns out to be the history of an increasing spectralization, which renders 
the ecologocentric denial of the inescapable spectrality of Being ever 
more impossible and makes the deconstruction of ecologocentrism the 
task of thinking today. In the ecologization of thought, which takes the 
essential spectrality of the ecological encounter into account, “thought is 
confronted with its anthropocentrism” (318). And according to Morton, 
the ecologization of thought is probably the radical consequence of just this 
anthropocenic movement of history:
When thinking becomes ecological, the beings it encounters cannot be 
established in advance as living or non-living, sentient or non-sentient, 
real or epiphenomenal. What we encounter instead are spectral beings 
whose ontological status is uncertain precisely to the extent that we 
know them in detail as never before. And our experience of these spectral 
beings is itself spectral, just like ennui. (309)
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Even if Marx, as Derrida has shown, sees spectrality to be at work at the 
very base of the capitalist constitution, capitalism, according to Morton, 
is not spectral enough (319). It insulates, as it were, the spectrality of 
ecological being, of what Jason Moore, whose work was already mentioned 
above, calls, more harmlessly, the “web of life”; it reorganizes the manifold 
of relationships in a highly reductionist way; it “implies a substance 
ontology that sharply divides what things are, considered to be ‘normal’ 
or ‘natural’ fixed essences (extensional lumps without qualities), from how 
things appear, defanging the spectral and ‘demystifying’ the thing, stripping 
it of qualities and erasing its data, resulting in nice blank sheets or empty 
hard drives” (319). Nor will communism or Marxism, at least insofar as 
it repeats this metaphysics, be able to imagine an ecological future. That 
is why it will have to be spectralized in the sense of a real materialism of 
encounter.
At the beginning of this introduction, I pointed out that the entry into 
the technological condition and the revaluation of the difference between 
nature and technology that comes with it unsettle teleological rationality 
and Western teleology generally. Tightly bound up with the emergence of 
a fundamental purposelessness and with the ruining of the means–purpose 
relation generally by a technology it no longer manages to schematize, the 
profound problematization, rejection, or reconceptualization of finality 
we have since been witnessing constitutes one of the central challenges 
faced by general ecologization coming to the fore in this new phase of 
technicity. Félix Guattari’s “generalized ecology,” whose overall goal lies 
in an ecological reformulation of modes of subjectivation and valuation, 
draws on a deep intuition of just this non-teleological turn, which we have 
to discuss with respect to a dimension so far underestimated: the dimension 
of value. This intuition contracts into a concept when Guattari adds an 
“ecology of the virtual” to the three “ecologies of the visible world,” the 
ecologies of mind, society, and environment. The ecology of the virtual 
raises the question of values beyond the traditional teleological fixations 
that always already presuppose purposes and goals that are given or to be 
given. The task of this virtual ecology, whose absolute urgency Guattari 
emphasizes, is “to reforge axes of value, the fundamental finalities of 
human relations and productive activity,”161 for the one-dimensionality 
and the predominance of the principle of general equivalence of capitalist 
subjectivity has completely disoriented values. In this sense, generalized 
ecology “will tend to create new systems of valorisation.”162 Guattari in this 
context also speaks of an “incorporeal ecosystem … giving meaning and 
value to determinate existential Territories.”163 What is crucial here is that 
its “being is not guaranteed from the outside,” it is not transcendentally 
given and warranted, but instead it “lives in symbiosis with the alterity it 
itself contributes to engendering.”164 What is at issue, in other words, is a 
fundamental modification of the way values are given—more than that, at 
issue is the end of their being given at all. The reorientation of values called 
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for here cannot simply put new values in the place of the old; it must, first 
of all, fundamentally reorient what value means. Only that may count as 
a new basis of thought in terms of values on a par with our situation in 
the history of sense. And here lies the full, usually overlooked challenge 
of Guattari’s reflections on an ecology of the virtual: they challenge us to 
elaborate a non-teleological conceptualization of value in which value is no 
longer some kind of transcendental given but an immanent heterogenetic 
entity.
It is this kind of far-reaching reflection on a general-ecological thought in 
terms of values, which, where it is to be found in Guattari, remains largely 
implicit, that Brian Massumi incisively picks up on: “To understand what 
his revalued ‘ecology of the virtual’ might be, the very concept of value will 
have to be reforged, beyond the normal compass” (346). What might such 
a reconceptualized non-teleological theory of value look like as an essential 
component of a general ecology? Key aspects of the general-ecological reval-
uation of value itself, such as Massumi undertakes to accomplish, include 
articulating the concept of value outside the capitalist framework of general 
equivalence and without reference to transcendence, norms, or universals, 
and instead combining it with a becoming, a constitutively multiple 
singular and qualitative, with what is potential, an immanent beyond, an 
immanently self-transcending experience, an excess of what appears that 
cannot be absorbed, a “moreness” of the world, with invention, with, 
finally, a surplus value of life that is not the same as capitalist surplus value. 
Massumi sketches the outlines of such a complex, immanence-philosophical 
“ecology of values,” as he explicitly calls it, by going back to two theorists 
of value that both stand for the non-teleological awakening in the twentieth 
century, Alfred North Whitehead and Raymond Ruyer. Massumi gives 
a careful reading of their impressive, non-dogmatic, axiological work. 
“Value,” he concludes, “does not inhabit some pure moral domain. It is 
active in the world, alive with appetition and self-transformation” (356).
Matthew Fuller and Olga Goriunova sketch the basic traits of a general-
ecological thought of devastation. Not the least of the achievements of their 
approach is that it accounts for the historical condition of the possibility 
of an ecology of values and recharts the terrain on which it takes place. 
The motivation for speaking in the Nietzschean tradition of a “power of 
devastation” rather than of “destruction” lies above all in its background 
in the history of sense: in the exodus from the dialectics of the negative and 
of contradiction and in the transition to an affirmation of difference or to 
difference as affirmation that Deleuze and Nancy, each from his perspective, 
have analyzed as the event of our history.165 General ecology, for its part, 
seems to be inscribed in this broad and difficult revaluation, which quashes 
“the well-known complementarities between affirmation and negation, 
life and death, creation and destruction”166 and instead conceives of a 
“nothing beyond nihilism” and begins to “snatch the existing from final 
annihilation” in order to, ultimately, “expose it to the eternal nothing or, 
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more exactly, to the nothing as eternity”167—to a sense without sense, goal, 
or purpose, which, it bears repeating, arises from the technological end 
of Western teleology. Following Fuller and Goriunova, it is precisely with 
and as the problem of devastation that general ecology affirms itself in all 
radicalness as the crystallization of just this revaluation and suspension: 
“Devastation in general ecology does not imply that there is an end to 
becoming or a negation of affirmation, but that there is a change to virtual 
becoming. Devastation seizes, eliminates or radically changes the conditions 
of other becomings” (325). Devastation is no longer immediately a kind 
of nihilating and annihilating in the sense of putting an end to something, 
as a thinking of destruction would have it. Given that “the conditions 
of the actual are grounded in the virtual, which is a differential infinitely 
saturated with change,” as they write in reference to Deleuze, conditions 
in which the virtual is real but not yet actualized while simultaneously also 
being affected by the actual, “devastation is a kind of ontological flexure 
on the process of actualization and change” (325). And this, precisely, is of 
central importance; it raises a tremendous question whose impact we have 
yet to grasp. For from this perspective, “devastation can generate novelty 
and complexity outside diversity.” Devastation, in other words, becomes 
productive:
Complex devastational forms include the dynamic behaviours of 
new auto-immune diseases, harmful molecule compounds, cancerous 
growths, radiation, accumulations of carbon dioxide, which do not 
eliminate complexity and wholeness in favour of randomness or a flat 
lack of differentiation, but radically redistribute the shares of potenti-
ality, shape planes of activity and tangle with, impersonate and swallow 
other processes of change. The active growth of devastation is not the 
individually unthinkable scope of the death of the individual or the 
overwhelming absences of pure nothingness, it is something to the side 
of such things, being devastatingly vital, active and productive. (325)
Fuller and Goriunova replace a static-mechanistic ontology that underpins 
the historically tenacious thinking of destruction and its fixation on 
negativity with a processual “ecology of non-linearity” (324) that underpins 
the thinking of devastation. The larger historical-ontological change that 
manifests itself here undoubtedly arises from the shift from a world of 
simple machines to the world of complex machinic assemblages under the 
technological condition as well.168
Conspicuously, devastation ultimately, and in keeping with a kind of 
active nihilism that clearly stands out here, turns out to be a highly active 
form of production: “Devastation does not simply amount to the existence 
of destructive qualities themselves or destruction per se. Devastation 
relates to changes in the conditions of becoming and can be of a form of 
very active production” (326). As general ecology of devastation, general 
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ecology comes very close to a strangely devastating productivism, which, of 
course, remains to be examined as to its urgency for a diagnostic reading of 
the present, its origins, and its difficult complicities. How exactly, we have 
to ask, does devastating production differ from the creative destruction 
Schumpeter conceives of as a core moment of the capitalist machine?169 Is 
there a distinction between an active and a passive form of production, and 
would this distinction find its radical exposition in, precisely, the general 
ecology of devastation? And what paths do the transitions from a limited 
to a general productivism, which might run along just this difference, take? 
(I am thinking of the transition discussed by Deleuze and Guattari, which 
they eventually capture in the concept of becoming, but one might equally 
cite the transition inscribed in Bataille’s distinction between restricted and 
general economy, or in Serres’ parasitological conception of an initial, 
albeit unexpected, improbable, and rare production.)170 Is it this turn, 
which we find to pervade the second half of the twentieth century at the 
latest, that general ecology will in the end have to account for? Is it in this 
turn, and precisely in the immense question of devastation, that general 
ecology reveals its generality?
Fuller and Goriunova call for an “ethico-aesthetic vocabulary for devas-
tation” (324–5) capable of doing justice to the entire scale of devastating 
production, to a “propulsive unfolding of things, for which we have no 
available ethico-aesthetic figures” (327). They give some indications and 
hint at the richness of the problem: they discuss, for example, the devasta-
tions of oil, paradigmatic of the entire problem, but also “the commons of 
devastation” (330), as they put it, from the Great Pacific Garbage Patch 
in the North Pacific Gyre to devastated areas like Bhopal or Chernobyl, 
and the bodily devastation of obesity. All these cases demonstrate that, 
whatever else it might be, the thought of the Anthropocene will have 
to be a thought of devastation, from catastrophic all the way to slow, 
imperceptible, cumulative, variable, familiar devastation. They also raise 
the question of the political aspect of devastation and ask, picking up on 
Eyal Weizman’s forensic project, how devastation can be witnessed and 
negotiated in the first place, what the media of devastation are, and what 
an epistemology might look like that acknowledges the non-linear causality 
of devastation rather than ignoring or obscuring it, as is usually the case. 
And by bringing in Catherine Malabou’s conception of the “destructive 
plasticity”171 of cerebral afflictions, they bring devastations of subjectivity 
into the purview of the fundamental problems of general ecology. Work on 
the ethico-aesthetic vocabulary for devastation as outlined by Fuller and 
Goriunova must continue. It is a significant project, one which demon-
strates, perhaps like no other, the incredibly problematic nature of the space 
of general ecology.
Berlin, January 3, 2016
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thinking, as calculating thinking, does not precede the technological, as 
Mersch claims, following the long logocentric tradition according to which 
technology as merely applied science is first of all mathematics, nothing but 
the material implementation and incarnation of a pre-existing mathematical 
mode of thought. Such a perspective ultimately misreads the historicity 
of mathematics, as displayed for example in the contemporary and thus 
technologically conditioned transition from a deductive to an inductive logic 
of computation and in the leaving behind of the axiomatic with the entry 
into what is a virulently algorithmic era. The discussion of a dominance 
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of the mathematical corresponds at its heart to Heidegger’s antimodernist 
conceptualization of modernity, from which we evidently cannot escape. 
This figure is a central component and one of the driving forces in the 
history of fascination with non-modernity. Inspecting the elements of a 
historical fascination involved in the anti-mathematical fervor clearly does 
not mean an uncritical commitment to mathematization.
42 The important question of the degree to which the complexity-theoretical 
understanding of relationality already conceptualized in the context of the 
Anthropocene corresponds to the revaluation of relationality in general 
ecology—and the degree to which its mathematical nature might obstruct 
this revaluation—would require an extensive investigation, which cannot 
be undertaken here. In particular, this would need to include a detailed 
reading of Edgar Morin’s “écologie généralisée (oikos),” which he developed 
in La Vie de la Vie (1980), the second volume of his six-volume work, La 
Methode. This is something I will be undertaking elsewhere.
43 Serge Moscovici, Essai sur l’histoire humaine de la nature (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1968), esp. 95–110. What is at stake in the historicity of states 
of nature as described by Moscovici is not just the historicity of concepts 
of nature. On the historical semantics of the concept of nature, see Niklas 
Luhmann, “Über Natur,” in Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik, vol. 4 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999).
44 Moscovici, Essai, 76, 39–40.
45 James Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic 
Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1986).
46 Beniger, Control Revolution, vi.
47 Heidegger was already quite aware of this. He speaks of the “the cybernetic 
way of thinking” which consists in “calculat[ing] everything, which is, as 
a steered process” and in considering everything that resists such planning 
and control to be “a disturbing factor.” See Martin Heidegger, “On the 
Question Concerning the Determination of the Matter for Thinking,” 
trans. Richard Capobianco and Marie Göbel, Epoché 14 (2) (Spring 2010): 
216. Cybernetic thinking in terms of control is the apex of “orderability 
[Bestellbarkeit],” which constitutes “the last phase in the history of the 
transformation of presence” (218). If one follows Jason Moore, it is in 
this manner that the capitalist organization of nature since its beginning in 
the long sixteenth century with the mobilizations of symbolic technologies 
that grounded it, implemented a paradigm of regulation, comprising a 
long-lasting enforcement of the ideal of control. See Jason W. Moore, 
“The Capitalocene. Part II: Abstract Social Nature and the Limits to 
Capital,” published online at http://www.jasonwmoore.com/uploads/The_
Capitalocene_Part_II_June_2014.pdf (accessed January 28, 2016).
48 Beniger, Control Revolution, 6.
49 Cf. Mark B. N. Hansen, “System-Environment Hybrids,” in Emergence 
and Embodiment: New Essays on Second-Order Systems Theory, ed. Bruce 
Clarke and Mark B. N. Hansen (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). 
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In a series of highly innovative and inspiring papers Hansen has elaborated 
what he calls “our originary environmental condition” that “has been 
brought into the open and made accessible through recent developments in 
technical distribution, which is also to say, in the technical infrastructure 
of environment.” See Mark B. N. Hansen, “Engineering Pre-individual 
Potentiality: Technics, Transindividuation, and 21st-Century Media,” 
SubStance 129 (41) (2012): 32–59, at 33. This work culminates in Mark B. 
N. Hansen, Feed-Forward: On the Future of Twenty-First-Century Media 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
50 Philip E. Agree, in 1994, positioned the “capture model” against the 
“surveillance model” and elaborated on capture as a fundamental 
concept of Environmentality. See “Surveillance and Capture: Two Modes 
of Privacy,” in The New Media Reader, ed. Nick Montfort and Noah 
Wardrip-Fruin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). See also Till A. 
Heilmann, “Datenarbeit im ‘Capture’-Kapitalismus. Zur Ausweitung der 
Verwertungszone im Zeitalter informatischer Überwachung,” Zeitschrift 
für Medienwissenschaft 13 (2015): 35–47. Economist Shoshana Zuboff has 
christened the new hypercybernetic market form that is based on the global 
architecture of computer mediation and that implements “a new logic of 
accumulation,” “surveillance capitalism.” According to her this new logic 
of accumulation is predicated on commoditized behavior modification, in 
other words: on the exploitation of behavior that has become possible due 
to the hyperscale extraction and analysis of data turning small data into 
big data. Means of production turn into means of behavioral modification. 
See Shoshana Zuboff “Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects 
of an Information Civilization,” Journal of Information Technology 30 
(2015): 75–89. For the algorithmic basis of environmentality see Antoinette 
Rouvroy “The end(s) of critique. Data behaviourism versus due process,” in 
Privacy, Due process and the Computational Turn. The Philosophy of Law 
Meets the Philosophy of Technology, ed. Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de 
Vries (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013): 143–67.
51 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 376.
52 Luciana Parisi and Erich Hörl, “Was heißt Medienästhetik? Ein 
Gespräch über algorithmische Ästhetik, automatisches Denken 
und die postkybernetische Logik der Komputation,” Zeitschrift für 
Medienwissenschaft 8 (2013): 39.
53 Lovelock and Margulis’s conceptualization of the Gaia hypothesis in the 
1970s marks the beginning of what we might call the metacybernetic 
imagination of the world as a control entity. But while the Gaia hypothesis 
as such is marked all the way down by second-order cybernetics and is even 
closely related to the formation of its basic concepts, such as autopoiesis, as 
Bruce Clarke has shown in a number of great articles, the metacybernetic 
concept of the technosphere corresponds to our environmental control 
culture. See the chapter by Bruce Clarke in this volume, as well as Earth, 
Life, and System: Evolution on a Gaian Planet, ed. Bruce Clarke (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2015).
54 Following Simondon, three stages or levels of technicity may be 
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distinguished: element (instruments, tools), individual (machines), ensemble 
(networks of machines). Haff’s geologically inclined autonomization thesis, 
which introduces a fourth level of technicity with the technosphere, directly 
follows Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control 
as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). The 
autonomy of technics was already central to Jacques Ellul’s La technique ou 
l’enjeu du siècle (Paris: A. Colin, 1954), which dedicates a whole chapter to 
just this problem.
55 Peter K. Haff, “Humans and Technology in the Anthropocene: Six Rules,” 
The Anthropocene Review 1 (2) (August 2014): 2.
56 Peter K. Haff, “Technology as a Geological Phenomenon: Implications 
for Human Well-Being,” in A Stratigraphical Basis for the Anthropocene, 
ed. C. N. Waters, J. A. Zalasiewicz, M. Williams, M. A. Ellis, and A. M. 
Snelling (London: Geological Society, 2014), 301–2.
57 On this point, cf. my “Other Beginnings of Participative Sense Culture.”
58 Cf. Gilbert Simondon, L’Invention dans les techniques: Cours et 
conférences, ed. Jean-Yves Chateau (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 86–101.
59 Haff, “Technology as a Geological Phenomenon,” 302; cf. 306.
60 Haff, “Humans and Technology in the Anthropocene,” 7.
61 Ibid. The genesis of the technosphere is to be read together with what 
Timothy Morton calls a “quake in being” in the last stage of the evolution 
of technical objects, i.e. hyperobjects. Hyperobjects are real entities whose 
primordial reality—“massively distributed in time and space relative to 
humans” (1)—radically withdraws from the human being, and whose 
emergence entails the necessity of a new style of thinking and a non-modern 
conception of the thing in particular. See Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: 
Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013).
62 Alf Hornborg has critically discussed the modern fetishization of 
technology, which culminates in faith in its autonomy, against the 
background of Wallerstein’s world systems theory, as a forgetting of the 
unequal exchange relations which form the basis of all of modern technics. 
He postulates a global “ecological theory of the unequal exchange” as 
a critique of the modern fetishizing of technology. See “Technology as 
Fetish: Marx, Latour and the Cultural Foundations of Capitalism,” Theory, 
Culture and Society, 31 (4) (July 2014): 119–40.
63 The concept of the Technocene has been proposed by Alf Hornborg among 
others. See Alf Hornborg, “The Political Ecology of the Technocene. 
Uncovering Ecologically Unequal Exchange in the World-system,” in The 
Anthropocene and the Global Environment Crisis: Rethinking Modernity 
in a New Epoch, ed. Clive Hamilton, François Gemenne, and Christophe 
Bonneuil (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 57–69.
64 Hans Blumenberg, “Lebenswelt und Technisierung unter Aspekten der 
Phänomenologie,” 1963, in Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 1981) 7–54.
65 This is why the question of media and technology marks the boundary 
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of phenomenology and can only ever be post-phenomenological, if and 
where it comes under the purview of phenomenology at all. On Husserl’s 
politics of sense, see my “Die technologische Sinnverschiebung,” in Medien 
denken, ed. Jiri Bistricky, Lorenz Engell, and Katerina Krtilova (Bielefeld: 
Transcript, 2010). On the question of the technical in transcendental 
phenomenology, see Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 2: Disorientation, 
trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), as well as 
Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, 
trans. John P. Leavey (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). On 
the project of post-phenomenology, see Mark B. N. Hansen, “Ubiquitous 
Sensation: Toward an Atmospheric, Collective, and Microtemporal Model 
of Media,” in Throughout: Art and Culture Emerging with Ubiquitous 
Computing, ed. Ulrik Ekman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).
66 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 129–67.
67 Jean-Luc Nancy, A Finite Thinking, ed. Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 25–6 [translation modified].
68 See the detailed exposition in my article “The Artificial Intelligence of 
Sense,” 11–24. Technology, undoubtedly, is the great agent and motor of 
the movement of the history of sense. Nancy already views the distinction 
between sense and technics from the other side of the caesura. From this 
point of view, the advent of sense already takes place through technics: 
the epoch of signifying sense and of endowing with meaning is the age 
of the subject whose labor and employment of tools and, later, simple 
machines mark its sovereignty in the sphere of technical culture and cultural 
technique. And its end, the unworking [Entwerkung] of signifying sense 
takes place through a proliferating machinism that points to the becoming 
of another kind of technicity. Transitioning from technical objects to 
assemblages and, finally, to the technosphere, this new technicity also 
implies a new kind of subjectivity that no longer endows with meaning 
and is no longer essentially non-technical. It is thus possible to distinguish 
between a pre-technological and technological culture of sense. Only a 
technological culture of sense fully acknowledges the genesis and validity 
of technicity, which has always had to make way for sense. While here, 
too, the difference between sense and technics still plays a decisive role, it 
is nonetheless dominated no longer by the side of sense but by the side of 
technics.
69 This also marks the boundary of the celebration of a purely symbolic 
world—a world that conceives of itself as already beyond meaning and 
claims to be, if not a thinking of machines and a machinism, then at least 
conceived in terms of machines, more precisely, cybernetic or computing 
machines, as is the case in Jacques Lacan or, even more so, in Friedrich 
Kittler. This celebration has undoubtedly accompanied the twilight of the 
traditional culture of sense, but it has not been able to stay on par with the 
next formation. The positing of a purely symbolic world as a world of the 
machine, the conception of everything machinic from the historical apex 
of a strict mathematical symbolism and formalism that manifests itself in 
the computer and can be implemented directly in the real thanks to the 
computer, still belongs to the rearguard action of the culture of meaning. In 
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its obvious fixation on the primacy of the signifier, it is even one of the most 
famous and therefore perhaps one of the most radical figures of the end 
of this culture—a kind of afterglow of the past culture of sense’s fixation 
on language. See Friedrich A. Kittler, “The World of the Symbolic—A 
World of the Machine,” trans. Stefanie Harris, in Literature, Media, 
Information Systems: Essays, ed. John Johnston (Amsterdam: GB Arts 
International, 1997). In Die heiligen Kanäle: Über die archaische Illusion 
der Kommunikation (Zurich: Diaphanes, 2005), I describe the historicity 
of this configuration in the history of sense, even if this earlier book is 
itself still a little fascinated by the purely symbolic. Lacan and Kittler 
develop their ideas in the wake of Heidegger’s interpretation of computers 
and cybernetics from out of the spirit of a technological reformatting of 
language into information. According to Heidegger this formatting, in turn, 
is conceived of by a longstanding metaphysical interpretation of the essence 
of language as “giving signs” (rather than an originary “showing” and 
“letting appear”), which constitutes “its exposed surface [Angriffsfläche] 
and possibility.” Heidegger famously opposes the total technologization of 
language, the “attack of technical language on what is authentic in language 
[das Eigentliche der Sprache]” and the “threat to the ownmost essence of 
the human being” it entails, with a different interpretation of language. 
Even if his hermeneutics of the world of technology operates on the extreme 
limits of the traditional culture of meaning and thinks a transition from 
out of it, it still remains within its framework. See Martin Heidegger, 
Überlieferte Sprache und technische Sprache, ed. Hermann Heidegger (St. 
Gallen: Erker Verlag, 1962), 23, 25.
70 Cf. for example Félix Guattari, “Escaping from Language,” in The Machinic 
Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis, trans. Taylor Adkins (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2007). This originary focus is owed to Guattari’s clinical 
practice in La Borde, which brought home to him the great multiplicity 
of non-linguistic assemblages of enunciation practically on a daily basis. 
Precisely this therapeutic experience formed an inexhaustible source of an 
unparalleled care for subjectivity which over time took on an ever more 
far-reaching set of political-diagnostic features. In the end Guattari came to 
understand the rearrangement of linguistic and non-linguistic assemblages 
of enunciation as the key moment in a therapeutic politics of subjectivity 
which, precisely because it was the offspring of his therapeutic experience, 
underpinned his ecosophical critiques of capitalism, media and technology. 
See Félix Guattari, De Leros à La Borde (Fécamp: Lignes, 2012).
71 Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, trans. Paul 
Bains and Julian Pefanis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 9. 
Under the heading “machines of subjectivation,” Guattari is explicitly 
concerned with discovering the “crucial” “non-human pre-personal part 
of subjectivity,” with discovering nonhuman machines contributing to 
the production of subjectivity such as “the large-scale social machines of 
language and the mass media” (ibid.).
72 Ibid., 91. Guattari’s repeated insistence, already found throughout 
Anti-Oedipus, that “[w]e need to free ourselves from a solitary reference 
to technological machines and expand the concept of machine so as to 
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situate the machine’s adjacence to incorporeal Universes of reference” (31), 
does not contradict my reading here—quite the contrary. The concept 
of a technological culture of sense shows a way out of a purely technical 
conception and thinking of the machine that has become outmoded and 
redundant and instead brings out the consequences of a technicity that 
exceeds technical objects or, rather, objectivity as such. In other words, the 
expansion of the traditional concept of the machine in Guattari’s machinism 
radically conceptualizes the technological displacement of sense towards a 
technoecological sense culture.
73 Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, 60, 92. The big question, of course, is 
whether there is a non-logocentric thinking of writing that could contribute 
to a hermeneia of the technological culture of sense. Following Deleuze and 
Guattari Lazzarato seems to reject all thinking of writing as an expression 
of the signifier’s imperialism. Bernard Stiegler’s pharmacological thinking of 
grammaticization, which leads to a general organology, undertakes to do 
just that. But does not Stiegler in turn come up against the limitations of 
the thinking of writing, for example where the affective is concerned, which 
he does not analyze convincingly but rather couches in terms of a Freudian 
doctrine of drives (even if, drawing on Herbert Marcuse and Donald 
Winnicott, he does elaborate this doctrine in the direction of a (techno)
ecology of desire)? See my essay, “Prosthesis of Desire: On Bernard Stiegler’s 
New Critique of Projection,” Parrhesia 20 (2014): 2–14.
74 I would like to emphasize that Guattari in no way seeks to dispute the 
relevance of language as such; what he is concerned with is questioning its 
universality and its privileged status in determining modes of semiotization 
and assemblages of enunciation.
75 Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, 93.
76 Ibid., 60; Lazzarato quotes Guattari, Machinic Unconscious, 73.
77 Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, 72.
78 Cf. Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, 39.
79 See Félix Guattari, “The New Aesthetic Paradigm,” Chaosmosis, 98–118.
80 Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, 66.
81 Félix Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies, trans. Andrew Goffey (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 137, 2.
82 Guattari, Cartographies, 11; for a more detailed description of the (media-)
technological conditions of this transformation, see ibid., 11–12.
83 Guattari, Cartographies, 11.
84 Cf. Angela Melitopoulos and Maurizio Lazzarato, “Machinic Animism,” 
in Félix Guattari in the Age of Semiocapitalism, ed. Gary Genosko 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). Let me note that this is the 
point at which Guattari is haunted by a fascination with non-modernity, 
a fascination that has become significant for contemporary thinking 
as a whole and, not least importantly, has left its mark in the general 
ecologization of thinking. Thus we read, for example: “And now it is 
Capital that is starting to shatter into animist and machinic polyvocity. 
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Would it not be a fabulous reversal if the old aboriginal African 
subjectivities pre-Columbus became the ultimate recourse for the subjective 
reappropriation of machinic self-reference? These same Negroes, these same 
Indians, the same Oceanians many of whose ancestors chose death rather 
than submission to the ideals of power, slavery and the exchangism of 
Christianity and then capitalism?” (Guattari, Cartographies, 15). Guattari’s 
historical conception of assemblages of enunciation is undoubtedly one 
of the sources of the current fascination with non-modernity. Yet there 
is another reading that suggests itself, namely that it is less about exiting 
modernity—which is essentially multilayered, despite what the anti- or 
non-moderns would have us believe—than it is about exiting the regime 
of the general equivalent, which for him, as we will see, constituted the 
decisive vanishing point of the movement of ecologization.
85 Félix Guattari, “Capital as the Integral of Power Formations,” in Soft 
Subversions: Texts and Interviews 1977–1985, trans. Chet Wiener and 
Emily Wittman (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 244. Picking up on 
Guattari’s semiotization of the concept of capital, “Bifo” has outlined 
a theory of “semiocapitalism”; cf. Franco Berardi, “Schizo-Economy,” 
SubStance 36 (112) (2007): 76–85; Berardi, The Soul at Work: From 
Alienation to Autonomy (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009); Gary Genosko, 
“Guattari’s Contributions to the Theory of Semiocapitalism,” in The 
Guattari Effect, ed. Eric Alliez and Andrew Goffey (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2011); Gary Genosko, ed., Félix Guattari in the Age of 
Semiocapitalism, Deleuze Studies 6.2 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2012).
86 The question of the general equivalent returns repeatedly in Guattari. 
Capital, Being, energy, information, the signifier—all these he considers to 
be general equivalents and expressions of one and the same ethico-politcal 
option. They envelop, desingularize, close processes; cf., for example, 
Guattari, Chaosmosis, 109, 46.
87 Like the machinocentric world that follows it, capitalization in Guattari 
takes on a certain technical and medial form, from letterpress printing (and 
thus the regression of orality) via the steam engine to the manipulation of 
time by chronometric machines that erode natural rhythms and techniques 
of economic semiotization (money as credit); cf. Guattari, Cartographies, 
9–10. The entire first half of “The New Aesthetic Paradigm” is a bold 
sketch of the history of modes of semiotization summarized here in terms 
of a history of three types of assemblages: territorialized assemblages, 
deterritorialized capitalist assemblages, and finally processual assemblages.
88 Cf. Guattari, “Capital as the Integral of Power Formations,” 244. A 
historical and systematic explication of the question of capital, modes 
of symbolization, and general equivalence within the framework of a 
theoretical numismatics can be found in Jean-Joseph Goux, Symbolic 
Economies: After Marx and Freud, trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990).
89 Ibid., 255.
90 Ibid., 252.
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91 Ibid., 254.
92 Ibid., 262. In A Thousand Plateaus, 456–8, Deleuze and Guattari 
schematize this grafting against the background of the difference between 
“machinic enslavement” and “social subjection.” Accordingly, the “third 
age”—the age of “cybernetic and informational machines” that follows the 
archaic enslavement in the time of the megamachine analyzed by Mumford 
and social subjection in the time of technical machines—not only restores 
a general regime of machinic enslavement of the kind originally associated 
with archaic imperial constructs but integrates it with social subjection 
taken to the extreme in the form of contemporary subjectivity.
93 Félix Guattari and Eric Alliez, “Capitalist Systems, Structures and 
Processes,” in Soft Subversions (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 273.
94 This view is already presented in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 240–62.
95 Guattari himself assumed the coexistence of several capitalisms under the 
technological condition:
 Automatized and computerized production no longer draws its 
consistency from a basic human factor, but from a machinic phylum 
that traverses, bypasses, disperses, miniaturizes, and co-opts all human 
activities.
  These transformations do not imply that the new capitalism completely 
takes the place of the old one. There is rather coexistence, stratification, 
and hierarchalization of capitalisms at different levels, which involve:
  On the one hand, traditional segmentary capitalisms, territorialized 
onto Nation-States, and deriving their unity from a monetary and 
financial mode of semiotization.
  And on the other hand, a World-Wide Integrated Capitalism, that no 
longer rests on the sole mode of semiotization of financial and monetary 
Capital, but more fundamentally, on a whole-set of techno-scientific, 
macrosocial and microsocial, and mass media procedures of subjection. 
(“Capital as the Integral of Power Formations,” 249–50)
 The principles of general equivalency and “general translatability” (257) are 
the core of capital’s semiotic operations.
96 Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, 84–5.
97 Félix Guattari, “The Place of the Signifier in the Institution,” in The 
Guattari-Reader, ed. Gary Genosko (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 151.
98 Félix Guattari, The Anti-Oedipus Papers, ed. Stéphane Nadaud (Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006), 225.
99 Félix Guattari, “Qu’est-ce que l’écosophie?”
100 On the epistemic and medial history of the concept “ecosystem,” see Sharon 
E. Kingsland, The Evolution of American Ecology 1890–2000 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 206–31. George Evelyn Hutchinson, 
a pioneer of research on ecosystems and one of Donna Haraway’s teachers, 
participated in the Macy Conferences. Cf. also Bruce Clarke, “Mediations 
of Gaia,” in Neocybernetics and Narrative.
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101 Guattari, “The Ecosophic Project,” Chaosmosis, 119–35, here 124.
102 Ibid., 124–5.
103 Ibid., 126.
104 Ibid., 127.
105 Félix Guattari, “On Machines,” trans. Vivian Constantinopoulos, Journal of 
Philosophy and the Visual Arts 6 (1995): 8.
106 Ibid., 9, emphasis Guattari; compare Guattari, “Machinic Heterogenesis,” 
Chaosmosis, 33–57, at 38.
107 Guattari, “On Machines,” 9, original emphasis.
108 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 177.
109 See her work on the becoming-algorithmic of design in Contagious 
Architecture: Computation, Aesthetics, and Space (Cambridge, MA and 
London: MIT Press, 2013).
110 On the epistemic and media history of the primacy of symbolic machines, 
see Hörl, Die heiligen Kanäle, English translation forthcoming 2018.
111 Brian Massumi’s scattered studies on Environmentality have now been 
collected in the volume, Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of 
Perception (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015). “Ontopower” succeeds 
“biopower.”
112 See Parisi, Contagious Architecture.
113 As early as the 1970s, Barry Commoner, in his The Closing Circle: 
Nature, Man and Technology (New York: Knopf, 1971) articulated one of 
his four laws of ecology as follows: “Everything is connected to everything 
else.”
114 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 12.
115 Frédéric Neyrat, Le communisme existentiel de Jean-Luc Nancy (Fécamp: 
Lignes, 2013), 12.
116 Ibid., 55.
117 This criticism of Neyrat’s thus goes in the same direction as Mark B. N. 
Hansen’s criticism of the widespread conceptualizations of the contemporary 
technosphere that are fixated on hybridity: “To my mind, some conception 
of closure, however provisional and non-autopoietic it may turn out to be, 
is absolutely necessary to introduce differentiation into the undifferentiated 
flows of the contemporary technosphere” (“System-Environment Hybrids,” 
116). In her contribution to this volume, Elena Esposito, too, calls for 
sharpening, not blurring distinctions. For the question of the gap, spacing, 
and the original exposition to the outside see Jacques Derrida, On 
Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizarry (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005).
118 Cf. esp. Bernard Stiegler, “Allgemeine Organologie und positive 
Pharmakologie,” in Die technologische Bedingung: Beiträge zur 
Beschreibung der technischen Welt, ed. Erich Hörl (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 
2011), 110–46.
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Digital Rubbish: A Natural History of Electronics (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2011).
127 Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life, 53.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 See Esposito, “The Paradigm of Immunization,” 45–77; compare 
Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life, trans. Zakiya Hanafi 
(Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2011). Even though modernity does not 
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in the present volume. See Bruce Clarke, “Neocybernetics of Gaia: The 
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133 Francisco Varela and Mark Anspach, “Immu-Knowledge: The Process 
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Becoming, ed. William Irwin Thompson (Hudson: Lindisfarne Press, 1991), 
69.
134 Ibid., 81, 69.
135 On this point, see the discussion of the history of relationality in the first 
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136 On the question of symbiogenesis and the paradigm shift it triggered in 
evolutionary theory, see esp. Bruce Clarke, ed., Earth, Life, and System: 
Evolution and Ecology on a Gaian Planet (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2015).
137 Scott F. Gilbert, Jan Sapp, and Alfred I. Tauber, “A Symbiotic View 
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definitions of the individual equally. Compare Erich Hörl, “‘Technisches 
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138 Haraway, “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulhucene,” 260.
139 Compare Roberto Esposito, “The Enigma of Biopolitics,” in Bios: 
Biopolitics and Philosophy, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis and 
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trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Verso, 1988).
142 Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism 
without Reserve,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: 
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Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
144 Cf. Ernst Haeckel, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, Bd. 2: 
Allgemeine Entwickelungsgeschichte der Organismen (Berlin: Reimer, 1866), 
286.
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of life” all the way to Vernadsky’s conception of the biosphere, and the 
pervasive cosmoecological moments and backgrounds of general economy 
such as they culminate in “L’économie à la mesure de l’univers” (1946) all 
already suggest this archeology of general economy.
151 See Hörl, “The Technological Condition.”
152 Tim Ingold, “Building, Dwelling, Living: How Animals and People Make 
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160 Hyperobjects are objects that do not lend themselves to any 
phenomenological experience and instead envelop us, “things that are 
massively distributed in time and space relative to humans,” they are 
“‘hyper’ in relation to some other entity, whether they are directly 
manufactured by humans or not” (Morton, Hyperobjects, 1). On the figure 
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CHAPTER TWO
Computational logic and 
ecological rationality
Luciana Parisi
The computational turn in architectural design has led to a new conception 
of nature, for which the idea of man-made structures has been surpassed by 
an investment in materially driven ecologies. Computational design is now 
concerned with the intelligence of materials, their capacity (or potentiality) 
to self-organize by changing over time. This attention to a bottom up order 
of becoming aims at “empowering matter in contemporary design”1 and 
cannot be understood in isolation from a naturalization of logic, in which 
computation constitutes the ground of in-distinction between technology 
and matter.
Historically speaking, the development of computational design is 
associated with the epistemological paradigms of second-order cybernetics 
and interactive computation.2 The last ten years have been characterized 
by a radicalization of the principles of biophysical self-organization 
involving a design thinking, which brings together evolutionary biology and 
non-standard geometry (or topology).3 The use of digital modeling inspired 
by the Universal Turing Machine involved the manipulation of symbols 
to test results and deduce proofs for possible structures. In contrast, this 
neo-materialist approach, I would suggest, relies on inductive methods of 
reasoning, where data from the biophysical world is algorithmically reacti-
vated to evolve spatio-temporal structures, which are, as it were, empirically 
derived from matter. This chapter argues that this naturalization of compu-
tation is an important instance of the ecological view of power.
Following Brian Massumi’s diagnostic analysis of governance in terms 
of environmental order, this chapter discusses the advance of an ecological 
form of rationality (the naturalized logic of affective power), which 
feeds off its media-technological condition. The turn to computation in 
design is already part of an ecological rationality of governance defined 
by the technocapitalization of the indeterminate behavior of materials. 
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The increasing investment in biotechnology, nanotechnology, information 
technology and cognitive science points to a shift towards a dynamic rather 
than mechanical instrumentalization of nature. I use ecological rationality 
to describe the modus operandi of a logic no longer relying on deductive 
reason. Far from simply imitating the physical properties of matter, this 
rationality invests in their indeterminacy to generate conditions of affective 
governance. I suggest that computational materialism in design is the 
manifest image of a technocapitalist culture turning the mechanization 
of deductive reasoning into a dynamic logic of computation whose rules 
are established by the indeterminate potentialities of physical, biological, 
chemical behaviors and their complex interactions.
However, I propose that this shift implies at least two overlapping 
tendencies. On the one hand, environmental governance points to the end of 
a deductive model of rationality surpassed by an inductive—or as Massumi 
says an “affective” mode of governance (from the model of cognitive 
mapping to the activities of pre-emptive power). On the other hand, this 
technological form of governance involves the reduction of media to a 
meta-computational apparatus of data, algorithms, and programs, defining 
media as information systems.4 Beneath these overlapping levels, however, 
this chapter argues, there is another, as yet unexplored consequence that 
concerns the transformation of computational logic and of a mode of 
reasoning involved in algorithmic processing. In what follows, I will draw 
on Alfred North Whitehead’s notion of the speculative or metaphysical 
function of reason to argue that computational logic could instead pose a 
challenge to the totality of ecological rationality.5
This is an attempt to unpack the rupture between computational reason 
and ecological rationality. My argument about the semi-autonomy of 
computational reason (as part and parcel of a generic function of reason) 
derives from a concern with the cogent reality of data architecture and its 
algorithmic processing, which I argue can hardly be explained in terms 
of what is affectively lived, perceived, and thought. I suggest that the 
critique of ecological rationality embedded in the techno-computational 
strata cannot only be explained in terms of the affective response reflecting 
another naturalization of the artificial. If computational design exposes the 
naturalization of both computation and technomediatic governance, it also 
allows us to explore the historical configurations of computational logic 
within the larger scope of a speculative or metaphysical function of reason 
embedded in the actuality of algorithmic thinking.
The tendency towards the digitalization of nature is not new in design 
and can be traced back to the use of mathematical formulae and solutions 
in planning.6 However, with the computational turn in design, the use of 
formulae has been replaced by the processing power of algorithms, their 
performative elaboration of data exceeding the a priori of axiomatic 
principles. The computational function of algorithms shows us that the 
deductive logic of truth and a priori axioms is unable to account for—and 
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to predict—contingent or external factors. The increasing use of large data 
volumes and distributive interactive systems in design has not only pointed 
to the limits of deductive logic (the general includes the particular) but also 
diffused the use of inductive methods of heuristic thinking (starting from 
the particular and proceeding by trial and error to arrive at the general) 
in which the realm of physical contingencies and not of mathematical 
formulae are said to be central to computation. If we read this shift to 
physicalism in computation as a symptom of a new logic of power, then it 
becomes evident that, as Massumi clearly argues, the chain of contingencies 
becomes the driving force for decision-making actions. Inductive reasoning 
is then complicit with the naturalization of computation and the emergence 
of an ecological rationality modeled upon the premise of indeterminacy. 
In particular, as evidenced in computational design, the indeterminacy of 
matter (and materials) to generate spatiotemporal forms has resulted in yet 
another idealization of physical structures, patterns, and complex behaviors.
While I suggest that inductive reasoning is central to a notion of compu-
tational nature, I also argue that ecological rationality can (and must) be 
questioned. The computation of matter’s indeterminacy could be read as 
the advance of power’s affective intelligence, whose actions, instead of being 
deduced from truths, are induced from the behavioral patterns of matter 
directly. This new level of equivalence between affect and reason reveals 
the paradoxical condition in which the technocapitalization of matter has 
led computational logic to become one with the physical indeterminacy of 
nature. This chapter is an attempt at unpacking this seamlessly paradoxical 
condition by arguing that the deductive limits of computation can rather be 
understood in terms of a transformation of the function of computational 
reason. I will discuss the computational mode of reason in terms of what 
Whitehead calls “non-sensuous” or “conceptual prehension” in so far as 
the algorithmic elaboration of data, I argue, partakes of a speculative, 
generic or metaphysical function of reason that moves through but cannot 
be contained by the biophysical layers of stratification central to ecological 
rationality. This chapter suggests that algorithmic processing is a form 
of reason that operates or becomes performative of a data environment 
through a prehensive synthesis, which mirrors neither the laws of physical 
nature nor the realm of mathematical order.7 In particular, the function 
of rule-based processing will be discussed in terms of a speculative reason 
that complicates the model of both deductive and inductive processing 
of truths, and disentangles naturalized computation from an algorithmic 
mode of thought. My attempt at halving the unity of computational reason 
and naturalized technocapitalism is also an effort to re-address the notion 
of reason in terms of a generic speculative schema—constituted by rules, 
axioms, procedures—that are neither simply imparted nor proven by 
the world. Instead, as debates about the limits of the deductive model of 
computation in information theory suggest, rules can be bent and postu-
lates can be revised, both according to contingencies occurring in data 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   77 11/01/2017   14:28
78 GENERAL ECOLOGY
processing, but also because computational processing stretches beyond 
given facts or data. In the history of information science, it is well known 
that the question of the incomputable (random or infinite strings of data) 
came to challenge the dominance of deductive axiomatic truths defining the 
universal function of finite rules according to a mechanistic view of nature. 
In the age of the algorithm, however, incomputables are no longer excep-
tions falling outside the remit of computational logic. On the contrary, 
the latter has surpassed its own deductive limits, and, contrary to today’s 
claims, it cannot be explained in the biophysical terms of the material 
world. Instead, and this is my argument, computational reason needs to be 
investigated according to its internal pragmatism, its own generic performa-
tivity (or even evolution) of data through which hypotheses are generated, 
and initial premises are revised. If computational reason could be defined in 
terms of its own dynamics, it would be approached in terms of a productive 
instrumentalization of reason not simply espousing the project of capitalist 
rationality (both formal and ecological). This productive instrumentali-
zation instead involves an engagement with the historical transformation 
of automated logic coinciding with the effort to theorize a generic model 
of artificial reason, defined by the formation of non-matching forms of 
intelligence—i.e. forms that cannot be naturalized into one univocal being.
This chapter suggests that divorcing computational logic from the 
technocapitalist naturalization of computation is a fundamental step for a 
speculative or metaphysical theorization of reason, that is, a generic archi-
tecture of reason that has infinite varieties of data environments and modes 
of abstraction. Computation, I would argue, is only one mode and the 
transformation of the logic of computation importantly reveals algorithmic 
actuality and its automated reason. This also means that computation 
needs to be disentangled from a totalizing notion of reason that ignores 
the artificiality of abstraction (or computation as a mode of abstraction) 
and its concrete structures of thinking. But how to engage with this mode 
of abstraction, which is accused of quantitatively reducing thought to a set 
of procedures without potentiality, chance and imagination? One way to 
do so may be to attempt to articulate a generic or speculative function of 
reason through a materialist approach that could explain the relation—and 
not the equivalence—between biophysical constraints and the artificiality 
of abstraction.
The final section of this chapter (“Speculative reason”) draws on Alfred 
North Whitehead’s brief excursus on the centrality of reason in the history 
of civilization, which is useful for our reconceptualization of computation 
because it explains that the function of reason involves the abstraction 
of causes from the physical chain of things. This involves counteracting 
the continuous process of causes and effects with a concrete abstraction 
of thinking. But why is a notion of speculative reason so important for 
counteracting the ecological rationality of technocapitalism today? Does 
it help us to move away from a totalizing technocapitalist naturalization 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   78 11/01/2017   14:28
 COMPUTATIONAL LOGIC AND ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY 79
of computation in which information is said to derive from the energetic 
(affective) activities of matter? In short, can a speculative notion of compu-
tational reason go beyond ecological rationality?
These questions could be answered with concrete examples. However, 
more (or less) than offering specific cases to evaluate these points, this 
chapter argues that the becoming-environment of computation does not 
mean that computation is nature. Instead I will consider computation as 
an evolving mode of abstraction that reveals alien, intelligible capacities for 
processing incomputable data.
While, as Massumi illustrated, the neoliberal form of technocapitalist 
environmentalism has replaced deductive rationality with affective (nomo)
logic, it is here contended that the reservoir of reason left to computation 
coincides neither with deductive logic nor directly with affective thought. 
Instead, its alienness remains a symptom of a non-mutual relation between 
ecological rationality and computational logic.
From this standpoint, this chapter suggests that it may not be sufficient 
to ask how and in what ways a notion of speculative reason in compu-
tation can help us to think what it may mean to live in an algorithmic 
environment. The alienness of automated reason rather involves the more 
fundamental problem of confronting the actuality of a non-sensible thought 
(algorithmic prehensions), amenable to neither logos (deductive rationality) 
nor affective thinking. The analysis of techno-mediatic computation thus 
requires a critical effort towards the articulation of automated reason.
What follows is an attempt to account for the function of computational 
reason, questioning the ontological equivalence (or mutual co-constitution) 
between the natural and the technical. I will discuss how computa-
tional design risks a renewed idealization of biophysical causes (and 
natural contingency) through the idealist conviction of an immediacy of 
computational logic and matter. The critique of deductive reasoning in 
computational design may thus risk falling into a crude materialism, in 
which the physical potentialities of material elements coincide with the 
primacy of aggregate causality (i.e., of indeterminate correlations). This 
view works to disqualify rather than explain the materiality of algorithms, 
their actual functions of extraction and abstraction of data, which are 
performative of a new order of finality leading to the production of rules on 
behalf of algorithms. Matter-oriented design seems to overlook the materi-
ality of artificial data environments. Paradoxically, here, the acceleration of 
algorithmic automation has led to an anti-speculative approach to compu-
tation, in which the order of abstraction (and the intelligible processing of 
data) has been reduced to the fluctuating dynamics of matter.
I will now address first the use of deductive approaches in computational 
design, then discuss the shift to the dominant inductive designing of spatio-
temporal structures.
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Digital nature
The Milgo Experiment, also known as the AlgoRhythms Project, devised by 
architect morphologist Haresh Lalvani, exemplifies well the use of deductive 
logic in computational design.8 Since 1997 Lalvani has been working with 
Milgo/Bufkin, a metafabrication company, to realize curved sheet-metal 
surfaces designed through digital programming. The development of the 
Morphological Genome is described as the search for a “universal code for 
mapping and manipulating any form, man-made or natural.”9
The universal structures that form matter, for Lalvani, must be derived 
from simple genetic rules: cellular automata that specify a family of 
related parameters, with each parameter controlled by a single variable 
of form corresponding to a base in the DNA double-helix genome.10 In 
other words, and in conformance with formal principles of computation, 
Lalvani believes that the infinity of all possible forms can be specified 
by a finite number of morph genes.11 Lalvani’s model of a continuously 
generating morphological genome embraces the deductive logic of a digital 
metaphysics, according to which cellular automata and discrete entities are 
universal codes from which it is possible to deduce, just like with DNA, 
an infinite variety of processes that enable the generation of new form. 
Lalvani’s use of algorithmic architecture is not too far removed from the 
fundaments of so-called digital philosophy, according to which digital or 
discrete codes are the kernel of physical complexity: code is ontology, that 
is, and finite sets of algorithms are the axioms upon which it is possible to 
build any complex world.
According to digital philosopher Edward Fredkin, all physics can be 
explained through the simple architecture of cellular automata, or discrete 
entities that form a regular grid of cells, existing in a finite number of spati-
otemporal states.12 According to this digital view of physics, the universe is 
a gigantic Turing cellular automaton: a universal machine that can perform 
any calculation and program any reality through a finite number of steps. 
For Fredkin, cellular automata are the ground on which physics can be 
explained. The universe is digital and not continuous. Cellular automata or 
discrete units are the ground of nature. This digital conception of compu-
tational nature divides the Parmenidean infinitesimal continuum into finite 
small particles, or atoms, within which complexity is contained.
This deductive view however has been challenged by a bottom-up 
method in digital design. Architect Neil Leach, for instance, pointed out 
that the use of swarm intelligence challenged this view resting on the use 
of the discrete logic of fractals, L-systems, and cellular automata.13 This 
meant that biophysical indeterminacy or the contingency of environ-
mental factors had to be accounted for by computational modeling. By 
adapting an inductive form of reasoning in which environmental variations 
became a central factor in computation, digital design turned towards a 
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generative form of modeling, incorporating temporalities and championing 
the indeterminacy of biological systems.14
In the field of algorithmic architecture, one example of the adoption of 
inductive logic aiming to include contingency in digital modeling can be 
found in the works of architect Greg Lynn. His design takes inspiration 
from biophysical vector fields that involve the growth of an emerging 
algorithmic form.15 Computational modeling here becomes an evolving 
system in constant coupling with the environment. Just as computa-
tional reason associated with cellular automata was attuned to first-order 
cybernetics and deductive logic, so too this view of computation involves 
notions of self-organization and interaction aligned to second-order cyber-
netics and its inductive reasoning. This shift, highlighting the centrality of 
interaction among agents, already constituted the germs of an ecological 
rationality in which computational systems are attuned to evolutionary 
dynamics.
Leach takes the 2008 design by Kokkugia of the Taipei Performing Arts 
Center as an example of swarm modeling, whereby interactive self-organ-
izing multiagents define objects in terms of unity and the parts thereof, as 
being both one and many.16 Here the parts of an object are conceived as 
semiautonomous agents able to evolve their own set of interactions with 
other objects without reproducing the same set of instructions. Similarly, 
changes are only dictated by the emergence of contingent solutions. 
This emphasis on self-organizing agents and partially interacting objects 
producing a whole bigger than its parts exposes second-order cybernetics’ 
emphasis on the behavioral capacities of biophysical properties to coevolve 
over time. The inductive premises of computational design are thus defined 
by emergent and not preprogrammed properties of interactive algorithms. 
These premises seem to anticipate a holistic view of computation in which 
the multiagent swarming intelligence points to computational modeling as a 
variable whole. This holistic view, however, cannot help but reify the notion 
of a computational nature in which it is impossible to discern the continuity 
of biophysical complexity from the discrete character of computational 
abstraction. Ultimately, swarm models reveal that the temporal dynamics 
intrinsic in the biophysical environment of continuous interactions is the 
motor of computation. The next section will discuss the radicalization of 
this inductive form of reason in computational design.
Computational nature
The most powerful and challenging use of the computer … is in the 
learning how to make a simple organization (the computer) model what 
is intrinsic about a more complex, infinitely entailed organization (the 
natural or real system).17
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Moving away from computation as a form of symbolic representation of 
physical elements, the definition of so called “material computation” has 
radicalized the inductive method of reasoning, arguing that the biophysical 
world of matter already provides us with a model of computational 
processing.18 From this standpoint, the elemental properties of materials 
and their generative rules constitute spatiotemporal structures in nature. 
Instead of following geometrical and mathematical patterns, this (hyper-
inductive) vision of material computation aims to directly follow material 
processes of self-assembling that result from the interactive relations of 
loose elements. Physical computation corresponds to pattern formations 
in both living and nonliving nature driven by the analogical process of 
local interactions, giving rise to material self-organizing structures and 
behaviors.19 Central to material computation is the question of design 
in nature. Against the Darwinian selection mechanisms, design is here 
explained in terms of physiological process and energy systems.20 The trans-
cendent model of natural selection based on rule-based design is replaced by 
an emergentist conception, whereby design is led by the inherent morpho-
genetic potential of material to grow and evolve into new structures. 
Material computation is concerned with immanent processing in which 
information has acquired an energetic pulse and has become itself a process 
in-formation. The scope is not simply to induce algorithmic processing by 
establishing a continuous feedback between programmed instructions and 
the biophysical environment. More radically, it involves an ontological 
merging of computational processing and physical process. This radicali-
zation of inductive reasoning problematically implies a naturalization of 
computation, claiming that the potentialities of biophysical substrates are 
now central to what can be constructed, thus ultimately dissolving any 
binarism between thought and things, concepts and objects.
This approach in design offers us an entry point to this ontologization of 
computational nature. For instance, architect Achim Menges’ project ICD/
ITKE Research Pavillion realized at the University of Stuttgart is conceived 
as a “bending-active structure” in which the feedback between computa-
tional design, advanced simulation and robotic fabrication is set to explain 
how the material behavior of wood coincides with a complex performative 
structure.21 Instead of relying on high-tech equipment that could simulate 
or activate material, Menges points out that the responsiveness of material 
is embedded in the computational capacities of the material itself.22 This 
approach involves a direct manipulation of the material and “the physical 
programming of humidity-reactive behavior of these material systems,” 
which leads to “a strikingly simple yet truly ecologically embedded 
architecture in constant feedback and interaction with its surrounding 
environment.”23
These challenging bio-technical structures are understood in terms of 
intensive aggregation (not partes extra partes but an intrinsic self-differen-
tiation of parts), explaining how the overall system behavior results from 
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the interaction of loose elements. Aggregates are thought to be able to 
“materially compute their overall constructional configuration and shape 
as spatiotemporal behavioural pattern.”24 Computation coincides here 
with the continuous integration between material, form and performance, 
in which material systems’ performative capacity is, as it were, enacted 
again. From this standpoint, the computational qualities of nature are 
here doubled, expanded and regenerated. While material computation is a 
radical step away from formal logic and symbolic language, it involves a 
radical attempt at integrating computation with matter, not only because it 
aims to re-enact computation in nature, but because it reveals the compu-
tation of materiality itself. “Inspired by nature’s strategies where form 
generation is driven by maximal performance with minimum resources 
through local material property variation,” material computation proposes 
to “analyse model and fabricate objects, with non-binary continuously 
heterogeneous properties designed to correspond to multiple and continu-
ously varied functional constraints.”25 This new level of designing matter 
is already instantiated by “rapid prototyping and manufacturing”: one of 
the many attempts to use material computation to establish an economical 
/ ecological way of minimizing energy expenditure, resources, and environ-
mental impact.26 The tendency of material computation therefore is not 
simply motivated by a reproduction of the computational processing 
of information found in nature. Instead, the radicalization of inductive 
reasoning here implies that the computation already found in biological, 
physical, and chemical systems explains that aggregate material properties 
constitute design. Differently from the crude empiricism of biomimetics, 
for which the natural order of design is reproduced and optimized in the 
development of nature-like structures, this new convergence of compu-
tation and materiality instead conceives of what is given in nature in terms 
of potentialities or indeterminacy. In other words, it is indeterminacy and 
not the already measured value of physical, biological, chemical processing 
of data that explain the tendency of nature to become more than what it is. 
This form of computation aims to explain an eco-logical order of nature. 
Ecology here involves not an (associationist) interaction of parts, but the 
capacities of the environment, defined in terms of a multiplicity of inter-
layered milieus or localities, to become generative of emergent forms and 
patterns.
Materialist computation specifically draws on the work of biologist Jakob 
von Uexküll, offering an ecological conception of space defined in terms of 
an immanent condition of subjective experience.27 In particular, his theory 
of the Umwelt (“surrounding world” or “environment”) explains natural 
design as intrinsic capacities of all human and nonhuman elements to feel 
and sense. Here the signaling processing (the transmission of information) 
or the interaction of perceptual and sensual signs is the condition for the 
activity of a selective mechanism continuously shaping and unleashing 
the capacities of organisms to transform and be transformed by the 
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environment.28 The GermanPhilosophie of Von Uexküll rejected Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection because it excluded the inner worlds of animals 
and their capacity to act upon and become co-constituted with their physical 
environments. Here, environments uniquely afford the internal capacities to 
generate new functions and behaviors.29 Von Uexküll’s ethological study 
of the environment as a fundamental factor in the constitution of beings 
explains not the optimization of species but the emergence of new patterns, 
orders, configurations. No longer deduced from finite sets of rules, but 
rather hyperinduced by the potentials of local interactions, allowing for a 
constant transformation of energy into information, this ecological view 
of computation defines the primacy of ever-evolving relations over a static 
order of matter. While this approach is now central to computational 
design, I argue that it also instantiates the complex constitution of an 
ecological rationality in contemporary power.
Ecological rationality
Brian Massumi argues that the contemporary regime of power could be 
understood in terms of an environment autonomous activity operating 
through the regulation of effects rather than of causes.30 In particular, 
he develops Michel Foucault’s insights about the environmental qualities 
of power defined not by formal rationality (transcendent law), but by 
inductive or local responses to governability, involving the performativity 
(evaluation, selection, ordering) of external variations and the establishment 
of general codes of conduct. Following Foucault, Massumi suggests that 
environmentality works through the “regulation of effects” rather than 
the re-establishment of causes, and must remain operationally “open to 
unknowns.”31 Massumi investigates the form of rationality involved in the 
calculation of risks and suggests that within a global mode of operative 
power, rationality is surpassed and replaced by an affective field.32 The 
questions “What order is this? Does it still have the rationality of a 
system?”33 point to the affective reconfiguration of the order of biopower.
For Massumi, this new order involves naturalization or naturing 
nature34—a concept that needs to be redefined away from any categorical 
opposition to the artificial because it operates in a zone of logical and 
ontological indistinction between nature and culture. Here the environment 
is not One un-adulterated given, but “indeterminacy” driven by intercon-
nected levels of complexity, comparable to the intricate unpredictability 
of weather systems, for instance.35 Massumi explains that nature now 
coincides with the primacy and the immanent reality of the accident—with 
indeterminate indeterminacy. But to understand this nuanced naturali-
zation of power, Massumi suggests that it is necessary to develop a concept 
of “naturing nature coming to cultivation.”36 Here nature is at once 
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produced and presupposed, induced and deduced, active and passive. This 
concept describes the constant correlation that constitutes the environ-
mental processing of interlayering strata from which an ongoing emergence 
of patterns is—as it were—excarnated from the “biosphere or noosphere.” 
This ecological interdependency among layers involves, for Massumi, a 
notion of “auto-conditioning” of naturing nature moving across scales and 
milieus. Naturing nature can also be understood in terms of an involutive 
(non-linear) process defined not by gradual steps but by intensive tempo-
ralities.37 Instead of the laws of nature deduced to explain the emergence of 
patterns, the machinic operations of a naturing nature involve a radicali-
zation of inductive forces in which unknown effects are driving forces, a 
quasi-causal motor of power. Borrowing from Gilles Deleuze, one could 
understand this radicalization in terms of “transcendental empiricism.”38 
The continuity of affects involves the temporal anticipation of potentiality, 
which Massumi understands in terms of preemption.39 This implies not 
a rational logic aiming at repressing the future through the pressures of 
the past, but more precisely a future-oriented logic entering the achrono-
logical fullness of time, absorbed by the affective experience of duration. 
This temporal performativity can no longer be defined according to 
Jameson’s critique of cognitive mapping—a critique of a deductive ration-
ality grounded in representation or conceptual framing of matter. Instead, 
ecological power involves an inductive logic of effects that are generative of 
infinite aggregations without primary cause.
If material computation in design is an instance of this form of ecological 
rationality, where power does not simply instrumentalize nature, but culti-
vates nature and anticipates its becomings, how can a critical conception 
of computation—or automated mode of reason—avoid the trap of techno-
capital naturalization? In order to develop a notion of reason away from 
the technocapitalist naturalization of matter’s behavior, it seems urgent 
to explore the computational and philosophical limits of deductive and 
inductive reasoning. If the deductive logic of technocapitalist naturalation 
involved the rational application of truth to the world through transcendent 
laws and rules, the technocapitalist adaptation of inductive logic rather 
implies that the truth becomes one with the lived world. Here reason 
becomes immersed in the capacities of a body to feel and make intuitive 
decisions rather than follow sequential, logical steps. While this ecological 
form of rationality explains what is at stake with technocapitalist naturali-
zation today, it discards the historical transformation of automated logic.
As discussed in the next section, the transformation of theories of compu-
tational logic highlights the existence of blind spots within a seemingly 
totalizing ecological rationality. I will attempt to develop a theory of 
algorithmic thought in terms of a speculative notion of reason by arguing 
that the intelligible capacities of algorithms to transform randomness into 
information patterns exceed the ecological rationality of capital. Borrowing 
from Alfred North Whitehead’s discussion of the speculative function of 
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reason, the next section will also address the limits of both deductive and 
inductive logic to account for how thinking operates. It will be suggested 
that beyond the tension between affective (or inductive-empirical) and 
rational (deductive-representational) logic, it is possible to discuss compu-
tation in terms of physical (efficient cause) and conceptual prehensions 
(final cause).40 If the ecological rationality of capital exposes the univocity 
of nature and culture through the centrality of affective thought, then 
the turn to computation may offer us a way to discuss the emergence of 
intelligible activities that challenge the ecological self-generation of being 
and thought. It will be suggested that Whitehead’s notion of speculative 
reason may be a productive starting point for a materialist approach to 
computation concerned not with re-enacting the computational qualities of 
nature, but with engaging with the intelligible tendencies of algorithms to 
process infinite varieties of infinite data.
Speculative reason
This final section will help clarify how and to what extent it is possible to 
approach computational logic without reducing its operations to technocap-
italist governance. My attempt at specifically theorizing the computational 
function of reason wants to suggest that this is not naturalizable insofar 
as it has fundamentally developed through the artificial construction of 
data-environment, and because it involves an algorithmic order of intel-
ligibility—an alien reason—intrinsic to the actual processing of data. 
Importantly, the articulation of a computational function of reason requires 
a theoretical engagement with the problem of the limit of computability, 
which has also been discussed in terms of randomness, incomputability or 
the famous “halting problem.”41
While this classic question of the limit of computability has been 
exhaustively addressed in the history of computational theory, Gregory 
Chaitin’s quest for Omega, or for an algorithmic pattern of randomness, 
seems to offer us one of the most promising views about the hypothesis 
that algorithmic procedures are not merely instruments of elaboration of 
primary data.42 Instead, one could argue that they can also be understood 
in terms of their prehensive activities of recording, storing, selecting, and 
elaborating patternless data. Chaitin’s views importantly contribute to the 
development of a theory of computation concerned with the transformation 
of automated logic. In particular, his renewed engagement with the mathe-
matical theory of information (especially the emphasis on the ratio between 
meaningful patterns and noise) and the problem of entropy (the measure 
of chaos) in a communication system offers us the opportunity to consider 
the issue of the limit of computation in terms of a historical realization of 
the limit of logic in the first place. Chaitin’s long-term study of the problem 
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of randomness in information theory is based on a specific notion of 
entropy, which he understands in terms of irreversibly increasing volumes 
of information generated at the input-output levels of computation.43 
Bringing together Alan Turing’s question of the limit of computability 
with Claude Shannon’s information theory, Chaitin tackles the question of 
indeterminacy in computation by demonstrating how randomness (noise 
or incompressible quantities of data) is rather central to computation.44 
For Chaitin, computation corresponds to the algorithmic processing of 
maximally unknowable probabilities. In every computational process, he 
explains, the output is always bigger than the input: something happens 
in the processing of data that breaks the equilibrium between input and 
output. Chaitin calls this phenomenon algorithmic randomness.45
The notion of algorithmic randomness implies that information cannot 
be compressed into a smaller program, insofar as between the input and the 
output there emerges an entropic tendency of data to increase in size (i.e., 
involving an increase in patternless information within the system). Chaitin 
explained the discovery of algorithmic randomness in terms of a rule-based 
processing that no longer follows the approach of deductive logic for 
which results are already contained in their premises. During the 1990s and 
2000s, Chaitin identified this problem in terms of the limits of deductive 
reason. He claimed that the problem of the incomputable defining results 
that could not be predicted in advance by the program are to be explained 
in terms of “experimental axiomatics,” a postulate or decision immanent 
to the patterns evolving in the algorithmic processing of primary data.46 
The increasing quantity of patternless information, emerging from within 
computational processing, points to a dynamics internal to algorithmic 
operations, whereby patterns are consequent to the synthetic relation 
between algorithms and data.
However, this dynamic is not derived from or induced by the biophysical 
activities of the environment, but operates within the data environment itself, 
according to which automated logic involves neither deductive (a priori 
rules) nor inductive (biophysically driven) reasoning. This is also to argue 
that to reject ecological rationality and its technonaturalized governance, 
we need to develop a new critical view of computation. One step towards 
the articulation of this view involves the enlargement of the question of 
automated logic through the theorization of a speculative function of reason, 
which, as will become clearer later, could account for the elaboration of 
generic rules from the prehensive elaboration of materially embedded 
data. Here the analysis of the historical transformation of computational 
logic as demonstrated by Chaitin’s method of “experimental axiomatics” 
is paramount. This means that computational logic can no longer be 
critically rejected because of its limited formal, symbolic order of reason, 
syntactically working to achieve arbitrary connections between units / bits 
of data. Similarly, automated logic and rule-based reasoning cannot simply 
be jettisoned in favor of locally induced inputs. I have discussed earlier the 
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predominance of these two models in computational design, particularly 
marking the shift from the model of cellular automata to aggregate causality 
in material computation. This historical shift however has to be accom-
panied by a theoretical reconceptualization of computational logic, and, I 
propose, it needs to be re-examined through Whitehead’s argument for a 
speculative function of reason (as discussed later in this section).
Similarly, one cannot overlook the increasing concreteness of data 
environments embedding the abstraction of social, economic, cultural, 
as well as physical data and constituting artificial socio-cultural environ-
ments whereby the relation among algorithms and between algorithms 
and data leads to the formation of socio-cultural generic patterns, rules 
and laws. This level of environmental artificiality cannot be explained in 
terms of the affective mechanisms of technocapital communication. These 
automated relations produce a surplus of information in which algorithms 
have acquired intelligible—or conceptual—functions revealing an order of 
decision incompatible with the effective avalanche of affective response. 
Instead this order reveals the establishment of algorithmic patterns of 
patterns elaborated through the physical and conceptual prehensions of 
computational data environments.
Beyond ecological rationality and the technocapitalist imaginary of a 
holistic enviromentality, it may be possible to argue for the “actuality” 
of data environments that explains the constitution of an artificial world 
equipped with its own notations, functions, physicality and conceptuality. 
This also implies the formation of a post- or neo-cybernetic phase of episte-
mological production in which data environments do not simply represent 
socio-cultural codes of conduct, but more importantly through a process of 
physical prehension they acquire an algorithmic order of intelligibility out 
of which socio-cultural rules are re-established (and re-visioned) because 
they are embedded in the use of techno-computational language.
As opposed to ecological rationality betting on the technocapitalization 
of affective thinking, data environments do not only execute instructions 
but also are physically and conceptually prehended to elaborate patterns 
at the limit of computational processing. This computational processing 
of data importantly points to the intelligible prehension of physical data 
that could create concepts or rules from a vast amount of patternless data. 
This process of elaboration of data into rules is what may characterize 
a data environment beyond the mathematical logic of deduction—estab-
lishing a formal or representational schema—and the empirical method of 
induction—establishing an experiential relativity of localized responses. A 
theory of automated reason may therefore show us the inconsistency of 
ecological rationality and its media-technological situation, which seems 
to offer us an opportunity to re-invent a critique of computation beyond 
the holistic history of technocapitalism. From this standpoint, computation 
is not equivalent to naturing nature, but involves a form of intelligibility 
able to use algorithmic processing to add a generic order of axioms, codes, 
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and instructions to what was initially programmed. Programming here 
corresponds to the calculation of complexity-by-complexity, exceeding 
programming itself.
If axioms are becoming experimental truths, able to postulate unknowns, 
computation too may need to be conceived in terms of experimental deter-
minations or intelligibility prehending unknowns and contributing to a 
process of revising initial conditions.47 I suggest that this experimental (i.e., 
a priorily improvable) processing of data can be understood in terms of 
Whitehead’s prehension because it involves a process of elaborating data, 
implying a consequent finality added to what was already programmed. 
According to Whitehead, prehension involves the physical and conceptual 
modes of selecting and evaluating data and thus the registering, storing, and 
processing of existing data. This notion of prehension importantly implies 
that the function of reason is not to mentally map physical data, but to 
transform—in counter-intuitive manners—physically prehended data, by 
adding a level of finality to the physical order. Prehension, in other words, 
corresponds not only to the physical mechanics of registering data and 
using their existing functions, but more importantly it implies a process of 
abstraction, or a conceptual elaboration of data, unfolding another level of 
function able to establish or not generic rules and articulating logic. This 
prehensive process explains that the function of reason is not mainly to 
represent what is physically sensed (or even to re-potentialize sense data). 
More importantly, it concerns the capacity to reset and redirect the scopes 
of inputted data according to what can be conceptually achieved through 
the conjunction and disjunction of patterns, involving the construction of 
hypothesis that agree or not with given conditions.
From this standpoint, the centrality of randomness or the entropic 
tendency of information to increase in size, resulting in an output that 
is bigger than the input, implies that algorithmic prehension involves the 
activation of reasoning leading to the experimental (non-a priori) estab-
lishment of rules. The generation of a bigger output can be understood 
in terms of an experimental intelligibility internal to computation able 
to surpass the limits of its deductive premises. Alfred North Whitehead’s 
theory of speculative reason could explain computational processing as a 
capacity to both surpass and bring forward deduction and induction, truth 
and fact as parts of its experimental axiomatics.48 This requires addressing 
algorithmic intelligibility in terms of hypothesis generation in which the 
data environments constitute the material (non-discursive) level, which is 
physically and conceptually prehended by algorithms, in turn establishing 
an automated function of reason defined by the propensity towards the 
generation of rules. Algorithmic intelligibility can be explained in terms of 
the speculative function of reason insofar as it involves the emergence of a 
generic form of process or algorithmic abstraction, which is embedded in 
the data environment that it retrieves and through which it elaborates an 
order of rules beyond deductive schema.
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   89 11/01/2017   14:28
90 GENERAL ECOLOGY
From this standpoint, I suggest that the development of material 
computational in design shall not be mainly concerned with the notion of 
aggregate causality (efficient causality) coinciding with the complexity of 
physical causes, leading to the elimination of rule-based processing. More 
importantly, in order to disentangle the computational environment from 
the technocapital naturalization of computation, we may need to unpack 
the order of conceptual elaboration and of experimental logic within 
computation.
This is to say that algorithms are not simply the computational version 
of mathematical axioms, but are to be conceived as actualities, self-
constituting composites of data, which is at once recorded and elaborated 
beyond its primary condition. As Whitehead explains, at a primary level of 
reality there are only actualities and nexuses of actuals.49 These composite 
actualities are comprised of physical and conceptual data. From a chemical 
element to an idea, actualities are constituted by the very activity of regis-
tering, recording, selecting and evaluating data. Actualities are neither 
subjects nor objects but the process of nesting data is explained by the 
manner in which objective data acquires a subjective form involving the 
hypothetical tendency towards a level of finality in which actualities reach 
completion through what Whitehead calls “concrescence,” the growing 
together of many levels of actualities.50 Central to actualities therefore is 
not simply their material aggregation, or biophysical co-causality, but also 
the introduction of a conceptual level of causality, defining the aim or the 
subjective formation of an actuality. Actualities are thus constituted by the 
physical and conceptual prehension of data.
From this standpoint, instead of being merely a set of instructions to be 
executed in an environment, the increasing concretization of data environ-
ments rather shows that algorithms are composites of data and could be 
understood as actualities equipped with their own procedure for prehending 
data. Their actuality therefore is not defined by substance but involves data 
processing (sequencing, execution, elaboration), which, within information 
theory, has been theorized in terms of an experimental logic in which results 
cannot be prescribed by inputs. At the same time however, algorithms 
are also a form of abstraction or conceptual schema, which, following 
Whitehead, is inevitably embedded in actualities. From this standpoint, an 
aggregation of actual entities can become an abstraction in which certain 
actualities become dominant over others. This process of abstraction is also 
to be understood in terms of a speculative function and not simply in terms 
of representation—i.e., in terms of a generic function of reason including 
abstraction in every actuality and not according to pre-constituted symbols 
framing actualities. In particular, Whitehead explains that the speculative 
function of reason entails a process of abstraction aiming not at reducing 
but mainly at counter-articulating or repurposing registered data towards 
generic ends.51 From the standpoint of computation, this process of 
abstraction involves the emergence of a generic order of finality or final 
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causality carried out by algorithms through the conceptual elaboration 
of physical data, a sort of algorithmic purpose that is immanent and yet 
not reducible to the locality of data environments. Instead, it is worth 
noticing that the dominance of the incomputable in interactive parallel and 
distributive systems today has turned these environments into uncountable 
quantities of search spaces, expanding rather than mainly containing the 
possibilities for algorithms to form generic information patterns.
The function of reason in computation importantly points to a historical 
transformation of mechanized logic, which in contrast to what is advocated 
by material computation cannot be explained in terms of the biophysical 
behavior of material substrates. What is needed therefore is not another 
technonaturalization of computation (as the approach to material compu-
tation in design risks doing) but a materialist approach to abstraction that 
is able to explain the evolution from physical to conceptual prehension in 
the formation of propositions in which an intelligible registering of data is 
followed by an elaboration of generic patterns or rules. Insofar as there is 
no actual process that is not accompanied by a conceptual prehension—or 
abstraction—of it, the speculative function of reason explains that the 
dynamics of abstraction involves a material process of elaboration and 
revision of rules, which emerges from and yet extends beyond the local 
circumstances of matter’s configuration. Conceptual prehensions define a 
final cause that pushes the initial conditions of given facts towards newly 
planned actions achieved through the abstraction of prehended data 
entering the realm of the generic so that it can yet again enable another 
level of actual processing. Final cause, therefore, coincides not with pre-set 
aims containing their results, but with the speculative tendency of reason to 
become generic and re-determine truths.
Conceptual prehensions define the level of finality of any actuality 
because they allow the intelligible elaboration of physical data, and the 
capacity of the latter to transform existing concepts beyond their initial 
premises. In other words, speculative reason clarifies the purpose of actual-
ities in terms of hypothesis generation or renewed determination of truths: 
experimental abstraction.52
From this standpoint, the speculative function of reason serves to explain 
the move from indetermination to determination defining computation as 
experimental axiomatic in which initial conditions—set ideas or facts—can 
change in the processing of data. For Whitehead, the purpose of reason is 
to revise its premises rather than being determined by the essence of who 
or what does the reasoning. In other words, and contrary to the universal 
principle of sufficient reason, any actuality has its own immediate finality 
driven by its own mode of reason determined by its own discretization 
of data, making infinities partially intelligible and thus extending the 
limits of reason towards incomputables. This is an instance of immanent 
finality, which rejects both vitalist (empirical induction) and mechanicist 
(or idealistic deduction) purposes of reason. It explains the autonomy of 
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any actuality that above all serves itself, rather than being an instrument 
for (and of) something else. It suggests that the computational function of 
reason is not a totalizing, sufficient model of reasoning.
A denaturalized conception of computational reason instead starts from 
the premise that prehensions involve non-conscious but nonetheless intel-
ligible operations of gathering and selecting data. Algorithmic prehensions 
imply no direct bodily sensing and no sense of self-awareness. Nevertheless, 
they are not simply the reproduction of existing data seamlessly reprocessing 
over and over again. Instead of a mechanical unconscious, which could be 
understood in terms of the affective qualities of feeling (and thinking) before 
cognition (and rational decision), the notion of algorithmic prehension here 
aspires to define an intelligible function of automation able to re-finalize 
gathered, selected, and evaluated data. Unlike the consciousness attributed 
to rational choice and to the analytic operations subtending decision, 
algorithmic prehensions do not achieve sophisticated levels of self-reflection 
(or critical view) and are thus instances neither of cognitive functions nor 
of the unconscious power of affective thought. How then to articulate 
these unfelt—unintuitive—and yet non-conscious automatisms? This is 
a challenging question and one that can be addressed if we entertain the 
possibility that automation also performs an intelligible function, and, 
to some extent, achieves a conceptual determination of incomputables. 
From this standpoint, the computational environment cannot simply be 
an instance of ecological rationality. Instead, the automatic functions of 
algorithmic prehension involve non-conscious53 yet intelligible elaborations 
of physically prehended data, showing a contradiction internal to techno-
capital, which is unable to mend its own schizophrenic constitution.
The computational function of reason thus coincides with the discre-
tization, selection, evaluation of increasingly random data (both external 
and internal to the computational environment itself), which importantly 
points to the generation of alien inferences advancing in the processing 
of data and algorithms (data, metadata, big data). Here a materialist 
approach to computation cannot be mainly concerned with the poten-
tialities of computation already existing in nature, but needs to address 
the artificiality of an automated elaboration of data followed by an alien 
epistemological production. Against the technocapitalist naturalization of 
computation which appears to be an extension (or smooth continuation) of 
the potentialities of nature, the computational environment of algorithms 
defines the development of a semi-autonomous mode of reason involving 
a level of abstraction of socio-cultural, economic, and political data: an 
artificial environment generating its own rules through conceptual prehen-
sions. The adaptation of this speculative conception of reason to explain 
the transformation of automated logic however is here primarily intended 
to argue against the holistic view of capital and technology, questioning the 
dominant critique of instrumentalization of matter. Whether or not capital 
is deemed to be one with computation, the articulation of the speculative 
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function of reason could enable us both to interrogate this equivalence and 
to theorize algorithmic actions as partaking of (and not representing) the 
historical transformation of the generic function of reason today.
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CHAPTER THREE
Elements for an ecology 
of separation
Beyond ecological constructivism
Frédéric Neyrat
Translated by James Burton
Everything is interconnected: such is the principle of principles of ecology. 
The objective of an ecology of separation is to contest this principle, not 
in order to refute it entirely, but to show that every relation is founded on 
a separation. In other words, it is concerned with causing the repressed 
content of ecology, and of the thinking which inspires it, to resurface. This 
repressed element is the following: interconnection must leave room for 
separation and must metabolize, symbolize, recognize it, if it is to avoid 
falling into the confusion resulting from the abolition of differences. For a 
confusion is not a relation, but its opposite—an indistinct jumble.
This confusion is not only harmful to theory, that is to say, to our 
capacity to distinguish [faire la part] forms of existence, but also to the 
political. Without separation, that is, without the capacity to produce a 
distance within the interior of a socio-economic situation, no real political 
decision is possible, no technological choice is truly conceivable, no resil-
ience—understood in the first instance as the capacity to draw back—can 
be expected.1 In a universe of pure continuity, with no faults, no outside, 
automated reactions replace decisions, and each new technology that 
appears in the saturated market of anthropogenic environments presents 
itself as an ineluctable destiny. For we no longer know how to tell apart 
[faire la part], we no longer know how to maintain a distance, how to 
separate ourselves. We are fascinated by the accumulation of forecasted 
ecological catastrophes, and we continue to adore a divine Technology that 
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we expect to save us from ourselves; every year we award a prize to the 
Hollywoodian scenario of the end of the world that we find most probable, 
and we admire the proposed atmospheric shield that geo-engineers promise 
will protect us from climate change.2 The imagination does not help us to 
contest this world: it does not offer us an alternative image, a counter-model 
to what we are; nor does it constitute the romantic reserve of lost voices 
of modernity, but participates in the production of the global network in 
which the living and the machinic, humans and nonhumans blend together. 
We are thoroughly interlinked, and we dream of being even more so.
The ecology of separation, this apparent paradox, does not refuse 
relations, zones of continuity and contiguity, the marvellous ambiguities in 
which differences change places and lose themselves; it is not in any sense 
about restoring pure ontological identities, sealed boundaries or any kind 
of symbolic order!3 The ecology of separation maintains simply this: to be 
truly political, to take into consideration the dangers which may threaten 
us, to distinguish between that which humans may construct and that which 
cannot or should not be constructed, to know in what ways it is still possible 
to use the words “nature” and “environment,” to enable the ecosystems to 
be resilient and to endure the disasters of the Anthropocene, ecology must 
leave space for separation. This will not be possible without attacking that 
which is clogging up this space, which we may call “ecological construc-
tivism.” Upheld by declared constructivists (Bruno Latour), advocates 
of a “pragmatic ecology” (Emilie Hache), sociologists of “risk” (Ulrich 
Beck) and by the “post-environmentalists” (Ted Nordhaus and Michael 
Shellenberger), ecological constructivism may be recognized by certain 
recurrent traits: (1) the idea, repeated like a mantra, that everything is inter-
connected; (2) the taking into consideration of “uncertainty” as a new deus 
absconditus; (3) an unshakeable faith in modernity—“reflexive” (Ulrich 
Beck) or not—and in technological progress, a progress that has already 
become sensitive to the “risks” and “unforeseen consequences” that always 
arise in an “uncertain world”; (4) a refusal of every idea of nature and 
environment, leading to the idea that everything is “process” and that as a 
consequence, everything is constructible. It is from this constructivism that 
ecological theory and practice need to separate themselves.
The reader will notice the strongly “critical” dimension of this chapter—
and perhaps find it disappointing: shouldn’t one be positive? Isn’t critique 
borne by resentment, by envy, maybe even by evil—in every case, arising 
from the inability to create new ideas? It is true that our exophobic 
epoch recoils from the negative just as it does from keeping-at-a-distance 
and from the recognition of the infinity of the outsides.4 Nevertheless, 
I maintain that no new approach to ecology will be possible without a 
critical understanding of the hegemonic structure that now constitutes 
ecological constructivism, both in theory and in industry. This hegemony 
extends far beyond professed constructivists: in speaking of an “ecology 
against nature” or “without nature”; in supposing (some forty years late, 
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as though that which Donald Worster terms the “ecology of chaos” had 
not profoundly transformed the environmentalist paradigm) that ecolo-
gists today still think of nature as a “well-balanced order” and a beautiful 
“homeostatic” totality; in recalling that nature is nothing other than a 
“second nature,” Žižek inscribes himself clearly within an ontologically 
constructivist perspective.5 6 This is not, of course, intended to reduce the 
thought of Žižek to constructivism, and we all know his radical political 
positions; however we must be able to discern, in his philosophy as in the 
hegemonic discourse relating to ecology, the ontological constructivist traits 
which orient the contemporary debates and the economic and technological 
choices with which they are associated.
At the heart of the hegemonic structure of ecological constructivism lies 
what Bruno Latour calls “political ecology.” The latter’s influence is felt 
in numerous theoretical fields, some of which rightly consider him one of 
the major thinkers of our time. Latour has ceaselessly contested the “great 
divides”; it is thus with him in particular that we may affirm the confusions 
that ensue when every kind of separation is rejected. His theory of “attach-
ments” and of the actor as “what is made to act”7 leads us straight away to 
the political impasses of our time: the incapacity to really choose the world 
we want. Against these attachments, we must propose a detachment, which 
is not to say, as in Latour’s caricature, a manner of retiring from the world 
into some imaginary citadel, but rather a distance within the world without 
which no politics are possible—other than, of course, the automatic 
politics of unlimited development and of what we can call the democracy 
of the economy (that is to say the subjection of politics to the sphere of 
economics). This distance alone may allow us to say—if necessary—“no,” 
precisely where ecological constructivism is incapable of doing so because 
it considers every possibility of a limit to be the effect of superstitious 
terror and ignorance. For material limits—as opposed to moral ones—are 
nothing but the other side of the relations which living beings maintain 
with the ecosphere. Against the dismissal of every idea of nature, an anti-
constructivist ecology must be capable of thinking nature neither as fixed 
substance, nor as indefinite process, but as separating mediation, as the gap 
between ourselves and that which we wish to produce; in other words, a 
necessary detour.
The principle of principles of ecology and 
ecological constructivism
A critique of ecological constructivism is obliged to understand from the 
outset that the principle of principles of ecology—the axiom of intercon-
nection—has both a history and a powerful justification. In the scientific and 
political form it has taken since at least the nineteenth century, ecological 
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theory has always consisted in a struggle against a denial of the relation: 
between so-called man and his “environment,” between the industrial 
revolution and the destruction of the conditions of possibility of the living, 
between humans and nonhumans, technologies and “risks” (Ulrich Beck), 
etc. But I maintain that ultimately this battle was waged against the wrong 
target. For the “humanist” denial of the relation, which grants to man a 
dignitas which he refuses other forms of life (animals), or the “Cartesian” 
denial of the relation, which excepts human consciousness from a matter 
that is mathematizable and controllable, is not—contrary to what we might 
believe—a separation which recognizes differences, but a split [clivage] 
which denies the existence of that which it opposes. Where separation 
articulates differences, the split juxtaposes identities without relations. In 
other words, the denial of the relation is founded on the split, and not on 
separation.
In light of this, let us briefly explore the history of ecological theory, 
that is, of the thinking informed by environmentalism. It has been perfectly 
justified in its struggle against the denial of relations. From the invention of 
the concept of ecology by Ernst Haeckel in 1866, to the “Gaia hypothesis” 
defended by James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis and recently reformulated 
by Isabelle Stengers, via the romanticism of John Muir, the ecosystem of 
Arthur Tansley, or Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, from the fierce oppositions to 
the deforestations taking place at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
all the way to the struggles against genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
and the “growth objectors” of the twenty-first century, ecological theory 
and environmental activism have shown the extent to which the world is a 
tissue of “entanglements” [enchevêtrements] (Isabelle Stengers) or “attach-
ments” (Bruno Latour). In both theory and practice, it is endlessly confirmed 
that ecology is the “science of the relations between living beings.”8 In order 
to oppose the domineering paradigm of a mechanistic science responsible 
for the “death of nature,” ecological theory raised once again the torch of 
organicism, and reaffirmed the need to take into consideration the relation 
between the whole and its parts.9 In order to avoid closing in on itself, 
it had to extend the science of fundamental interconnections proper to 
“natural” environments, to environments considered “anthropogenic”. 
Supported by atmospheric chemists, it proposes today, with the concept 
of the Anthropocene, to consider the human being as a “major geological 
force”10 interlaced with the earth.
But what this model history leaves in shadow is the current impasse of 
ecological theory. In constantly raising the stakes of the necessity of calling 
into question the “great divides”—between culture and nature, the built and 
the natural environment, and above all between humans and the earth—
ecological theory is becoming less and less capable of making distinctions. 
Maintaining that nature does not exist, or that it is of the order of pure 
faith, ecological theory is delivered, bound hand and foot, to the construc-
tivist viewpoint, which, often going well beyond that of declared ecological 
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constructivists, concerns every approach that is based on the following 
idea: since nature doesn’t exist, since there is no preconditional common 
world, everything makes itself over and over again, endlessly constituting 
and reconstituting itself, ceaselessly becoming. Ecological constructivism 
pushes the rich thinking of flux and becoming—of a Serres, a Deleuze, a 
Whitehead—into a limitless artificialism, as if Lucretius had replaced his 
atoms and his void with tools and capital—as if De rerum natura had given 
way to De rerum factura. This lack of distinction unavoidably translates 
into two major symptoms:
1 A fantasy of fusion. Contrary to received wisdom, this is not the 
fantasy of radical ecologists or deep ecologists, because most of 
them live in the pain and sorrow of the lack of separation, and 
of the unrestrained intrusion of humans into nonhuman spaces. 
Ecological constructivism has not eroded the great divides; its 
action has not consisted—as some wrongly suggest, and as 
reactionaries complain—in eliminating frontiers, but in colonizing 
the minority element of the great divides: thus the human has 
colonized the nonhuman, and technologies have colonized the 
domain which used to be called nature. Whence the illusion of 
the “end” of the great divides, which is ultimately nothing but the 
reinforcement of the movement initiated by the techno-humanistic 
colonization of modern times. Ecological constructivism must be 
analyzed as a narcissistic thinking, quasi-incestuous, loving itself 
among the nonhumans, without noticing that they are the products 
of its own industrious operations.
2 An unquestioning faith in technology [un suivisme technologique], 
which acquires its condition of possibility from a blind technophilia. 
Resolutely modern, the ecological constructivist swears by the most 
recent technology, the latest industrial innovation. It will extol the 
virtues of the sequestration of carbon for mastering climate change, 
right up until the approach finally proves to be impracticable; 
no matter—another possibility will present itself, one which will 
seem just as wonderful in the eyes of the ecological constructivist: 
marveling before the promises of climate geo-engineering, the 
ecological constructivist in fact becomes a geo-constructivist.11
In summary, the fantasy of fusion and the unquestioning faith in technology 
delineate the hegemonic psycho-political landscape—stretching well beyond 
those constructivists who are recognized as such—from Žižek to Crutzen.12 
The difficulty is in knowing whether it is possible to propose a different 
landscape; an alternative topography.
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   105 11/01/2017   14:28
106 GENERAL ECOLOGY
The future of post-environmentalism
“Post-environmentalism” is a perfect illustration of ecological construc-
tivism. Edited in 2011 by Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, 
Love Your Monsters: Postenvironmentalism and the Anthropocene lays 
out clearly what is theoretically and practically at stake in this approach: 
getting rid of a form of environmentalism judged by the two editors to be 
outmoded. How, they ask, can we reduce the ecological footprint of the 
human being in a world of seven billion individuals all “seeking to live 
energy-rich modern lives”?13 It is thus necessary to embrace from now on 
“human power, technology, and the larger process of modernization” (57). 
Fundamentally, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger claim, there 
exists no natural limit, neither for the human being, nor for the rest of what 
is known as nature. For human beings have always lived in a relationship 
with a technological universe, which has fashioned them in turn. Instead of 
stupidly rejecting technologies, we must find in them the means of “saving” 
ourselves.
Saving the earth does not mean protecting it from all contact with 
man—in fact, such a preservation would be impossible: (a) how does one 
determine the natural state of nature? This point is fair: a natural state 
cannot be a state determined in the past, since ecosystems are changing all 
the time; (b) likewise, how should one determine a state of nature protected 
from human activity, given that humans have modified the ecosphere from 
top to bottom and that they have become, as Paul Crutzen maintains, 
a “major geological force”? To save the earth can thus mean only one 
thing, and this is the leitmotif of ecological constructivism and of all post-
environmentalism: intervening even more, that is, “creating and recreating 
[the earth] again and again” (111–12). We need not be afraid of this further 
intervention in the least; quite to the contrary, it is fear that we need to get 
rid of, along with all the “apocalyptic fears of ecological collapse” which 
have turned environmentalism into an “ecotheology” (162). Against this 
archaic religion, it is necessary to oppose the “theology of modernization” 
which envisages technology as something “humane and sacred” (208).
What problems does this analysis pose? Doesn’t it seem like common 
sense? Shouldn’t we accept the idea that technologies, even while dangerous, 
are the only means humans have at their disposal with which to save 
themselves? Going beyond this understanding of technologies as means, 
should we not recognize that, in every aspect, the notion of humanity itself 
is unthinkable without technologies? This, let us recall, was the lesson 
of 2001: A Space Odyssey: without the black monolith, and without the 
bone which becomes a weapon, there is no passage from the pre-human 
to the human … However, a doubt assails us. Ted Nordhaus and Michael 
Shellenberger tell us that, from the Neolithic era until the present, the 
manner in which human beings have shaped “nonhuman nature” has not 
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changed in “kind,” but in “scope” and in “scale” (131–3). Is this really the 
case? Is the Anthropocene merely a change of scale? Or is it the sign of a 
movement of much greater amplitude, an “event”?14 On this account, is it 
really stupid to experience certain fears regarding the future? What if the 
stupidity, in the sense of the stupefaction which prevents one from thinking 
correctly, were on the side of those who make modernization into a 
religion, and make this religion into the comfort of a future of unrestrained 
development?
Let us slow down, and reconsider whether it may not be a little too 
soon to be post-environmentalist. To test this, we must turn to the founda-
tions of the thought of Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger: one will 
notice that the title of their collection, Love Your Monsters, is also that 
of the article bearing Latour’s name in the same volume. Such a choice 
cannot be by chance. It signals the importance, for these two authors, of 
Latour’s thought in their sustained attempt to show that environmentalism 
is “outmoded.”15 In the following sections, we will try to show the inter-
twining of post-environmentalism and the “political ecology” of Bruno 
Latour.
Monstrous ecology
Entitled “Love your Monsters: Why we must Care for our Technologies 
as we do our Children,”16 Latour’s essay begins with a rereading of 
Frankenstein by Mary Shelley. This rereading had already been developed 
ten years earlier in Aramis or The Love of Technology (1992). In this 
book, as in the article, Latour asserts that the crime of Dr. Frankenstein 
was not his hubris, his transgressive creation, but the abandonment of his 
creature. The latter became monstrous because of this abandonment, and 
not as a result of his unusual genesis. Frankenstein should thus be seen as 
paradigmatic of our inadequate relationship with that which we produce: in 
referring to foodstuffs as “frankenfood” or “frankenfish,” Latour tells us, 
we are constantly reproducing the gesture and the error of Dr. Frankenstein. 
Rather than taking care of our productions, we reject them. And it is this 
rejection itself that should be considered the ultimate cause of our troubles.17
This rejection would be anchored in the manner in which we consider 
ourselves modern. Following up in this article on the analyses carried out in 
We Have Never Been Modern (1993), Latour claims that the perception we 
have of ourselves rests on a misunderstanding: we believe we have clearly 
separated the domains of science and politics, we believe that modernity 
consists precisely in this separation; but in fact we have spent our time 
constructing our world on the basis of an unending series of hybridiza-
tions.18 In reality the science referred to as modern has intertwined science 
and politics, humans and nonhumans, it has produced with all its strength 
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what Latour names “attachments”: connections between nature and scien-
tific production (GMOs), links which could never have been possible 
without robotics (Latour takes the example of robots sent to Mars), climate 
change, etc. To believe ourselves modern is to believe that science has 
“emancipated” us from “nature,” where in fact it has produced ever more 
“imbroglios” and “entanglements” (289). For this reason, Mary Shelley’s 
novel, romantic as it is, will wholly remain prisoner to the belief that 
modernity has built around itself. And so we will always remain prisoners 
too: even as the dissonance, Latour tells us, between what we believe we are 
and what we truly are comes to light, even as everything proves to be inter-
connected and as attachments become more and more evident, we continue 
to refuse that it is so, we refuse this generous ecology that attaches humans 
to nonhumans—to GMOs, to bacteria, to the earth. Why?
Because modern belief, as erroneous as it is, has not been without 
effect: in believing that science has emancipated nature, we have believed 
in the existence of a Great Divide between ourselves and the rest of the 
world. There is all that we have made, our technologies, progress; and, 
alas, the collateral damage of progress—pollution, the hole in the ozone 
layer, Chernobyl. Yet the idea itself of collateral damage is an effect of the 
Great Divide. In the same way, claims Latour, ecological disasters are the 
analogues of Frankenstein’s creature because our representations rest upon 
a Great Divide: culture–technology–humans versus nature–nonhumans. But 
everything changes, or would change, if we came to grasp that everything 
is attached. Everything will change if we understand that science has never 
stopped connecting nature and culture, to the point where it produces what 
Latour calls “natures–cultures” (106–7). In fact, if everything is connected, 
then collateral damage, or at least the “unwanted consequences” of 
progress are nothing more nor less than inevitable: a new technology will 
necessarily, whether one wishes it to or not, have an impact upon us and 
on what is known as “environment.”19
Like Michel Serres and Ulrich Beck, Bruno Latour declares the expiration 
of the concept of environment. The latter is in fact built upon the division—
fallacious, but with real consequences—between humans (at the center) 
and their (surrounding) environment.20 In other words, claims Latour, we 
have begun to speak of the environment at the same moment that we come 
to understand that there is no environment! This idea is at the heart of 
the conceptual strategy of Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger: they 
reproach the environmentalists for believing in the environment, that is, 
as a “separate ‘thing’” from humans—from humans who see themselves 
as “separate” from and “superior” to the “‘natural world.’”21 But with 
the conceptual and real disappearance of the environment, as if by magic, 
the monsters disappear as well: the monstrous turns out to be normal! 
Instead of being surprised by some unfortunate “unwanted consequence” 
of a new technology launched onto the global market, we should on the 
contrary take specific and constant care of that which we produce, tracing 
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and tracking the consequences of our productions. Far from abstaining 
from creation, far from “retreat[ing]—as the English did on the beaches of 
Dunkirk in the 1940s”22 and leaving so-called nature alone entirely, Latour 
invites us to “intervene even more” (348). In this sense, “the environment 
is exactly what should be even more managed,” supervised, “integrated 
and internalized in the very fabric of the polity.” (344) We need to be, 
increasingly, “master and possessor of nature,” to recall Descartes’ famous 
statement, provided one fully grasps that this “mastery” must be under-
stood as an increasingly strong “attachment” between “things and people” 
(383–400). More attachments, more mastery, more interventions: here is 
where someone like Paul Crutzen would be in agreement.23
A first lesson imposes itself here: the opposition between Hans Jonas and 
Bruno Latour could not be greater. Where the former, in The Imperative 
of Responsibility, deals with a “Prometheus permanently unbound” and 
insists, like the majority of ecologists, on worrying about limits,24 the 
latter, on the contrary, develops the idea of a Prometheanism without soul-
searching, free of complexes; a kind of hyper-Prometheanism. Where we 
moderns (who believe ourselves to be modern), the Jonases and all those 
who want to “withdraw” into themselves, are taken, in a caricature of a 
religion from another era, to be saying, “Thou shall not transgress,” Latour 
and his friends Nordhaus and Shellenberger say: “we shall overcome.”25 
According to this view, we must go beyond our timorous natures to 
intervene technologically, surpass our constant fear in order to become the 
Prometheus that we cannot not be—we, technologically assisted beings, the 
Terraformers of our own planet.
Having always been modern, or: 
Long live development
One point however seems to distinguish Latour from Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger: where Latour critiques the false consciousness of the first 
modernity, the modernity that is not “reflexive” and has not accepted its 
inevitable share of “risks” (Beck), Nordhaus and Shellenberger place their 
faith solely in an immediate and unilateral “theology of modernization.” 
However, Latour and the post-environmentalists have precisely the same 
target: those who refuse development; or in other words, those who want 
to move “from hubris to asceticism,” as Latour writes in the long version of 
“Love your Monsters,” which bears the eloquent title, “It’s Development, 
Stupid!”26 In a footnote, Latour explains for North American readers: 
“‘Décroissance’ is the term used by some French groups” to describe this 
asceticism.27 Of course, for Latour, those who wish to “withdraw” are 
after all resolutely ensconced within the faith of modernity, in that they 
too think that there is a Great Divide between humans and nonhumans. 
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In Politics of Nature, in 1999, ecologists were attacked for their “nature-
centrism,” which maintains unchanged the modern faith in a nature that it 
is considered necessary to preserve intact.28 As an extreme example of this 
position, deep ecologists were considered to be simply outside of ecological 
politics (43); in 2011, it is not deep ecology but the idea of décroissance 
(degrowth) that is attacked. According to Latour, décroissants are those who 
are too “stupid” to understand the necessity of development. Certainly, all 
those who believe in the Great Divide are stupid for Latour; but the greater, 
more dangerous imbeciles are those who not only believe in this divide, but 
through their “asceticism” do nothing but confirm and reinforce it. They 
are dangerous in that they do not understand at what point it is necessary, 
in order to address environmental problems, to engage in further techno-
logical intervention. Like Nordhaus and Shellenberger, Latour maintains 
that it is necessary to have done with “the limits of the notion of limits”29 
and that the time has come to “develop more, not less” (3): “the goal 
of political ecology,” Latour writes, “must not be to stop innovating, 
inventing, creating, and intervening.”30 Like Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 
Latour has an iron-clad belief that salvation comes about through techno-
logical development. In this sense—and this is the point we need to 
grasp—like Nordhaus and Shellenberger, Latour is resolutely modern—
without hesitation, without distance. To be sure, Latour maintains that he 
is not modern and that “between modernizing and ecologizing, we have to 
choose.”31 Yet in believing that science, or rather techno-science, will save 
us from climate change, Latour expresses the essence of modernity! He thus 
adopts the position perfectly summarized by von Neumann in 1955:
Prohibition of technology … is contrary to the whole ethos of the indus-
trial age … It is hard to imagine such a restraint successfully imposed 
in our civilization. Only if those disasters that we fear had already 
occurred, only if humanity were already completely disillusioned about 
technological civilization, could such a step be taken. But not even the 
disasters of recent wars have produced that degree of disillusionment, as 
is proved by the phenomenal resiliency with which the industrial way of 
life recovered even—or particularly—in the worst-hit areas.32
The example of Fukushima perfectly validates this statement. It seems in 
fact that the calling into question of technology is the prohibition before 
which all moderns recoil—Latour included. In this sense, “It’s Development, 
Stupid!” is the modern enunciation par excellence. The moderns are those 
who believe in the sacrosanct holiness of technological development. Being 
modern means having faith in the technological surmounting of the impos-
sible, as Latour affirms: the moderns “want the impossible, and they are 
right”; but, he adds, we must change the impossible.33 The impossible that 
is to be abandoned is impossible emancipation with regard to nature; this 
should not require of us too great an effort, since this emancipation (this 
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detachment) has, for Latour, never really existed! In fact, as we have seen, 
Latour claims that the moderns have spent their time, without realizing it, 
in hybridizing humans and nonhumans. That is, emancipation in relation 
to nature is for Latour truly impossible. In turn, the impossible to be 
promoted, according to Latour, is that which consists in having done with 
“the limit of limits”: wanting there to be no limits any longer, it is to this 
that Latour addresses his prayers (12). But isn’t finishing with “the limit of 
limits” the modern project par excellence? Consider Bacon:
The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes and the secret 
motion of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of the human empire, 
to the effecting of all things possible.34
Contrary to what Latour claims, for the thinkers of modern science, the 
problem is not emancipation with regard to nature (such is already theoreti-
cally accomplished by the transformation of nature into a mathematical 
object) but the future technological realization of all possible things. It is 
from this impossible that Latour, as a good modern, is not detached. It is this 
attachment which leads him to the declaration that concludes the article: “We 
want to develop, not withdraw.”35 Here we are faced with an infernal pair of 
alternatives: on the one hand the proposition of the endlessly developmental 
ecology of Latour and his post-environmentalist comrades; on the other a 
form of withdrawal which would consist in the refusal of all technology.
That we are constrained to these alternatives will come as a bit of a 
surprise, for Latour appears to be a shrewd modern who knows perfectly 
well that progress is indissociable from “unwanted consequences”—but 
which consequences does he draw from this constant necessity of relating 
to consequences? What does it mean, for Latour, to take care of our 
creations in their consequences? Describing the principle of precaution, 
as it was introduced into the current French Constitution, Latour seeks 
to show that the principle’s opponents and its supporters fundamentally 
agree. The first group refuses this principle on the pretext that it necessitates 
anticipating risks to the point where one is no longer able to innovate, while 
the second—those who Latour designates the “modernist environmen-
talists”—celebrate a law which dictates “no action, no new technology, no 
intervention unless it could be proven with certainty that no harm would 
result.”36 Latour simultaneously refuses to give in to paralyzing anticipa-
tions and to “withdrawal,” but demands—what, in the end?—a following 
[un suivisme]. Whence comes the metaphor of love for our monsters, of 
which Nordhaus, Shellenberger and Latour are all equally fond. To love our 
technological creations means accompanying them in their effects, neither 
leaving them to grow in isolation, nor believing there will be no conse-
quences; it is certain that there will be, for our creations are attached to us, 
to everything, to the world, on account of the generalized interconnection 
which relates every part of the world to every other part.
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Of course, it is fairly obvious that we do not leave the nuclear power 
plant to run on its own, the door slamming shut behind us as we head off 
to the pub, just as we make sure to install automatic alarm systems capable 
of reacting to “unforeseen” accidents. But Latour seems to have forgotten 
that what was at stake in the principle of precaution was precisely the 
putting in place of systems of constraint able to incorporate uncertainty! To 
say that we do not know what consequences will follow the introduction 
of a new technology into the world is absolutely right, but these are the 
central stakes of our relations with technologies: this should generate that 
which Hans Jonas called a concern, and not a fear, as some wrongly suggest 
(Jonas uses the word Sorge, “care,” “concern”). But this concern consists 
precisely in thinking in advance that a certain uncertainty must lead us not 
to promote certain technologies. Dispensing with such an “in advance,” 
such an anticipation, amounts to no more nor less than the dismissal of 
the foundation of the principle of precaution, and venturing forth without 
direction; like a good modern. If there is something to be criticized in the 
principle of precaution, it is not that it has paralyzed action, but that it 
has wrongly considered risks to be calculable (in the form, for example, of 
risks of risks). To this precaution, we must oppose—following the work of 
Günther Anders and Jean-Pierre Dupuy—a prevention, that is, a preventive 
action which accepts its inability to calculate risks.37 This is to say that the 
problem does not really lie in knowing that there will be unwanted conse-
quences (this is obvious), but of knowing that one can not want some of 
these unwanted consequences, at any cost.
But Latourian theory does not allow us to not want. This is one of the 
traits common to the ecological constructivism of Latour and the post-
environmentalism of Nordhaus and Shellenberger, whereby they claim that 
“each new act of salvation will result in new unintended consequences, 
positive and negative, which will in turn require new acts of salvation” 
(110–11): with them, Prometheus, whose name signifies “the one with 
forethought,” fuses with his brother Epimetheus, “the one who reflects 
after the fact.” In Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, Bernard 
Stiegler insists on the difference between Epimetheus, who because he 
foresees nothing leaves the human being destitute [démuni], without 
qualities, and Prometheus, the one who, because of his foresight, takes 
care of the human being by compensating for the fault of Epimetheus 
with the gift of technics.38 With this dangerous fusion of Prometheus and 
Epimetheus, it is no longer a question of care [soin] and anticipation: 
henceforth, Prometheus will be able to make use of his (nuclear) fire and 
his weapons, but will do so freed of any necessity of foreseeing anything. 
Epiprometheus is this new monster—must we love him? Must we be bound 
to him? Let us hesitate for a moment before replying; later, it will doubtless 
be too late.
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Making Dr. Frankenstein hesitate
Let’s hesitate; and return with precaution to the analysis of Mary Shelley’s 
book proposed by Latour. It is quite true that Victor Frankenstein’s creature 
suffers from a lack of love from his creator. When the two of them meet 
in the Alps, Victor Frankenstein uses every name he can to abuse his 
creature—“devil,” “vile insect,” “abhorred monster,” etc.39 And the poor 
creature informs him of his solitude, reproaching his creator for failing to 
“perform thy part, the which thou owest me.” (68). We will thus grant 
Latour an acknowledgment that the attitude of Victor Frankenstein lacks 
the most elementary care—it lacks responsibility. All very well—but the 
question is, what caused Victor Frankenstein to become this way?
Contrary to what Latour would have us believe, the doctor is not exactly 
a modern: in his early youth, he was influenced by “natural philosophy,” 
Cornelius Agrippa and Paracelsus—in other words, by conceptions of 
science legitimizing magic and alchemy, the quest for the philosopher’s 
stone and the elixir of eternal life. It is from this context that Victor 
Frankenstein draws his fundamental desire: to manufacture life—to become 
“capable of bestowing animation upon lifeless matter” (32), “render[ing] 
man invulnerable to any but a lifeless death!” (23). But during his studies, 
Dr. Frankenstein encountered modern science, and the manner in which 
it took over from what had preceded it. This is what Professor Waldman 
says in Mary Shelley’s novel: the previous professors “promised impossi-
bilities” while “the modern masters promise very little”; they seek neither 
the philosopher’s stone nor the elixir of life, but “dabble in dirt” and “pour 
over the microscope” (28). In so doing, they have accomplished miracles:
They penetrate into the recesses of nature, and shew how she works in 
her hiding places. They ascend into the heavens; they have discovered 
how the blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe. They 
have acquired new and almost unlimited powers; they can command the 
thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake, and even mock the invisible 
world with its own shadows. (28)
A humble approach, and a change of method in comparison to the alche-
mists, certainly—but with results that are so much more marvelous! 
Modern science appears here as the pursuit of magic and its fantasies by 
other means. And Victor Frankenstein stands precisely at the junction of 
this monstrous fusion of the modern with an enduring magical thinking. 
And we ourselves, just how far have we really moved beyond the search for 
the elixir of life …? In a famous passage of the Discourse on the Method, 
Descartes argued that modern science, specifically physics, will allow us to 
attain that “primary good” that is “the preservation of health”;40 today, 
we are less concerned by health, which presupposes a state to be attained, 
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than by fitness, which knows no upper limit—as Zygmunt Bauman writes: 
“However fit your body is—you could make it fitter.”41 One should 
certainly not confuse the elixir of life, preservation of health, and fitness; 
just as—on another plane—one should not confuse the omnipotence of God 
with the sovereignty of the State; secularization (of religion and of magical 
thinking) is never a simple reproduction of identity. But just as certain 
States imagine themselves to be all-powerful because they possess nuclear 
weapons, one might say that, on a scientific plane, a certain imaginary of 
eternal life has found a new embodiment through the will to mastery and 
possession which Descartes formulated in the middle of the seventeenth 
century. This hypothesis may allow us to understand that what leads to the 
belief in the all-powerful nature of development and technologies is a belief 
in modern science under-girded by a pre-modern fantasy.42 Isn’t it this belief 
and this fantasy that the constructivists and the post-environmentalists 
perpetuate? If they are modern, in the end it is not only because they want 
more technologies (this is merely a symptom), but because they do not 
question the manner in which modernity has metabolized—integrated, 
reprised and modified—pre-modern science and its libidinal investment in 
technologies. It is this belief which animates geo-engineering, that is, the 
project—approved by Paul Crutzen—which consists in mastering climate 
change through the technological “optimization” of the climate. And it is 
this belief which ecological theory must today do away with.
It becomes therefore very problematic to generalize Latour’s propo-
sition that we should love all our monsters. In fact, Victor Frankenstein 
bears some resemblance to our monstrous Epiprometheus, who acts first 
and thinks later. We can certainly understand that there should be cases 
where, once a creation has taken place, it becomes necessary to take care 
of it. One might think here of the fiction—which is becoming less and less 
absurd—of human clones: once they have been created, regardless of what 
the law might say, it will be untenable not to take care of them. Yet what 
the position of Nordhaus, Shellenberger, and Latour renders impossible is 
preventive action, that is, the possibility of not realizing a technology. We 
said above that a fundamental prohibition weighs down upon us: the prohi-
bition on calling technology into question. To call into question [remettre 
en cause] should mean, theoretically, to return to its cause [ramener à sa 
cause], to interrogate causes and thus to get away from the “pragmatic 
ecology” proposed by Emilie Hache, who speaks in favor of a “pragmatic 
philosophy” understood as an “art of consequences which is interested 
in the effects which its propositions induce.”43 The ecological theory that 
we are seeking to promote is anti-pragmatic for reasons that are very … 
pragmatic: to take an interest in effects, is to take an interest too late; it is on 
causes that we need to reflect, ahead of actions. Only a return to causes, to 
aims, to principles, to what we desire, may allow us to make the distinction 
between the technologies that we want and those we do not want. This 
distinction must be made before, not after the event.
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Dividing technologies: Cosmotechnologies and 
selected mechanisms
To make this distinction, it is first of all necessary to think technologies as 
such, in other words to stop confounding—as Latour does—the education 
of children and the production of technologies, the love we devote to the 
former and the attachment we sometimes feel towards the latter. A robot is 
not, after all, the same as a child! Thereafter, it becomes possible to restrain 
oneself, and to abstain. It is this abstention which is impossible for Latour, 
for the principle of precaution is “not a principle of abstention, but a change 
in the way any action is considered,” that is, a profound change relative 
to the connection between science and politics: thanks to this principle, 
“unexpected consequences are attached to their initiators and have to be 
followed through all the way.”44 The problem of the post-environmentalist 
is that he always arrives after the party: the new technologies have been 
launched onto the market, and the post-environmentalist asks us to love 
them, to observe them closely and tirelessly. Ecological constructivism is a 
kind of caricatural pragmatism: the causes (the principles, the ontological 
foundation of technologies) don’t matter; but let’s pay attention to the 
consequences. This is why the ecological constructivist says yes to every 
technology—to GMOs, to fracking, to nuclear technology and climate 
engineering.
Post-environmentalism, like every ecological constructivism, is prisoner 
to a scheme of thought which obscures ecological theory and reduces 
everything to two possibilities: either the hatred of technology, or the 
love of it. Either one rejects everything, absolutely, or one accepts all 
technologies. Either one refuses all development, or deems “stupid” those 
who reject it. Our problem is not that of finding some kind of median 
position, but on the contrary, of precisely establishing a political position 
whose goal would be differentiating what we want from what we don’t. 
Such is the first meaning of the expression “ecology of separation”: 
learning to distinguish between what is harmful and what is not. But this 
entails knowing how to work on causes before being able to act on their 
consequences. What are the criteria that might allow us to evaluate and 
separate technologies? In The Domestication of Being, Peter Sloterdijk 
distinguishes between:
(1) on the one hand, “allotechnologies,” which name a violation of the 
earth, and lead to the “destruction of primary materials.” The allotech-
nologies are applied from the outside, they are exercized by a subject 
(a master) who applies his power to an object (a subordinate).45 As 
some thinkers of resilience have understood, merely trying to “control,” 
from the outside, a supposedly “predictable” nature, makes ecosystems 
vulnerable and “contribute[s] to the erosion of [their] resilience”;46
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(2) on the other hand, “homeotechnologies”: developed based on the 
paradigm of information, the “thought of complexity” and “ecology,” 
these technologies entail a strategy of “cooperation,” of “dialogue” with 
nature. Homeotechnologies, Sloterdijk writes, “cannot at all desire to 
differ totally from that which ‘things themselves’ are for themselves or 
may become for themselves.”47
André Gorz, one of the most important ecological thinkers France has 
known, takes up these distinctions at the end of one of his works, 
L’immatériel.48 Drawing on the works of Ivan Illich, Gorz distinguishes 
between “technologies of confinement” [technologies verrou], which lead 
to the domination of nature, “dispossess[ing] people of their living 
environment,” and “open technologies,” which “favour communication, 
cooperation, interaction, such as the telephone, or nowadays, networks and 
open source software.”49 What Sloterdijk and Gorz ultimately stress is the 
opposition between cooperative technologies and self-enclosed technologies, 
the latter leading on from what Illich called the “radical monopoly,” which 
replaces the “empowerment [pouvoir-faire] of the individual.”50 This radical 
monopoly is today simply that which makes possible the democracy of the 
economy, in other words, the possibility of a capitalism without restraint.
Still, we can see the problem posed by the ecology of separation: how 
to mark the difference between good and bad technologies, without 
presupposing a predetermination of technologies that would fail to take 
into consideration the manner of their use? Aren’t uses varied and unfore-
seeable? Doesn’t the critique of the end of the Great Divides lead to a new 
essentialism? In fact, it is necessary to think together technologies and 
the world whose production (or destruction) they tend towards: every 
technology is a cosmotechnology. If, for example, nuclear technology is an 
“allotechnology,” a “technology of confinement,” it is because the nuclear 
requires the secret (that of the routing of nuclear waste), requires an army 
to defend it, requires a simultaneously economic and policing mechanism 
to allow this self-enclosed technology to exist. It is not that there is an 
essence of the nuclear plant, but that there are mechanisms selected by 
this technology. A selected mechanism is not inscribed in the essence of 
a technology, but forms the complement without which its use would be 
impossible, or suicidal (for example: publicly informing potential terrorists 
or anti-nuclear activists of the routes of the trains that carry nuclear waste 
…). In this sense, a technology and its selected mechanisms produce a 
certain type of world (of society, of individual relation to energy and its 
consumption, etc.) To believe that nuclear power could vary according to its 
uses—to believe for example that it is possible to have nuclear technology 
without an army—is to believe in a dangerously idealist fiction: the 
constructivist fiction of worlds without limits which one can form at will.
In the end, it is only by envisaging problems from a cosmotechnological 
perspective that we will be able (1) to distinguish desired values, desired 
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worlds; (2) to know, through attentiveness to causes, which are the mecha-
nisms selected by such and such a technology, and which world is necessarily 
associated with these mechanisms; and (3) to decide upon a politics which 
legitimizes cooperative technologies—here again, it is separation (parting) 
which presides over the relation (cooperation).
Uncertain collectives
This inability to separate technologies is to be understood as one of the 
symptoms of constructivism as such: its unilateral taste for association, 
putting together, attachment, means it has difficulty accessing the dimension 
of separation, of division or opposition. Remember that for Latour, human 
beings do not form a society of subjects cut out of the world of objects, but 
rather a constantly growing collective of humans recognizing the existence 
of nonhumans aspiring to find their place in this collective. The collective 
is a set of procedures whose function is “collecting associations of humans 
and nonhumans.”51 One can always call into question the collection, accept 
or refuse new entrants, propose their “candidacy for common existence” 
after “consultations” of these new “propositions” (104). The collection has 
no end, its edges are not fixed except in a temporary manner. We may add 
that this collection is not the effect of a sovereign decision made by humans: 
for Latour, there is nothing more false than the “concept of a human actor 
who would be fully in command.”52 Human creators and constructors must 
accept that they “share their agency with a sea of actants over which they 
have neither control nor mastery”: in place of a fantastical human mastery, 
reigns “uncertainty” (32). The latter presides over all construction, all 
collective “composition,” knowing that the goal of the “political process” 
is to create a “common world”: “the unified world is a thing of the 
future, not of the past. In the meantime, we are all in what James calls the 
‘pluriverse’” (37–9). The goal of this common world is to guarantee that 
“humans and nonhumans are engaged in a history which should render 
their separation impossible” (39).
That there should be concern for nonhumans is one thing; that all 
separation should be impossible is another. Proposing the common, non 
-separation, unification, as a political objective, highlights a crucial point: 
the ultimate objective of Latour is not to let the multiplicity of actants 
exist, but to produce the One. Although the unified world is a “thing 
of the future,” such an idea obliges us to reconsider this statement that 
Latour made in Politics of Nature: “The term ‘collective’ does not mean 
‘one’; rather … it means ‘all, but not two’” (94). We can take from this 
the following lesson: the (ontological and political) rejection of the two 
leads inevitably to the One, “future” though it may be. Certainly, the One 
is deferred, since Latour’s collective is uncertain, always “on the path of 
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expansion,” capable of being ceaselessly amended, reformed, always able to 
recognize the existence of new entrants. But while separation and the two 
have no place, everything tends towards intermixing, and becoming indis-
tinct: the Latourian collective places all beings on the same plane—prions, 
primates, and humans, in the same way that, as we have seen, techno-
logical production is placed on the same plane as human generation. Some 
will find this very amusing, and proclaim the delights of object-oriented 
ontology with its endless lists.53 But the problem is that the conditions of 
such a collective make it impossible to discern politically between what 
is important and what is not, placing the knowledge or disappearance of 
prions on the same level as the knowledge or disappearance of the great 
apes. As Alain Caillé writes in an article on Latour:
It is hard to understand which people is likely to live on, or more 
generally, which human subject will be capable of surviving in the long 
term, given that they have been placed in principle on the same plane 
as any electron, amoeba, virus or adjustable spanner. The only moral 
which seems to survive the process of Latourian (de)construction is that 
of permanent openness to the infinity of the thinkable and the feasible. 
To translate: everything that can be done, technically, should be done. 
Nothing will know how to oppose, nor should oppose the indefinite 
expansion of biotechnologies … It is against this absence of limits, 
this hubris, that the ecologists are battling … Is there not something 
paradoxical in calling for a political ecology which in the end develops 
a tendency to substantiate objectives which are situated at the other end 
of the spectrum from those clearly manifested by ecologists?54
“Nothing in the proposition of Latour,” Caillé adds, “permits opposition of 
any kind to GMOs, to the hegemony of biotechnologies or to the unlimited 
modification of the genome, for example,” but “everything encourages 
them” (113). And this is for a very simple reason: the political, for Latour, 
can never mean conflict (which would require, at least, that there be two!), 
but always means process and production—this being the manner in which 
the multiple converges towards the One. His problem is knowing “how 
to bring the sciences into democracy”—this is the subtitle of Politics of 
Nature—rather than how to get democracy into the sciences!55 It is a matter 
of building, building well, building better—“how can [the world] be built 
better?”56—but by no means of opposing that which might end up being 
produced badly. To do so would be to oppose the imperative of absolute 
realization, this Baconian superego which consists in the inevitable techno-
logical realization of everything it is possible to realize. Latour’s unbounded 
collectives are the effects of this imperative: everything is uncertain, except 
the certainty of producing everything.
Thus we grasp the problem: uncertainty, which does seem to describe 
adequately an ontological state of matter in its quantic state, is employed 
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in an expansive manner to justify the fact that the manner in which humans 
must relate themselves to nonhumans is uncontrollable. Yet whence comes 
the uncertainty in the case of Fukushima? From the tremendous agency 
of plankton and shrimp? From some mystical and improbable reaction 
on their part to the equally mysterious components of the reactors? No. 
A plant installed on a seismic rift, documents of inspection falsified by 
Tepco, a lack of respect for the WHO and other global regulators of 
nuclear and environmental safety,57 the destruction of the cliff that formed 
a natural protective barrier,58 and so on: Fukushima was not an accident, 
the unintended consequence resulting from uncertainty and our lack of 
ontological mastery; Fukushima was a programmed accident. We know, we 
could have known. Talking here of uncertainty or of “unexpected” conse-
quences, is either ignorance or the sinister justification of disasters and their 
causes. Behind the uncertain collectives of Latour lies the certainty of the 
pluriverse aspiring to the One; against this, an ecology of separation must 
measure up to the task of reintroducing the power (puissance) of the two, 
of the separation without which every association becomes vague, of the 
opposition without which producing and developing become meaningless.59
Nature as detour
If everything is uncertain, if everything shapes and reshapes itself endlessly, 
if everything is process and everything is constructible, in the end this 
coheres with the constructivist and post-environmentalist declaration: there 
is no nature. For Latour and his friends, for Žižek as for Crutzen, the end 
of nature is great news! “Thank God, nature is going to die. Yes, the great 
Pan is dead! After the death of God and the death of man, nature, too, had 
to give up the ghost.”60 What is dead is nature as a term that “makes it 
possible to recapitulate the hierarchy of beings in a single ordered series” 
(25), nature as order, law, right, “inflexible causality,” “imprescriptible 
laws” (28). What are the advantages and the drawbacks of such a position? 
This is what we will seek to grasp in concluding this chapter.
The goal of an ecology of separation does not consist in the restoration 
of nature as order, substance or transcendental scheme, as the basis for 
identifying and ordering distinct cultures. Every ecological theory worthy 
of the name has had to integrate the contributions of what Donald Worster 
has called “the ecology of chaos,” formed, in the 1970s, on the wreckage of 
those ecologies based on the idea of a well-balanced nature.61 Nevertheless, 
the idea that everything is process has also served to accompany the 
ontological requirements of industry under the capitalist condition and 
its penchant for unlimited development. To adhere without reservation to 
the ontological thesis that “all is process” risks leading irreversibly to the 
blind political following [suivisme] analyzed above, that is, to the state in 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   119 11/01/2017   14:28
120 GENERAL ECOLOGY
which one says yes to all the latest industrial innovations. In other words, 
is it not the phobia of everything that could resemble, from near or far, a 
limit placed upon the joys of uncertain collectives, which has driven the 
post-environmentalists and constructivists, and indeed a large portion of 
contemporary thought, to declare nature dead?
It is certain that ecological theory and practice have succeeded in replacing 
the term “nature” with terms like “ecosystem” and “ecosphere,” and have 
insisted on the fact that, as Barry Commoner proposed in 1971, “everything 
is connected to everything else.”62 The problem is the rapid manner in which 
this theory, based on cybernetics, has been denaturalized: interconnections 
are used less and less to describe the internal relations of ecosystems, and 
more and more to describe that which human beings put into contact. 
Once entangled with constructed ecosystems, those ecosystems referred to 
as natural have become, little by little, simple elements integrated within 
anthropogenic super-ecosystems. The principle of principles of ecological 
theory has become the principle of anthropogenic interconnections, and 
henceforth, in the era of the Anthropocene, the principle of geo-anthropo-
genic interconnections. The paradox is the following: the more, in theory, we 
affirm that the struggle against anthropocentrism consists in recognizing the 
uncertainty that inhabits our projects and the agency proper to nonhumans, 
the more, in practice, that is to say in industry, we allow the so-called “end 
of the Great Divides” to fulfill itself, to the benefit of humans and their total 
colonization of the world. In other words, the more the post-environmen-
talists affirm that there is no nature, no limit, no separation between humans 
and their environment, the less agency nonhumans will have …
What, then, is the proposition of an ecology of separation with regard 
to nature?
1 First of all, we recall that every relation implies a limit that is not 
moral and religious, but material. The relation maintained with 
this or that source of energy or water includes the possibility 
that that source might run out. After all, this is what ecological 
discourse has been saying since its beginning! A limit is nothing 
but the immanent and material underside of every relation. One 
may say: that’s obvious! But post-environmental constructivism has 
rendered this obvious truth inaudible, by incessantly hammering 
away at the point that to speak of limits is necessarily to adopt the 
frightened discourse of those who fear to “transgress”… Thinking 
the connections between material limit, relation and technology, 
means thinking in cosmotechnological terms; it means measuring 
the risk of selected mechanisms that do not favor democracy, care 
for environments and their possible resilience; it means reinserting 
technologies into the context of a desirable world and of the 
oppositions which this desire will never fail to provoke—the 
political power of the two is unassailable.
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2 But how can we become capable of considering both the relation 
and the limit, in other words, the interconnection and that which 
could shatter it, in a world which increasingly presents itself as 
immanent, lacking an outside, continuous? Instead of considering 
nature as a fixed substance or an element folded into a permanent 
process of transformation, an ecology of separation might take on 
the thinking of nature as detour, that is, as a mediation allowing us 
to separate ourselves, even if only temporarily, from what we are 
doing. This would be the inversion of a paradigm that considers 
nature as something immediate (continuous, enveloping, perhaps 
even maternal), precisely where technologies (of information, 
communication) are supposed, in complete contrast, to allow the 
creation of mediations among beings. But, in the era of generalized 
connections, of the Internet of Things or communication among 
machines, it is the opposite which is true: geo-anthropogenic 
interconnections create a great, seamless tissue of “immediations.” 
What if nature could appear henceforth as that which allows 
us to re-establish a gap within the global technological system? 
Rather than being a totality, nature should be understood locally, 
as a means of allowing the creation of a temporal procedure 
of mediation, as detour—spatial and temporal—allowing us to 
measure the relations we produce and the material limits belonging 
to these relations.
On the basis of such a hypothesis, let us reread the famous 23rd letter of La 
Nouvelle Héloïse by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: in the end, that supernatural 
aspect of nature which Saint-Preux feels in the high mountains is simply 
a way of considering nature not as substance or transcendental principle, 
but as the detour, the mediation, the transient outside which permits him 
to engage in a radical critique of a society, and to call for its political 
transformation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
General ecology, economy, 
and organology
Bernard Stiegler
Translated by Daniel Ross
Ecology, organology, cosmology
In “A Thousand Ecologies: The Process of Cybernetization and General 
Ecology,” Erich Hörl takes up a proposition wherein Michel Deguy makes 
ecology the “task of thinking.”1 And he points out that a phrase such as the 
“task of thinking” owes something to Martin Heidegger. On the basis of 
this remark, he explains why Heidegger could not himself assume such a(n 
“ecological”) task in our epoch, that is, inasmuch as it posits that human-
ity’s ecological dimension is what, above all, today reveals its primordially 
artificial constitution—and its “artifacticity.”2
Furthermore, Erich Hörl himself refers to Gilbert Simondon to show that, 
in addition to the fertility of the terms and analyses proposed by this thinker 
of the relation, ecology, insofar as it is above all a relational form of thinking, 
must be conceived starting from cybernetics and from Simondon’s critique 
thereof (in the Kantian sense of “critique”), and by taking up this program 
on new bases (other than those of Norbert Wiener). This is what leads Hörl 
to conceive of a general ecology capable of assuming the task of thinking on 
the basis of a techno-logical perspective in which cybernetics, which was for 
Heidegger, too, the science characteristic of “modern technics” (see Zeit und 
Sein), constitutes the new conceptual framework that opens the way for a 
new “encyclopedism” in Simondon’s sense—that is, forming the new horizon 
of the transindividual (which in Simondon constitutes meaning) insofar as it 
bears the promise of a reconciliation between “culture” and technics.
I have myself argued for ten years that cybernetics must be under-
stood as the most recent stage of a process of grammatization that can be 
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thought only through the perspective that I have called, on the basis of a 
critique of Simondon (again, in the Kantian sense of “critique”), a “general 
organology,” which I believe to be a more apt way of approaching these 
questions than through what Simondon himself called a “mechanology” 
(although he did occasionally use the term “organology”).3
Before giving a recap of what I call general organology, let me explain 
how I use the concepts of Bertrand Gille, such as the concept of technical 
system and of social systems. General organology is a method of thinking, 
at one and the same time technical, social, and psychic becoming, where 
technical becoming must be thought via the concept of the technical system, 
as it adjusts and is adjusted to social systems, themselves constituted by 
psychic apparatuses.
There is no human society that is not constituted by a technical system. 
A technical system is traversed by evolutionary tendencies that, when they 
concretely express themselves, induce a change in the technical system. 
Such a change necessitates adjustments with the other systems constituting 
society—those systems that Bertrand Gille called social systems, in a sense 
that should be specified in confrontation with Niklas Luhmann.
These adjustments constitute a suspension and a re-elaboration of the 
socio-ethnic programs or socio-political programs that form the unity 
of the social body. This re-elaboration is a selection among possibilities, 
effected across what I call retentional systems, themselves constituted by 
mnemo-techniques or mnemo-technologies that I call hypomnesic tertiary 
retentions, the becoming of which is tied to that of the technical system, 
and the appropriation of which permits the elaboration of selection criteria 
constituting a motive, that is, a characteristic stage of psychic and collective 
individuation.
Hypomnesic tertiary retentions are fruits of a process of grammatization, 
wherein all the fluxes or flows through which symbolic and existential acts 
are linked can be discretized, formalized, and reproduced. The most well-
known of these processes is written language. And digital tertiary retention 
is the most recent of these processes.
Let’s now remind ourselves about the meaning of what I call “general 
organology”: general organology defines the rules for analyzing, thinking, 
and prescribing human facts at three parallel but indissociable levels: the 
psychosomatic, which is the endosomatic level, the artifactual, which is 
the exosomatic level, and the social, which is the organizational level. It is 
an analysis of the relations between organic organs, technical organs, and 
social organizations.
As it is always possible for the arrangements between these psychoso-
matic and artifactual organs to become toxic and destructive for the organic 
organs, general organology is a pharmacology. In the analysis that I will 
present here, I would like to project these perspectives into what I believe 
to be a broader, more encompassing, more clearly urgent and “relevant” 
(as one says in English) consideration of what for the last fifteen years has 
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been referred to as the Anthropocene, which I would like to consider from 
the point of view of what I provisionally call, with regard to Alfred North 
Whitehead, a “speculative cosmology.”
The speculativity of such a cosmology, which would also be performative, 
leads to the theoretical and practical prospect and program of a passage 
from the Anthropocene to what I propose naming the Neganthropocene—
all these issues being placed in the context of the cosmological stakes of 
thermodynamics, with the notion of entropy that is its second law, and of 
the analysis of life and technics as negentropic inversions and bifurcations 
that nevertheless do not oppose entropy but divert it, by deferring it, in a 
process resembling what Derrida called “différance,” with an “a.”
This diversion is, in the case of technics (that is, organology), 
a pharmacology, and it constitutes a future, an avenir, within the 
irreversible law of entropic becoming, devenir—a becoming that, insofar 
as it is inherently entropic, then becomes the law of what had hitherto 
and without major objection been referred to as “being”: that is, until 
1924, the year of the discovery by Edwin Hubble of the expansion of the 
universe, opening the era of what Ilya Prigogine calls the evolutionary 
perspective in physics.
Generality, metaphysics, cosmology
What does the adjective “general” mean in the expressions general ecology 
used by Erich Hörl and general organology as I try to think it? Is it the 
same as what Georges Bataille was referring to in his thought of general 
economy?4 Does this “generality” inevitably lead us back to a metaphysica 
generalis—or to a metaphysica speculativa?
These questions must be explored in dialogue with Whitehead and 
Simondon, that is, with, respectively, concrescence as that process which 
is the subject of Whitehead’s Process and Reality, and the process of 
concretization,5 which is one of the main concepts of Simondon’s Du mode 
d’existence des objets techniques—by raising the question of the generality of 
the point of view of process, and as passage from abstraction to concretion, 
or to concrescence, the abstract and the concrete being conceived here, 
therefore, from a fundamentally and primordially processual point of view.
In addition, these questions lead us back to that cosmology which 
passes through Simondon and Whitehead—beyond the rational cosmology 
of Kant, who could not, precisely, take into account the organological 
question (any more than could philosophy in general, with the exception 
of Marx). The ideas of a rational cosmology are in Kant those of reason 
(see “The Transcendental Dialectic,” Chapter 2, “The Antinomy of Pure 
Reason”), and we shall see that Whitehead sees himself in some respects 
from a similar perspective. Nevertheless, it is impossible to think with this 
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apparatus alone the thermodynamic question such as it was constituted 
with Sadi Carnot as the theory of the steam engine.
Kantianism, in fact, is constituted by a denial of the organological condi-
tions of the formation of reason as well as of understanding. This does 
not allow for any thought of entropy such as Carnot understands it on 
the basis of the artifact that is the steam engine as closed thermodynamic 
system. Nor does it allow for consideration, therefore, of those regimes of 
negative entropy that were uncovered by Erwin Schrödinger, preceded by 
Henri Bergson,6 then by Claude Shannon, Léon Brillouin, and Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen, who, unlike his predecessors, insisted on the issue of 
exosomatic organs.
I tried to show, in Technics and Time, 3, why the Kantian schematism, 
fruit of the transcendental imagination, did not allow him to think the 
organological (that is, tertiary retention) and its consequences for any idea of 
reason (including the idea of rational cosmology).7 From the organological 
perspective I defend here, the schematism originally comes from technical 
exteriorization and the artifactualization of the world as the condition of 
the constitution of the world, that is, as condition of the projection in the 
world of concepts constituting the given data of intuition of this world such 
as it is ordered in the cosmos—and it is the consideration of the cosmos 
itself (and not just of the world) that hence finds itself affected: we access 
the cosmos as cosmos on the basis of hypomnesic tertiary retentions in all 
their forms, from the shaman’s instruments to Herschel’s telescope.
Since the time of ancient philosophy, the kosmos, as an arrangement 
[disposition] of physis, through which it lets itself be seen and thus appear 
(phenomenalize itself) as this very arrangement, and as an order,8 has 
been conceived in terms of spheres and cycles closed in upon themselves 
as a fundamental and absolute equilibrium. In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 
which localizes the sublunary world in the fixed sphere, technics, which 
constitutes the organological condition, is in relation to the sublunary 
as the region of contingency and of “what can be otherwise than it is” 
(to endekhomenon allos ekhein), whereas the eide, conceived in relation 
to cosmic fixities, opposes to this facticity the necessity of to on. This 
division will be maintained in Kant, and this is particularly clear in 
“Theory and Practice.”9
Combustion
The advent of the thermodynamic machine, which Heidegger does not take 
into account, nevertheless constitutes, with the automation of machines, 
what Heidegger refers to as the Ereignis of “modern technology” (that is, 
of the industrial revolution) and its Gestell—and this is also the advent 
(“Ereignis”) of what today we refer to as the Anthropocene, but not as an 
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Er-Eignis, that is, a co-propriation, as the French translators of Heidegger 
wrongly claimed, but rather as an ex-propriation, wherein the human 
world appears to constitute a fundamental disruption of the cosmos, and 
of its local (planetary) equilibriums.
The thermodynamic machine is, however, also what introduces the 
question of an irreducible processuality of the cosmos itself, of the irrevers-
ibility of becoming, and, if not the instability, then at least the processuality 
in which this becoming consists, and it introduces all this at the heart of 
physics itself. This question seems, however, to have remained hidden in 
Heidegger due to his fixation on cybernetics (which seems equally to mask 
the question of marketing—in Heidegger as well as in Hans Jonas—such as 
Deleuze attempted to think it as that knowledge characteristic of societies 
of control).10
The thermodynamic machine—which in physics raises the specific and 
new problem of the dissipation of energy and, more generally, of the 
irreversibility of the “arrow of time” oriented towards disorder, that is, the 
irreversible increase of entropy—is also an industrial technical object that, 
arranged with the first automatisms and establishing proletarianization 
(that is, loss of knowledge) as the fundamental principle of productivity, 
fundamentally disrupts social organizations, and at the same time radically 
alters “the understanding that Dasein has of its being.”
If proletarianization radically disrupts social organization, the thermo-
dynamic machine also transforms the scientific point of view. Consisting 
essentially in a combustion, this technical object—an element of which, the 
flyball governor, will prove critical for conceiving cybernetics—introduced, 
on both the physical plane and the ecological plane, the question of human 
fire and of its pharmacology, which is thereby inscribed at the heart of the 
thought of the cosmos as cosmos (both from the perspective of physics and 
from that of anthropological ecology), the play between them being both 
cosmic and mundane: this is what the Promethean myth of fire means in 
Greek tragedy.
The notion of the Anthropocene can appear as such only from the 
moment when the question of the cosmos reveals itself to be that of 
combustion, accomplishing the transformation of cosmology into an astro-
physics of combustion, and as emerging from the thermodynamic question 
opened and posed by the steam engine—that is, by the techno-logical 
conquest of fire. Only within this perspective can there occur the kenosis of 
the “death of God.”
As a problem of physics, the techno-logical conquest of fire (which 
is the Ereignis of Gestell on the basis of which proletarianization arises 
as Bestand) placed anthropogenesis at the heart of concrescence, that is, 
organological organogenesis (what Georgescu-Roegen therefore calls the 
exosomatic), and as the local technicization of the cosmos—local and 
therefore relative. But this leads to a complete rethinking of the cosmos 
from an astrophysical perspective, starting from this position and from 
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this local opening of the question of fire, and as a pharmakon of which 
we must take care, which we must tend, and such that the question of the 
energy it harbors constitutes the matrix of the thought of life as well as of 
information as the play of entropy and negentropy.11 The cosmos certainly 
becomes the universe well before this, with Nicolas of Cusa and Giordano 
Bruno. But it is only with thermodynamics that it becomes the astrophysical 
“consumption” of becoming.
The notion of entropy natively presupposes the experience of anthropic 
fire, so to speak, as the entropy of physical combustion, then as the negen-
tropy of vital combustion, if we can put it this way, through which the 
living finds its place, its locality and its ethos in the universe that is carried 
along in the dissipative movement of its disorder. Here the living, insofar as 
it is not immortal, nor therefore divine, always returns to cosmic entropy—
including as the production of methane by animals, which can lead to the 
disequilibrium of the biosphere in relation to the ozone layer and so on, 
that is, even before they return to inertia.
Organology of the question
It is doubtful whether the full dimension of the question of entropy and 
negentropy among human beings, as a question, has ever truly been 
grasped.12 We could show, for example, that the works dedicated to 
entropy by Henri Atlan and Edgar Morin take no account whatsoever of 
the specificity of organological (exosomatic) negentropy, nor obviously of 
the equally specific entropy that it generates—in particular since the advent 
of the Anthropocene. And we could show that this also fundamentally 
weakens the theory of information conceived as a regime to entropy and 
negentropy (Simondon included).13
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, technics establishes, scien-
tifically but also socially (as standardization and proletarianization), the 
question of entropy and negentropy as the crucial problem of the everyday 
life of human beings and of life in general, and, ultimately, of the universe 
as a whole, which once again becomes the kosmos insofar as it invites, hosts 
and in some way houses the negentropic, that is, the living, including noetic 
life, which we therefore ought to call the neganthropo-logical.
As such, that is, as the organogenesis of this anthropos that is not self-
sufficient, technics—which is also anthropic in the sense that it extends and 
accelerates the entropy of anthropization in the Anthropocene—constitutes 
the matrix of all thought of the oikos, of habitat and of its law as ecology 
as well as economy, which is also to say, as oikonomia (which can here be 
“general” only in George Bataille’s a-theological sense).
This is also what was going on with what was at one time conceived 
as hermeneutic knowledge of the mind. This eventually became, with the 
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utilization by cognitivism of the concept of information—as it was thought 
by information theory and computationalist cybernetics—a new “science 
of the mind” (and of spirit and Geist), in which mind and spirit find 
themselves folded back into “cognition.”
In this new metaphysics that is cognitivism, the organological question 
that makes possible such a perspective (where the computer assumed to 
be a “Turing machine” becomes the model of the mind) is never posed. 
“Organological” means here: that which causes the living to pass from the 
organic stage to the organological stage, which requires radically new terms 
with which to think the organization of that of which this new organo-
genesis is the condition.
Technics—as the advent and event of what Ernst Kapp and then Friedrich 
Engels called “projection” or “organic extension,” but which more 
precisely is an organological extension, an extension that is not organic—is 
the pursuit of life by means other than life. And this is also the opening 
of what Heidegger believed should still be called the “question of being” 
as the advent of Dasein, that is, of the “being who questions.” Contrary 
to this Heideggerian perspective, we posit that if Dasein questions, it can 
only be insofar as technics challenges it, puts it into question—and does so 
starting from the fact that it is necessary to formulate this challenge, that 
is, to exteriorize it, which is very often (if it is indeed a question and not 
a fantasy or chatter) the starting point for a new technical exteriorization 
and a new putting in question, a new challenge, and so on.
As this organogenesis that is at once anthropic and neganthropic, technics 
is the post-Darwinian evolution of life that has become essentially technical 
and organological, and not just organic. This technical form of life poses in 
completely new terms the problem of what Canguilhem called the infidelity 
of the milieu, which confronts living things in general each time their milieu 
changes, but which, in the case of technical life, constitutes a technical milieu 
that introduces a new type of infidelity, in which it is organological and not 
just organic life that ceaselessly disrupts its milieu, and does so structurally 
and ever more rapidly: structurally to the extent that this disruption is 
vital to it, but tragically to the extent that it is always also toxic—insofar 
as it constitutes a phase difference that cannot be transindividuated, that 
is, adopted, in the sense that it must be individuated both psychically and 
socially (this is what Niklas Luhmann, it seems to me, does not see).
In other words, this organological milieu poses in completely unprec-
edented terms the question of the relations between what Claude Bernard 
called the interior milieu and the exterior milieu. New conditions of fidelity 
are required in order to overcome the shocks of infidelity, so to speak, that 
are provoked by what I call the epokhally double redoubling. This study 
of milieus and infidelities constitutes the field of what we can refer to as a 
general ecology inasmuch as it inscribes in the cosmos the perspectives of 
a general organology. It is also the pathway to a new understanding of the 
dynamics and statics of religion.
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The quasi-causal economy of infidelity
When life becomes organological, and not just organic, and when the 
“external” technical milieu conditions and in so doing constitutes the 
interior milieu of collective individuation and of the social systems in 
which it consists, as well as of psychic individuation (which results, as we 
now know, in an organological reorganization of the organic organization 
in which the cerebral organ primarily consists, and through the psycho-
synaptic internalization of the exosomatic and the social relations which it 
weaves, as the work of Maryanne Wolf shows), organological and pharma-
cological beings encounter the infidelity of the technical milieu, which as 
such constitutes them as noetic beings, for whom noesis is always both the 
repercussion [contre-coup] and the aftershock [après-coup] of an epokhal 
technological shock.
Technological shock is epochal in as much as it makes an epoch, that 
is, it is a suspension, an interruption, a disruption, and as such stupe-
faction. Epochal technological shock (such as the thermodynamic machine 
in partnership with discretization and the reproduction of the gestures of 
work by mechanical and automatic tertiary retention) is stupefying (and 
generates stupidity in a thousand ways) in that it disrupts the organo-
logical arrangements established by a prior and metastabilized stage of 
transindividuation—forming what Heidegger called “the understanding 
that there-being has of its being.”
Such an “understanding” is trans-individuated between the psychoso-
matic organs, technical organs, and social organizations (that Gille and 
Luhmann both call, but in two very different senses, “social systems”), 
and engenders a new “understanding that there-being has of its being” 
formed by the new circuits of transindividuation that form between the 
initial technological shock and a second moment that amounts to a noetic 
fulfilment (that is, a circuit of transindividuation) through which stupor 
becomes surprise and ultimately eventuates in an understanding.
General ecology, general economy and general organology are attempts 
to form such circuits in our epoch. This “generality” is indicative of an 
attempt to respond to the generality (and to the planetary, and as such 
locally cosmic, globality) of the shock we are given to think, and this 
requires us to trans-form this thinking into action—that is, into decision, a 
decision that slices into becoming, that carves into it in order to carve out a 
future, that is, a protention that is desirable and that would not be reducible 
to becoming: becoming, devenir, is entropic, whereas the future, avenir, is 
negentropic. Such a program is necessarily also a neganthropology.
Stupefaction, which is the condition of noesis (just as stupidity is the 
condition of thinking, as say Nietzsche and Deleuze), is that of which one 
always finds an echo, more or less near or distant, in what I call surprise, 
a sur-prised ap-prehension, a sur-prehension [surpréhension], which would 
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be irreducible to under-standing [compréhension], and where this relates to 
reason, to that reason which Kant distinguished from understanding.
It is as reconstitution of a fidelity to the milieu, and, in this milieu, 
to psychic individuals, technical individuals, and social individuals (via 
social systems), that a libidinal economy is established that would also 
be a general economy and a general ecology. In this libidinal and as such 
general economy, psychic, technical, and social individuals take care of 
one another through transductive relations, relations in which one side (for 
example, psychic individuals) cannot exist without the others (for example, 
technical individuals or social individuals), even though technical and social 
individuals pre-cede psychic individuals, and do so as the condition of 
formation of their preindividual funds, funds that were previously consti-
tuted as circuits of transindividuation for those who are now dead.
In principle, and because reason is rooted in what Kant called trans-
cendental apperception as the spontaneous coming together that occurs 
between the noetic order and the cosmic order, care, insofar as it is inher-
ently negentropic, and as such derives from a neganthropology, is also that 
care taken of ecology insofar as the cosmic milieu is locally neganthropic 
and must be protected from anthropic disequilibriums.
To what extent and in what economic conditions the coming together, 
the agreement, that founds Kantian transcendental apperception is possible 
in the Anthropocene epoch is the entire issue at stake in bringing together 
general ecology, general organology and general economy—that is, libidinal 
economy as the possibility of moving beyond the drive-based stage of 
consumerist capitalism and as constituting an economic system founded on 
the valorization of negentropy translated into neganthropology.
The precedence of technological shock constitutes what Simondon 
described as a phase difference, and it finds its point of departure in the 
originary default of origin. In this regard, the allegory of Prometheus 
and Epimetheus is the mythical formulation of what the archaeology of 
André Leroi-Gourhan describes as a process of exteriorization, after it was 
thought by Canguilhem as technical life, and which I myself call the pursuit 
of life—that is, of negentropogenesis—by means other than life.
This shock through which life mortifies itself by secreting what I have 
described as an epiphylogenetic memory that constitutes the possibility of 
what we today call culture, and which is the unthought ground of what 
Dilthey called the science of spirit, is also what constitutes libidinal economy 
insofar as, as artifact, it constitutes the fetish and hence the organological 
body as object of desire. In this way the instinct becomes the drive, that is, 
the capacity for detachable fixations, which is also to say, for perversion, 
and ultimately desire, via the binding of these drives through what Freud 
described as identification, idealization and sublimation—which is always 
a neganthropic process.
Such a libidinal economy implements, through various causal chains 
arising from the cosmos and the biosphere, a positive quasi-causality. And 
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as such it inverts the arche-event or Ereignis of organological facticity into 
a therapeutic necessity, and does so to the benefit not only of psychic, 
technical, and social individuals, but also vital, terrestrial and cosmic 
individuals: to take care of psychic and collective individuation, that is, of 
the organological biosphere (that we currently call the Anthropocene) is 
also to take care of what constitutes the general ecological condition.
Selection and decision
Here it is absolutely essential to read and critique The German Ideology, 
and then to re-read the Grundrisse on the basis of this re-reading of The 
German Ideology. I have tried to open up this work in States of Shock and 
in Pharmacologie du Front National. Only on the basis of such a critique 
of what in Marx and Engels amounts to the first philosophical formulation 
of the organological question (engendering and pre-ceding as it does the 
question of class struggle) is it possible and necessary to constitute general 
ecology on the basis of a general economy, that is, a libidinal economy, 
itself conceived on the basis of a general organology, and to do so as a new 
political thinking founded on a critical reinterpretation of Marx.
But this in turn is possible only on the basis of a conjoined re-reading 
of Marx, Freud, Husserl, Canguilhem, Leroi-Gourhan, Derrida, Deleuze, 
Lyotard and many others, through an investigation of the fundamental 
question of the difference between the organic and the organological, which 
is also their mutual différance(s), and thereby opens a new age of that 
différance that is noesis (by tracing new circuits of transindividuation) in 
relation to the différance that is life.
Such an investigation, such an instruction, is itself possible only by 
adopting a method that will coordinate the diverse knowledge that consti-
tutes a theory of general organology, but that will also, and as organological 
practice, invent negentropic instruments at the service of all forms of 
knowledge—savoir faire, savoir vivre, savoir théoriser (knowledge of how 
to do, live and think): it is in relation to these two dimensions that, with IRI, 
Ars Industrialis, pharmakon.fr and the digital studies network, I understand 
the program that Deleuze formulated in his call to “look for new weapons.”
In this context, Ars Industrialis problematizes digital shock in the social 
field as in the psychic field; IRI elaborates prototypes that are instrumental 
alternatives derived from what we call practical organology; pharmakon.
fr engages in theoretical practices with these instruments; and the digital 
studies network understands these problematics from a transdisciplinary 
perspective that takes the digital as its object insofar as it is conceivable 
only on the condition of rethinking all forms of knowledge starting from 
the organogenesis of artifacts, societies and psychic individuals that has 
been occurring since the origin of hominization.
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As I imagine it, the general ecology invoked by Erich Hörl is both a scientific 
and a political ecology, and it must as such tightly articulate the questions of 
selection and of decision—in the epoch of the digital trace and its algorithmic 
treatment, as well as in debate with Nietzsche. It is, in other words, a funda-
mental critique that poses the question of the criteria of selection, formed in 
such a way that they become criteria of decision, that is, critical categories, 
rather than merely biological, psychic or technical automatisms (and I will 
return to this question from the perspective of a philosophy of automaticity).
The passage from psycho-biological automatic selection to its 
dis-automatization as decision is possible only when organic organs 
combine with, and form a system with, the organological organs that are 
tertiary retentions, that is, with the epiphyologenetic supports of collective 
memory, opening up an interpretive play (a différance) through which 
criteria of selection become criteria of decision, that is, of psychosocial 
individuation, and not just vital individuation.
The outcome of this interpretive play is the production of circuits of 
transindividuation, that is, the continuous formation of new knowledge 
arising from the unfurling of organogenesis, generating new pharmaka from 
the circuits of transindividuation deriving from constituted knowledge, in 
turn requiring new forms of knowledge—placing into crisis those from 
which they stem, and provoking more or less stupefaction as this stunning 
and astounding in which the pharmakon always consists.
Hence is produced the transformation of techno-epochal shock into a 
surprise, a sur-prehension that eventually becomes a com-prehension—
which is less the understanding that there-being has of its being than that 
through which psychosocial individuation takes care of its organological 
and pharmacological condition, by trans-forming technical becoming by 
the same token into a noetic future, that is, into the desire to live in quasi-
causality, and therefore by default, and as a fault that is necessary—and on 
the basis of which, and because it has become banal, can arise a new and 
always surprising pharmacology.
Neganthropy of “torpor”—if not stupor, 
if not stupidity
It is in the context of this normativity that we must interpret Canguilhem 
when he posits that knowledge of life is the specific form of life capable of 
caring for itself, treating itself—and in the same way we must understand 
ecology as this same form of life caring for itself through the knowledge 
of the milieus, systems and processes of individuation through which the 
concrescence of the cosmos generates processes of individuation such that 
entropic and negentropic tendencies play out in different ways in each of 
the different forms of infidelity of these milieus.
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The questions about life and negentropy that arise with Darwin and with 
thermodynamics must in this sense be reinterpreted in the organological 
context, given that natural selection gives way to artificial selection, and 
that the passage from the organic to the organological displaces the play of 
entropy and negentropy.14 Thought in this way, technics is an accentuation 
of negentropy, since it is a factor of increased differentiation, but it is also 
an acceleration of entropy—not just because it is a process of combustion 
and of the dissipation of energy, but because industrial standardization 
seems today to lead to the destruction of life as the burgeoning and prolif-
eration of differences: biodiversity, cultural diversity, and the singularity of 
psychic individuations as well as collective individuations.
Only from this perspective do the questions of Bestand, Gestell, and 
Ereignis makes sense for us—that is, for those in the Anthropocene who 
question the epokhal singularity in which this time, which is a period that 
presents itself as the probability of the end of time, fails to consist, so to 
speak. But if so, Bestand, Gestell, and Ereignis take on a meaning that is in 
a way the epoch of the default of epoch, which is possible only according to 
a twist of meaning that is incompatible with Heideggerian thought—even 
less so given that the epochal dimension of thermodynamics is in no way 
taken into account in the writings of the Kehre.
In addition, the perspective and the prospect (that is, the future) that I 
propose here (as the epoch still to come) in terms of general organology 
with respect to a Neganthropocene calls upon a neganthropological 
conception of noetic life, that is, of life that studies and knows life in 
order to care for it (as biology, ecology, economy, organology, and every-
thing that this entails—namely, every form of knowledge understood in 
terms of its cosmic tenor). This would furthermore be a life that would 
be functionally and primordially that of a libidinal economy, and of such 
an economy rethought in organological terms and as general economy in 
Georges Bataille’s sense, which requires a complete redefinition of phenom-
enology in general and the existential analytic in particular.
Such a redefinition passes through the inscription of Freudian shock 
within an organological perspective, thereby going beyond Freud himself. 
It means asking the organological question of tertiary retention as that 
which constitutes the possibility of the dis-automatization of instinct—in 
a vein not foreign to the questions raised by Arnold Gehlen, who must 
be read here with John Bowlby and Donald Winnicott. The dis-automati-
zation of instinct comes at the cost of the formation of other automatisms, 
artificial—that is, psychic, technical, and social—automatisms that as a 
general rule require an economy: that which sets the rules in any society 
and does so through various forms of regulation (rituals, education, law, 
institutions), governing the processes of exchange resulting from the 
dis-automatization of the instincts insofar as this makes possible and 
necessary the detachability of artificial organs, which become objects of 
exchange, as well as the detachability of the drives, which, precisely insofar 
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as they themselves become detachable, must be bound together so as not 
to become entropic.
General economy, general ecology, and general organology are a salvage 
effort with respect to the conditions of a libidinal economy today ruined, 
which it is a matter of rethinking from the perspective of neganthro-
pology starting from the fetish, the transitional object, and the artifact as 
condition of all consistence—and in the sense where Whitehead inscribes 
this dimension of consistence at the heart of concrescence.
General economy, ecology, and organology thus conceived with Georges 
Bataille, together call for Vladimir Vernadsky’s concept of “biosphere,” 
later replaced with that of “ecosystem,” and reactivated in France by René 
Passet, a concept with which we can explore the paradox of technology, 
which is another name for what Ivan Illich called counterproductivity. 
When, as a system, the growth of technology reaches a certain point, 
its effects are inverted—and as such it becomes paradoxical, which 
Passet described as a “passage to limits.” We must relate this concept of 
counterproductivity to the pharmakon in general, and the diverse counter-
productive effects of the prevailing organological condition should be seen 
as entropic and negentropic pharmacological effects.
The automotive pharmakon, the car, created to augment mobility, 
engenders urban congestion. The computerized pharmakon, created to 
assist with decision-making, engenders cognitive overflow syndrome and 
paralysis (confounded with stupefaction and consolidated with the systemic 
and functional stupidity wrought by drive-based capitalism, to which 
is added, in France, the institutional stupidity generated by the Ecole 
nationale d’administration, an institution responsible for training, for 
example, François Hollande and most of his advisers: hence France hurtles 
towards its current fate, one in which stupidity reaches extreme levels). 
This paradox can also be seen with medicines that, if poorly prescribed (not 
just in the wrong doses), poison the patient, or may even produce what in 
pharmaceutical science is called a “paradoxical reaction,” that is, where the 
medicine acts in such a way that it causes the very thing against which it is 
intended to fight.
The pharmacological paradox equally afflicts the social organizations 
that are institutions and corporations insofar as they always make use 
of political technologies, governmentality, and management, in the sense 
in which Foucault placed these political technologies at the heart of his 
thought of power in general under the umbrella of biopower (which should 
be related back to Weber, and read alongside Polanyi), an issue that should 
also be explored with Gille and Luhmann with respect to the concept of 
social system, all of these things constituting specific cases of the pharma-
cology that conditions and limits any organology and therefore any human 
ecology.
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Limits
We must, then, also examine more closely the general conditions of 
emergence of these paradoxical effects, and we must do so alongside a 
reading of Passet’s L’Économique et le Vivant, in which the problem of 
sustainable development is examined from the perspective of systems 
theory, in terms of passages to limits in various domains, domains that are 
understood as systems or elements of systems:
Sustainable development is not a question like others, or just one among 
others. This question reveals a passage to limits through which it is the 
interplay of economic laws that is transformed.15
These limits raise the question of new equilibriums and disequilibriums, 
establishing new general conditions of intersystemic metastability:
Beginning in the eighties, in fact, with the issue of global damage to the 
biosphere … it is no longer specific resources or environments that are 
threatened, but the regulatory mechanisms of the planet itself.16
The biosphere is defined here, following Vladimir Vernadsky, as a complex
and self-regulating system, in the adjustments and evolutions of which 
life—and thus the human species—plays a fundamental role. Two logics 
confront each other here: that which presides over the development of 
economic systems and that which ensures the dynamic reproduction of 
natural environments.17
The question raised here is that of the Anthropocene—more than twenty 
years before its more or less official recognition—at the level of natural 
milieus. But this question also arises today, and perhaps especially, and 
certainly firstly, at the level of organological milieus themselves, and of 
social systems and social environments—that is, mental environments.
For if it is true that the question is care, its organization, its culture, 
one might even say its worship [culte]—care as the formation of attention 
through circuits of transindividuation that cultivate reason through reasons 
to live and to take care of life in quasi-causality—then the question of 
mental ecology precedes the question of environmental economy—even 
though mental ecology is conditioned by organology and pharmacology, 
so that from Plato to Marx and up until ourselves, it presents itself as the 
question of stupor, or of torpor: I employ this latter term that Adam Smith 
used in his analysis of the extremes of the industrial division of labor—
“torpor” was used by Smith to describe the effects of mechanization on the 
minds of those who were in the course of becoming proletarian.
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And such torpor becomes, in our time, a stupor—and our stupefaction 
in the face of the state of shock provoked by digital technology leads not 
only to functional stupidity, but to a catastrophic and dis-astrous (losing 
the light of the stars, the stars that in French are “asters,” and losing them 
for lack of a therapeutic of computation based on a new cosmology), 
destruction of noesis itself by automatic proletarianization.
As for development, in Passet’s terms, this involves growth that is both 
complexifying and multi-dimensional:
MM this growth is complexifying through a dual movement of 
diversification and integration, allowing the system to grow by 
reorganizing itself yet without losing its coherence;
MM it is multi-dimensional to the extent that, beyond the economic in 
the strict sense, it takes into account the quality of the relations 
established between human beings within the human sphere, and 
their relations with the natural environment.18
This duality is a source of conflict because
while nature maximizes its stocks (biomass) on the basis of a given flow 
(solar radiation), the economy maximizes market flow by depleting 
natural (non-market) stocks, the decrease of which is noted in no 
economic records and produces no corrective action.19
Hence there arises a question of nature and culture. I would have liked to 
show that to address Passet’s question we must overcome this opposition, 
but I will be able to do no more than give an outline of this in my 
concluding remarks.
Be that as it may, this conflict has today reached a threshold that 
amounts, precisely, to a passage to limits. Now, in reaching its limits,
any system in ‘phase transition’ undergoes changes in the way it 
functions:
MM the limit of the saturation of needs …
MM the limit of the reproducibility of a natural resource …
MM the limit of rhythms of assimilation or self-purification …20
Such a passage to limits is a sudden return to entropy. At stake is therefore 
the power to provoke bifurcations in this entropic becoming, reopening 
unknown pathways to come, to the future—and I argue (in agreement, I 
think, with the perspective of Erich Hörl) that such pathways are organo-
logical, and must above all consider the still unknown possibility of the 
most recent stage of grammatization, that is, of digital tertiary retention 
inasmuch as it makes possible new and unprecedented neganthropic 
works.21
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The calculation industry, quantum organization 
of the inorganic, and decision
Let us conclude by turning to Whitehead. When he introduces the concept 
of process, he at the same time establishes that the opposition between 
natural phenomena and cultural phenomena has become outdated. This 
obviously does not mean that the distinction between nature and culture 
would be outdated. In this way, a general economy is outlined that is not 
yet a general organology, but that calls for the latter and requires it.
In Whitehead, with regard to cosmology, it is no longer a question of 
spheres, but of process, that is, more precisely, of dynamic interlocked 
spirals materialized by regimes of speed—and where there is such a thing 
as infinite speed, which is that of thought: the power to disrupt and to 
dis-automatize, that is, to change the rules—a power that is knowledge, 
which Whitehead, in his “Introductory Summary” to The Function of 
Reason, also called history, and which is par excellence the function of 
reason (Whitehead here inherits something from the Kantian framework 
that I recalled at the beginning of my remarks):
History discloses two main tendencies in the course of events. One 
tendency is exemplified in the slow decay of physical nature. With 
stealthy inevitableness, there is degradation of energy. The sources of 
activity sink downward and downward. Their very matter wastes. The 
other tendency is exemplified by the yearly renewal of nature in the 
spring, and by the upward course of biological evolution. In these pages 
I consider Reason in its relation to these contrasted aspects of history. 
Reason is the self-discipline of the originative element in history. Apart 
from the operations of Reason, this element is anarchic.22
This discipline that is reason, the privilege of noetic beings in Aristotle’s 
sense, is obviously a specific negentropic capacity to “realize” an order 
in struggling against this “anarchic element.” I myself argue that such a 
faculty is neganthropological and constitutes the neganthropos that we 
strive to be in actuality.
More often, however, we are entropic, in particular since the advent 
of consumer capitalism: this capacity to change the rules that is negan-
thropological reason brings with it a danger of intersystemic conflict 
(highlighted by von Bertalanffy in the introduction to his General System 
Theory, and as this theory’s justification23). The pharmacological question 
is in this way inscribed at the heart of cosmology and as the “anthropo-
technical,” bio-spherical and local consequence that follows from the initial 
combustion and its universal thermodynamic law.
To change the rules is the power to move faster than the speed of 
light, insofar as the latter has become, as the speed of digital automata, 
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the horizon of the calculation and computing industry: it is to move 
infinitely fast—to escape established circuits regardless of their speed, and 
to introduce a bifurcation—at the speed of desire, that is, of idealization, 
through which neganthropy passes onto the plane of consistence, making 
the noetic economy of desire the line of flight of any neganthropology that 
can be realized only organologically, that is, pharmacologically, and this is 
the stake of what Whitehead called the function of reason:
The function of Reason is to promote the art of life.24
The higher forms of life are actively engaged in modifying their 
environment. In the case of mankind this active attack on the environment 
is the most prominent fact in his existence.25
The primary function of Reason is the direction of the attack on the 
environment.26
Such a power, however, presupposes knowledge, knowledge that is always 
the knowledge of powerlessness (and of a “non-knowledge”). The question 
then arises of the laws of the universe conceived as constituting the field of 
what we call physics, a body of rules for a game that we cannot change—
but that we can localize and, through this localization, which is also an 
augmentation, interpret. That is, we can organize this inorganic, entropic, 
and sidereal play or game, and this is what we do with nanophysics and 
quantum technology, at the risk of bringing about, in return, dis-organiza-
tions, such as for instance via that new toxicity imposed on organisms by 
the nanometric infidelity of new milieus of life. And this is so only because 
the universe is incomplete, unfinished.
Given that technics consists above all in the organization of inorganic 
matter, leading in turn to the organological reorganization of cerebral 
organic matter, which modifies the play of every somatic organ, and thus 
gives rise to a new form of life (that is, a new form of negentropy) that 
is nevertheless also, as technical, an accelerator of entropy on all cosmic 
planes (and it is this two-sidedness that characterizes the pharmakon), 
there remains a cosmic question of technics: that is, of a technical epoch 
of a cosmos within which nanophysics amounts to a transformational 
inscription (in Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s sense when he refers to transformational 
technologies), at the quantum level, of re-organization, one that operates 
via the intermediary of the scanning tunneling microscope.
The scanning tunneling microscope is itself a computer capable of 
simulating, that is, of schematizing. This arrangement between the cerebral 
organ and the quantum scale of hyper-matter is a stage of concrescence that 
is also a process of concretization in the broader Simondonian sense—in 
that it operates on all planes of the cosmos at the same time: sidereal, vital 
and psychosocial, that is, technical. This localization can act retroactively 
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on the play of the whole biosphere, into which it can in a way spread itself 
generally (through a process of amplification27), and this has now engen-
dered that specific stage of concrescence that we refer to in our epoch as the 
Anthropocene.
Technics obviously respects the laws of physics, since otherwise it would 
not function. But technics, as “matter that functions” organologically 
(and constituting as such what I propose calling hyper-matter), locally 
trans-forms the cosmic order in ways that are not predictable. Hence 
the concretization of the technical individual as a mode of existence, the 
functioning of which cannot be dissolved into the laws of physics, tends to 
gives rise to associated techno-geographical milieus. It was for this reason 
that Simondon claimed the need for a mechanology that I prefer to under-
stand as an organology—given that mechanology does not enable us to 
think pharmacologically, or to think the links between psychic, technical, 
and collective individuation.
Processes, concrescence, disruptions, infidelities of milieus, and 
metastable equilibriums (and thus disequilibriums) all form what, in our 
epoch, presents itself to us as what we are causing within ourselves, around 
us, and between us, as projections of a becoming that we are no longer able 
to trans-form into a future on the basis of our organological and pharma-
cological condition, that is, as the play between the processes of psychic, 
technical, and collective (that is, social) individuation, processes through 
which and in which we always find ourselves tied to these three dimensions 
by their mutual organological condition.
It seems today that this play and this game is turning into a massacre, 
wherein psychic and collective individuation are being killed off by a 
technical individuation that is slave to a self-destructive economy—because 
it is destructive of the social milieus without which no technical milieu is 
possible that does not at the same time destroy the physical milieus of the 
biosphere.
The general ecological question poses and imposes on this tripartite 
division the question of biological, geographical, and cosmic systems and 
processes, such that they thoroughly infuse, constantly, locally, and in 
conditions of locality that remain totally to be thought, the processes of 
psychic, technical, and social individuation. In addition to analyzing the 
condition of transindividuation through co-individuation of the processes 
of psychic, technical, and social individuation, general organology studies 
the conditions of returning to vital biological sources, and of doing so in the 
cosmic, entropic, and sidereal conditions of negentropy, insofar as these are 
made possible by scientific and noetic instruments.
Through this dual approach, general organology investigates the condi-
tions of possibility of a political and noetic decision, a decision that is 
made possible by grammatization. And at the same time it investigates the 
specific regime of the pharmakon that is established by grammatization, 
which is haunted by the question of proletarianization. The realities of the 
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latter, in terms of subsistence and existence, must be studied for each epoch 
of the “history of the supplement,” given that, failing the development of 
therapies and therapeutics, proletarianization has the effect of eliminating 
the possibility of decision, that is, of neganthropogenesis.
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proletarianization that occurs when the steam engine combines with the 
automatisms made possible by the mechanical tertiary retention characteristic 
of industrial mechanization.
12 In the sense that I attempted to redefine this as a question, as creating a 
question, in What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology, trans. 
Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
13 On this subject, see my Beyond the Anthropocene, trans. Daniel Ross (New 
York: Columbia Univeristy Press, forthcoming).
14 Which cannot but radically affect ecological science, and not just political 
ecology. But it does so by inscribing the political event into the very heart of 
the science of the living in its negotiation with the organized non-living and 
the organizations in which it results.
15 René Passet, L’Économique et le Vivant (Paris: Economica, 1996), x–xii.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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20 Ibid.
21 The latter pass through a fundamental economico-political change, which 
takes account of automation and its ruinous effects on employment, and 
installs a new mechanism to redistribute productivity gains, in the wake of 
the analyses of Oskar Negt and André Gorz, in the form of time allocated 
for the development of individual and collective capabilities (in Amartya 
Sen’s sense): it is for this reason that Ars industrialis advocates the creation 
of a contributory revenue, modeled on the law of the “intermittents” of the 
entertainment industry in France, and IRI is developing contributing research 
platforms with a view to designing a new architecture of the world wide web 
at the service of an economy that values negentropy and fights entropy at the 
same time. These perspectives are developed in Stiegler, Automatic Society, 
Volume 1.
22 Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1929), “Introductory Summary,” n.p.
23 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory (New York: George 
Braziller, 1968), 3–29.
24 Whitehead, The Function of Reason, 2.
25 Ibid., 5.
26 Ibid.
27 See Simondon, Communication et information.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The modern invention 
of nature 1
Didier Debaise
Translated by Michael Halewood, 
with James Burton
A growing tension has set its seal on our experience of nature. There is, on 
the one hand, the modern conception of nature which we have inherited 
and which permeates each of our thoughts and, on the other, the contem-
porary ecological transformations with which we are faced. It seems that 
this tension has, today, reached a point of no return. The concepts we 
deploy, the abstractions we construct, our very modes of thought, are no 
longer able to deepen and develop our experience of nature; they only 
obscure its meaning. My ambition, then, is twofold: first, to show that the 
modern conception of nature does not express any true ontology (dualist 
or monist), but that it is essentially operative; and that if we want to 
understand how a certain representation of nature has imposed itself, it is 
the status of these operations that we must elucidate and interrogate. The 
center of this operation, the constitutive gesture which characterizes it, is the 
division of nature into two heterogeneous modes of existence; its paradig-
matic expression is the difference between “primary” and “secondary” 
qualities. The whole distribution of beings, all the oppositions between 
their attributes and their appearances, derive from this: existence and 
value, the real and the apparent, fact and interpretation. Hence I propose, 
secondly, to follow the proposition of an evental conception of nature, 
according to which the sense of value, of importance and finality—which 
in the modern experience of nature are classified as “psychic additions,” 
human projections on to a nature that would otherwise be destitute—can 
be found everywhere, from the most primary, microorganic forms of life, 
to reflective consciousness.
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The gesture of bifurcation
My primary aim is to take up, while also trying to update, Whitehead’s 
protest against what he calls “the bifurcation of nature.” Although this 
phrase is, at first sight, somewhat puzzling, it designates the collection of 
experiential, epistemological and political operations which were present at 
the origin of the modern conception of nature, a concept whose effects can 
still be felt today. In the very first pages of Concept of Nature, Whitehead 
provides a definition, in the form of a protest:
What I am essentially protesting against is the bifurcation of nature 
into two systems of reality, which, in so far as they are real, are real in 
different senses. One reality would be the entities such as electrons which 
are the study of speculative physics. This would be the reality which is 
there for knowledge; although on this theory it is never known. For what 
is known is the other sort of reality, which is the byplay of the mind.2
This passage has been the subject of a series of misreadings and misun-
derstandings with regard to how bifurcation should be understood. It is 
necessary to take this passage at face value, in order to develop a better 
grasp of what is at stake in the challenge that it makes. The first impression 
is that, in one way or another, bifurcation returns us to dualism. The termi-
nology and the oppositions used certainly seem similar. Does the difference 
between a “reality which is there for knowledge” and a reality established 
by “the byplay of the mind” or, equally, between “causal nature” and 
“apparent nature,” not return us to the distinction between extension and 
thought, between matter and spirit? If this were the case, would bifurcation 
not simply be a new way of thinking about dualism and, furthermore, a 
new approach to developing a critique of dualist philosophy, principally 
that of Descartes, and its influence on the modern epoch? If Whitehead’s 
philosophy is read in this way, it might certainly gain from a juxtaposition 
with other critiques of dualism, but it would lose its originality. Yet it is 
this reading of bifurcation as offering a new critique of dualism, which has 
predominated. It can be found in the lectures that Merleau-Ponty3 gave on 
Whitehead’s philosophy, in the work of Jean Wahl,4 but it is Félix Cesselin 
who makes the point most starkly: “I think that it is only possible to fully 
grasp Whitehead’s thought by starting with reading of what he understands 
by the rejection of the ‘bifurcation’ of nature. The bifurcation of nature is 
dualism. In particular, it is Cartesian dualism.”5 This interpretation is far 
from being an isolated case. It expresses most clearly and succinctly that 
which the majority of readers of Whitehead believe they have found in 
bifurcation.
I would like to suggest a different way of inheriting this concept by 
affirming a radical difference between bifurcation and dualism. This is 
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not to claim that previous readings of bifurcation are false, but they have 
reduced its importance. If bifurcation is to be given its true force, another 
approach needs to be taken. In order to substantiate this hypothesis, three 
elements will be introduced. Firstly, although Whitehead often refers 
to dualism in his writings, notably Cartesian dualism, he also talks of 
bifurcation, its constituent elements, and its influence in the experience of 
modernity, without invoking any relationship to dualism. If bifurcation 
really were just another name for dualism, if Whitehead had tried show 
its constitutive role in the constitution of modern science, then why did 
he not take the time to link them in some way? The most plausible inter-
pretation is that the two problems seemed so different to Whitehead that 
he did not think it necessary to comment on the distinction. It seemed, to 
Whitehead, that the obvious difference between the two requires no expla-
nation. As a result, according to Whitehead the only possible relation is one 
of an inversion. One of the rare occasions on which Whitehead does link 
bifurcation and dualism can be found in Science and the Modern World, 
when he writes: “the revival of philosophy in the hands of Descartes and 
his successors was entirely coloured in its development by the acceptance 
of the scientific cosmology [the bifurcation of nature] at its face value.”6 
This is a particularly important remark which merits a careful reading. Far 
from identifying bifurcation with dualism, Whitehead is clear that both 
Cartesian dualism, and dualism more generally, are dependent upon the 
question of bifurcation. It is Cartesian philosophy which accepts “at its face 
value” the cosmology of the bifurcation of nature. This rare allusion to the 
relation between bifurcation and Cartesian philosophy makes Whitehead’s 
position absolutely clear, although he does not draw out its implications. 
The reading of this passage offered here entails that the notion of bifur-
cation outlines a concept which is broader and more fundamental than 
that of dualism which, ultimately, is only one of its manifestations. Taken 
in the most direct, literal, sense, these two notions designate fundamentally 
different realities. The notion of bifurcation manifests the idea of process, 
a movement of differentiation. It is the trajectory through which nature 
is divided into two distinct branches. The phrase says nothing about how 
this division occurred, and even less about that which produced it, but it 
already points to a primary and important difference to dualism. If dualism 
is understood in terms of a duality of substances, regardless of how these 
are characterized, bifurcation indicates something very different, namely, 
how a single reality, nature, came to be viewed as divided into two distinct 
realms.
I will use the terms “gesture”7 and “operation” to account for the 
division of nature, as they seem to capture most accurately the particular 
character of bifurcation. The fundamental question is not that of knowing 
whether nature is genuinely, in itself, composed of two realms, each with 
distinct attributes. Rather, it is a question of the means by which the differ-
entiation of these attributes was established. It is the modus operandi of 
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the division, the gesture of the constitution of this division, which needs to 
be addressed, not its consequences, as expressed in a dual vision of nature.
As such, the origin of bifurcation should be sought not in the relations 
between thought and extension, mind and body, the real and the apparent, 
but in the characteristics of bodies themselves. Bifurcation gains its sense at 
the intersection of a range of questions: what is a natural body? What are 
its qualities and how do we experience it? Can we identify characteristics 
which are common to the multiplicity of physical and biological bodies, and 
what would these be? These are the same questions as those posed by the 
distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies that lies at 
the origin of the modern conception of nature, of which we are still the heirs.
One of the classic texts in which the difference between the qualities of 
bodies is most clearly stated, and which provides the basis for Whitehead’s 
development of his critique of bifurcation, is Locke’s An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. Of course, Locke’s Essay cannot claim to be the 
origin of the problem. For example, Boyle’s book The Origin of Forms and 
Qualities According to the Corpuscular Philosophy, published in 1666, 
undoubtedly influenced Locke’s thought, and this text contains the essen-
tials of the difference between the qualities of bodies. However, it is not 
an outline of the history of bifurcation, as such, which is important here. 
Rather, the task at hand is to trace its dispersed invention and how it was 
consolidated within both experimental practice and certain texts which 
provided it with its conceptual expression.
first such as are Primary qualities utterly inseparable from the body … 
These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may 
observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, 
motion or rest, and number. Secondly, such qualities which in truth are 
nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensa-
tions in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and 
motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, etc. These I 
call secondary qualities.8
In this passage, Locke assigns the qualities of bodies to two different realms. 
Firstly, there are primary qualities which are “inseparable from the body.” 
The term “primary” should be taken in its strong sense, as it indicates that 
these qualities are fundamental to the body and characterize its deepest reality. 
Primary qualities express the purified state of the body, unadorned by any 
variations to which it could be subjected. The qualities which Locke lists in 
this passage all refer to a physico-mathematical order: solidity, extension, 
figure [number], motion, and rest. As such, it is now possible to give a first 
response to the question what is a natural body? It is a particular articulation 
between physico-mathematical qualities. Locke gives an example which has 
become well-known: “take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part 
has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains 
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still the same qualities and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they 
must retain still each of them all those qualities.”9 The phenomenal variations, 
such as the color of the grain, its particular texture, the sensations that we 
have of it, in no way undermine the status of the primary qualities with which 
they are associated. Even when division renders a body imperceptible, so that 
it falls short of producing an empirical experience, as these qualities are of 
a specific kind and refer to what might be called a non-subjective aspect of 
nature, they must still be constitutive of all experiences of bodies. This is why 
it is necessary to insist that without these primary qualities, nature would be 
“soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, 
meaninglessly.”10 It would be wrong to think that this is an outdated 
conceptual approach; its legacy can still be found in contemporary science.
There persists, however, throughout the whole period the fixed scientific 
cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute 
matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations. 
In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It just does 
what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed by external relations 
which do not spring from the nature of its being. It is this assumption 
that I call “scientific materialism.” Also it is an assumption which I shall 
challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which 
we have now arrived.11
Having set out this primary realm of bodies, it is now possible to turn to 
that which Locke calls “secondary.” In the passage cited above, he gives 
some examples: colors, sounds, taste, etc. It is important to note a subtle 
point here. Secondary qualities are not described as simple projections by 
the mind onto bodies, as if the perceiving subject projects forms or impres-
sions which are completely external or unrelated to the bodies which are 
experienced. This is the difficulty presented at the end of the quotation 
taken from Locke’s Essay. Here he writes that secondary qualities are 
nothing other than the “power to produce various sensations in us by their 
primary qualities.”12 Locke is invoking a complex relation of dependence 
and difference. The mind is clearly involved, since it is in the activity of 
perception that primary qualities are altered, forming the different aspects 
by which we experience them, but the mind’s capacity is intimately linked 
to the power of primary qualities to affect. In short, although secondary 
qualities are radically distinct from primary qualities, they are derived 
from them, as they are an aspect of them. Secondary qualities constitute 
what might be called the domain of “psychic additions.” It is through 
such an addition that materialism is able to give a place to subjective 
experience:
we perceive the red billiard ball at its proper time, in its proper place, 
with its proper motion, with its proper hardness, and with its proper 
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inertia. But its redness and its warmth, and the sound of the click as a 
cannon is made off it are psychic additions, namely, secondary qualities 
which are only the mind’s way of perceiving nature.13
In the context of bifurcation, the theory of psychic additions enables 
a link to be established between primary and secondary qualities. This 
theory appears to give a place to the phenomenal experience of bodies 
by inscribing the latter in an order of non-phenomenal qualities. In our 
immediate experience, we only encounter hybrid qualities, ones derived 
from the power of bodies, but altered by the mind. In this sense, and in 
more contemporary terms, it is possible to re-read the previous examples 
and state:
What is given in perception is the green grass. This is an object which we 
know as an ingredient in nature. The theory of psychic additions would 
treat the greenness as a psychic addition furnished by the perceiving 
mind, and would leave to nature merely the molecules and the radiant 
energy which influence the mind towards that perception.14
What is fundamental is that the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities starts from an empirical base—the perception of a grain of wheat, 
the red billiard ball, the green grass, the law court—in order to then differ-
entiate between non-perceptual qualities and those subjective qualities 
which are supposedly derived from the former, while also expressing them. 
This is the center of the operation of bifurcation. It is here that the moment 
of bifurcation is located. Starting with immediate experience, bifurcation 
operates by splitting such experience into two regimes of existence. In 
doing so, it takes that which makes up the primary experience of nature 
and places it in a derivate, phenomenal realm. Once this bifurcation is 
established, once the two regimes are stabilized and subjective experience 
is rendered as epiphenomenal, it is possible to state that even if a funda-
mental knowledge of primary qualities is permanently postponed, in fact, 
it is possible, by right, bypassing both secondary qualities and the need for 
an exploration of the perceptions of such bodies. On this basis, it is possible 
to define the process of which is at the root of all epistemologies that are 
derived from the operation of bifurcation, an operation which makes any 
correlation between secondary qualities, simple appearances, and primary 
qualities, purely conjectural.
Another way of phrasing this theory which I am arguing against is to 
bifurcate nature into two divisions, namely into the nature apprehended 
in awareness and the nature which is the cause of awareness. The nature 
which is the fact apprehended in awareness holds within it the greenness 
of the trees, the song of the birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of 
the chairs, and the feel of the velvet. The nature which is the cause of 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   156 11/01/2017   14:28
 THE MODERN INVENTION OF NATURE 157
awareness is the conjectured system of molecules and electrons which 
so affects the mind as to produce the awareness of apparent nature. The 
meeting point of these two natures is the mind, the causal nature being 
influent and the apparent nature being effluent.15
The conclusion which can be drawn is that the modern invention of nature 
does not come from an ontological position, either dualist or monist, but 
from the local operations of the qualification of bodies. The ontology of 
the moderns is the manner in which it tries to explain, while masking, the 
gesture of the permanent repetition of a division between bodies and their 
qualities. In short, this ontology presupposes the gestures, techniques, and 
operations of division.
The localization of matter
Bifurcation leaves a murky zone in its wake, one produced by its own 
operations. Since all modern experience of nature inhabits this bifurcation 
and points towards the primary qualities of bodies, which are both consti-
tutive of experience and yet inaccessible to it, a more detailed investigation 
into these natural bodies in themselves is necessary. The question of quite 
what these primary qualities are in themselves is put center-stage, drama-
tized, intensified to the maximum, by this murky zone. But bifurcation 
leaves open the question of knowing how to characterize bodies when they 
are extricated from their phenomenal dimension. The operation of bifur-
cation only repeats, permanently, the separation of the qualities of bodies 
into various registers—that of physics, the biological, and social. But this 
separation continually leads back to a series of questions which receive no 
adequate response: what is a body which is separated from its secondary 
qualities? How can we make sense of such a body, since we only have 
access to secondary qualities? What kind of knowledge would allow us to 
penetrate into the interior of these non-observable qualities? According to 
the interpretation provided above, the inability provide a characterization 
of primary qualities is not a weakness of the modern conception of nature, 
it is where it draws its strength. It is the dramatization of this difficulty 
which constitutes this modern conception. It was necessary to push this 
point to the extreme, in order to give due weight to the second operation 
[procedure] which is constitutive of modern cosmology. Whitehead grants 
it a new name: “the simple location of matter”. It is this which will provide 
the abstractions which are required to deal with natural bodies. I will cite 
the long passage in which Whitehead describes this:
To say that a bit of matter has simple location means that, in expressing 
its spatio-temporal relations, it is adequate to state that it is where it 
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is, in a definite finite region of space, and throughout a definite finite 
duration of time, apart from any essential reference of the relations 
of that bit of matter to other regions of space and to other durations 
of time. Again, this concept of simple location is independent of the 
controversy between the absolutist, and the relativist views of space or 
of time. So long as any theory of space, or of time, can give a meaning, 
either absolute or relative, to the idea of a definite region of space, and 
of a definite duration of time, the idea of simple location has a perfectly 
definite meaning.16
Whitehead seems to state that, in the modern conception of nature, the 
possibility of having a simple location is a quality of matter. It is important 
not to misunderstand his point. Whitehead’s proposition is much more 
fundamental and it is possible to derive a general definition of matter from 
it; in any case, it represents the crucial element of this passage. With regard 
to the question—“what is matter in modern experience?” I would offer 
the response—“a localizable point.” It is a minimal definition, but it has a 
radical effect. For, questions about the origin, form and nature of matter 
are replaced by a question of a quite different order—where is it situated? 
Thus, it is as if the body, detached from “psychic additions,” is no more 
than an element which is localizable in space–time. It is only possible to 
understand “scientific materialism” if we take into account the circularity 
of its definition of matter and of space–time which leads to the reduction of 
matter to a localizable element. “The characteristic common both to space 
and time is that material can be said to be here in space and here in time, or 
here in space–time, in a perfectly definite sense which does not require for 
its explanation any reference to other regions of space–time.”17
There is a multiplicity of here-and-nows which precisely delimit zones 
of matter and the boundaries that separate other areas of the universe. 
According to this perspective, one space–time is sufficient, in itself, and does 
not need to make any reference to other space–times. Consequently, the 
response to the question “what is the world made of” that emerged in the 
seventeenth century was as follows: “the world is a succession of instanta-
neous configurations of matter, or of material, if you wish to include stuff 
more subtle than ordinary matter, the ether for example.”18 Whitehead sees 
Newtonian physics as one of the most important examples of this cosmo-
logical outlook:
Newtonian physics is based upon the independent individuality of each 
bit of matter. Each stone is conceived as fully describable apart from 
any reference to any other portion of matter. It might be alone in the 
Universe, the sole occupant of uniform space. But it would still be that 
stone which it is. Also the stone could be adequately described without 
any reference to past or future. It is to be conceived fully and adequately 
as wholly constituted within the present moment.19
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Whitehead’s critique of the notion of “simple location” can be developed by 
delineating three premises which are fundamental to modernity’s cosmology 
and which need to be analysed further. The first premise is: Matter can only 
occupy one space–time. The reason for this is clearly that this premise is 
based on the idea of simple location. This simplicity must be taken literally. 
It describes the mode of localization, a quality which has a profound place 
in modern thought. Schematically, it is possible to say that matter is placed 
here in space and, even more so, now in time; it is not only a question of the 
spatial and temporal framework, but of nature itself. Nature is envisaged 
as a multiplicity of localizable material points which form the bodies and 
locales of all existence. Thus, Whitehead rejects the first premise of locali-
zation and states that the simple existence of matter is a myth or, more 
precisely, an abstraction which has had disastrous consequences.
While the division of space and time into points and instants is useful in 
many cases, it is made possible by the work of an abstraction and becomes 
the center of innumerable difficulties and false problems when it is gener-
alized and posited as a principle of matter itself. The questioning of this 
first premise will lead Whitehead to develop a relativistic theory of time 
and space.
Second premise: Other modes of existence of matter are exclusively 
phenomenal. It is in this premise that simple location most clearly displays 
its relation to the bifurcation of nature. Indeed, the same gesture of differen-
tiation between two orders of reality can be found here, but now situated in 
a more technical framework. On one side, these points of localizable points 
constitute matter; on the other, are all the derivative forms such as duration, 
persistence of matter, the variations and intensifications of existence. This 
is bifurcation redeployed at another level, with its psychic and phenomenal 
additions, yet always reducible to the material, brute, existence of simple 
location. This construction “is beautifully simple. But it entirely leaves out 
of accout the interconnections between real things. Each substantial reality 
is thus conceived as complete in itself, without any reference to any other 
substantial reality.”20
Third premise: matter is that which is more concrete. This is the paradox 
of scientific materialism. Material points, the ultimate existents of matter, 
which are called upon to occupy a central and primary place in any expla-
nation of nature in general, are unthinkable without a formalization of 
space–time. Yet, how is it possible to locate a point and establish an instant 
without positing, either beforehand or simultaneously, a space and a time 
within which these can be established? This premise demonstrates one of 
the aspects of the relation between materialism and formalism.
Matter (in the scientific sense) is already in space and time. Thus matter 
represents the refusal to think away spatial and temporal character-
istics and to arrive at the bare concept of an individual entity. It is this 
refusal which has caused the muddle of importing the mere procedure 
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of thought into the fact of nature. The entity, bared of all characteristics 
except those of space and time, has acquired a physical status as the 
ultimate texture of nature; so that the course of nature is conceived as 
being merely the fortunes of matter in its adventure through space.21
According to the interpretation given above, bifurcation entails, necessarily, 
the localization which will complete it and provide it with its formal tools. 
The three premises that I have tried to outline form the axes from which this 
relation between bifurcation and localization draws it efficacy. Whitehead’s 
position is unambiguous: “I shall argue that among the primary elements 
of nature as apprehended in our immediate experience, there is no element 
whatever which possesses this character of simple location.”22
A whole tranche of modern philosophy has strayed into bifurcation and 
localization, losing itself in their effects, notably that of dualism, without 
ever returning to the source of the operations which they claim to have 
gone beyond. Whitehead paints a picture which is undoubtedly incomplete 
but gives the general image of the kind of thought which was founded on 
bifurcation: “There are the dualists, who accept matter and mind as on an 
equal basis, and the two varieties of monists, those who put mind inside 
matter, and those who put matter inside mind.”23 The range of positions 
is apparent, for they all share the same space, a common problem; one 
which accepts the primary existence of bifurcation but tries to reduce its 
effects while still confirming its importance. Thus, “the enormous success 
of the scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand matter with its 
simple location in space and time, on the other hand mind, perceiving, 
suffering, reasoning, but not interfering, has foisted onto philosophy the 
task of accepting them as the most concrete rendering of fact.”24 Therefore, 
we do not have to choose between these alternatives, as they all confirm 
the gestures at the origin of this image of thought. Simply opposing 
modern ontology does not make sense as the operations from which they 
are derived remain implicit, finding their efficacy in their effacement. The 
modern experience of nature has consisted in trying to connect conjecture 
(real nature) to a dream (phenomenal nature).
Nature as event
The bifurcation must be surpassed. But in what direction should we look 
for the conditions of such a surpassing? Everything seems blocked. We are 
at the crossroads of different possibilities, but the Whiteheadian diagnostic 
of the emergence of the concept of nature in modernity renders every 
position suspect at the least. Have we not said that the alternatives can only 
be apparent, that the ontologies which are presented as so many proposi-
tions, in seeking to replace the bifurcation, too often conceal the operations 
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and the gestures which they have just confirmed? We have tried to separate 
the concepts of bifurcation and localization in order to reveal the higher 
interests at work in this construction of the concept of nature. It is a 
question of interests which are essentially operational, practical, deriving 
from gestures of differentiation whose function is to allow possible actions 
and formalizations with regard to nature. Everything has been inverted: 
operation has taken the place of ontology, abstraction has replaced the 
concreteness of things and the possibilities of the knowledge of existence 
itself.
And what if we replaced everything in nature? What if, instead of 
distinguishing a phenomenal order and a real order, an order of secondary 
qualities and one of primary qualities, an aesthetic order and an ontological 
order, we began with a profoundly hybrid experience of nature, articulated 
according to axes that would be subject to variation at each moment, 
where the aesthetic immediately became an ontological problem, where 
perception and its qualities were commingled at the heart of being? Doesn’t 
the contemporary experience of nature oblige us to link together that 
which the cosmology of the moderns has conscientiously attempted to 
separate? Let us therefore restore everything to a single plane of nature, a 
single surface, without dualism and without differentiation from the outset! 
Whitehead gives the formula for this in a central passage of The Concept 
of Nature, which I would like to make the leitmotif of this alternative 
thinking of nature: “Nature is that which we observe in perception through 
the senses.”25 Here, in the form of a simple proposition, Whitehead makes 
a radical decision. It entails the restoration to immediate experience of all 
its rights: “All we know of nature is in the same boat, to sink or swim 
together.”26 This is an opportunity to deploy a true method. There is in these 
propositions a method which The Concept of Nature follows as strictly as 
possible, and which, transformed, deployed in the most radical possible 
form, will become the method particular to speculative thought. I would 
claim without hesitation that the evolution of Whitehead’s thought, leading 
him towards a speculative approach, is connected to this method, which he 
never wished to renounce: nothing is to be removed from experience. In his 
final work, Modes of Thought, he reprised this notion and identified it with 
an exigency which would be proper to philosophy, notably in contrast to 
the sciences: “philosophy can exclude nothing.”27
How, in The Concept of Nature, does this method transfigure the 
experience of nature? Let us take up the starting point to which the 
empiricist method appeals. How can it be directly given to us in perception, 
given that we subtract nothing and add no external elements? Whitehead’s 
response to this question is disconcerting to say the least, since it opens up 
perception to a hitherto unknown level: “the immediate fact for awareness 
is the whole occurrence of nature. It is nature as an event present for 
sense-awareness, and essentially passing.”28 This last part of the phrase 
is particularly important, since it raises the question of the “essence of 
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nature,” describing this essence as “passing.” It is from this quality of 
“passage” attributed to nature that everything else in the experience of 
nature derives, as multiple instances or actualizations. Whitehead specifies 
the meaning of this in returning once again to the philosophy of Bergson: “I 
am in full accord with Bergson, though he uses ‘time’ for the fundamental 
fact which I call the ‘passage of nature.’”29 Whitehead wants to take up this 
Bergsonian notion of passage anew, and give it as broad a sense as possible. 
It is to indicate not only a temporal transition, an evolution or a becoming, 
but also a spatial change, a shifting of place or a movement. There is no 
reason to attribute primacy to one or the other of these dimensions. All 
passage is directly—immediately, we should say—temporal and spatial.
How, starting from this notion of event, this conception of nature as 
event of all events, can Whitehead truly reconstruct a concept of nature 
which would free itself from the bifurcation? I will address this on the basis 
of three enunciations, each of which expresses an evental mode of existence 
in nature.
1 “Yesterday a man was run over on the Chelsea Embankment.”30 
The idea of an accident or a singular occurrence is the most 
common characteristic of an event: something has happened. An 
accident, the unexpected collapsing of a situation, the emergence 
of a reality that seems to break with the causal chain to which we 
may retrospectively connect it, a more or less radical rupture in 
the continuity of experience—all these are contained within the 
idea of the event as an occurrence within nature. There is nothing 
surprising in this. Whitehead does nothing more than take up the 
commonsense conception of the event in gathering these disparate 
expressions under the term “occurrence.” Nevertheless, if we go a 
little deeper, we find in them a base of presuppositions which the 
“Chelsea” example particularly brings out. Where exactly should 
we situate this idea of an “occurrence”? Is it in the subject to which 
something happens, and which therefore pre-existed that event? 
In this sense, would the evental dimension of what happened be 
merely an attribute? Let us be more precise: in our statement, is 
the event situated in the man who is run over, or does it have, 
rather, a more diffuse reality, connecting the witnesses, the victim, 
the driver, and perhaps the histories which populate the Chelsea 
Embankment? There has certainly been an occurrence, but it seems, 
when we explore it more deeply, to divorce itself from any support, 
any subject to which it could be attributed or from which it might 
emanate. The decision of Whitehead, who does nothing but take up 
the method that is imposed upon him, is that we have no reason to 
reduce the event to anything other than itself, to that which is given 
to us in immediate consciousness. This is a change of perspective 
which gives everything its proper place: the event as such is this 
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occurrence, and it is this which becomes the genuine substantiality 
whose attributes will then be the man, the witnesses, the Chelsea 
Embankment, and the narrator. Let us go further. The occurrence 
“a man was run over” unfurls itself in a multiplicity of spatial 
relations which become clear as we try to express their meaning. 
It is adjacent to “a passing barge in the river and the traffic in 
the Strand.”31 But it is also very much a temporal occurrence, 
which inserts itself within an infinite multiplicity of other past or 
concomitant experiences. Hence, “the man was run over between 
your tea and your dinner”32 expresses this temporal localization 
of the occurrence, within a constellation of others. This spatio-
temporal relation of the occurrence, which situates it at the center 
of a collection of other events, is not an exterior context, as if time 
and space were merely forms, receptacles or axes within which 
events took place. Whitehead makes the relation among events the 
center, from which time and space draw their consistency.
2 “Cleopatra’s Needle is on the Charing Cross Embankment.”33 
Attributing the status of event to Cleopatra’s Needle is a decision 
which at first seems to run counter to common sense. We find in it 
nothing in terms of those notions of occurrence, passage, temporal 
transition, that can easily be attributed to events belonging to the 
first category. What remains here of those accidents, those causal 
ruptures, those irruptions which formed the substance of the first 
type of event? If we look a little closer, however, the difference is 
perhaps not so marked as it first appears. We can find the same 
dimensions here, but transposed onto a new scale. In order to show 
this, Whitehead appeals to an experience of thought, an imaginative 
change of experience: “If an angel had made the remark some 
hundreds of millions of years ago, the earth was not in existence, 
twenty millions of years ago there was no Thames, eighty years ago 
there was no Thames Embankment, and when I was a small boy 
Cleopatra’s Needle was not there.”34 Everything depends on the 
temporal perspective in which we are invested. If we insert ourselves 
within a particularly long time, the persistence of the Needle 
becomes more ephemeral than our initial impression of it. We may 
add that if, from a point of view with sufficient scope, it is true that 
the Needle seems unchanging, when we observe it in more precise 
detail, when we insert ourselves into its internal existence, when we 
analyze its parts, we see that beneath its apparent simplicity there 
unfolds a multiplicity of modifications, variations and exchanges 
with its surroundings. Thus a “physicist who looks on that part of 
the life of nature as a dance of electrons, will tell you that daily it 
has lost some molecules and gained others.”35 If we were to decide 
to view it within a much larger timescale, or if we inserted ourselves 
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within the micro-variations which are imperceptibly transforming 
it, the observation would be similar: the continuity of the Needle’s 
existence is an event which is not so different, in its principles, 
from any occurrence in nature. However, this has an important 
implication. If we agree with Whitehead, then all the “objects” of 
our experience—material objects, physical, technical, biological 
objects—are indeed events displaying similar principles of passage 
and temporal transition. An evental occasion, an accident or an 
occurrence, does not directly display the idea of a persistence, even 
if it presupposes one. In the case of my first example, the persistence 
of the driver, the victim, the witnesses, and Charing Cross, are 
required in order for the accident as irruption, as the bifurcation of 
a situation, to have any reality at all. The accident realizes itself on 
the basis of multiple persistences in relation to which it produces 
a difference. But what is persistence, exactly, for Whitehead? 
It relates to notions of duration, of maintained existence, of an 
extended being. As I said above, if we were to insert ourselves into 
these persistences, to sink ourselves into their interior, we would 
find there the multiplicity of little accidents, little changes and little 
metamorphoses which, beneath the level of apparent stability and 
invariance of the “needle,” are transforming it at every moment of 
its existence. We may identify the following general consequence of 
this: persistence presupposes occurrence.36 The sustained existence 
of the Needle is nothing but the repetition, the recurrence of what 
Whitehead would later call the “historical route”; that is, of a series 
of occurrences, of little events, that are wholly ephemeral within the 
perspective of the scale of its existence.
3 “There are dark lines in the Solar Spectrum.”37 This enunciation 
seems at first glance to converge with and confirm the first two. 
One would be tempted to see in this a fresh insistence on expressing 
either the idea of occurrence—the fact that a dark line can make 
an irruption within the solar spectrum—or the persistence of 
the spectrum, whose existence involves the presence of dark 
lines. However, it is actually a new component of the notion of 
event which Whitehead wants to highlight on the basis of this 
enunciation. What is at stake is neither the question of how to 
speak properly of the existence of “dark lines,” nor of the “solar 
spectrum,” but the putting of these two events into a relation. In 
a certain manner, as I have already said, every event is essentially 
relational, whence the impression that this enunciation does 
nothing more than affirm the other two. How then does the putting 
into relation of these two events in fact differentiate itself from 
the relational existence of other events? The singularity of this 
enunciation must be positioned in the operation of this relating, in 
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the introduction of a new dimension added to the events which are 
the “solar spectrum” and “dark lines.” Whitehead does not make 
this qualification directly. I propose to call it objective correlation. 
The question which this enunciation poses is the following: given 
two events, what correlation may be established? This activity is at 
the heart of the theories, and primarily the scientific theories, whose 
specificity Whitehead wants to reveal based on the solar spectrum 
example. One may say that “if any event has the character of 
being an exhibition of the solar spectrum under certain assigned 
circumstances, it will also have the character of exhibiting dark 
lines in that spectrum.”38 This is the whole theoretical dimension, 
abstract and operational, that Whitehead means to locate in 
the theory of events. This decision is loaded with consequences. 
First of all, it shatters the initial distinction between the events 
of nature and the ways of representing them, in order to place 
them directly on the same level, on the same plane. Everything is 
positioned horizontally on this plane of nature. The ways in which 
we connect events form parts of experience itself; they are factors 
of existence just as real as the persistence of the Needle. Recall the 
importance, for Whitehead, that encompasses the method from 
which he proceeds, and which must accept no exception. Theories 
are immediate data of consciousness just as much as the Chelsea 
accident or the persistence of the Needle. Subsequently, in affirming 
that correlations are events as such, Whitehead induces the idea that 
they should have been treated like every other event in nature. The 
question of the consequences of this relation between theories and 
events remains in suspension at the time of The Concept of Nature. 
Scientific theories are events, marked by the same characteristics 
of occurrence, persistence, historical trajectory, mobile relation. 
Thus, the evental meaning of this third enunciation is that the event 
“solar spectrum” is connected to another event, “dark line,” by the 
intermediary of a third type of event, that of correlation. It is an 
entirely different space of events which establishes itself, with the 
function of associating and articulating other events. What I call 
the objective correlation thus becomes a new mode of existence of 
events, which adds itself to occurrence and persistence. The method 
which Whitehead implicitly follows, let us say again, consists in 
placing within experience what is, for sensory consciousness, the 
immediate fact of the passage of nature. At this level, it is the 
interlacing of these components which forms the primary matrix of 
the plane of nature: the accident, Cleopatra’s Needle and the dark 
lines correlated with the solar spectrum, are immediate fact.
It is on the basis of this that a new composition of nature becomes possible. 
The event takes the place of dualisms and separations. All the operations 
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are displaced, now forming the general qualities of the events of nature. If 
we follow this logic of events directly, it is no longer necessary to oppose 
ethics to ontology, perception to being, appearance to reality, fact to value, 
epistemology to axiology. The immediate fact is the great plane of nature, 
surface with neither height nor depth, site of the constant entanglement of 
the events which form the substance of beings.
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CHAPTER SIX
Deep times and media mines
A descent into the ecological 
materiality of technology
Jussi Parikka
The classic curse of Midas became perhaps the dominant 
characteristic of the modern machine: whatever it touched was 
turned to gold and iron, and the machine was permitted to exist 
only where gold and iron could serve as foundation.
LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION, 1934
Introduction
In Lewis Mumford’s influential take on technology, one aspect stands 
out as well as literally escapes the eye. For Mumford, the underworld 
of excavations and mines is a crystallization of modern technology. It is 
devoid of nature, an artificial environment, which transposes the city into 
a place underground. It is mobilized and itself accelerates the emergence of 
capitalism1 while at the same time creating a new sort of a media-ecological 
environment, the non-organic habitat. Rosalind Williams does an excellent 
job of elaborating Mumford’s historical philosophy of technology as an 
analysis of the contemporary technological moment. Mumford’s argument 
that the underground constitutes one essential part of technological devel-
opment becomes clear through his mapping of the mining culture producing 
coal and other mining products as a paleotechnical industry and his account 
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of mining as a wider metaphor for technology: the artificial, constructed 
environment, carefully managed, burrowing into the earth and displacing 
the natural with the constructed, the non-organic. The geological identifi-
cation of earth history, Cuvier’s work on fossils as indicators of different 
spatio-temporal strata of the earth, the emergence of mining cultures 
but also the urban life of the underground—transport, sewage, building 
projects, infrastructure—were together responsible for the birth of the 
technological imaginary of the underground.2 Mumford stands as one early 
theorists of this “underground turn” in modern technology but we can 
more broadly ask, what are the media-ecological stakes in the depths of the 
earth and the geophysical?
The underground and the geological persist as part of the discourse and 
practices of technology. Williams is equally apt in her argument that the 
depth and method of excavation were transposed into quests for truth: 
the political economy, the discovery of the undergrounds of the mind in 
psychoanalysis and other forms of hermeneutics of depth, were indicative 
of the rise of the modern idea of surface-depth-dialectics as part of episte-
mology. For our contemporary media culture, this idea of depth has carried 
over some of its earlier meanings. Our discourse of data mining drives the 
enthusiasm-fuelled big data-discourse and business practices; besides depth, 
massive building projects have not disappeared and characterize the contem-
porary geoengineering in the midst of the Anthropocene: plans for Canal 
Istanbul connecting the Black Sea and Marmara Sea, the Kingdom Tower in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia that has had to lower its ambitions from the original 
plan of 1.6 kilometers to 1 kilometer, the earlier speculations of China’s 
ambition to build a railroad of 1,300 kilometers to connect Russia, China, 
and the U.S., and many more. The architectural imaginary in connection 
with the ecological focus is a way to understand the contemporary media 
cultural moment and is penetrated by the geophysical forces that are 
closely entangled with technology. Besides the architectural angle, media 
technologies are, in short, ways of making sense of the earth (surveying, 
visualizing, informationalizing, quantifying, modeling, simulating) as well 
as being enabled by it—from electromagnetic communications to the 
minerals we extract to make cars and computers work.
This chapter is a short take on this notion of the underground and 
more specifically the deep time of the media. The term was already used 
by the media theorist Siegfried Zielinski, but I will take it in an alternative 
direction, using it to emphasize the materiality of media as part of earth 
durations and earth excavations: the mineral and metal basis of digital 
media ecology. In Mumford’s take, the materiality of the elements, places, 
and practices—wood, coal, mines, mining, etc.—stand out in discussions of 
technology and allow us to realize, again, the influence of such elemental 
conditions of media-technological relations to the earth. One can connect 
this to Guattari’s ecological thought, but in ways that expand from three 
ecologies to the multiple overlapping stratifications of the informational 
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across the earth. Benjamin Bratton speaks of the stack as the leading 
concept for this planetary condition, which reorganizes some of the 
political coordinates of the geographical becoming geopolitical becoming 
geophysical. Bratton’s analysis includes six layers of “Earth, Cloud, City, 
Address, Interface, and User,” demonstrating a rich ecology of interac-
tions vertically and horizontally.3 The stack defines interdependent layers 
that seem to be partly technological, partly natural, partly social, but the 
best way to understand them is as political geographies, and what Bratton, 
drawing on Carl Schmitt, calls the new nomos defining the design of the 
contemporary political moment.
Furthermore, in terms of extensions of the Guattarian ecological, Gary 
Genosko has recently spoken of the four elements of the contemporary 
political moment. “Earth–air–fire–water” are mobilized by Genosko from 
fragments of Empedocles into the beginning of an ecological ontology 
of the contemporary in terms of the earth and the recircuited political 
economy of appropriation:
Wrapped around these elements is the planetary phylum, a great tellurian 
cable bunch with its own products: EARTH: electronics; WATER: liquid-
ities like bottled water, which throws forward diagrammatic intensities 
in the explosion of plastic debris; AIR: gases (greenhouse); and FIRE: 
artificial plasmas and lasers. However, as we have seen, the new elements 
combine both in existing direct—blood mixed with dust in the extraction 
of conflict minerals and oil fields, or methane, a flammable unnaturally 
mingled with the water supply, and which contributes to the green-
house gas effect—and extra-rotational manners, by means of especially 
communicative matters, like microscopic fragments of plastics that 
perfuse the oceans and get into the food chain, and constitute fine dusts 
that affect respiration, settling among the fogs, gases and lethal clouds.4
As one of the elemental media conditions, deep time resources of the earth 
sustain technological processes—the machine that needs “gold and iron” 
as its foundation—but also a wider range of other metals, minerals and 
energy. The emergence of geology as a discipline since the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, as well as the techniques of mining developed since 
then, are essential for media-technological culture. Institutions such as 
the US Geological Survey have transformed into institutions central to 
the contemporary geological and geographical condition; they are sites 
of epistemological transformation where the earth becomes an object of 
systematized knowledge. This knowledge, including knowledge concerning 
material resources, becomes mobilized towards technological production, 
governmental geopolitics and increasingly a global survey of the minerals 
of the earth.
Land artist Robert Smithson referred to “abstract geology”: the idea 
suggests that tectonics and geophysics pertain not only to the earth but 
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also to the mind. Thinking and conceptual work become embedded in a 
wider material condition. Abstract geology is a field where a geological 
perspective is distributed across the organic and non-organic division. Its 
reference to the “abstract” might attract those with a Deleuzian inclination 
and resonate with the concept of “abstract machines.” However, Smithson’s 
interest was in the materiality of the art practice, reintroducing metals (and 
hence geology) back into the studio. What’s more, Smithson was ready to 
mobilize his notion, which emerged in the artistic discourse of land art 
in the 1960s, towards a conceptualization of technology that we can say 
was nothing less than anti-McLuhanian: instead of seeing technology as 
extensions of Man, here technology is aggregated and “made of the raw 
materials of the earth.”5 From our twenty-first-century perspective, approx-
imately fifty years later, it starts an imaginary alternative media-theoretical 
lineage that does not include necessarily McLuhan, Kittler and the like, 
but instead tells a story of materials, metals, chemistry, and waste. These 
materials articulate the high-technical and low-paid culture of digitality. 
They also provide an alternative ecological paradigm for the geophysical 
media age—the persistence of the deep elements, remixed.
And the earth screamed, alive
So here is a suggestion that differs from the usual narrative of digital 
economy: What if your guide to the world of media were not one of the 
usual suspects—an entrepreneur or evangelista from Silicon Valley, or 
from a management school, aspiring to catch up with the smooth crowd-
sourced clouding of the network sphere? What if your guide were Professor 
Challenger, the Arthur Conan Doyle character from the 1928 short story 
“When the World Screamed”? The text appeared in the Liberty magazine 
and offered an odd insight into a mad scientist’s world, with a hint of 
what we would nowadays call “speculative realism.” Professor Challenger, 
whose dubious and slightly mad reputation preceded him, raised a prospect 
later taken up by the philosophers Deleuze and Guattari: that the earth is 
alive, and its crust is tingling with life, exhibiting the work of non-organic 
life, as Manuel DeLanda argued. The idea of the living earth has a long 
cultural history: from Antiquity it persists as the idea of terra mater, and 
in the emerging mining cultures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
become embedded within Romantic philosophy; later, in the twentieth 
century, the emergence of Gaia theories brings a different connotation to 
the holistic life of the planet.
The narrative of strata and geology starts with a letter: an undated letter 
addressed to Mr. Peerless Jones, an expert in Artesian drilling. The letter 
is a request for assistance. The nature of what is required is not specified, 
but the reputation of the mad scientist, the slightly volatile personality of 
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Professor Challenger promises that it will not be a normal operation. Mr. 
Jones has to put his specialist knowledge in drilling into good use. In Sussex, 
U.K., at Hengist Down, Professor Challenger is engaged in a rather secret 
operation, although it remains for a long period unclear what sort of a job 
the special drills are needed for. Even the sort of material to be penetrated 
is only later revealed to be different from what is usually expected when we 
speak of mining operations: it is not primarily chalk or clay that are to be 
drilled, or the usual geological strata, but some kind of jelly-like substance 
that demands the attention of the specialist.
The operation itself did not start with the undated letter. The Professor 
had already for a long time been drilling deeper and deeper into the earth’s 
crust, until finally he had reached a layer that pulsated like a living animal. 
The earth is alive, and to prove this vitality with experimental means was 
actually the true objective of Challenger’s mission. Instead of drilling and 
mining for petroleum, coal, copper, iron ore and other valuables for which 
men usually dig holes in the ground, Challenger’s mission is driven by a 
desire to prove a new speculative position that concerns the living depths 
of the earth: beyond the strata of “sallow lower chalk, the coffee-coloured 
Hastings beds, the lighter Ashburnham beds, the dark carboniferous clays, 
and … gleaming in the electric light, band after band of jet-black, sparkling 
coal alternating with the rings of clay,”6 one finds unusual layers, which did 
not adhere to the classical geological theories of Hutton or Lyell. It seems 
suddenly as if undeniable that even non-organic matter is alive: “The throbs 
were not direct, but gave the impression of a gentle ripple or rhythm, which 
ran across the surface.”7 Mr. Jones describes the deep surface they found: 
“The surface was not entirely homogenous but beneath it, seen as through 
ground glass, there were dim whitish patches or vacuoles, which varied 
constantly in shape and size” (11). The whole layers, the core and the strata 
throbbed, pulsated, animated. Hence it is not even necessary to go to such 
lengths as Professor Challenger, in one of the most bizarre rape-like scenes 
in literature, when he penetrates that jellyesque layer just to make the earth 
scream. This scientific sadism echoes in the ears of the audience and much 
further afield. It is the sound of “a thousand of sirens in one, paralysing all 
the great multitude with its fierce insistence, and floating away through the 
still summer air until it went echoing along the whole South Coast and even 
reached our French neighbours across the Channel.”8 All this was observed 
and witnessed by an audience called by the Professor—peers and interested 
international crowd, by invitation only.
Professor Challenger was predated by nineteenth-century fiction 
characters, like Heinrich in Novalis’ “Heinrich von Ofterdingen” (1800/02), 
asking “Is it possible that beneath our feet a world of its own is stirring 
in a great life?”10 The poetics of the earth was paralleled by the increasing 
demand for new resources of energy and non-fuel minerals. Earth metals 
and minerals were tightly linked to the emergence of modern engineering, 
science and technical media. Metals such as copper were a crucial material 
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feature of technical media culture from the nineteenth century onwards. A 
lot of the early copper mines were however exhausted by the start of the 
twentieth century, leading to new demands both in terms of international 
reach and in terms of depth: new drills were needed for deeper mining, 
which was necessary in order to provide the materials for an increasing 
international need exacerbated by its systematic—yet environmentally 
wasteful—use in wires and network culture. In addition the increasing 
demand and international reach resulted in the cartelization of the copper 
business from mining to smelting.11 Indeed, besides such historical contexts 
of mining, in which Challenger’s madness starts to make sense, one is 
tempted to think of the imaginary of horrors of the underground from 
Lovecraft to Fritz Leiber. Leiber preempts a much more recent writer of 
the biopolitics of petroleum, Reza Negarestani, both of them highlighting 
the same theme: petroleum as a living, subterranean life form.12 One should 
neither ignore the earth-screams caused by hydraulic fracturing—fracking—
which besides the promise that it might change the geopolitical balance of 
energy production, also points towards what is often neglected in the 
discourse of geopolitics, that is, the geo, the earth, the soil and depth of the 
crust that leads to bowels of the earth. By pumping pressurized water and 
chemicals underground the procedure forces gas out from between rocks, 
forcing the earth to become an extended resource. Rocks fracture, benzene 
and formaldehyde creep in, and the earth is primed to such a condition 
to expose itself. Fracking is in the words of Brett Neilson perfectly tuned 
to the capitalist hyperbole of expansion across limits: “Whether it derives 
from the natural commons of earth, fire, air, and water or the networked 
commons of human cooperation, fracking creates an excess that can be 
tapped.”13
The metallic reality of the earth finds its way to consumer technologies, 
infrastructures and also media technologies. Besides the speculative stance, 
one can turn back to empirical material. According to 2008 statistics, 
media materiality is actually very metallic: “36 percent of all tin, 25 
percent of cobalt, 15 percent of palladium, 15 percent of silver, 9 percent 
of gold, 2 percent of copper, and 1 percent of aluminum”14 goes annually 
to media technologies. We have shifted from being a society that until 
the mid-twentieth century was based on a very restricted list of materials 
(“wood, brick, iron, copper, gold, silver, and a few plastics”15) to one reliant 
on a computer chip that is composed of “60 different elements.”16 Such lists 
of metals and materials of technology include critical materials such as rare 
earth minerals that are increasingly at the center of both global political 
controversies of tariffs and export restrictions from China. They are also 
related to the debates concerning the environmental damage caused by 
extensive open pit mining, which is massively reliant on chemical processes. 
Indeed, given that the actual rock mined is likely to contain less than one 
percent copper,17 the pressure is on the chemical processes to tease out the 
Cu for further refined use in our technological devices.
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The figures concerning the metals of media seem astounding, yet testify 
to another materiality of technology that can be linked to Conan Doyle, 
but also to the contemporary media arts discourse of the deep time of the 
earth. There is an interest in the living matter of geology that continues 
from poetics and narratives to the mobilization of resources that animate 
(digital) media culture. Thus, I will move on from Professor Challenger to 
Siegfried Zielinski, and his conceptualization of deep times of media art 
histories. In short, and as I shall elaborate in more detail soon, the figure 
of deep time is for Zielinski a sort of a media-archaeological gesture that, 
while borrowing from paleontology, actually turns out to be a riff used to 
understand the longer-term durations of artistic and scientific collaboration 
in Western and non-Western contexts.
An ecology of deep time
Zielinski’s notion of Tiefenzeit, deep time, is itself an attempt to pick 
up on the idea of geological time as a way of guiding how we think of 
the humanities-focused topics of media arts and digital culture. Deep 
time carries a lot of conceptual gravity and is employed as a way to 
investigate the “Deep Time of Technical Means of Hearing and Seeing.” 
Zielinski’s approach kicks off as a critique of a teleological notion of 
media evolution which assumes a natural progress embedded in the 
narratives of the devices—a sort of a parasitical attachment, or insistence 
on the rationality of the machines and digital culture, that of course has 
received its fair share of critique over the past few decades of media and 
cultural studies.
For Zielinski, earth times and geological durations become a theoretical 
strategy of resistance against the myths of progress that impose a limited 
context as the basis for understanding technological change. It relates in 
parallel to the early modern discussions concerning the religious temporal 
order vis-a-vis the growing “evidence of immense qualitative geological 
changes”19 which articulated the rift between some thousands of years of 
biblical time and the millions of years of earth history.
This deep temporality combined the spatial and temporal. Indeed, in 
James Hutton’s Theory of the Earth, from 1778, depth means time: under 
the layers of granite you find further strata of slate signaling the existence 
of deep temporalities. Hutton proposes the radical immensity of time, 
although this comes without a promise of change; all is predetermined as 
part of a bigger cycle of erosion and growth.20 Indeed, it becomes necessary 
for Zielinski to rely on Stephen Jay Gould’s more nuanced contemporary 
theories of the punctuated equilibrium and variation at the core of 
geological time—and find in them an indication of how to think media 
artistic / cultural times as well.
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For Zielinski, this makes possible a way to understand media archaeology 
as related to a notion of the deep times of the ways in which we modify, 
manipulate, create and recreate means of hearing and seeing. Zielinski 
introduces inspirational deep times of apparata, ideas and solutions for 
mediatic desires which take inventors as the center of gravity. He himself 
admits that this approach is romantic and focused paradoxically on human 
heroes. It includes figures such as Empedocles (of “the four elements” 
fame), Athananius Kircher, and for instance Joseph Chudy, with his operatic 
dreams and his early audiovisual telegraph system dating from the late eight-
eenth century (he composed a one-act opera on the topic, The Telegraph or 
the Tele-Typewriter). They also include the opium-fuelled media desires of 
the slightly masochistically inclined Jan Evangelista Purkyne, a Czech from 
the early nineteenth century, who was in the habit of using his own body 
for various drug- and electricity-based experiments geared towards under-
standing how the body itself is a creative medium. What we encounter are 
variations that define an alternative deep time strata of our media culture 
outside the mainstream. The approach offers the anarchaeology of surprises 
and differences, of the uneven in media cultural past revealing a different 
aspect of a possible future. Zielinski’s project is parallel to imaginations of 
“archaeologies of the future”21 that push us to actively invent other futures.
In any case, while Zielinski’s use of the deep time of media as a metaphor 
is fascinating, I want to focus on the rather more materially animated 
version of media geology. With a theoretical hard hat on, I wonder if there 
is actually more to be found in this use of the notion of deep time both 
as temporality and geological materiality. Perhaps this renewed use may 
offer a variation that attaches the concepts back to discussions concerning 
media materialism as well as the political geology of contemporary media 
culture, with its reliance on the metals and minerals of the earth. The earth 
time gradually systematized by Hutton and other geotheorists of his period 
sustains the media time we are interested in. In other words, the heat engine 
cosmology of earth times that Hutton provides as a starting point for a 
media art historical theory of later times is one that also implicitly contains 
other aspects we need to reemphasize in the context of the contemporary 
Anthropocene and its obscenities: the machine of the earth is one that lives 
off its energy sources, in a manner similar to the way our media devices 
and political economy of digital culture are dependent on energy (cloud 
computing is still to a large extent powered by carbon emission-heavy 
energy production22) and materials (metals, minerals, and a long list of 
refined and synthetic components). The earth is a machine of variation, and 
media can live off variation—but both are machines that need energy and 
are tied together in their dynamic feedback loop. Electronic waste is one of 
the examples of the way in which media feeds back into the earth’s history 
and the future fossil strata of a deep time to come.
The main question that Zielinski’s argument raises is this: besides the 
media-variantological account concerning the design of apparatuses, users, 
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desires, expressions, and different ways of processing the social order and 
means of seeing and hearing, there is this other deep time too. This kind 
of alternative is more literal in the sense of returning to the geological 
stratifications and a Professor Challenger-type excavation deeper into the 
living ground. The interest in geology from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries onwards produced what was later coined “deep time,” but 
we need to understand that the new mapping of geology and the earth’s 
resources was the political economic function of this emerging episte-
mology. Indeed, the knowledge of the earth through geological specimens 
(demonstrated for instance in Diderot and D’Alembert’s “Mineral Loads 
or Veins and their Bearings” in volume 6 of Encyclopédie in 1768) and its 
newly understood history meant a new relation between aesthetics and the 
sciences. This link is also beneficial for new ways of extracting value: “As 
a result of eighteenth-century archeological and antiquarian activities, the 
earth acquired a new perceptual depth, facilitating the conceptualization of 
the natural as immanent history, and of the earth’s materials as resources 
that could be extracted just like archeological artifacts.”23
The media-theoretical deep time divides in two related directions:
1 Geology refers to the affordances that enable digital media to exist 
as a materially complex and political-economically mediated realm 
of production and process: a metallic materiality that links the earth 
to the media-technological.
2 Temporalities such as deep time are understood in this alternative 
account as concretely linked to the non-human earth times of 
decay and renewal but also to the current Anthropocene and the 
obscenities of the ecocrisis.
Deep temporalities24 expand to media ecology: such ideas and practices 
force media theory outside the usual scope of media studies in order to 
look at the wider milieu in which media materially and politically become 
media in the first place. This relates to John Durham Peters’ speculative 
question about cosmology, science and media, which develops into a short 
historical mapping of how astronomy and geology are susceptible to being 
understood as media disciplines of a sort.25 Continuing Peters’ idea we 
can further elaborate geophysics as the degree zero of media-technological 
culture. It allows media to take place, and has to carry their environmental 
load. Hence this “geology of media” perspective expands to the earth 
and its resources. It summons a media ecology of the non-organic, and 
it picks up from Matthew Fuller’s notes on “media ecology as a cascade 
of parasites”26 as well as an “affordance,” but one that itself is supported 
by a range of processes and techniques that involve the continuum of the 
biological-technological-geological.
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A media history of matter: From scrap metal 
to zombie media
One aspect of any general ecology of twenty-first-century capitalist techno-
logical culture is its relation to specific environmental themes. Electronic 
waste and planned obsolescence are indexes of this context and another 
aspect relates to energy and power.27 Indeed, what I want to map as the 
alternative deep time relates to geology in the fundamental sense of the 
Anthropocene. Crutzen’s original pitch presented it as a transversal map 
across various domains: from nitrogen fertilizers in the soil to nitric oxide 
in the air; carbon dioxide to the condition of the oceans; photochemical 
smog to global warming. (Is photochemical smog the true new visual 
media form of post-Second World War, technological, polluted culture?) 
Already Crutzen had initiated the expansive way of understanding the 
Anthropocene to be about more than geology. In Crutzen’s initiating defini-
tions it became a concept investigating the radical transformations in the 
living conditions of the planet.
The Anthropocene can be said to be—as Erich Hörl suggests in reference 
to Deleuze—a concept that maps the scope of a transdisciplinary problem. 
So what is the problem? Hörl’s suggestion is important.28 He elaborates the 
Anthropocene as a concept that responds to specific questions posed by the 
technological situation. It concerns environmental aspects but is completely 
tied to the technological: this concept as well as its object are enframed by 
technological conditions into which we should be able to develop further 
insight with the tools and conceptual arsenal of the humanities. Indeed, this 
is where a geology of media can offer the necessary support as a conceptual 
bridge between materials of chemical and metallic kinds and the political 
economy and cultural impact of media technologies as parts of the ongoing 
discourses of the global digital economy.
The concept of the Anthropocene becomes environmental. This is not 
meant purely as a reference to “nature” but to an environmentality under-
stood and defined by the “technological condition.”29 The environmental 
expands from a focus on the natural ecology to an entanglement with 
technological questions, notions of subjectivity and agency (as a critique 
of the human-centered worldview) and a critique of accounts of rationality 
that are unable to talk about nonhumans as constitutive of social relations. 
The Anthropocene is a way to demonstrate that geology does not refer 
exclusively to the ground under our feet. It is constitutive of social and 
technological relations, as well as environmental and ecological realities. 
Geology is deterritorialized in the concrete ways that metal and minerals 
become themselves mobile, and enable technological mobility: Benjamin 
Bratton’s words could not be any more apt, when he writes how we carry 
small pieces of Africa in our pockets, referring to the role of, for instance, 
coltan in digital media technologies; visual artist Paglen makes a similar 
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point in seeing the geo-orbital layers of satellite debris as outer reaches of 
earth’s geology and the Anthropocene (The Last Pictures project).30
Mammolith, an architectural research and design platform, describes 
technological artifacts such as iPhones as “geological extracts,” drawing 
earth resources across the globe and supported by a multiplicity of infra-
structures. The bits of earth you carry around are not restricted to small 
samples of Africa but include the material from Red Dog pit mine in 
Alaska, from where zinc ores are mined, before they are refined into indium 
in Trail, Canada. That’s only one example. Such sites where minerals and 
mining transform into technology are “scattered across the globe in the 
aforementioned countries, as well as South Korea, Belgium, Russia, and 
Peru.”31
More concretely, let’s focus for a while on China and its role in the 
global chains of production and discarding of media technologies. This 
geopolitical China is not solely about the international politics of trade 
and labor, though these are not to be neglected either. In a sense, we can 
focus on the material production of what later ends up as the massive 
set of consumer gadgets, and the future fossil record for a robot media 
archaeologist, but also as discarded waste: both electronic waste and scrap 
metals in general are necessary for the booming urban building projects and 
industrial growth. So much of this is driven by the entrepreneurial attitude 
of optimism; of seeing the world in terms of material and immaterial 
malleability, which in the case of media technologies has recently been 
realized also to include hardware in new ways. Indeed, in the midst of the 
wider enthusiasm for a global digital economy of software, some business 
correspondents like Jay Goldberg have realized that hardware is dirt cheap 
and even “dead.”32 His claim is less related to the Bruce Sterling-initiated 
proposal for a Handbook of Dead Media, “A naturalist’s field guide for the 
communications palaeontologist,”33 and has more to do with observing a 
business opportunity.
Goldberg’s dead media business sense is focusing on the world of super-
cheap tablet computers he first encountered in China, then in the U.S., 
for forty dollars. In this particular story, it triggers a specific realization 
regarding business models and hardware: the latter becomes discardable, 
opening a whole new world of opportunities.
When I show this tablet to people in the industry, they have univer-
sally shared my shock. And then they always ask “Who made it?” My 
stock answer is “Who cares?” But the truth of it is that I do not know. 
There was no brand on the box or on the device. I have combed some 
of the internal documentation and cannot find an answer. This is how 
far the Shenzhen electronics complex has evolved. The hardware maker 
literally does not matter. Contract manufacturers can download a 
reference design from the chip maker and build to suit customer orders. 
If I had 20,000 friends and an easy way to import these into the U.S., I 
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would put my own name on it and hand them out as business cards or 
Chanukah gifts.34
The reduced price of the tablets means widespread availability even for 
specified niche uses: from waitresses to mechanics, elderly people to kids, 
tablets could become the necessary accessory in such visions that would 
amaze investors. The visceral reaction by Goldberg is followed by rational 
calculations of what it might mean in the context of digital economy 
business models:
Once my heart started beating again, the first thing I thought was, “I 
thought the screen alone would cost more than $45.” My next thought 
was, “This is really bad news for anyone who makes computing 
hardware …”
 No one can make money selling hardware anymore. The only way to 
make money with hardware is to sell something else and get consumers 
to pay for the whole device and experience.35
Even hardware gets drawn into the discourse of experience economy with 
its connotations of immateriality. Hardware softens, becomes immateri-
alized; its materiality seems to change before our eyes. What Goldberg 
misses is that hardware does not die, not even in the Sterling sense of the 
unused dead media that become a sedimented layer of fossils left for quirky 
media archaeologists to excavate. Instead, it is abandoned, forgotten, 
stashed away, and yet retains a toxic materiality that surpasses the usual 
time scales we are used to in media studies. Such abandoned media devices 
are less about the time of use, or practices of users, than the time and 
practices of disuse. It would actually be interesting to write a history of 
cultural techniques of technological disuse. Besides such ideas, I want to 
remind us of the chemical durations of metal materiality. Think of this idea 
as the media-technological equivalent of the half-life of nuclear material, 
calculated in hundreds and thousands of years of hazard; in media-techno-
logical contexts, it refers to the dangerous materials inside screen and 
computing technologies that are a risk to scrap workers as well as to nature, 
for instance through the contamination of soil.
Next, look at the case from a different perspective. Adam Minter’s 
journalistic report Junkyard Planet offers a different story of hard metals 
and work, and looks at the issue from the perspective of the geology 
of scrap metals.36 China is one of the key destinations not only for 
electronic waste but scrap metals in general, a fact which offers a different 
insight to the circulation of what we could call geology of technologies. 
China’s demand for materials is huge. Integral to its still continuing 
major building projects, from buildings to subways to airports, was the 
need to be able to produce—or reprocess—more metals: scrap copper, 
aluminium, steel, etc.:
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On the other side of the mall, in all directions, are dozens of new high-
rises—all under construction—that weren’t visible from the subway and 
my walk. Those new towers reach 20 and 30 stories, and they’re covered 
in windows that require aluminum frames, filled with bathrooms 
accessorized with brass and zinc fixtures, stocked with stainless steel 
appliances, and—for the tech- savvy households—outfitted with iPhones 
and iPads assembled with aluminum backs. No surprise, China leads 
the world in the consumption of steel, copper, aluminum, lead, stainless 
steel, gold, silver, palladium, zinc, platinum, rare earth compounds, 
and pretty much anything else labeled “metal.” But China is desper-
ately short of metal resources of its own. For example, in 2012 China 
produced 5.6 million tons of copper, of which 2.75 million tons was 
made from scrap. Of that scrap copper, 70 percent was imported, with 
most coming from the United States. In other words, just under half of 
China’s Copper supply is imported as scrap metal. That’s not a trivial 
matter: copper, more than any other metal, is essential to modern life. It 
is the means by which we transmit power and information.
The big picture of technological culture is not restricted to worried 
comments about the rare earth minerals essential to iPhones. Instead it is 
necessary to realize the link between design and the residual of technology; 
the abandoned e-waste and other sorts of issues not always considered as 
part of the consumer cycle. The material history of media—for instance 
telecommunications—extends to the copper extracted from wires, through 
the removal of the outer covers to uncover this mini-mine of valuable media 
materials. The history of copper mining with its environmentally dangerous 
effects is extended to the re-mining from wires for use in a variety of novel 
ways of repurposing. One could say, following Minter’s narrative, that 
such a technological history of materials and material history of media as 
matter does not really follow the logic of a trajectory from life of use to 
death of disuse, but in places such as Foshan’s Nanhai District, technologies 
and media materials never die: they are the places where scrap metal gets 
processed.37
In Zombie Media, Garnet Hertz and I address the wider context and 
impact of the refusal of “dead media” to disappear from their planetary 
existence.38 Building on Sterling’s work, we argue that there is a need to 
account for the undead nature of obsolete media technologies and devices 
in at least two ways: in order to be able to remember that media never dies, 
but remains as toxic waste residue, and in order to be able to repurpose 
and reuse components in new ways, as for instance circuit-bending and 
hardware-hacking practices imply. The zombie media angle builds on 
two contexts not specific to digital media but present in such accounts as 
Goldberg’s and the wider micropolitical stance that ties consumer desires 
to design practices. Planned obsolescence is one such design feature that 
has been focused on in the critical literature. It is also something that other 
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art and hacking projects such as Benjamin Gaulon’s Recyclism, address as 
a persistent part of the design and production of technological objects and 
systems. Similarly, such approaches take into account the current issue 
of abandoned hardware, which even in functional devices amounts to 
hundreds of millions of screens, mobiles, electronic and computing devices 
that are still not properly dealt with after their use. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) statistics from 2009 indicate that there are 
2.37 million tons of electronics ready for their afterlife management, 
representing “an increase of more than 120% compared to 1999.”39 The 
primary category is related to screen technologies but we can safely assume 
that the rise of mobile technologies will soon constitute a rather big share 
of this dead media pile, of which only 25 percent was collected for any sort 
of actual management and recycling in 2009. The amount of operational 
electronics discarded annually is one kind of geologically significant pile 
that entangles first, second, and third nature:40 the communicational vectors 
of advanced digital technologies have a rather direct link to and impact 
upon first natures, reminding us that the contemporary reliance on swift 
communicational transactions is also reliant on this aspect of hardware. 
Those communicational events are sustained by the broader sphere of 
geology of media: technologies abandoned and consisting of hazardous 
material: lead, cadmium, mercury, barium, etc.
National, supranational, and NGO bodies are increasingly forced to 
think the future of media and information technologies as something 
“below the turf.” This means both a focus on the policies and practices 
of e-waste as one of the crucial areas of concern and planning for raw 
material extraction and logistics to ensure supply. As illustrated by the 
brief mention of scrap metal in China, the usual practices of mining are 
not considered the only possible route for the future geology of media. The 
future geo(physical)politics of media circulate around China, Russia, Brazil, 
Congo and for instance South Africa as key producers of raw materials. The 
materiality of information technology starts from the soil and the under-
ground. Miles of crust opened up by sophisticated drills. This depth marks 
the passage from the mediasphere to the lithosphere. An increasing amount 
of critical material is found only by going down deeper into the crust or 
otherwise difficult-to-reach areas. Offshore oil drilling is an example of 
this—in some cases in rather peculiar circumstances and at unusual depths: 
the Tupi deposits of oil off the shore of Brazil, “beneath 1.5 miles of water 
and another 2.5 miles of compressed salt, sand and rock”;41 new methods 
of penetrating rocks, by fracturing them or steam assisted cavity drainage; 
deep sea mining by countries such as China; the list could be extended. 
Corporations and mines compete for the depth record of mining for fuel 
and materials such as gold. Imagining the passage tens of thousands of feet 
under the ground and the ocean floor, suddenly an image comes to mind, 
one familiar from an earlier part of this essay: Professor Challenger’s quest 
of digging deeper and deeper inside the living crust.
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Depth becomes not only an index of time but also a resource in the funda-
mental sense of Martin Heidegger’s standing-reserve: technology reveals 
nature in ways that can turn it into a resource. For Heidegger, the writer of 
trees, rivers, and forest paths, the river Rhein turns from Hölderlin’s poetic 
object into a technological construct effected in the assemblage of the new 
hydroelectric plant. The question of energy becomes a way of defining the 
river, and in Heideggerian terms, transforming it:
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character 
of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That challenging 
happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is 
unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored 
up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about 
ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching 
about are ways of revealing.43
This notion of transformation becomes a central way to understand the 
technological assemblages in which metals and minerals are mobilized as 
part of technological and media contexts. Technology constructs such new 
pragmatic and epistemological realms, where geology turns into a media 
resource. And similarly, geology itself transforms into a contested techno-
logically conditioned object of research and a concept that we are able to 
use to understand the widespread mobilization of nature. It also transforms 
questions of deep times from a merely temporal question of pasts to one of 
futures of extinction, pollution, and resource depletion, triggering a huge 
chain of events and interlinked questions: the future landscape of media 
technological fossils.
This transformation of geology of media, and media of geology / metals, 
works in a couple of directions. Theorists, policy makers, and even politi-
cians are increasingly aware of the necessity of cobalt, gallium, indium, 
tantalum and other metals and minerals for media technological ends, from 
end-user devices like mobiles and game consoles to, more generally, capac-
itors, displays, batteries and so forth. The geophysics of media consists of 
examples such as:
Cobalt—(used for) lithium-ion batteries, synthetic fuels
Gallium—thin layer photovoltaics, IC, WLED
Indium—displays, thin layer photovoltaics
Tantalum—micro-capacitors, medical technology
Antimony—ATO, micro-capacitors
Platinum—fuel cells, catalysts
Palladium—catalysts, seawater desalination
Niobium—micro-capacitors, ferroalloys
Neodymium—permanent magnets, laser technology
Germanium—fibre optic cables, IR optical technologies44
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Moments of deep time are exposed in such instances as Clemens Winkler’s 
1885/86 discovery of Germanium (named of course after his home country) 
when he was able to distinguish it from antimony.45 Winkler’s discovery 
in Freiberg has its place in the history of chemistry and elements for sure, 
but it also relates to computing culture and the necessary materials for 
semiconducting: Germanium alloy was the competing material to what we 
now consider a naturalized part of computers: silicon. But the deep times 
are also telling a story of the underground which is not to be confused 
with the discourse of underground art and activism, to which we so often 
revert in media-art-historical discourse. This new definition of media deep 
time is more in tune with mining and transportation, of raw material 
logistics and the processing and refining of metals and minerals.
To reiterate the argument: the extensively long historical durations of 
deep time in the manner introduced to media art discussions by Zielinski 
take place in Antiquity, with medieval alchemists and in nineteenth century 
science-art collaborations, as exemplary events of deep time media-artistic 
techniques and ideas. But what if we need to account for an alternative deep 
time, which extends deeper towards a geophysics of media culture? This is 
a possibility not to be missed: an alternative media history of matter. Such a 
project extends the historical interest in alchemists to contemporary mining 
practices, minerals and the consequent materialities.
The geology of media that nods towards Zielinski but wants to extend 
deep times towards chemical and metal durations includes a wide range of 
examples of refined minerals, metals, and chemicals that are essential for 
media technologies to operate in the audiovisual and often miniaturized 
mobile form that we have grown to expect as end-users of content. A usual 
focus on Understanding Media is complemented with the consideration of 
the duration of materials as significant for media temporality.46 Gold and 
iron might refer to alchemy of transformation, but nowadays this transfor-
mation concerns the scientific and technological forces that are producing 
multiple ecologies, recircuiting the earth.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Planetary immunity
Biopolitics, Gaia theory, the holobiont, 
and the systems counterculture
Bruce Clarke
Biopolitics and the immunitary paradigm
Biopolitics concerns the thinking together of issues of sovereignty and 
governmentality with the matter of life, predominantly but not exclusively 
human life. Standard biopolitical topics include the eugenics movement of 
the earlier twentieth century, especially as it brought about laws for racial 
hygiene; also, the dire outcome of eugenic initiatives in the Nazi death 
camps; and, in contrast to such “thanatopolitical” events, the post-war 
normalization of the welfare state in advanced industrial nations. In this 
sampling, the political themes are clear enough, but the bio- of biopolitics 
leaves nonhuman life largely out of the equation. In his introduction to a 
French edition of Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito’s work on biopol-
itics, Frédéric Neyrat writes: “Of course, life protects itself, ‘by nature’; but 
modern sovereignty must be thought of as a second, ‘meta-immunitary’ 
‘dispositif’ that, coming from life itself, separates itself from it, and forms a 
transcendent instance that bears down on life to the extent that it destroys 
it.”1 However, what appear to be Neyrat’s assumptions about “life” and 
its “nature” leap over a number of biological and ecological issues of great 
import to the aim of Esposito’s project as Neyrat describes it, “to make 
impossible any transcendent normativity, which will always have as its effect 
to prescribe a dreadful distinction between a good life on the one hand, and 
on the other hand a life that deserves only death or abandonment” (36).
This chapter also seeks to question notions of immunopolitical 
transcendence, with an inquiry into the possibility of thinking Gaia theory 
and biopolitics together, of thinking the form of a Gaian biopolitics. 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   193 11/01/2017   14:28
194 GENERAL ECOLOGY
Francisco Varela’s second-order systems-theoretical characterization of 
the theory provides a succinct synopsis of the strand of Gaia discourse on 
which I will stake my argument:
We all are used to thinking that the biosphere is constrained by and 
adapted to its terrestrial environment. But the Gaia hypothesis proposes 
that there is a circularity here: this terrestrial environment is itself the 
result of what the biosphere did to it. As Lovelock puts it metaphorically: 
we live in the breath and bones of our ancestors. As a result the entire 
biosphere/Earth “Gaia” has an identity as a whole, an adaptable and 
plastic unity, acquired through time in this dynamic partnership between 
life and its terrestrial environment.2
To make a start, then, on the construction of a Gaian biopolitics, Cary 
Wolfe’s Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical 
Frame, given its concern to extend biopolitical discussion beyond humans 
alone, offers this enquiry a posthumanist if not altogether planetary 
orientation.3 Before the Law sets about deconstructing some key pairs 
of distinctions endemic to standard biopolitical thought, such as proper / 
improper and inside / outside, while pressing them toward the immunitary 
form of these dialectics, in Wolfe’s words, “the ‘immunitary’ (and, with 
Derrida, ‘autoimmunitary’) logic of the biopolitical.”4 His note to this 
remark cites Esposito’s Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life.5 
While Esposito’s text does not take nonhuman animals and their possible 
standing “before the law” into its purview, it too drives beyond standard 
biopolitical discussion by delving deeply into some key histories of modern 
biology and physiology. Immunitas draws out the multivalent development 
of the notion of immunity from its classical roots as a political concept of 
individual exemption from communal demands to a modern biomedical 
concept of organic exemption from the harm borne by environmental 
pathogens: “But if the notion of immunity only takes form against the 
backdrop of meaning created by community,” Esposito remarks, “how are 
we to characterize their relationship? Is it a relation of simple opposition, 
or is it a more complex dialectic in which neither term is limited to negating 
the other but instead implicates the other, in subterranean ways, as its 
necessary presupposition?” (5).
Immunitas unfolds in great detail what turns out to be an exceedingly 
complex dialectic between the concepts of immunity and community. 
However, once the issue of immunity in relation to community is posed in 
its biological provenance, where is one to stop? Could one not reconfigure 
one’s view of the community of the living, whatever the vagaries and varia-
tions of its immunitary situations, in order to extend it to Gaia’s planetary 
horizon? Esposito appears to gesture in that direction at the end of his work 
Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy, in particular, through a reflection on a 
remarkable, proto-ecological passage from Spinoza’s Ethics:
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So if something in Nature appears to us as ridiculous, absurd, or evil, this 
is due to the fact that our knowledge is only partial, that we are for the 
most part ignorant of the order and coherence of Nature as a whole, and 
that we want all things to be directed as our reason prescribes. Yet that 
which our reason declares to be evil is not evil in respect of the order and 
laws of universal Nature, but only in respect of our own particular nature.6
However, according to Wolfe, Esposito draws from Spinoza’s defense of 
Nature’s right to exist on its own terms the contemporary imperative that 
“a turn away from the thanatological and autoimmunitary logic of biopol-
itics can only take place if life as such—not just human (vs animal) life … 
becomes the subject of immunitary protection,” which absolute imperative 
amounts to a form of “biologistic continuism.”7 Some of the issues here 
may be stated like this: does such “immunitary protection” refer to political 
and legal or to biological and ecological matters? Can such protections be 
applied to both at once? And in either case, can such protections really 
be referred to “life as such” as opposed to some forms of life rather than 
others? Wolfe comments: “Where Esposito is wrong is in his insistence on 
‘the principle of unlimited equivalence for every single form of life’”; for 
this leads him dangerously close to “a sort of neovitalism that ends up 
radically dedifferentiating the field of ‘the living’ into a molecular wash of 
singularities that all equally manifest ‘life.’”8
Wolfe counters Esposito’s Deleuzian route to an affirmative biopolitics 
with an alternative model that develops the operational isomorphism 
between immunitary and autopoietic systems, and so insists instead on the 
necessity to observe biological and social differentiations in the midst of 
their integration into higher-order ensembles.9 We will come back to this in 
the context of biologist and evolutionary theorist Lynn Margulis’s formu-
lation of the Gaian system as an autopoietic system in its own right. But 
for the moment let us return to Esposito’s Immunitas. This is a crucial text 
precisely for its author’s candor in declaring how the more recent immune-
system theorizing available to him around the year 2000 disorients the 
dialectical approach he has brought to the topic. As we will see, it is this more 
recent immune discourse, significantly inflected by the work of Francisco 
Varela and Humberto Maturana, that can be effectively marshalled for 
something like a Gaian ecopolitics of planetary immunity.10 Encountering 
this constructivist school of immunological thought, Esposito’s own dialec-
tical inquiry into the self / non-self distinction reaches the limits of its 
paradigm. Let us look quickly at how Esposito presents this instructive 
impasse in his introduction to Immunitas.
Given how the full text of his study will detail the manifold conceptual 
cul-de-sacs, the dismaying hypertrophies of militaristic metaphors, and 
other negativities, contradictions, and self-destructive dynamics of the 
immunitary paradigm, it makes good sense for Esposito to preview the shift 
in tone to come at the end of this book. He asks: “Is there a point at which 
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the dialectical circuit between the protection and negation of life can be 
interrupted, or at least problematized? Can life be preserved in some other 
form than that of its negative protection?” (16). Must biopolitics always 
devolve into a thanatopolitics where the lives of some are protected by the 
putting to death of others, or could there be an affirmative biopolitics that 
might avert the sorts of murderous episodes commonplace in the twentieth 
century? The biological turn in Esposito’s philosophy is driven by this quest 
for a non-facile form of biotic affirmation: “I have sought the answer to the 
question with which I began at the very heart of the protective mechanism 
that has progressively extended itself to all the languages of life—namely, 
on the biological plane, in the immune system that ensures the safeguarding 
of life in the body of each individual” (16). However, upon lengthy exami-
nation of the modern discourse of the immune system, affirmation is not 
easy to come by. Indeed, according to biomedical and immunological 
discourse from the time of Pasteur to the time of AIDS, vertebrate immune 
systems succeed in protecting their possessors against the onslaughts of the 
viruses, the bacteria, and the killer fungi only by placing their beneficiaries 
on uncertain hair-triggers against autoimmune fiascos. Life is war, patho-
genicity is everywhere, and your best friend could be your worst enemy.
It is against this dismal immunitary vista that Esposito locates incipient 
glimmers of an alternative view:
However, more recent study of the structure and functioning of the 
immune system seems to suggest another interpretive possibility, one 
that traces out a different philosophy of immunity … This new inter-
pretation situates immunity in a nonexcluding relation with its common 
opposite. The essential point of departure … is a conception of individual 
identity that is distinctly different from the closed, monolithic one we 
described earlier … Rather than an immutable and definitive given, the 
body is understood as a functioning construct that is open to continuous 
exchange with its surrounding environment. (17)
Indeed, he concludes, “once its negative power has been removed, the 
immune is not the enemy of the common, but rather something more 
complex that implicates and stimulates the common” (18). Admirably, 
however, he confesses that “the full significance of this necessity, but also its 
possibility, still eludes us” (18). I will venture to suggest that in this remark 
Esposito sees clearly enough that the old dialectical machinery of self and 
non-self no longer provides an adequate description of immune functions, 
but also, that he cannot yet see how to fit these newer observations into 
some other comprehensive scheme. But in the subsequent development of 
immunological theory, that alternative scheme and its significance have 
taken on sharper outlines. A key element of these newer conceptions of 
the immune system concerns its ecological extension beyond the “immune 
self.” This revision to the immunitary paradigm is amenable to a Gaian 
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description of biological community coordinated with ecological environ-
ments, a view that lifts the immunitary paradigm up to a planetary horizon.
Gaia and the systems counterculture
A set of planetary discourses published several decades ago already indicated 
how to expand the immunitary paradigm beyond the old ontologies of the 
self. Current biopolitical thought provides an apt occasion to consolidate 
some of these abiding theoretical leads. They originated with the architects 
of Gaia theory, Lynn Margulis in particular, in the milieu of a larger systems 
counterculture including William Irwin Thompson and Francisco Varela. If 
the power of their combined vision has since lain semi-dormant in a state of 
relative obscurity, or submerged under insipid or bastardized versions of their 
insights, I hope to extract the actual detail of that conceptual vision from 
such neglect for renewed appreciation. Some narration and commentary 
from a 1986 NOVA documentary will give us a preview of our destination:
Narrator: Geologists use changes in fossils to date the history of the 
world. And the record shows that mass extinctions have happened 
repeatedly. Is this a failure of Gaia? Or has life been under attack 
from the outside, and survived? The answer may lie in the large craters 
scattered around the earth’s surface. One popular though controversial 
theory holds that they were caused by asteroids or comets hitting the 
earth. The effect of an impact great enough to cause such craters would 
be devastating. It’s calculated that the shock would be a thousand times 
that of all of the world’s nuclear weapons going off in one place. The 
effect would be to throw up a blanket of dirt and debris, which would 
circulate around the world, blocking out the sun, freezing the continental 
areas, killing most plants and animals. How could the Gaian system have 
survived such a devastating blow?
Lynn Margulis: Gaia is run by the sum of the biota, and therefore you 
can lose enormous numbers and great diversity with mass extinctions, 
but you never come anywhere near losing everything, and you certainly 
don’t lose the major groups of bacteria, ever. They’ve been in continuous 
existence, and we think it’s the major groups of bacteria that actually are 
running the Gaian system. So in a sense these—whether they’re caused 
by impact or whatever they’re caused by—these great extinctions are 
tests of Gaia, and the system bounces back.11
 Several intellectual venues helped to cultivate the Gaia concept such that 
its immunitary implications would eventually take on a specifically biopo-
litical inflection. The first of these venues is the Whole Earth Catalog, with 
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its persistent foregrounding of “whole systems.” Such “wholeness” was not 
precisely a medical, psychological, or spiritual ideal, although those conno-
tations are always available. In the beginning, the “whole Earth” named a 
desire to see a photograph taken from space of the full earth, like the full 
moon, unobscured by shadow.12 But once that technical image did arrive 
in 1967, the wholeness in question was explicitly synergetic in the sense 
popularized by the original intellectual hero of the Catalog, Buckminster 
Fuller, synergy being the “unique behavior of whole systems, unpredicted 
by the behavior of their respective subsystems’ events.”13 As filled out by 
its regular opening section, “Understanding Whole Systems,” the Catalog’s 
vision of wholeness is broadly cybernetic, systems-theoretical: it is the 
operational wholeness of a systemic process bounded with a closed organi-
zational loop while driven by a material-energetic flux. The outside back 
cover of the Catalog’s second major iteration in Spring 1969 figured this 
initial orientation toward far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic systems by 
placing the following statement next to an image of Earthrise: “the flow of 
energy through a system acts to organize that system.”14 The self-organizing 
system in question is clearly the whole earth in solar context.
Among the many wider repercussions of the Whole Earth Catalog as it 
expanded in size and mutated in form over the next two decades was its 
availability to a conceptual gathering I call the systems counterculture. In 
the late sixties, the systems thinkers favored by the Catalog featured, preem-
inently, Buckminster Fuller, as well as the inventor of the term cybernetics, 
Norbert Wiener, and also, less famously but more importantly for future 
developments, cyberneticist Heinz von Foerster, who provided the Catalog’s 
editor, Stewart Brand, with a seminal review of George Spencer-Brown’s 
calculus for constructivism, Laws of Form.15 After the prematurely named 
Last Whole Earth Catalog of 1971, it was three years before the Catalog 
project reappeared in new forms. One of these was the Whole Earth Epilog, 
released in September 1974. For our narrative the key development here is 
the arrival of Gregory Bateson in the wake of his signature collection of 
1972, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. The influence of Bateson now eclipsed 
that of Fuller, leading Brand during the 1970s to prefer whole systems 
thinking purveyed through less technological, more anthropological and 
ecological varieties of cybernetics.16 This development is epitomized by 
the major mutation of the occasional Catalog into a quarterly journal that 
began operation in the spring of 1974—the CoEvolution Quarterly (CQ).
The cover of the first CQ wonderfully captures this ecological shift. We 
observe coevolution as a human face figured from a profusion of myriad 
coevolutionary relationships gathering together insects and flowers, sea 
creatures and oceans, microbes and galaxies, an image Gaian in spirit if 
not in letter. Meanwhile, with Bateson as its primary standard bearer, the 
systems counterculture began to gather within the pages of CQ. An early 
number included an announcement for a voluntary community formed in 
1972 by a scholarly prodigy and lapsed Yeats expert turned poet and cultural 
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historian, William Irwin Thompson. Thompson had already published 
two widely distributed trade books, At the Edge of History: Speculations 
on the Transformation of Culture in 1971 and Passages About Earth: An 
Exploration of the New Planetary Culture in 1974. During that period he 
founded the Lindisfarne Association as an esoteric community with a contem-
plative orientation toward an intellectual agenda taking up the cultivation 
of a “Planetary Culture and the New Image of Man.” We will come back 
shortly to Bill Thompson and his place within the systems counterculture.
Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock arrive in CQ’s Summer 1975 issue, 
making it the first non-specialist journal to publish on Gaia, with what 
was still a distinctly specialized treatment.17 Their headnote begins: “We 
would like to discuss the Earth’s atmosphere from a new point of view—
that it is an integral, regulated, and necessary part of the biosphere,” and 
in the article proper they restate the main point: “The purpose of this 
paper is simply to present our reasons for believing the atmosphere is 
actively controlled” (30, 32). The discussion regarding “regulation” and 
“control” is in a distinct idiom of engineering cybernetics. And the object 
of discussion is still relatively modest: it is not precisely the whole earth or 
the biosphere in its entirety but a specific component thereof, the atmos-
phere as systemically coupled to the biota. Early Gaia discourse reconceived 
the evolution and composition of the contemporary atmosphere not as 
the abiotic lucky happenstance of traditional geology but as a system 
regulated by and integrated with the biota, and as a necessary outcome of 
living, largely microbial processes. This construction was heretical then, 
but settled science now: the air we aerobic organisms breathe to stay alive 
is itself biogenic. In overwhelming proportions it comes from life and 
forms the earthly repository—both sink and source—wherein the gaseous 
wastes of living metabolisms circulate in and out of organic capture and 
use. Lovelock and Margulis’s atmosphere hypothesis was also cybernetic 
to the core: the peculiarly far-from-equilibrium and biologically viable 
composition of the atmosphere is the emergent outcome of a closed loop 
of biogeochemical cycles at the planetary level, held in homeostasis, that is, 
feedback-regulated, throughout geological time “by and for” the biota.18
Another member of the systems counterculture arrives in the Summer 
1976 issue of CQ. Francisco Varela is the subject of a fine interview that 
lays out some of the original conceptuality of second-order cybernetics.19 
Carl Sagan, Margulis’s ex-husband, had recommended her to Brand, but 
how does an unknown émigré Chilean neurobiologist make such a dramatic 
debut in the pages of CQ? In fact, his mentor, Humberto Maturana’s good 
friend and colleague, Heinz von Foerster, had put Varela forward, who 
thereby quickly came to the notice of the California systems intelligentsia. 
That same summer, Varela attended the “Mind / Body Dualism Conference” 
organized by Brand and Bateson and attended by von Foerster and others, 
and that fall, CQ published his conference contribution, “Not One, Not 
Two,” which material he would incorporate into his first book, Principles 
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of Biological Autonomy, published three years later.20 “Not One, Not Two” 
formulates the post-dialectical epistemology of second-order systems theory, 
for which “dualities are adequately represented” neither by negation nor 
polarity but, rather, “by imbrication of levels, where one term of the pair 
emerges from the other.”21 I call this logical modality double positivity, 
as in the mutually supplementary relation of systems and their environ-
ments. Gaian applications would be to observe, first, that the Gaian system 
emerged from the dynamical coupling of the primeval biota to the planetary 
surface to form a geobiosphere, and next, that from that moment on, all 
earthly environments within the Gaian sphere have co-emerged from or in 
structural relation to the operations of living systems in the same measure 
that living beings have had their terms of existence in correlation with the 
contingencies, affordances and limitations, of their enabling environments.
In CQ for Winter 1978 we come upon another encounter with William 
Irwin Thompson.22 What one would not have been able to learn from the 
pages of CQ is that for several years now his Lindisfarne Association had 
run a Fellow-in-Residence program. The first Lindisfarne residential fellow 
was Gregory Bateson in 1976, while he was working on his final book, 
Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity, followed by Varela in 1977 and 
1978, during which time he completed Principles of Biological Autonomy. 
While the residential component of Lindisfarne gradually waned, its major 
activity continued in the form of annual symposia, which Thompson 
approached as a master intellectual impresario with an intensive rigor 
manifest in organization, strategic invitation, and discursive preparation. 
Gathered from several Lindisfarne events in the 1980s, but based in 
particular on the 1981 meeting, in 1987 Thompson published the collection 
Gaia—A Way of Knowing: Political Implications of the New Biology.23 
With some significant anticipations on the part of Stewart Brand’s opera-
tions at CQ, and adding in a dash of continental flavor with the inclusion 
of the French theoretical biologist Henri Atlan, Gaia—A Way of Knowing 
assembles in one prime location the top tier of the systems counterculture.
This impression is only strengthened by the fact that, although he is not 
present in the volume, von Foerster also spoke at the 1981 Lindisfarne 
meeting that forms the core of the volume. Moreover, in assembling the 
“new biology” for political interrogation, Thompson places the Gaia 
concept in direct relation to his vision of a planetary culture. With the 
general ecological theorist Bateson participating in absentia and the key 
theorist of second-order cybernetics von Foerster present but off-stage, 
Gaia—A Way of Knowing seizes and synthesizes the epistemological 
suggestions implicit in all of the countercultural systems biologies on hand. 
These have now emerged full-blown in Lovelock’s first-order cybernetic 
Gaia hypothesis crossed with Margulis’s signature discourse of microbial 
symbiosis, placed alongside Maturana and Varela’s inspired application 
of second-order cybernetics, defining biological self-reference, operational 
autonomy, and cognitive capacity through the concept of autopoiesis.
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Working out a planetary cultural synthesis of the new systems biologies, 
Thompson develops that discourse in terms that are distinctly at home in 
second-order systems theory: “what I am offering in this book is not so 
much a description of some scientific theories but an unfoldment in which 
the observer of the scientific observer changes the science of the scientist. 
The literary writer, the poet, becomes possessed by science, and in reflecting 
the work back to the scientist, the scientist sees his image transformed.”24 
Thompson’s second-order observation acts not as a mere reception and 
sorting operation but as a new construction in its own right, specifically 
as a determination of cultural values proper to the artist’s role. And with 
hindsight it is rather stunning that his terms, as in the phrase below, 
“politics of life,” leap out to us now as precisely biopolitical. Thompson 
gets all the way there by adding the element of mindfulness in the discourse 
of autopoietic cognition to the feedback circuit between Gaia and the biota. 
His preface to the Gaia volume concludes:
The Gaia hypothesis alone would not be enough to express the way 
of knowing or the politics of life. With the atmospheric chemistry of 
Lovelock, we have the macrocosm; with the bacteriology of Margulis 
we have the microcosm, but moving between the macrocosm of the 
planet and the microcosm of the cell is the mesocosm of the mind. It is 
here in the cognitive biology of Maturana and Varela that knowing truly 
becomes the organization of the living that brings forth a world. (10)
Drawn from his introductory remarks at the 1981 Lindisfarne meeting, the 
introduction following Thompson’s preface to the Gaia volume begins by 
noting Bateson’s absence—he would die within a month—while explicitly 
addressing the wider cybernetic transformations in which he was a crucial 
participant as one of the key thinkers “responsible for opening up new paths 
in cybernetics, epistemology, and self-organizing systems biology.”25 Toward 
the conclusion of a set of detailed remarks drawing out and linking up the 
conceptual interconnections of the systems counterculture into an overarching 
view, Thompson speculated that “if food-sharing is the fountainhead and 
source of our original humanity, then we most truly perform that humanity 
when we share food and see with Lewis Thomas in his Lives of a Cell that 
the whole earth is a single cell and that we are simply symbiotic organelles 
involved with one another. There can be no ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The global 
politics that issues forth from this vision is truly a bios and a logos” (25–6). In 
what he calls elsewhere Gaia politique, Thompson indicates again the biopo-
litical substance of his intervention. Importantly, he notes that our symbiotic 
coupling with the rest of life in a “single” Gaian “cell” is not universal merger 
but dynamic differentiation leading to higher coevolutionary complexity:
The fundamental principle that I see coming out of this new mode of 
thought is that living systems express a dynamic in which opposites are 
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basic and opposition essential. One cannot say that the ocean is right 
and the continent is wrong in a Gaian view of planetary process. What 
this means for me is that the movement from archaic industrial modes 
of thought into a new planetary culture is characterized by a movement 
from ideology to an ecology of consciousness. (27)
Let us skip ahead one more time. The May 1988 Lindisfarne Fellows 
meeting in Perugia, Italy, became the basis for a subsequent Gaia collection, 
Gaia 2—Emergence: The New Science of Becoming. Once again the core 
group is Lovelock, Margulis, and Varela. From its contents I single out for 
quick summary just one article, which will close the circle for now on our 
recovery of a discourse of planetary immunity from within the systems 
counterculture. Co-written with Mark Anspach, Varela’s contribution 
to Gaia 2 is “Immu-knowledge: The Process of Somatic Individuation.” 
Finalized around 1990, this article reviews the newer immunology being 
developed throughout the 1980s, including the network theory of Niels 
Jerne and the work on immune system autonomy and cognition in Varela’s 
collaborations with Nelson Vaz, Antonio Coutinho, and others. It is this 
work and its continuation throughout the 1990s that enters Roberto 
Esposito’s narrative at the end of Immunitas. The following passage, from 
which I cited an excerpt early in this chapter, sketches the main argument:
The alternative view we are suggesting can be likened to the notion of 
Gaia claims that the atmosphere and earth crust cannot be explained in 
their current configurations (gas composition, sea chemistry, mountain 
shapes, and so on) without their direct partnership with life on Earth. We 
all are used to thinking that the biosphere is constrained by and adapted 
to its terrestrial environment. But the Gaia hypothesis proposes that 
there is a circularity here: this terrestrial environment is itself the result of 
what the biosphere did to it. As Lovelock puts it metaphorically: we live 
in the breath and bones of our ancestors. As a result the entire biosphere/
Earth “Gaia” has an identity as a whole, an adaptable and plastic unity, 
acquired through time in this dynamic partnership between life and its 
terrestrial environment … Let us transpose the metaphor to immunobi-
ology, and suggest that the body is like Earth, a textured environment for 
diverse and highly interactive populations of individuals. The individuals 
in this case are the white blood cells or lymphocytes which constitute the 
immune system. (69)
Varela and Anspach go on to write that one must “drop the notion of the 
immune system as a defensive device built to address external events,” and, 
instead, “conceive it in terms of self-assertion, establishing a molecular 
identity by the maintenance of circulation levels of molecules through the 
entire distributed network [… ] This idea is strictly parallel to the species 
network giving an ecosystem an identity within an environment” (78–9).
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Exit the individual, enter the holobiont
In comparing the immune system to an ecosystem, and ultimately, to Gaia 
altogether, Varela anticipated by two decades some of the most exciting 
contemporary work on the symbiotic nature of immunological regimes. This 
work has been based in recent years on the arrival of genome-sequencing 
technology capable of unraveling the molecular detail of symbioses among 
host organisms and their microbiomes.26 And while no one person gets full 
credit for the current shift in the view of symbiosis from a marginal to a 
pervasive phenomenon, the systems counterculture’s evolutionary biologist 
Lynn Margulis deserves a major portion of it.27 Indeed, after the full run 
of Margulis’s scientific career, symbiosis is no longer just a biological 
issue, and biology is no longer a self-contained object of knowledge. In a 
symbiotic view, biology is always also ecological and geobiological, or, in 
a word, Gaian.
Precisely defined, symbiosis is the temporary or permanent living-
together of two or more different organisms in bodily contact. Close 
relations between, say, a human and a domestic animal may be termed 
companionate, but they are not symbiotic in this strong sense. The 
permanent mutualistic relation of fungal nodules—mycorrhizae—growing 
on and into plant roots: this is symbiosis. Yet symbiosis was once a 
doubtful, even derided topic in biology, because its emphasis on ensembles 
and collectives of living beings ran counter to the larger discipline’s inher-
itance of Western and modern valorizations of individuality. Proper biology 
was to be concerned with individual organisms, or individual species, or 
individual populations of the same species, all caught up in a struggle for 
life with the survival of the fittest individuals, and so forth, and so on. 
Indeed, “the Darwinian view of life regarded aggregates of individuals of 
common ancestry as identifiable units in competition with one another.”28 
And in its fixation on molecular biology, neo-Darwinism—the gene-
centered synthesis of Darwinian evolution through natural selection with 
molecular genetics—drove this philosophical commitment to unitary units 
and singular causes down to the genetic bone, with what Gilbert et al. state 
as the “one-genome / one-organism doctrine of classical genetics” (330), 
declaring that one specific genome alone must account for all the distinct 
traits of each individual of each species.
The second edition of Margulis’s major scientific text, Symbiosis in Cell 
Evolution: Microbial Communities in the Archean and Proterozoic Eons, 
presents the mature version of her most famous scientific contribution, 
serial endosymbiosis theory, or SET. Here symbiosis is accorded a central 
role in the early evolution of life’s quantum jumps in complexity. The term 
Margulis uses for this particular symbiotic dynamic is symbiogenesis—the 
development of new life forms by the incorporation or colonization of 
one or more organisms into or by one another. As restated through Carl 
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Woese’s three-domain idiom, over life’s first three billion years, symbio-
genesis names the step-by-step evolutionary assembly of the eukaryotic or 
nucleated cell, and thus, of the domain Eukaryota—all life forms composed 
of eukaryotic cells—out of a viable symbiotic / symbiogenetic microbial 
consortium coupling the two evolutionarily prior domains, as an Archean 
host accepts a series of Eubacterial partners.29
Symbiosis in Cell Evolution also discusses in passing some non-microbial 
manifestations of symbiosis, and in the process, Margulis provided terms 
that have gained a new currency. For instance, the lichen exhibits the 
fecundity of symbiotic possibilities. In all of their varieties, lichens arise from 
the opportunistic but non-obligatory integration of a fungus with either an 
alga or a bacterium: “The integrated symbionts (holobionts) become new 
organisms with a greater level of complexity.”30 Lichens are emergent cross-
kingdom holobionts with their own peculiar properties, organisms wholly 
built out of dissociable symbiotic partnerships. More commonly, however, 
symbioses evolve toward obligate status, such as those endosymbioses that 
have locked together the previously independent components of the eukar-
yotic cell. Mutualistic symbionts joined in a holobiont typically arrive at 
permanent and obligatory accommodations, and the newer understanding 
is that virtually all plants and animals have never been free-standing or pure 
individuals but, instead, from the evolutionary get-go, host partners to a 
holobiont containing an indispensable complement of microbial symbionts.
Traditional accounts of evolution have been strongly zoocentric, treating 
the microbial relations of animals as either peripheral or pathological. Being 
animals ourselves, we identify with their seeming discreteness as separate, 
individuated organisms. However, the recent literature of symbiosis has 
paid particular attention to the cross-domain relations between animals 
and bacteria in the evolutionary formation and distributed functions 
of holobionts that encompass both domains. Evolving from the largely 
microbial world of the pre-Cambrian seas prior to fungi or plants, animals 
emerged out of and within a biospheric matrix of microbes, a microcosm 
within which they have always been ecologically integrated and from which 
they can never viably depart.31 With such developments, the newer sciences 
of symbiosis are in the process of ecologizing immunology and biology 
altogether.32 McFall-Ngai et al. write:
Viewing bacterial colonization of animals as an ecological phenomenon 
adds clarity to an understanding of the mechanisms and routes by which 
phylogenetically rich and functionally diverse microbial communities 
become established and evolve on and within animal hosts. An ecological 
perspective influences not only our understanding of animal-microbiome 
interactions but also their greater role in biology. The ecosystem that 
is an individual animal and its many microbial communities (i.e., the 
holobiont) does not occur in isolation but is nested within communities 
of other organisms that, in turn, coexist in and influence successively 
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larger neighborhoods comprising ever more complex assemblages of 
microbes, fungi, plants, and animals. (3233–4)
Moreover, the microbial-animal holobiont possesses multiple and specific 
organ-system niches for particular activities and select populations of the 
diverse symbionts they support. These include the gut or digestive system, 
the circulatory system, and the central nervous system. Gilbert, Sapp, and 
Tauber’s “Symbiotic View of Life” draws out the systemic foundations of 
symbiotic relations: “Only with the emergence of ecology in the second 
half of the 19th century did organic systems—comprised of individuals in 
cooperative and competitive relationships—complement the individual-
based conceptions of the life sciences.” They note how the prior Darwinian 
fixation on biological individuals no longer fits the new evidence: “Symbiosis 
is becoming a core principle of contemporary biology, and it is replacing 
an essentialist conception of ‘individuality’ with a conception congruent 
with the larger systems approach now pushing the life sciences in diverse 
directions” (326).
What had traditionally been taken to be the nature of individuality has 
now been shown to be an inadequate construction. Every “individual” 
animal is always already a multi-systemic, multi-genomic holobiont host. 
Gilbert et al. mount a sustained attack on the residual ideology of biological 
individualism, revealing its roots in pre-scientific philosophical ideas. 
In contemporary symbiotic science, then, the concept of individuality is 
having its “natural” credentials revoked, revealing instead that concept’s 
deep participation in Western idealism’s metaphysics of essence. Their 
essay deconstructs the modes of biological individuality piece by piece. For 
instance, for traditional anatomy, “the individual animal is regarded as a 
structured whole”; but now, “the term ‘holobiont’ has been introduced as 
the anatomical term that describes the integrated organism comprised of 
both host elements and persistent populations of symbionts” (327–8). In 
due course these authors also dismantle the embryological, physiological, 
and genetic rationales for the thesis of biological individuality.
For instance, in the case of the genetic rationale: “The one-genome / 
one-organism doctrine of classical genetics has been eclipsed by studies 
of hereditary symbiosis. Microbial symbionts form a second type of 
genetic inheritance” (330). Moreover, the neo-Darwinist fixation on allelic 
variation in nuclear genomes (alleles are subdivisions of the genome that 
encode specific traits of the phenotype), must yield its grip, because “there 
is also allelic variation in the human microbiome. The genes of Bacteroides 
plebeius differ in different human populations. The Japanese strain contains 
at least two genes (horizontally transferred from a marine relative) that 
enable the bacteria to metabolize complex sugars, such as those found in 
seaweeds.”33 In this example of epigenetic symbiosis, the gut microbiome 
of certain Japanese people possesses a microbial symbiont that has incorpo-
rated the genetic machinery to digest seaweed by horizontal transfer from 
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a marine bacterium that presumably entered the gut microbiome along 
with the seaweed. The marine relative of the gut symbiont did not itself 
colonize the gut, did not itself become a part of the Japanese holobiont. 
But by the lateral transfer of some of its genetic complement, it shared its 
seaweed-digesting metabolic capacity with its gut-dwelling cousin. Now 
the Japanese seaweed-eater gets more nutrition from it than a non-native 
person, or, has coevolved to be more fit than strangers are to exploit their 
indigenous environment. And shooting down dogmatic neo-Darwinist 
rejections of “group selection,” it turns out that “the entire group—the 
holobiont—is the selectable entity rather than either host or symbiont 
alone” (330). The combined genetic make-up of the holobiont has been 
termed the “hologenome” and has already been elaborated in a “holog-
enome theory of evolution.”34 And so down goes, too, the evolutionary 
rationale for biological individuality.
The recent literature on symbiosis handles another prime topic—the 
immune system. Once again the genome-sequencing evidence runs counter 
to the traditional notion that “portrays the immune system as a defensive 
network against a hostile exterior world,” that the “immune individual 
rejects anything that is not ‘self’ … In a fascinating inversion of this view 
of life, however, recent studies have shown that an individual’s immune 
system is in part created by the resident microbiome” (330). And if that is 
so, then what is “self” or “not-self” is not a dialectical discriminating of 
singular or individual essence but a collective negotiation carried out by the 
committee comprising the holobiont. Gilbert et al. extend the biopolitical 
analogs of the situation: “associates in a symbiotic relationship are under 
the social control of the whole, the holobiont … If the immune system 
serves as the critical gendarmerie keeping the animal and microbial cells 
together, then to obey the immune system is to become a citizen of the 
holobiont” (332). The prior immunitary paradigm has been stood on its 
head: the immune system’s primary concern is not to seek out and destroy 
any and all microbial elements of “not-self,” it is instead to hold together 
the many selves of the holobiotic ecosystem, comprised of the animal host 
coupled to its own microbiome, by identifying, tolerating, and recruiting 
beneficial microbial symbionts. Only the occasional bad microbial actors 
are targeted for removal.
Echoing Gilbert et al.’s “fascinating inversion” of the individual / 
symbiont relation, another recent essay strikes the same note of conceptual 
reversal: “Bacteria also must be seen as an essential part of the vertebrate 
immune system. The paradigm that the adaptive immune system has 
evolved to control microbes has been modified to include the concept that 
the immune system is in fact controlled by microorganisms.”35 In this new 
immunitary scenario, the traditional location of control with the host—
the supposedly controlling metazoan individual providing the protected 
“environment” of the microbial inhabitants and invaders—is reversed: 
control is relocated with the encompassed population. The distribution and 
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reciprocation of agency within the holobiont and the displacement of the 
biological individual in favor of the holobiont’s symbiotic ecology makes 
it a contemporary avatar of a prior ecological scenario—the inversion of 
“control” as initially propounded by the Gaia hypothesis.
At first, Lovelock and Margulis framed the Gaia hypothesis as a provoc-
ative reversal of the normal scientific axiom that states that life is controlled 
by and so must adapt itself to its geological host, the abiotic environment. 
In its upstart period during the 1970s, in a sheer reversal of prior biological 
common sense, the Gaia hypothesis stated to the contrary that life controls 
the abiotic environment. In this extreme form it was hooted down by its 
mainstream critics. However, as their science developed beyond its first 
decade, Gaia’s theoreticians saw that, once systemic self-regulation emerges 
from the synergy of the entire ensemble, the inherited distinction between 
life and its environment is no more absolute than that between any of the 
partners of a holobiotic consortium. The science of Gaia graduates from 
hypothesis to theory with the recognition—aptly expressed in Varela’s 
formulation cited earlier—that neither life nor its planetary medium is so 
fundamental that either can be said to control the other. Rather, after four 
billion years of coevolution, living processes, symbiotic organizations, and 
the sum of their global niches are all relative to ongoing reformulation by 
evolving eons of matter, life, and sun. Geobiological history has thoroughly 
churned them all together into a planetary holobiont that maintains, 
defends, but also surpasses its parts. Just as symbiosis is no longer just 
a biological matter but must now be seen as an ecological principle, an 
all-pervasive geobiological dynamic—so, too, “Gaia is symbiosis seen from 
space.”36
The system bounces back
Consequently, and in full vindication of Margulis’s predictions about the 
fundamental role of symbiosis for the biosphere altogether, the old, static 
“immune self” has been jettisoned in favor of the holobiont—the ecologi-
cally distributed and environmentally dynamic and conserved consortium 
of a fungal, plant, or animal host and its microbial symbionts. And, as we 
have seen, when Varela addressed his close colleagues Margulis, Lovelock, 
and Thompson at the 1988 Lindisfarne meeting, his treatment of “immu-
knowledge” expressed a remarkable, explicitly Gaian turn, pushing the 
ecosystem metaphor all the way to the planetary horizon. It is not only, as 
explicitly articulated by Thompson in his introduction to Gaia 2, that “Gaia, 
in essence, is the immune system of our planet.”37 It is also, as explicitly 
articulated by Varela and Anspach, that the immune system itself may be 
taken as operating “like a microcosmic version of Gaia” (69). In the new 
immunitary paradigm already under construction in Varela’s bioscience, the 
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defensive function is subordinated to an “individual molecular identity,” 
that is, a systemic coherence of which Gaia is the molar outcome. The 
counterpart to the protection of life is not the negation of that which 
threatens it but the affirmation of its dynamic continuity. Like Gaia or the 
biosphere, any given immune system has “stability and plasticity”:
The point is not to deny that defense is possible, but to see it as a limiting 
case of something more fundamental: individual molecular identity 
… Defensive responses, the center of attention in medical immunology, 
are secondary acquisitions … Or in the Gaian metaphor, certainly 
the stability and plasticity of the eco/biosphere has been remarkably 
successful in coping with, say, large meteoric impacts. But such events 
were rare, and it seems odd to say that ecosystems evolved because of 
those events. (81–2)
 The point is also this: if, after a serious planetary infection such as that 
produced by the evolution of the cyanobacteria, which precipitated the 
“oxygen holocaust” that forever changed the early biosphere, or if, after 
a traumatic planetary injury such as the meteoric impact that theoretically 
extinguished the last of the dinosaurs, in Margulis’s phrase, “the system 
bounces back,” it does so because life’s own predilection for community 
has systematized itself at the planetary level. What bounces back is neither 
some atomized assortment of random living beings nor some mystic whole 
but the Gaian system itself, that is, a distributed but bounded planetary 
network whose systemic resilience rises above the particular fates of its living 
components. The Gaian perspective foregrounds, first of all, the autopoietic 
systematicity of living organization. Restated in immunitary terms, from 
the moment of life’s first appearance some 3.5 thousand million years ago, 
every living being in its minimal and bounded quasi-autonomy has needed 
protection from the sheer physical flux of elements and energies. So prior to 
any evolutionary development whatsoever, and prior to any gain of safety 
in collective numbers, in their very origin and emergence from prebiotic 
conditions, living systems may be thought of as self-immunizing. Stated in a 
neocybernetic idiom, in their very self-constitution and self-maintenance as 
membrane-bounded, autopoietic unities, living systems operate to maintain 
the integrity of their “somatic individuation,” in Varela’s phrase, from the 
wider abiotic matrixes out of which they emerge. From the primordial cell 
on, to be alive is to be exempted as much as may be possible from entropic 
dispersion back into a relatively non-differentiated physical environment. 
To be alive grants temporary immunity from an eventual return of the living 
system’s material elements to non-living conditions of non-operation—in 
short, immunity from being dead.
And finally, the Gaian perspective foregrounds the dynamic coupling of 
biotic and abiotic organizations. Following upon the arrival of the microbial 
world as a microcosm distributed across the surface of the earth, the Gaian 
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system arose as a second-order development. Restated in the idiom of the 
biopolitical theory with which we began, Gaia theory suggests that in the 
early evolution of primordial life and its expansion into an operationally 
coupled symbiotic planetary phenomenon, the global interactions of living 
beings eventually fell into the systemic form of an immunitary consortium. 
Microbial life in its integration with the earth, to form and maintain a 
geobiological system, evolved Gaia as the communal immune system of 
the biosphere. Subsequent to her encounters with Maturana and Varela, 
Margulis would go on to suggest that the Gaian system is autopoietic in its 
own right.38 And if that is so, then just as the membrane self-produced by a 
living cell operates to immunize that system as much as possible from incur-
sions from or dispersions into its circumambient environment, so too Gaia’s 
own operational closure as a system, like that of its living elements, forms 
an immunitary boundary around the biosphere as a whole, a membrane 
whose upper surface is the atmosphere. Gaia operates to provide life on 
earth temporary immunity from cosmic extinction. Keeping that vigil 
going, walking that beat for three billion years, has been no paltry accom-
plishment. The symbiotic tolerance of planetary immunity might be a place 
to begin a new reflection on human political organization in relation to a 
planetary ecology we are still only beginning to discover in the wider range 
of its cooperational diversities.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Ecologizing biopolitics, or, What 
is the “bio-” of bioart?
Cary Wolfe
Introduction
In this brief chapter I want to put two problematics side by side and examine 
the extent to which they illuminate each other: biopolitical thought and 
bioart. The reason I find this a worthwhile endeavor is simple: if we believe 
that biopolitics is a new and / or dominant mode of the political in modern 
society, a mode whose distinctive characteristic is that life itself in its barest 
form becomes the direct object of political power, then the question of the 
socially and politically representative character of bioart takes on a new 
and pressing relevance, simply because what distinguishes bioart (or so the 
story goes) is that life itself becomes the medium of the artwork—versus say 
gouache, or cor-ten steel, or the digital image.
I want to begin to frame this question of the socially representative 
character of bioart by providing a bit of background on two fundamental 
and divergent strands in biopolitical thought centered around the work of 
Agamben and Foucault, and then move to Roberto Esposito’s attempt to split 
the difference, if you will, in what he calls his attempt to think an “affirm-
ative biopolitics.” While I admire Esposito’s work, I want to suggest that his 
retort contains a particular danger for biopolitical thought—namely, a kind 
of neo-vitalism—and it is a danger that is even more dangerous for thinking 
about bioart, simply because a persistent temptation with bioart (for all 
the obvious reasons) is to think that the meaning or politics of the artwork 
can somehow be anchored in or indexed to the particular and peculiar 
character of its medium, its material substrate. What I will want to argue, 
however, is that the meaning and politics of bioart cannot be understood 
in this way, and that a different and more pragmatically effective grasp of 
the biopolitical meaning of bioart will diverge from such an understanding 
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along two different axes of biopolitical thought: either what we might call 
a “restricted” sense of the political (and of art, as it turns out) that might 
be associated with the work of Niklas Luhmann, or a more generalized and 
diffuse understanding of the complex relationship between the political and 
“politicization” that is focused not on the problem of sovereignty (as it is 
in Agamben or Schmitt) but on material dispositifs and apparatuses that 
constitute political effectivity, a line of thought associated most of all in 
biopolitics with the work of Michel Foucault.
What is needed, to put it another way, is what we might call an “ecolo-
gization” of the biopolitical paradigm: an ecologization that drives us 
toward not a vitalism that wants to derive ethical or political imperatives 
from “life” (in the form, let’s say, of the “biocentrism” familiar to us from 
the moment of “Deep Ecology,” or a prima facie valuing of biodiversity 
in certain versions of environmental ethics) but rather a denaturalized 
understanding of the ecological paradigm that emphasizes form, time, and 
dynamic complexity (in the case at hand, social complexity as that bears 
upon the forms taken by “life”) as the key constituents for thinking how 
biopolitics and bioart operate and signify. This “ecological” or “evolu-
tionary” or “metabiological” emphasis on social complexity, as Hans-Georg 
Moeller puts it, “starts from the ‘for itself’ of organic life and goes behind 
it” to “the cybernetically described, basic phenomenon of the self-mainte-
nance of self-relating systems in the face of hyercomplex environments.”1 
A certain (and, I would argue, dominant) understanding of ecology would 
share with biopolitical vitalism the desire to ground what Esposito calls an 
“affirmative” biopolitics in the material substrate of life itself as a given 
good. But the understanding of “ecology” that I am promoting here would 
emphasize that what the immunological paradigm of biopolitics and the 
ecological paradigm have in common is that, for both, it is not a question 
of a biological or ecological substrate but rather of thinking the forms and 
processes by which the system / environment relationship is stabilized and 
managed by systems that find themselves in an environment of exponentially 
greater complexity than they themselves possess—all of which reaches back 
to perhaps the most important thinker in the ecological paradigm, Gregory 
Bateson, who long go reminded us that, in ecological thinking, you don’t ask 
“what it’s made of—earth, fire, water, etc.,” you ask “what is its pattern?” To 
put it another way, the immunitary mechanism,2 like Derrida’s pharmakon, 
can’t be about a grounding in a material substrate simply because the effect 
and indeed meaning of a given substance—toxic or therapeutic—depends 
on the real-time, dynamic state of the system (and this includes legal and 
political systems, not just biological systems, as we will see).3
* * *
Let me begin with a brief survey of the biopolitical literature, its main lines 
of fracture and divergence, and how the problem of neo-vitalism makes 
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itself manifest in Esposito, before moving to a more specific discussion of 
bioart in its biopoltical dimension. As any number of commentators have 
observed, the general drift of contemporary thought on the biopolitical—
whether under the influence of Giorgio Agamben’s large body of work 
on the Nazi death camps, or Jacques Derrida’s analysis of the autoim-
munitary logic of modern democratic politics—has been overwhelmingly 
thanatopolitical: that is, oriented toward the domination of life and the 
increasing power over the life / death interval at a capillary level heretofore 
unknown. As is well known, Michel Foucault argues in The History of 
Sexuality that “for millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a 
living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern 
man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in 
question.”4 Moreover, as Foucault famously defines biopolitics, it “is the 
power to make live. Sovereignty took life and let live. And now we have the 
emergence of a power that I would call the power of regularization, and it, 
in contrast, consists in making live and letting die.”5
In the three-volume sequence of which Bios is the third installment, 
Esposito sets himself two main tasks: trying to understand the extent to 
which biopolitics is a specifically modern phenomenon, and exploring the 
extent to which biopolitics is necessarily thanatopolitical, with the eventual 
aim, as he puts it, of framing an “affirmative” biopolitics that runs counter 
(most conspicuously) to the work of Agamben.6 The possibility of an 
affirmative biopolitics hinges for Esposito on a reconceptualization of the 
“subject” of politics (in both senses), one that can be traced to Foucault’s 
later work. As we know, Foucault argues in Society Must Be Defended that
an important phenomenon occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries: the appearance—one should say the invention—of a new 
mechanism of power which had very specific procedures, completely new 
instruments, and very different equipment. It was, I believe, absolutely 
incompatible with relations of sovereignty. This new mechanism of 
power applies primarily to bodies and what they do rather to the land 
and what it produces … It was a type of power that presupposed a 
closely meshed grid of material coercions rather than the physical 
existence of a sovereign.7
Most importantly for our purposes, he argues that this shift from sover-
eignty to biopower involves a new concept of the subject, one who is 
endowed with fundamental interests that cannot be limited to or contained 
by the simple legal category of subjectivity.
What Maurizio Lazzarato calls Foucault’s radical “displacement” of the 
problem of sovereignty “does not neglect the analysis of sovereignty,” but 
merely points out that “the grounding force will not be found on the side 
of power, since power is `blind and weak’” (as Foucault puts it)—hence, its 
growing need, in an increasingly complex and differentiated field, for the 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   219 11/01/2017   14:28
220 GENERAL ECOLOGY
various techniques of management, surveillance, and so on that it deploys.8 
What we are dealing with here is not, as Esposito puts it, “some kind of 
withdrawal or contraction of the field that is subjected to the law,” but 
rather how the law for its force gradually shifts “from the transcendental 
level of codes and sanctions that essentially have to do with subjects of 
will to the immanent level of rules and norms that are addressed instead to 
bodies.”9
As Lazzarato argues, three important points follow from this: first, 
“biopolitics is the form of government taken by a new dynamic of forces 
that, in conjunction, express power relations that the classical world 
could not have known”;10 second, “the fundamental political problem of 
modernity is not that of a single source of sovereign power, but that of a 
multitude of forces … If power, in keeping with this description, is consti-
tuted from below, then we need an ascending analysis of the constitution of 
power dispositifs”; and third, “Biopower coordinates and targets a power 
that does not properly belong to it, that comes from the ‘outside.’ Biopower 
is always born of something other than itself.”11
Here, then—with Foucault’s emphasis on bodies “before” and “outside” 
the law—we find a potentially creative, “aleatory” element (to use Foucault’s 
term) that inheres in the very gambit of biopower, an element that is not 
wholly subject to the thanatological drift of a biopolitics subordinated to 
the paradigm of sovereignty. In Foucault’s words, “where there is power, 
there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in 
a position of exteriority in relation to power.”12 Indeed, the political payoff 
of Foucault’s analyses of the mechanisms of disciplinarity, governmentality, 
and so on resides in no small part in their anatomy of how the machinery of 
power races to maintain control over the forces it has brought into its orbit—
forces that derive in no small part from animal bodies (both human and 
nonhuman) that are not always already abjected, as in Agamben. Quite the 
contrary, those bodies are enfolded via biopower in struggle and resistance. 
And because those forces of resistance are thereby produced in a specifically 
articulated form, through particular dispositifs, there is a chance—and this 
marks in no small part Foucault’s debt to Nietzsche (as Esposito points 
out)—for life to burst through power’s systematic operation in ways that are 
more and more difficult to anticipate. Thus, as Lazzarato notes, “Without 
the introduction of the ‘freedom’ and the resistance of forces,” he concludes, 
“the dispositifs of modern power remain incomprehensible.”13
But as Esposito observes, all of this leaves us with “a decisive question: if 
life is stronger than the power that besieges it, if its resistance doesn’t allow 
it to bow to the pressure of power, then how do we account for the outcome 
obtained in modernity of the mass production of death?” In short, “Why 
does biopolitics continually threaten to be reversed into thanatopolitics?”14 
Are the Nazi death camps, to use Agamben’s words, not “a historical fact 
and an anomaly belonging to the past,” but rather “the hidden matrix and 
nomos of the political space in which we are still living”?15 It is this impasse, 
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Esposito argues, that Foucault never really overcomes because he does not 
fully develop the “immunitary” logic of the biopolitical that he identifies 
in his later work (a paradigm also explored in this connection by Donna 
Haraway, Jacques Derrida, and Niklas Luhmann). Foucault recognizes in 
his lectures from 1976 that “the very fact that you let more die will allow 
you to live more,”16 but he is unable to see that the affirmative and thana-
tological dimensions of biopolitics—either “a politics of life or a politics 
over life,” as Esposito puts it—are joined in a single mechanism.17 “Rather 
than being superimposed or juxtaposed in an external form that subjects 
one to the domination of the other,” Esposito writes, “in the immunitary 
paradigm, bios and nomos, life and politics, emerge as the two constituent 
elements of a single, indivisible whole that assumes meaning from their 
interrelation.”18 So if the fundamental logic of biopolitics is immunitary, 
then the problem becomes how to keep the immunitary from more or less 
automatically turning into the autoimmunitary along the lines described 
by Derrida in the interview “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides” 
where, following the earlier logic of the pharmakon, the very mechanism 
designed to cordon off and protect the body politic instead makes it all the 
more vulnerable, attacking it from the inside by a logic of runaway hyper-
purification according to some identity principle.19
For his part, Esposito insists that a turn away from the thanatological 
and autoimmunitary logic of biopolitics and toward an affirmative biopol-
itics can only take place if life as such—not just human (vs animal) life, not 
just Aryan (vs Jewish) life, not just Christian (vs Islamic) life—becomes the 
subject of immunitary protection. Esposito writes:
we can say that the subject, be it a subject of knowledge, will, or action 
as modern philosophy commonly understands it, is never separated 
from the living roots from which it originates in the form of a splitting 
between the somatic and psychic levels in which the first is never decided 
[risolve] in favor of the second … This means that between man and 
animal—but also, in a sense, between the animal and the vegetal and 
between the vegetal and the natural object—the transition is rather more 
fluid than was imagined.20
And this is so, he argues, because “there is never a moment in which the 
individual can be enclosed in himself or be blocked in a closed system, 
and so removed from the movement that binds him to his own biological 
matrix.”21 And this leads, in turn, to Esposito’s retrofitting of Spinoza’s 
concept of natural right to make “the norm the principle of unlimited 
equivalence for every single form of life.”22 The general idea here is that 
this new norm will operate as a sort of homeostatic mechanism balancing 
the creative flourishing of various life forms. As Esposito characterizes it, 
“the juridical order as a whole is the product of this plurality of norms and 
provisional result of their mutual equilibrium.”23
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But there are a few fundamental problems here. First—if we are indeed 
talking about actual political and legal norms—there are serious pragmatic 
limitations to this view. For one thing, it replays all of quandries around 
“biocentrism” brought to light during the 1970s and 80s in North America 
during the heyday of the “Deep Ecology” movement—debates that Esposito 
(or for that matter his fellow Italian political philosophers) would have little 
reason, perhaps, to know about. As Tim Luke notes, if all forms of life 
are given equal value, and if no form of life can be favored over another 
with regard to ethical and legal norms, then we face questions such as the 
following: “Will we allow anthrax or cholera microbes to attain self-reali-
zation in wiping out sheep herds or human kindergartens? Will we continue 
to deny salmonella or botulism micro-organisms their equal rights when we 
process the dead carcasses of animals and plants that we eat?”24 There are 
perhaps those who would respond to Luke’s questions in the affirmative—
who would argue that, yes, all forms of life should be equally allowed to 
take their course, even if it means a massive die-off of the species homo 
sapiens. But biopolitically speaking, that hardly solves the problem (or even 
achieves the stated aim) because when we ask what the demographic distri-
bution of such an event would likely be, we realize that the brunt would 
be absorbed by largely black and brown poor populations who live south 
of the “rich North Atlantic democracies” (to use Richard Rorty’s phrase), 
which would protect themselves by whatever means possible.25
Secondly (and more theoretically, as it were), if all forms of life are 
taken to be equal, then (as Eugene Thacker has pointed out) it can 
only be because they, as “the living,” all equally embody and express a 
positive, substantive principle of “Life” not contained in any one of them. 
“The problem,” he argues, “is that once one considers something like 
life-in-itself”—whether in the form of a “life-principle” or some other 
“inaccessible first principle”—then “one must also effectively dissociate Life 
from the living.”26 To put this slightly otherwise, what Esposito is unable to 
articulate is that what “binds him to his own biological matrix” is nothing 
“living,” but neither is it “Life.” Instead, as Martin Hägglund has argued, it 
is the trace-structure and “spacing” that is “the condition for anything that 
is subject to succession, whether animate or inanimate, ideal or material.”27 
Such a structure (or more precisely, such a system) is, strictly speaking 
“dead”; it is a “machinalité” (to use Derrida’s term) that allows the concat-
enation of material processes that may (but only may) eventuate in forms of 
life.28 Far from metaphysical, however, such a system is perfectly compatible 
with a materialist and naturalistic account of how life evolves out of 
non-living matter, how even the most sophisticated forms of intentionality 
or sensibility arise out of the inorganic systematicity of repetition and 
recursivity, retention and protention.29 In this way, the arche-materiality 
of the structure of succession, of what Derrida calls “living-on,” allows, as 
Hägglund puts it “for a conceptual distinction between life and matter that 
takes into account the Darwinian explanation of how the living evolved out 
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of the non-living, while asserting a distinguishing characteristic of life that 
does not make any concessions to vitalism.”30
This is an important point, I think, for making sense of the biopolitics 
of contemporary bioart. It brings into focus the manifold problems with 
equating the norm with “the principle of unlimited equivalence” of “life” 
pure and simple in the same way that prominent developments in contem-
porary biology such as in vitro meat or synthetic biology do. After all, is in 
vitro meat “real” meat? Is it “life”? Or does it simply underscore what was 
always already true of “life” to begin with—that forms of life depend upon 
a recursive ongoing interaction between the “who” (biological wetware) 
and the “what” (environment, weather, shared social and semiotic archives 
and repertoires, “fixed” or “instinctive” stimulus–response mechanisms, 
tool use and tool making, and the like). Precisely here, it seems to me, it is 
useful to remember Derrida’s discussion of cloning in his late book Rogues. 
As he summarizes it, those who oppose cloning object to it “in the name of 
ethics, human rights … the dignity of human life … and the nonrepetitive 
unicity of the human person … a unique, irreplaceable, free, and thus 
nonprogrammable living being.”31 But what is overlooked here, he argues, 
is that
So-called identificatory repetition, the duplication, that one claims to 
reject with horrified indignation, is already, and fortunately, present and 
at work everywhere it is a question of reproduction and of heritage, in 
culture, knowledge, language, education, and so on … so many dimen-
sions that are irreducible, even for “identical” twins, to this supposedly 
simply, genetic naturalness. What is the consequence of all of this? 
That, in the end, this so-called ethical or humanist axiomatic actually 
shares with the axiomatic it claims to oppose a certain geneticism or 
biologism, indeed a deep zoologism, a fundamental but unacknowledged 
reductionism.32
Derrida’s commentary here—and the example of synthetic biology in 
general—enables us to see how the biopolitical frame makes possible the 
thinking of a more nuanced and differentiated set of ethical and political 
relations with regard to “forms of life,” but only if we do not succumb to 
the sort of neo-vitalism that, at the end of Bios, seems to leave us with a 
stark choice: either “life” as “unique, irreplaceable, free, and thus nonpro-
grammable” and the biocentrism that results from it on the one hand, or 
the autoimmune disorder which, Esposito suggests, is bound to eventuate if 
the continuum of life is broken, on the other.
* * *
What all the foregoing draws our attention to is the intensely non-generic and 
“transversal” (to use Deleuze’s term) character of the “bio” of biopolitics 
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in its Foucauldian articulation, how it is essentially a strategic problem and 
object for political power, one that is conjugated and reconjugated anew 
under very specific coordinates and conditions, which may be ontological 
(in the sense of specific forms of embodiment and articulation with the 
environment) or sociological and historical, or both. What I now want to 
ask is what art adds, exactly, to that understanding. What does bioart make 
available to us that we can’t get elsewhere—in an essay on synthetic biology 
and capital, say, or a lecture on genetic engineering, patents and law? It 
would be easy enough to begin by saying that bioart dramatizes what is 
always already true of the “bio” of biopolitics in general: that it is always a 
matter of the enfolding and coimplication of the living, the “wet,” and that 
which is radically not living and nonorganic—technicity and machinalité 
in the broadest sense—whether that takes the form of the tool and the 
semiotic, the archive, the “gramme” of the instinctive program (so-called) 
or, most conspicuously in art, the frame and the parergon which is linked, 
via Heidegger’s famous essay on technology, to the entire genealogy of 
bipolitical thought. But I want to try and be a little more specific about how 
bioart may be seen to be socially or politically representative, as art, in a 
biopolitical context, in ways that might seem a little unexpected while at the 
same time nevertheless extending the Foucauldian idea of the political itself.
Here, I want to return to Niklas Luhmann’s work in Art as a Social 
System, which I used in What Is Posthumanism? to make sense of certain 
trends in contemporary architecture’s relationship to what we used to 
call “nature” and “landscape.” As Luhmann tells it, once the patronage 
system collapses, art is faced with the problem of justifying, and securing, 
its own autonomy, which can no longer be explained by reference to 
how it serves the church, the Medicis, and so on. In this new situation of 
modernity understood as a phenomenon of functional differentiation, the 
social system of art obeys the same formal dynamics that all social systems 
do. In brief, the art system, like all social systems, faces the dilemma of 
having to reproduce itself and maintain its autopoiesis under conditions of 
overwhelming environmental complexity—an asymmetry between system 
and environment that is axiomatic for systems theory. Like all social 
systems, it does so by using a highly selective code to reduce environmental 
complexity. For the education system, the code is knowledge / ignorance; 
for economics, credit / debit; for politics, power / opposition.33 For art as a 
social system, Luhmann sometimes says that the code is beautiful / ugly, but 
clearly this can’t be right. It makes more sense to say instead, as he puts it, 
that art under functional differentiation exists to constantly raise the question 
that it itself also answers—if only for a fleeting moment—necessitating the 
production of more art: namely, the question “what is art?” and “is this 
particular thing a work of art?”34 But all such distinctions that organize the 
autopoiesis of social systems are built around a constitutive “blind spot,” 
as Luhmann puts it, because of their tautological self-reference. To wit, in 
the legal system, the two sides of its organizing distinction legal / illegal are 
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in fact a product of only one side of the distinction, namely the legal. But 
the legal system cannot acknowledge the fundamental, tautological identity 
of both sides of the distinction and at the same time use it to organize and 
carry out its first-order operations. Only another observer, a second-order 
observer, using another code or distinction, can do that—can undertake 
what Luhmann calls “the observation of observation”—but of course 
the second-order observer will be bound by the same formal dynamics of 
blindness and self-reference.35
Here, however, Luhmann’s theory of art introduces a wrinkle that 
is important for our purposes. For Luhmann, “the paradox unique to 
art, which art creates and resolves, resides in the observability of the 
unobservable”—and this is because art alone is able, uniquely, to re-enter 
the difference between consciousness (or perception, as he sometimes 
puts it) and communication into its own systematic communication.36 
For all other social systems, the autopoiesis of communication takes 
place in spite of perception, consciousness, psychic activity, and so on. 
For art, however, communication takes place through perception and 
consciousness—or more precisely, by means of the artwork’s modulation of 
the difference between perception and meaning, consciousness and commu-
nication, against the background of the art system as a whole and formal 
selections that are meaningful in that context. (For as Luhmann points 
out, perception and communication operate in mutually exclusive, opera-
tionally closed autopoietic systems—the neurophysiological wetware of the 
brain and body vs the externality of social systems of communication and 
their media—though those systems may be structurally coupled through 
symbolic media such as language.) This difference—between perception and 
communication, and especially between their different speeds and quali-
tative aspects (perception is fast and “all at once” while communication 
is linear and sequential, for example, operating by means of delays and 
deferrals-) is used by art to call attention to the contingency of communi-
cation or, to put it another way, to simply raise the question of meaning: 
namely, is the thing we are looking at or experiencing art, and how does 
this particular artwork mean in the larger context of art as a social system 
and its function? And so, as Luhmann puts it, “The function of art would 
then consist in integrating what is in principle incommunicable—namely, 
perception—into the communication network of society,” thus giving 
society another way—indeed a unique way—to observe itself.37
Following Luhmann, we might put it this way: if art, because of its 
unique use of the difference between perception and communication, has 
a privileged relationship to the invisible or ineffable (namely, making it 
visible) then it also makes more visible than other social systems the fact 
that when one thing is made visible (or formally selected) another is made 
invisible (because of the “blind spot” of observation and its contingent self-
reference). And if we rewrite that point about the visible versus the invisible 
in terms of Thacker’s reading of the difference between “the living” and 
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“Life,” then my larger point about bioart comes into view: that the old 
adage “art imitates life” remains true (and is intensified by bioart) only in 
the sense that the “the living” makes “Life” invisible—that is to say, art 
imitates life only by not imitating Life. Or as Luhmann puts it, “art can no 
longer be understood as an imitation of something that presumably exists 
along with and outside of art”; rather, “to the extent that imitation is still 
possible, it now imitates the world’s invisibility, a nature that can no longer 
be apprehended as a whole.”38
What this means is that “the living” as the medium of bioart is actually 
able to become a medium for art’s communication about the unobserv-
ability of “Life” in general and as such. The self-reference of bioart thus 
communicates how “Life” is never apprehended “as a whole” or “as such” 
but always takes specific forms, which are themselves riven by contingency, 
difference, and “blindness.” That is simply to say those forms (of “the 
living”) are selective. Thus, what Luhmann says about “the world” in the 
following quote could as well be said about “Life” with regard to bioart’s 
use of “the living”: “The world displays all the qualities that Nicholas 
of Cusa ascribed to God: it is neither small nor large, neither unity nor 
diversity, it neither has a beginning nor is it without beginning—and this 
is why the world needs forms.”39 Or as he puts it later in Art as a Social 
System:
the function of art is to make the world appear within the world—with 
an eye toward the ambivalent situation that every time something is 
made available for observation, something else withdraws, that, in other 
words, the activity of distinguishing and indicating that goes on in the 
world conceals the world … Yet a work of art is capable of symbolizing 
the reentry of the world into the world because it appears—just like the 
world—incapable of emendation.40
And this is true even of works—one might actually say especially of 
works—such as Genesis or GFP Bunny by bioartist Eduardo Kac, in 
which changes in the work (in either its medium or its component parts) 
inevitably become part of the meaning of the work itself, its ongoing 
recursive build up of its own self-reference: a process that starts, for the 
artwork, in a decision, a mark, an indication that is absolutely contingent 
and moves from there, through self-reference, to demarcate itself from 
everything else in the universe, as this object and not some other.41 In 
Genesis, for example, Kac takes a passage from the King James Bible that 
reads “Let man have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl 
of the air, and over every living thing that moves upon the earth,” then 
translates that first into Morse code, and then into genetic code by making 
the dashes equal thymine, the dots, cytosine, the spaces between words, 
adenine, and the spaces between letters, guanine. This “translation” is 
then used to create the genetic sequence for a unique “artist’s gene,” which 
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is then incorporated into bacteria displayed in the gallery space. Online 
participants can remotely activate ultraviolet light in the gallery to cause 
mutations in the bacteria, and the resulting changes are then translated 
back from the genetic code to the biblical passage, altering its meaning and 
in some cases rendering particular words gibberish, so that the resulting 
non-communicative verbal elements are incorporated into the artwork’s 
specific communication. GFP Bunny takes a different tack, which consists 
not only of the green fluorescent rabbit named Alba that Kac created with 
the help of genetic engineers, but also the public dialogue and drama that 
unfolded around the project when the director of the lab in which she was 
born in France refused to release her to return home with Kac to Chicago—
to which Kac responded, in turn, by staging various means of protest, such 
as placing “Free Alba” posters in various parts of Paris and mounting an 
exhibition of the same name which “reappropriated and recontextualized 
this vast coverage, exhibiting the productive tension that is generated when 
contemporary art enters the realm of daily news.”42
Such strategies are not rare; in fact, they are part of the stock in trade 
of many practicing bioartists, as attorney Lori Andrews points out in her 
essay “Art as a Public Policy Medium.” She gives several examples of how 
bioartists integrate into their work various legal disputes, edicts handed 
down by university committees regulating the use of biological material, 
and so on. Banks in Pink and Blue, created by artist Inigo Manglano-
Ovalle for the University of Washington’s Henry Art Gallery, for example, 
consisted of two sperm bank tanks, each containing sperm more likely 
to produce boys or girls. When the university’s Institutional Biosafety 
Committee requested that he destroy the samples when the show ended, he 
hired lawyers to challenge the order and then used the contracts with the 
sperm providers, the university, and himself as part of the installation.43 
Andrews argues that bioart can thus help society “confront the social impli-
cations of its biological choices, understand the limitations of the much 
hyped biotechnologies, develop policies for dealing with biotechnologies, 
and confront larger issues of the role of science and the role of art in our 
society.”44
There is little to argue with here, of course, but when it comes to 
political theory, the devil is in the details, as they say. Here again, it seems 
to me the systems theory perspective can be of use for thinking about the 
complexities and actual channels of real political effectivity in the context 
of biopolitics. Andrews argues that “by pointing out the gaps in regulation, 
the risks of these technologies, the inequities in access, and the way in 
which application of certain technologies may harm important social and 
cultural values, artists can encourage the social discussion that is necessary 
to adopt social public policies for biotechnologies.”45 But the question, 
of course, is what is the nature of this “social discussion” and what are 
the processes by which public policies are adopted? On this question, 
Andrews’ problem is not unlike that of Bruno Latour’s “political ecology,” 
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which pays insufficient attention to the autopoiesis of the law—and, more 
broadly, the phenomenon of functional differentiation as the very motor 
of modernity. As legal theorist Gunther Teubner puts it, Latour imagines 
a “great unified collective” where professions make their contributions to 
the decision-making process in a single conversation, but in fact there is 
little evidence to suggest that “an overarching societal discourse” called 
“political ecology” will emerge. Indeed, the phenomenon of functional 
differentiation and the specialization and self-reference of the various 
professions involved in these conversations (not least of all, of course, the 
specialization and differentiation of the various branches of the law itself) 
suggests quite otherwise; and thus, the sites on which Latour’s political 
ecology plays out are fragmented, “dispersed over different social institu-
tions.”46 As Teubner points out, each social subsystem operates “under 
sharply defined conditions” for attributing actions, responsibilities, rights, 
duties, and so on.47 “Using their specific models of rationality,” he writes, 
“each institution produces a different actor, even where concretely it is the 
same, human or non-human, that is involved.”48 This doesn’t mean that the 
question of nonhuman actants doesn’t affect the operations of the law or 
of other social subsystems; it means, rather, that they affect them in quite 
specific ways (and not others). And it also means that these new social 
actors—nonhuman animals, electronic technologies, biological materials, 
and so on—thus “lead a highly fragmented existence in society,” appearing 
“in very different guises in politics, in the economy, in the law, and in other 
social contexts.”49 What art can do, then—as part of the larger environment 
in which the legal system operates—is perturb and stimulate the law to 
respond to changes taking place in the world around it, but that response 
will take place in and through the law’s own autopoiesis. And so, we end 
up with a picture of the legal system as both open and closed: open to its 
environment, but responding to changes in it in terms of the autopoietic 
closure of its own self-reference, what the legal code makes possible or 
forecloses.
Indeed, Andrews’ essay ends with the story of a case that bears out 
this fact quite clearly. When British artist Anthony Noel-Kelly convinced 
Richard Heald of the Royal College of Surgeons to grant him access 
to cadavers so that he could sketch them (a practice in keeping with 
longstanding artistic tradition, of course) all seemed well. But soon, 
Noel-Kelly began smuggling cadavers and body parts out to take them to 
his studio where he could make casts of the bodies and body parts, burying 
them in the grounds of his family’s estate when he was done. When a police 
officer realized at one of Noel-Kelly’s exhibitions that the statues must 
have been cast from dead bodies, the artist was charged with theft, but he 
defended himself by arguing that the body parts had been “abandoned” 
(the same argument that protects doctors and scientists who do research on 
human tissues). And he pointed out that even if he were in violation of the 
law, so too was the Royal College of surgeons, which kept the body parts 
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even longer without burying them “in a timely manner.” His primary legal 
argument, however, was a very simple but very broad one: that he could not 
be charged with theft because for centuries judges had made it clear that the 
human body could not be property. (This is why turn-of-the-century body 
snatchers were charged not with theft but with violating public decency.) 
The prosecutor in the case countered that this legal tradition was the result 
of an erroneous reading of a case from 1614 where defendants had stolen 
corpses to take their burial clothes—and the error had been perpetuated 
since by centuries of legal precedent.50
The judge in the case, Geoffrey Rivlin, conceded that it was indeed 
strange that body-snatching in its heyday was not declared a felony, even 
though during the same period other offenses, from shooting rabbits to 
appearing in disguise on a public road, could be punished by the death 
penalty. Rivlin finally concluded that the reason body-snatching was not 
declared a felony was that “Parliament, if not exactly turning a blind 
eye to it … winked at it in the interest of medical science.” And while he 
agreed that body parts were not, after all, property—seemingly letting the 
artist off the hook for the charge of theft—he then cited a 1908 Australian 
case which established that altering body parts (as the Royal College had 
done by putting them in formaldehyde) transformed them into the alterer’s 
property. And so Noel-Kelly was convicted of stealing human remains in 
April of 1998.51
The final twist in the story is this: as part of the litigation, Noel-Kelly’s 
sculptures were ordered to be given to the Royal College of Surgeons to 
display in their museum, underscoring the fact, as Andrews puts it, “that 
medical institutions are allowed to do things with body parts that other 
individuals and institutions are not.” At the same time, however, she 
notes that in the United States, artists are in some ways more favored by 
laws pursuant to the Constitutional emphasis on “the progress of science 
and useful arts.” For while a scientific researcher receives a twenty-year 
monopoly on his or her invention under patent law, the copyright of an 
artist is good for life plus seventy years after the author’s death. Moreover, 
it is unconstitutional under the First Amendment right of free speech to 
adopt a law prohibiting art about a particular subject matter (a ban on 
paintings that parody a president is Andrews’ example), but researchers 
are routinely blocked from undertaking various kinds of research (on 
human fetuses, for example) without that constituting a violation of the 
researcher’s first amendment rights.52
Another way to put it, then—to return to my opening question—is to 
say that if bioart is socially representative, what it is socially representative 
of is the inability of any particular social system to steer or determine the 
autopoiesis of how other social systems relate to or “code” the question 
of “Life” (and the difference between “Life” and “the living”) in terms of 
their own self-reference. It is always a matter of “transversal” relations, you 
might say—a fact which Luhmann emphasizes and intensifies by rethinking 
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“objects” as “eigen values” (to use Heinz von Foerster’s terminology). 
From this vantage point, as Luhmann puts it, “giving up the notion of the 
subject”—which biopolitical thought, like systems theory, already does 
(a point that receives particular emphasis in Esposito’s work)—“requires 
reconstructing the object, which loses its opposite.”53 In this light, objects 
appear not as givens but “as repeated indications, which, rather than having 
a specific opposite, are demarcated against `everything else’”; they appear 
as “eigen-behaviors of recursive calculations.”54 But even more important 
for our purposes—and here we extend but also refine the Foucauldian line 
of biopolitical analysis—is that “the stabilization of objects (identification, 
recognizability, and so on) is more likely to contribute to stabilizing social 
relationships than the famous social contract,” so that “objects that emerge 
from the recursive self-application of communication [as eigen behaviors] 
contribute more than any other kinds of norms and sanctions to supplying 
the social system with necessary redundancies.”55 And even more significant 
is that “this may be even more true of objects that have been invented for 
the sake of this specific function, such as kings or soccer balls”—or, works 
of art, which are “quasi-objects” (to use Michel Serres’ term) in exactly this 
sense. It is precisely because such quasi-objects dramatize what is already 
true of all objects—that they are not given but rather produced by recursive 
social communications and behaviors—that, in the quasi-object,“the 
socially regulative reveals itself.”56 And in my view, such a process is 
political precisely because it is contingent and ontologically ungrounded, 
always a matter, as Foucault reminds us, of highly specific configurations, 
overdeterminations, histories, dispositifs, and so on. To put it this way to 
give a different cast to what is often seen as the “apolitical” character of 
Luhmann’s social systems theory. It allows us to understand how the point 
is not that art is “political” in the usual sense of having a linear or represen-
tational relationship to some political ground that is external to it and that 
determines or motivates its features or themes. Rather, art’s relationship 
to the political is non-representational in making visible for society’s 
self-observation the “socially regulative” and “stabilizing” contingencies 
that structure the field of objects and observations in which we make art 
and communicate, the highly selective overdeterminations that bear upon 
how—in the contemporary context of the “right to life,” the sixth great 
extinction event in the history of the planet, the increasing pervasiveness 
of synthetic biology and genetic engineering, and much else besides in the 
domain of the “bio-“—we conjugate the relationship between what we call 
“Life” and its empirical instantiations in the domain of “the living.”
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CHAPTER NINE
Ecologies of communion , 
contagion, &c, especially 
Bataille
David Wills
So this is where it all ends, or perhaps begins. I’ll quote from the original to 
save myself some embarrassment:
Hâtivement, nous fîmes, hors du chemin, dans la terre labourée, les dix 
pas que font les amants. Nous étions toujours au-dessus des tombes. 
Dorothéa s’ouvrit, je la dénudai jusqu’au sexe. Elle-même, elle me 
dénuda. Nous sommes tombés sur le sol meuble et je m’enfonçai dans 
son corps humide comme une charrue bien manœuvrée s’enfonce dans 
la terre. La terre, sous ce corps, était ouverte comme une tombe, son 
ventre nu s’ouvrit à moi comme une tombe fraîche. Nous étions frappés 
de stupeur, faisant l’amour au-dessus d’un cimetière étoilé. Chacune des 
lumières annonçait un squelette dans une tombe, elles formaient ainsi un 
ciel vacillant, aussi trouble que les mouvements de nos corps mêlés. Il 
faisait froid, mes mains s’enfonçaient dans la terre : je dégrafai Dorothéa, 
je souillais son linge et sa poitrine de la terre fraîche qui s’était collée à 
mes doigts …
 Je dus, comme je pouvais, tirer mon pantalon. Je m’étais mis debout. 
Dirty restait le derrière nu, à même le sol. Elle se leva péniblement, elle 
attrapa une de mes mains. Elle embrassa mon ventre nu: la terre s’était 
collée à mes jambes velues: elle la gratta pour m’en débarrasser. Elle 
s’accrochait à moi. Elle jouait avec des mouvements sournois, avec des 
mouvements d’une folle indécence. Elle me fit d’abord tomber. Je me 
relevai difficilement, je l’aidais à remettre ses vêtements, mais c’était 
difficile, nos corps et nos vêtements devenus terreux. Nous n’étions pas 
moins excités par la terre que par la nudité de la chair.1
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That is Georges Bataille down and dirty, his female fictional character 
nicknamed as such (Dirty), both of them in the dirt, covered in it, in the 
climactic scene of Blue of Noon. It is also Georges Bataille down to his most 
ecological, if by that we mean—something no one is conceding here—an 
intimate relation with an elemental nature: naked bodies in soft bare soil, 
sexual intercourse like ploughing a field, fellatio impeded by grit on hairy 
legs, carnal excitement competing with humicolous arousal. This is a sex 
that returns to the earth, composts itself almost, shares the same space as 
the tomb, and gives itself over to the teeming life of the soil.
Something perverse keeps bringing me back to this scene: in books, in 
classes, in provoking a close colleague and friend happy to participate in a 
panel on Bataille “as long as you don’t ask me to talk about the fiction.” 
But in coming back to it I am also of course economizing, using a renewable 
resource, avoiding archival overload, reducing my or our intellectual and 
neuronal footprint, even keeping things down to earth. Or else capitalizing, 
exploiting it for all it’s worth, trading it in the marketplace of rarified super-
structural exchange, fetishizing it beyond any authentic use value, even 
automatizing it in some uncanny and grotesque repetition.
It is where it all ends, or perhaps begins, because the scene is set in that 
most economicological of cities, Trier, perhaps Germany’s oldest town but 
specifically Marx’s birthplace, and its timing is calculated to be All Saints’ 
Day, 1934. Offstage, as far as the novel is concerned, Gustav Simon, the 
Gauleiter (Nazi party regional leader) appointed by Hitler, is making the city 
a Brown Shirt stronghold and showcase. It is eight months since Heidegger 
resigned as Freiburg Rector, four months since the Night of the Long Knives, 
and a couple of months since Carl Schmitt published his defense of the 
Führer’s upholding the law. It is also during this time frame that Bataille has 
entered a period of intense erotic disarray centered on the person of Colette 
“Laure” Peignot, without doubt the most important woman in his life, who 
will accompany him through what he will later call—referring specifically 
to 1934—“a serious moral crisis,” and with whom he will remain, into 
the Acéphale adventure, until her death in November 1938.2 An additional 
time frame: when Bataille publishes La Part maudite [The Accursed Share] 
in 1949 he refers to it as a work eighteen years in the making, which takes 
its beginning back to the early 1930s, and he will not publish Blue of Noon 
itself, dated May 1935 but whose “Introduction” was drafted in 1928, until 
1957. That makes the beginning of Blue of Noon, where Troppmann the 
narrator and Dirty / Dorothea are first found wallowing in alcohol, tears, 
vomit, perfume, body odor, blood, urine, and shit, the first thing Bataille 
will have written, and turns the novel into a work that spans most of his 
active life as a writer.3
The earth that is made so explicitly and elementally present in 
Troppmann’s Trier tryst—in which he overcomes his impotence—with 
Dorothea is of course not the only thing to be emphasized in this scene. 
Equally, if not more important, is its necrophilic bias; not just the fact of 
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the festival of the dead in the cemetery and the thematics of the skeletal, 
but the whole apocalyptic approach of war presaging dead children, a 
legless Dorothea, and finally the whole “rising tide of murder” of the 
book’s final paragraph, “far more corrosive than life (because blood is 
more luminous in death than in life).”4 For whereas Bataille’s necro-erotics 
is, as we know and as I shall shortly develop, a multi-layered question, it 
begins as a relation to blood that is more vital for being shed, more highly 
charged when it overflows its bodily limits, more incandescent in its awful 
visibility. Thus although in this scene the blood does not explicitly flow—
perhaps a few scratches when they take a tumble, the threat of much more 
had they “fallen into the night,”5 the hallucinated killings and mutilations 
of war foretold—it remains the implicit undercurrent of, and thematic 
counterpoint to the earth and soil that becomes the lovers’ bed. After all, 
blood and soil are the two poles of every anthropo-ecological impulse and 
enterprise, the two oikoi or (home)-bases upon which rest both the private 
and public versions of environmentalization in general, both the personal 
and political self-constitutions of the human. In each case what takes place 
in the first place—and these are precisely events of “taking place as first 
place”—is an economy of interiorization: immediate environment, ideally 
no environment, conceived of as self-enclosed interiority. Blood is that 
interior life in the body, pumping from heart to extremity without for all 
that breaching the confines of the body; soil is the blood of the nation, 
the very substance that defines and circumscribes native territory from 
its center or capital to its borders (and in whose interest and for whose 
safeguarding blood must periodically be shed).6
Some version of ecology in that most literal sense might therefore have 
to be conceded here, since it is the very literalization of the stable (house) 
vis-à-vis the mutable or less defined (environment), even if we resist 
reducing it to an intimate relation with an elemental nature. It is difficult to 
conceive of ecology without the idea of a relation between a living entity or 
organism and a more or less defined territory; indeed, without the sense of 
an organicity of that relation, the living organism organically conforming 
to the territory in which it lives and moves; and that is figured through Blue 
of Noon as blood relating to soil. Hence my interest here is in the buttresses 
that ecology relies on, and the stresses to which it is exposed once the 
concept is required to confront Bataille’s thinking concerning communion 
and contagion; and further, once it is called upon to deal with what I’ll call 
an originary environmental rupture, prosthetization and technologization.
The tension between blood and soil is a major problematic posed in 
Bataille’s Blue of Noon, and the cemetery scene in Trier, followed by what 
happens the following day, represents such a problematic in all its ambiva-
lence. In 1934 in Germany the restricted economy of both a metaphorical 
and metonymical transfer between blood and soil (the authentic lifeblood 
of the Volk pumping up the Vaterland; the blood, already being shed, whose 
present and future effusion will cleanse the Aryan earth) is well on the way 
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to being fully mobilized. In the novel, Hitler youth are encountered by the 
protagonists en route to their funereal tryst, an SA officer is on the train the 
next day, and in the square in front of the Frankfurt station the narrator 
is drawn to a concert by Nazi boys in uniform, playing a “violent music, a 
sound of unbearable bitterness” as though “possessed by some cataclysmic 
exultation.” It is a music whose marching rhythm mimics, supposedly, the 
beating of the heart, but that, in the event, is so inflexible that it takes the 
narrator’s breath away [un rythme si cassant que j’étais devant eux le souffle 
coupé], like a machinic heart that stops the heart: “Each peal of music in 
the night was an incantatory summons to war and murder. The drum rolls 
were raised to their paroxysm in the expectation of an ultimate resolution 
in bloody salvos of artillery.”7 As is made patently clear in those words, so 
extraordinarily prescient that it is hard to imagine Bataille never revised 
them between 1935 and 1957, and as is made equally clear by means of 
the martial music they describe, the ideology of exultation that marked that 
part of the twentieth century was expressed as a fever-pitched stridency 
of nationalist fusion accompanying an orgy of holocaustic violence and 
cruelty. And its ideology was wedded to the earth, rooted in a specific soil, 
functioning within the most restricted economy of home and land, the 
strictest law of belonging, requiring increasingly bloody expurgation.
In opposition to that, the sexualized soil, the besmirched coupling of 
Bataille’s fictional protagonists promises only slim resistance, and reveals 
itself as the ineffectual indulgence that tradition accuses it of being. Yet 
that promise is precisely what is wagered, according to a straightforward 
reading, by means of the narrative conceit of the novel: Troppmann, 
plagued by sexual impotence and lacking respect for any woman who 
does not desire the same level of debauchery as Dirty, and beset by a 
parallel bad faith regarding his own lack of political commitment, either 
to a more or less doctrinaire Marxism or to the revolutionary anarchism 
that he witnesses taking shape in Barcelona, finally finds himself, or 
satisfaction, albeit melancholically, in the Trier scene. According to that 
interpretation, Bataille is positing in this early fiction the double wager of 
a general economy, capable of expending itself by means of the hecatombs 
of war (wanton dissipation of the national body) as well as in the grimy 
excesses of sexual dissolution (wanton dissipation of lovers’ bodies). 
Such a double economy comes to be articulated through the writer’s two 
grand projects that are Inner Experience (1954) and The Accursed Share 
(1949); or within the larger version of The Accursed Share between the 
political economy of the first volume, and the works on eroticism and 
sovereignty that followed; or within that first volume, in the alternative 
that emerges at the end between a third World War and the Marshall 
Plan. And fundamental to Bataille’s understanding of economy, as is 
laid out superbly by Allan Stoekl in his Bataille’s Peak, what makes that 
economy an ecology in the most everyday sense, and what makes Bataille 
a thinker for the current age and a thinker of ecology, is the question 
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of sustainable energy. According to Stoekl, Bataille puts “energy at the 
forefront of his thinking of society: we are energy, our very being consists 
of the expenditure of quantities of energy.”8 In doing that Bataille follows 
Giordano Bruno’s idea that movement, or “what a later age might call 
energy is … the driving force of all matter” (5); and Sade, for whom “the 
greatest energy … entails a radical selfishness that finally is not even selfish: 
it is a kind of impersonal power that concentrates its effects in order to 
heighten the effect of energy itself, intensifying and hastening the process 
of destruction” (14–15).
Erotic life provides the clearest context for energy spent for its own sake, 
outside of any utility, or in forms that greatly exceed reproductive necessity. 
Indeed, the useless excess of pleasure is inextricably woven within the very 
the act—to the extent of diverting or perverting it—by which the species 
performs its most important and utilitarian function, namely procreation. 
A profound asociality operates inside the means by which the social entity 
guarantees its continuation:
It is always by means of conduct dedicated to growth that we affirm 
ourselves on the social level. But in the moment of sexual fever we 
conduct ourselves in a contrary fashion: we deplete our forces without 
keeping account, and we expend considerable amounts of energy 
without measure or profit. Sexual pleasure [volupté] seems so much 
like ruination that we have named the moment of its paroxysm “a little 
death.”9
The expenditure of energy in Bataille thus involves an irreducible principle 
of destruction that is epitomized by death. As Stoekl reads Sade, and as 
Bataille’s work on eroticism will make abundantly clear, “nature needs the 
death of her creatures; death is not definitive but a point of transition in a 
larger movement of life.”10 Hence the principle of energy will not automati-
cally give rise to questions of conservation. On the contrary, conservation is 
at the outside conceptually incompatible with an energy that is determined 
by excess; or rather, conservation has somehow to be conceived of within 
an economy whose principle is excessive expenditure, a “prodigality” as 
Bataille states in Eroticism, that is extended to the point of “intolerable 
anguish.”11 Thus, for Stoekl:
Bataille’s energy is a transgression of the limit; it is what is left over in 
excess of what can be used within a fundamentally limited human field 
… It is the energy that by definition does not do work, that is insubor-
dinate, that plays now rather than contributing to some effort that may 
mean something at some later date and that is devoted to some trans-
cendent goal or principle. It is, as Bataille reminds us a number of times, 
the energy of the universe, that energy of stars and “celestial bodies” that 
do no work, whose fire contributes to nothing.12
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The energy of the universe comes to the earth naturally and automatically, 
and effectively limitlessly, by means of the sun. At bottom, Bataille writes 
in “L’économie à la mesure de l’univers,” “we are only an effect of the 
sun.”13 The blue of noon is the sovereign moment of solar recognition or 
reconciliation, described in the novel of the same name as an “insolence” 
bestowed on the narrator, elating him “with a happiness affirmed against all 
reason.”14 The “triumph” of that insolence is described at the end of Part 1 
of Blue of Noon, an italicized dreamlike sequence that barely extends onto 
a second page, but which, formally speaking, has the same weight as the 
rest of the book (Part 2 amounts to ninety pages in the Oeuvres complètes). 
The narrator explains how that insolence persists, then bursts upon him, 
following a confrontation with the law or with God in the person of the 
Commendatore.15 From there and throughout Part 2, leading up to the 
delirium of the series of Barcelona chapters that are entitled “Blue of 
Noon,” it is as if he were working to regain such a sovereign indifference, 
through scenes that alternate between night and day (or open and closed 
eyes), between starlight and sunlight, and between his past childhood and 
the present:
There were stars, an infinity of stars … I was eager for daybreak and 
sunrise … When I was a child, I loved the sun; I used to shut my eyes and 
let it shine, red through my lids. The sun was terrible—it evoked dreams 
of explosion … Now, in this opaque night, I’d made myself drunk with 
light … My eyes were no longer lost among the stars that were shining 
above me in reality, but in the blue of the noon sky. I shut them, so as to 
lose myself in that brilliant blueness … I opened my eyes. The stars were 
still covering my head, but I was mad with sunlight.16
That solar elation allows him to emancipate himself from a childhood in 
which he stabbed himself with a pen, and a new “happy insolence” now 
sustains him, making him capable of nothing less than “turn[ing] the world, 
quite ineluctably, upside down” (ibid.). But some pages later, following 
nightclub and beach scenes, he realizes that he has not escaped from, but 
instead reconstructed the life he was trying to flee by leaving Paris. Out in 
the sun once more, he encounters a beggar who stares at him fixedly and 
insolently, but that insolence, which Troppmann envies, now seems beyond 
his reach: “In the sunshine, there was an insolent look about him, a solar 
look [un aspect solaire] … I would have liked to have that dreadful look, 
that solar look of his, instead of acting like a little boy who never knows 
what he wants.”17 In a sense, then, that alternation between elation and 
morbidity pursues the narrator right up to the end of the novel. Trier, after 
Barcelona, will be all grey, autumnal, and lunar, meager candlepower and 
deep foreboding. Following Dorothea’s departure in another direction, and 
the final episode of martial music, Troppmann will take the train to an 
uncertain destination and future.
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So the question is: what sort of energy is this, both solar and lunar, 
insolent and morbid, potent yet useless, inexhaustible yet dissipated? How 
can a species such as the human make sense of, resist, harness, or conform 
to such a force of nature? How does one choose between a rationalization 
of energy expenditure and abandonment to its implacable burn-off? Those 
irreconcilable questions appear to be as susceptible to a Hegelian treatment 
as to a mystical explanation, and Bataille’s work of course explores both, 
on its way to understanding how—especially by means of religious or 
quasi-religious rites—societies of all stages of development deal with the 
inassimilable elements of their systems of self-organization, and periodically 
reconcile with the boundless energy of matter. But if we follow Stoekl’s 
cogent analysis, the terms of those questions ultimately posit a politics and 
ethics of “generosity” that he also calls one of “postsustainability.” Such 
a politics “would entail not a cult of resource conservation and austere 
selfhood, but, instead, a sacrificial practice of exalted expenditure and 
irresistible glory.”18 The self would be precisely what was sacrificed through 
such expenditure, as when, in Sade, “extreme pleasure is pushed to the limit 
[and] the sheer energy of destructiveness threatens the stability of all selfish 
subjectivity” (27).
The provocation or perversity of Bataille’s general economy therefore 
renders him less than an ideal poster boy for the ecological paradigm, 
hardly a paragon of ecological virtue. At the global level—and beyond—
his generosity has nothing to do with sacrifice understood as making do 
with less, for it is based on a principle of pure waste such as motivates 
the offering up of an animal or human to some divinity, even though that 
practice be rationalized as a form of thanks, repayment of a debt, or down 
payment on future security. It would refuse an understanding of energy 
that turned on the depletion of fossil fuels, as well as an understanding of 
resource depletion related solely to the sustainability of a restricted economy 
of middle-class comfort. To the extent that such an economy increasingly 
includes notions of respect for natural resources, postsustainability would 
require that such respect be understood within the ecological indifference 
of the universe, which values a particular animal species no more than it 
does forms of vegetation. But within that “cruelty” such as it would be felt 
by a depleting species in the same way that it befalls the victims of cruelty 
in Sade, there can again be found the space of generosity: “The post-
sustainable economy is a general economy; beyond the desires and needs 
of the human ‘particle,’ it entails the affirmation of resources conserved 
and energy spent on a completely different scale … the world offers itself 
as sacred victim” (144). This is not to revel in the destructive force of the 
sun as a pretext for turning a blind eye to the perils of global warming, 
or for ignoring the perversion of inattention to human destruction of the 
ecosphere, which is, in any case, systematically employed in the cause of the 
restricted economic practices of the first world. It is rather to recognize that 
no economy, and no ecology, can ignore its own heterogeneous complexity. 
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And, in any case, in a situation where human waste—from household refuse 
to spent nuclear fuel rods, to marine archipelagos of plastic garbage, and 
orbiting satellite wreckage—already haunts the entire ecospheric landscape, 
the species seems to be suffocating, stretched to the limit on the altar or 
rack of meager creature comfort, when it could otherwise be celebrating its 
fulgurant consumption in the universal ocean or firmament of excess.
* * *
Ecology as relation of organism to environment presupposes some idea of 
contiguity and contact. As traditionally conceived, it will always have to 
wrestle with principles of proximity that are determined in turn by notions 
of affect. We are concerned, in ecological terms, by what affects, touches 
(on) something near; on the organism’s organic conformity to, or harmony 
with its territory. Just as the first economics is home economics, so the first 
ecology is, as I have already suggested, constituted by the idea of a house. 
One could cite examples as diverse as the hermit crab in competition with 
the mollusk, celebrated by Francis Ponge:
The mollusk is endowed with powerful energy to close itself in. To tell 
the truth, it is simply a muscle, a hinge, a door latch and its door.
A latch that secreted the door. Two slightly concave doors constitute its 
entire abode.
First and last abode. It resides there till after its death.
There’s no way to get it out alive.
Every last cell in a human body clings in the same way, and with the 
same vigor, to words—reciprocally.
But at times some other creature comes along and violates this tomb, 
when it’s well made, and settles there in place of its late builder.
Take the hermit crab for instance.19
Or, alternatively, one could cite Levinas’s sense of exteriority—and interi-
ority—as developed in the “Interior and Economy” section of Totality 
and Infinity, an articulation that relies entirely upon a certain undecid-
ability of the house. Man, writes Levinas, “plunges into the elemental 
from the domicile … He is within what he possesses, such that we shall 
be able to say that the domicile … renders the inner life possible”; and 
later: “Simultaneously without and within, he goes forth outside from 
an inwardness [intimité]. Yet this intimacy opens up in a house, which 
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is situated in that outside”; and again, “Interiority [is] concretely accom-
plished by the house.”20
Those examples, extending from a simple marine symbiosis to an ethics 
based on an encounter that is rooted in a more or less enclosed space, 
determine ecology as contact with what is contiguous. Ponge’s mollusk is 
all house, a latch that secretes a door, and its energy is all devoted to self-
enclosure for the duration of its life, at which point the house becomes its 
tomb. Its mode of being is attachment: glued to the shell, which is glued 
shut. The hermit crab will appropriate the house as its own form of being-
in-attachment, albeit different from that of the mollusk. Levinas’s man 
self-constitutes as interiority thanks to his contiguous existence within a 
house that is exterior interiority; it is from the house that he learns and 
adopts the exterior limits that give him interiority, according to a mode 
of being-in-attachment that borrows aspects of both the mollusk (he must 
first close the door in order to constitute himself) and the hermit crab (he is 
thereafter mobile enough to desert the house).
A third example could be provided by an ecology of sound.21 In De Anima 
Aristotle found that among the senses “touch alone perceives by immediate 
contact,” but that hearing nevertheless relies on a single and continuous 
mass of air “from the impinging body up to the organ of hearing [which is 
thus] physically united with air.”22 Hearing would therefore function as a 
form of touching, which gives hearing oneself speak all the auto-affective 
force that Derrida has analyzed and deconstructed. It appears to take place 
within a single organic otolaryngological circuit, in a perfect egoecological 
economy whereby one simultaneously hears the sound waves that one 
feels issuing from the throat, as though nothing had escaped outside of 
the body. Speaking (or singing, or otherwise uttering) thus creates for the 
self a house of sound. But, in fact, any seeming closed circuit is “radically 
contradicted” by difference—beginning with time—in which “is rooted 
the possibility of everything we think we can exclude from auto-affection: 
space, the outside, the world, the body, etc.”23 The presumed organicity 
of contact produced by soundwaves emerging from the body to re-enter 
the ear comes therefore to be broken. Every auto-affection is in that way 
a hetero-affection: touching oneself means being touched—which always 
means being touched from the outside, as Nancy has emphasized24—and 
hearing oneself is a matter of being heard, from the outside. Furthermore, 
as Derrida emphasizes, for example in On Touching, the differential rupture 
that takes place within the supposed intact and closed auto-affective circuit 
introduces not only a displacement but also the structure of prosthesis, 
leading him to ask “whether there is any pure auto-affection of touching or 
touched, and therefore any pure, immediate experience of the purely proper 
body, the body proper that is living, purely living. Or if, on the contrary, 
this experience is at least not already haunted, but constitutively haunted by 
some hetero-affection related to spacing.” Presuming that is the case, such a 
spacing would have to include “the outside itself, the other, the inanimate, 
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‘material nature,’ as well as death, the nonliving, the nonpsychical in 
general, language, rhetoric, technics, and so forth.”25
Thus the contiguity of the house, the very fact of its making contact with 
its inhabitant, determines it as prosthetic to its supposed organic interior. 
There is no environment without that rupture of organicity, its rewriting as 
prostheticity. So how does ecology deal with that originary environmental 
rupture, not just that of the human / animal divide, or that between living 
and non-living, but the fundamental rupture within physis of the techno-
logical, the denaturing of nature and ecosystem alike? In Bataille’s terms 
it would be the rupture of the general within the restricted economy, the 
heterogeneous within the homogeneous, and his response would entail in 
the first instance a rewriting of contact or contiguity as contagion. The 
word “contagion,” which is of course an emblematic term in Bataille, is 
used in his earliest text, Story of the Eye, to refer already to a contact 
whose terms are not determined by normal social or societal relations, a 
contact whose model would be infection. It might be understood in the first 
instance as something as innocent as infectious laughter (“she couldn’t … 
stop laughing, so that, partly by contagion, partly because of the intense 
light, I began laughing as hard as she, and so did Sir Edmund”26), but the 
transfer that takes place by means of laughter stands for any such form of 
effervescence up to and including the orgiastic. That sense of contagion 
can begin in the context of a highly codified societal ritual that actually 
requires touching, or ingesting (such as handling taboo objects, or the 
Eucharist).27 But there is nothing to prevent such a codified usage from 
intensifying to the point where the codes no longer hold, and indeed such 
usages themselves are often designed to play with their own limits, or 
open themselves to perversion such that the contagion spreads beyond any 
controlled contact. Hence contagion will also refer to something as indis-
criminate as the transfer of feelings, such as the sexual, through which the 
limits of corporeal substantiality come to be unsettled (“this renewed desire 
was unsettling me … and the state of malaise was such that it was commu-
nicated by contagion to Sir Edmund”28). Bataille’s contagion is, if you wish, 
a type of animal or microbial contact, but it might more accurately be 
described as viral, for it is able to mutate out of the strict physical materi-
ality that the word suggests, becoming in Story of the Eye, for instance, the 
figure of an uncontrolled drift—in excess of any clear semantic or rhetorical 
logic—that connects eyes, eggs, testicles, milk, sperm and milky way in an 
orgy of signification. From another point of view it can be understood as an 
organic relation that unites participants in a given system while at the same 
time producing a rupture within that system, introducing heterogeneous 
elements or provoking an eruptive overflow of it, destroying its organic 
coherence. As Bataille writes in Le coupable, “contagion (the intimate 
compenetration of two beings) is contagious (giving rise to an indefinite 
repercussion).”29 Thus, the operation of contagion within an ecology that 
presumes a contextual environment defined by contact, necessarily has a 
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delocalizing and destabilizing effect. But that is, after all, how nature works, 
rendering the concept of an ecosphere or ecosystem highly problematic: 
because such systems overflow, a presumed protected environment or 
habitat is destabilized by intrusions, and ecological balance becomes an 
issue.
By the time of Inner Experience contagion will thus have become 
Bataille’s key word for the more or less indiscriminate manner by which 
energy is communicated throughout, and in excess of an organic entity:
What you are derives from the activity that links the innumerable 
elements that compose you to the intense communication among those 
elements. These are contagions of energy, movement, heat, or transfers 
of elements that internally constitute the life of your organic being. Life 
is never situated in a particular point: it rapidly passes from one point to 
another … like a sort of electric stream [ruissellement] … Living signifies 
for you not only the flows and fleeting play of light that combine in you, 
but the passing of heat and light from one being to another.30
In that passage the operation is described in increasingly fluid terms, to 
the point of becoming decidedly oceanic, as life is said to be transformed 
“from its empty and sad solidity to the happy contagion of heat and light 
as communicated by water and air,” and each existence opens to “the 
contagion of a wave and its repercussions,” whose unity is “as indefinite, 
as precarious as that of the agitation of the waters.”31
Bataille is there again referring to the contagion of laughter, and by 
extension to the fusional experiences that for him constitute commu-
nication, or rather communion within a community. “Words, books, 
monuments, symbols, laughter are only so many paths to that contagion” 
in which “individual beings count for little and encompass unavowable 
points of view once one considers what gets animated, transferring from 
one to the other in love, tragic spectacles, moments of fervor.”32 But 
as we know from history, the precise history that was being written as 
Bataille was composing Inner Experience (1943), already presaged in Blue 
of Noon, communal fusion risks not just the dissolution of the commu-
nity’s individual members but their (re)coalescence as a homogeneous, 
monolithic and fascistic singularity. Bataille’s own “Psychological Structure 
of Fascism” (1933) attempted to analyze that singularization in terms of 
a type of sublation by society of its inassimilable heterogeneous elements 
in the person of a dictator who is himself heterogeneous (“in opposition 
to democratic politicians, who represent in their respective countries the 
inherent platitude of homogeneous society, Mussolini and Hitler immedi-
ately stand out as wholly other”), without for all that showing any way out 
of that totemic attraction and the more or less morbid fascination that it 
entails.33 The greatest politico-ecological threat resides precisely in an effer-
vescence that preserves contact in a communosphere without contagion; 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   245 11/01/2017   14:28
246 GENERAL ECOLOGY
more precisely still in the absolute anthropocentrism of such homogeneous 
contiguity. For the pure congealed humanism of Nazism was precisely what 
allowed it to purge heterogeneous members of its communities by calling 
them sub- or nonhuman; and the dream of a distillation-in-effervescence 
rather than dissolution-in-excess was what tethered it to the homeostatic 
ideals of blood and soil. Bataille’s community, on the other hand, is in the 
first instance a community of an-anthropomorphic “particles”: among 
them “there is some this that forms here or there, each time in the form of a 
unity, but that unity doesn’t persevere as such … it is riven by its profound 
internal division, it remains imperfectly closed and, at certain points, can be 
attacked from the outside.”34 Thus, even though he did not himself theorize 
the radical inorganicity of that outside, as we saw earlier following Derrida, 
it necessarily generalizes to include “the other, the inanimate, ‘material 
nature,’ as well as death, the nonliving, the nonpsychical in general, 
language, rhetoric, technics, and so forth.”35
* * *
This discussion has turned around a paradigmatic ecological moment 
constituted by a “return to the earth.” It can mean the fusional terrestrial 
appropriation that we have just seen, whose uniformed representatives move 
ominously from background to foreground in the closing episodes of Blue 
of Noon. But it can also return us to the terms of Dirty’s and Troppmann’s 
cemetery tryst, precisely the metonymy of their sex and the buried dead. 
The return to the earth of the dead by means of burial is generally assumed 
to be a particularly human approach to death, an assumption to which 
Derrida, for instance, declines to subscribe in The Animal That Therefore 
I Am.36 But it would make sense, à la Bataille, to read in the burial of the 
soon-to-rot, soon-to-be-maggot-ridden corpse the heterological disavowal 
of life-in-decay that nevertheless also operates as a type of primary or even 
primal ecology. Death is where the house that is the body is seen most 
spectacularly and most repulsively to exceed its limits, being violated from 
outside, oozing and exploding from inside, given over to the unstoppable 
energy of teeming life. Of all that, sex can be only a pale simulacrum, try as 
we might to render it in its own way repulsive or spectacular.
But there is, in the messy aftermath of such a big death, a broad if 
not deep ecology, precisely in the sense of attending to what state of the 
ecosphere we leave behind. Each practice of disposal of the dead, from 
proverbial Inuit ice floe to Parsi towers of silence, to cremation and 
inhumation, necessarily amounts to an ecological ethics of the treatment 
of remains, understood as what returns to the earth, and as a concern for 
the state in which we leave the earth behind us. Bataille would want to 
interpret that within the perspective of his version of solar vitalism, which 
is what mobilizes the necro-eroticism that we have been tracing from 
the beginning: what returns most ethically to the earth, or the means by 
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which an ethical return to the earth is enacted, is determined by a practice 
of remains that somehow celebrates death as expenditure. The forms of 
festivity or reaffirmation of life that customarily accompany funerals—at 
least in the West—may or may not fall within such an ethics since they 
likely signify a return to, and triumph of the restricted economy whose safe 
circuits of exchange the affirmation of life all the way to death (by means 
of sex, laughter, other ecstasies, death itself) precisely wished to break open. 
The ecologico-ethical treatment of remains would, for Bataille, presumably 
involve some form of orgiastic contagion and communion that does not 
conform to the variety of taboos that codify and enforce the handling of 
a corpse. For at the very moment following death, the moment at which 
solar energy is about to take over and recycle a cadaver, to defile it with 
the pure force of nature, the dead body is socially homogenized more than 
ever, more than ever treated as intact and inviolable. In shocking contrast to 
that we can read Simone’s sacrilege involving the eye of the murdered priest 
at the end of Story of the Eye; an orgy of desecration beyond the pale. If 
I am tempted to cite that indigestible scene in conclusion, as the inassimi-
lable counterpoint to the Trier passage from Blue of Noon with which we 
began—never fear, I’ll save us all the embarrassment, preserve us all from 
Bataille’s extreme heteronomy37—it is in order to make this point: the 
ecology of death returns the corpse not just to the earth and to the sun. It 
turns it over to the other in the most general sense, beginning with its being 
handed over to the inanimate. In order for nature and the sun to turn it 
back into animating energy it must first be treated as a thing to be disposed 
of. That is what Derrida emphasizes in his long discussion of inhumation 
versus cremation, and the fear and fact of being buried alive, in The Beast 
and the Sovereign:
Being dead, before meaning something quite different, means, for me, 
to be delivered over … with no possible defense, after being totally 
disarmed, to the other, to others. And however little I know about what 
the alterity of the other or the others means, I have to have presupposed 
that the other, the others, are precisely those who might die after me, 
survive me, and have at their disposal what remains of me, my remains 
… the other is what always might, one day, do something with me and 
my remains, make me into a thing, his or her thing.38
Being dead means not just being reanimated by the energetic forces of the 
universe in Bataille’s sense; it also means being deanimated, reduced to an 
inanimate thing. A necessary ethical element of the treatment of our dead, 
along with respect for the human and respect for the earth, is a respect 
for the thing, recognition of the body’s rupture into thingness. But that 
does not, of course, begin with death itself, no more than does becoming-
a-thing-for-the-other. The little death of eroticism stages a similar passive 
objectification, even inanimation, as part of the general economy that we 
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sign on to when we invite the other to disrespect us in one form or another 
even as we presume that disrespect will stay within certain bounds. The 
necro-erotics of Blue of Noon’s cemetery scene includes important elements 
of such objectification: beyond the obvious metonymy of prostrate bodies 
and corpses, as well as the crass comparison between penetration and 
plowing the earth, lovemaking is initially described as a ten-step technical 
program [les dix pas que font les amants].39 Similarly in Story of the Eye, 
Simone’s nether-regional antics with the priest’s eye, manifestly out of 
bounds, are nevertheless “permitted” to function within the structure of 
a general erotic economy, as Bataille realized. But any such excess—and 
there is no eroticism without excess—from plowed body to an eye as sex 
toy, functions as a prosthetization or technologization that is the general 
structure of the body’s articulation with supposed external otherness, which 
necessarily includes the inanimate, the nonliving, the technological: technol-
ogizing and prosthetizing the very body that resorts to inanimate aids to 
living or to loving. As long as the human body’s relation to its earthly 
environment remains the basis for ecology, then such an ecology will have 
to be understood to be fractured, within itself, by originary technicity. 
There is no return to the earth without that rupture of organicity, which 
renders the earth both teeming with animality to wallow in, and the scaffold 
life mounts over its own abyss.
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CHAPTER TEN
Metafiction and general ecology
Making worlds with worlds
James Burton
We cannot produce that final adjustment of well-defined 
generalities which constitutes a complete metaphysics. But we 
can produce a variety of partial systems of limited generality. The 
concordance of ideas within any one such system shows the 
scope and virility of the basic notions of that scheme of thought. 
Also the discordance of system with system, and success of 
each system as a partial mode of illumination, warns us of the 
limitations within which our intuitions are hedged.
—ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD1
Herein lies the charm and the terror of ecology—that the ideas 
of this science are irreversibly becoming a part of our own 
ecosocial system.
—GREGORY BATESON2
Introduction
This paper attempts to think the relation between ecology and metafiction, 
not, primarily at least, in order to continue the task of resituating literature 
within the new media ecology, effectively pioneered—in quite different 
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ways—by Friedrich Kittler and Marshall McLuhan, and since taken up in 
a variety of projects, but rather in order to consider the more direct role 
of metafiction as a non-literary dimension of ecological thinking, specifi-
cally in terms of what may be termed, with some qualification, their shared 
generalizing tendencies. Treating metafiction as ultimately a process or 
phenomenon that is not essentially literary does not mean, here at least, 
ignoring its emergence as a concept, critical tool and putative literary 
category or subgenre within the field of literary criticism; given the extent 
to which the imbrication of the general and the particular is at stake here, 
it would seem unwise to neglect a major local context of the emergence 
and study of metafictional processes. There is however no scope here for 
engaging in sustained readings of literary works: instead, I begin with a 
telescoped look at the literary-critical study of metafiction, in order to 
highlight both the broad cultural and theoretical potential it finds in the 
concept and its objects of study, and the way such study restricts this 
potential through the maintenance of a set of disciplinary, humanist, and 
critical boundaries.
Most crucially, these restrictions may be said to have given rise to a 
failure to think metafictively about metafiction. One of the central tasks 
of the thinking of general ecology, it seems to me, is, in parallel with the 
challenge of metafiction, to think ecologically about ecology (or the ways 
the study of ecology fosters ecological thinking), and to attend to the 
implications of this, both obvious and obscure. Thus I want to point here 
to some of the ways the thinking of general ecology might seek to avoid 
the traps encountered in the literary study of metafiction—which should, 
arguably, have given rise to a general engagement with fictionalizing and 
metafictionalizing but instead largely restricted itself to an account of 
the way this challenge was posed by certain literary works; and beyond 
this, to consider some of the ways ecological thinking, both in restricted 
and general(ized) contexts, must always already be considered metafic-
tional—albeit in a sense which, as we will see, converges with a notion of 
reality-building or worldmaking—and what this may imply for its ongoing 
study and application.
It is worth noting at the outset, however, that the relationship between 
metafiction and general ecology is not just a parallel to be constructed or 
developed here: rather, it can be argued that these two phenomena are to 
a large extent conditioned by and participate in a shared set of historical-
cultural and epistemological developments. Crucial among these would be 
the historical growth of the process of cyberneticization (which, as Erich 
Hörl notes in the introduction to this volume, precedes the emergence of 
cybernetics as a post-war research field, and is traceable back as far as the 
nineteenth century), and what Hörl, as discussed below, refers to as the 
“technological shifting of sense.” Partly as a result of these trends, and 
partly informed in its various cultural sites of emergence by diverse local 
factors and concerns, we may point to a wide-ranging epistemological shift 
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across the twentieth century, manifest in different forms in different fields, 
away from the focus on an individual, system or object, towards a consid-
eration of its relationship to its environment or context. One could trace an 
entire, interdisciplinary history of this shift towards more “environmental” 
perspectives from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, encompassing, 
variously: the emergence of ecological ideas in biological research and 
theory, following the impact of Darwinian theory and Ernst von Haeckel’s 
introduction of the term Oecologie;3 the shift away from the hermeneutics 
and analysis (or “practical criticism”) of individual texts, artworks and 
other cultural products in favor of attending to their socio-cultural and 
historical contexts—and later, their technical / mediatic conditions; the 
numerous ways in which both governmental politics and political theory 
have been forced to expand any restricted focus on the internal situations 
of given nations or groups and approach their objects of interest from 
international and global perspectives; the general trend in psychology and 
psychoanalysis away from individual psyches to psycho-social processes; 
the various moves in philosophy beyond paradigms privileging subjects 
and objects as pre-given, stable entities, traceable in the emergence of 
process philosophy and vitalism at the turn of the twentieth century, and 
the explosion of relational ontologies at its end; and of course, the various 
strands of political-social environmentalism—the “ecological” movements 
in the most everyday sense—themselves.
One of the interesting features to arise from such a historical overview 
would be the overlaps in the ways that, in such areas and others, the 
movement towards a more environmental or ecological perspective seems 
to give rise to elements of self-reference and (self-)generalization, whereby, 
as the perspective is widened to encompass the environments, contexts, 
milieus or sets of relations surrounding and partially constituting particular 
objects or phenomena, the study itself along with its cognizing observers 
or thinkers are also recognized as part of those environments or milieus. 
Thus—again, to give some indicative, if cursory examples: philosophy 
must attempt to take into account its own conditions of (im)possibility, the 
effects and limitations arising from the human mind or being’s own impli-
cation within its objects of study—whether in the sense of the Heideggerian 
Destruktion of ontology,4 Derridean deconstruction, or any number of 
critical projects from François Laruelle’s “nonphilosophy” to the variety 
of approaches recently dubbed “speculative realism”;5 biology, at least in 
certain areas, attempts to take into account the fact that biologists (their 
brains, organisms, the cognitive behavior through which the study is 
conducted) are also part of its object;6 different branches of physics (not 
just quantum mechanics) attempt to understand and operate in light of 
the so-called observer effect, in which the observer (human or otherwise—
e.g., in the form of a measuring instrument) has a nontrivial effect on the 
phenomenon under observation; critical and cultural studies, in a wide 
variety of areas (e.g., critical ethnography, postcolonial studies, feminism, 
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post-Marxist theories of power) attempt to negotiate the power relations 
and hierarchies implicit within their own academic and social relationships 
to the phenomena and subjects they discuss.
Within the sphere of literature, the appearance of metafiction would be 
one of the sites of this seeming tendency (if, indeed, it may be considered 
legitimate to see a tendency or pattern across such diverse areas of thought; 
such generalization is itself part of the task but also the risk of thinking in 
general ecological terms—as Bateson puts it in the above citation, both “the 
charm and the terror of ecology”). Yet at the same time, a consideration of 
the notion of metafiction as a process particularly illuminated within, but 
ultimately going far beyond certain literary and narratological domains, 
offers an opportunity to explore the ways in which this tendency towards 
self-reference and self-generalization that is bound up with environmental-
izing shifts in perspective in various manifestations, is always already in 
some sense metafictionalizing. This is why this essay takes up metafiction as 
an object of potential significance to the thinking of general ecology.
Perhaps the most “general” of the many attempts that have been made 
to incorporate the observer / researcher / perceiving-producing agent into 
the systems and phenomena being observed / researched / engaged is the 
sphere of second-order cybernetics and systems thinking. As discussed 
by Hörl, again in this volume’s introduction, systems theory (at least in 
its Luhmannian form, but under the influence of Humberto Maturana 
and Francisco Varela, and arguably other second-order thinkers such as 
Gregory Bateson)7 can be understood as one of the early legible forms 
of an “ecological rationality,” and thus a key strand of the burgeoning 
general ecological thinking. In his contribution to this volume, Bruce Clarke 
elaborates the importance of such thinking to the rise of the ecological 
movement, as a constitutive part of what he terms the “systems counter-
culture.” It would thus be both viable and productive to highlight the 
parallels and the convergences between metafiction and general-ecological 
thinking by using second-order systems theory, with its attentiveness to 
the blind spots that are necessarily built in to any self-referential observing 
system, as well as the essential role of constructivism that this entails. 
It would make perfect sense to use key terms in the lexicon of second-
order systems thinking, such as the feedback of feedback and levels of 
(self-)observation, to (re)describe metafiction as “second-order fiction,” 
fiction(alizing) about fiction(alizing). Indeed, there are now several works 
applying the implications of second-order systems thinking to literature, 
especially in terms of self-reference and autopoiesis;8 and in works such 
as Postmodern Metamorphosis (2008) and Neocybernetics and Narrative 
(2014), Clarke has made major contributions to such a task, while tracing 
various of its wider implications for both cultural reality and interdisci-
plinary thinking. As he writes elsewhere, metafiction’s “foregrounding 
of paradox by narrative embedding, metalepsis, and mise-en-abyme are 
to postmodern narrative aesthetics … what self-referential recursion and 
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system differentiation—the emergence of systems within systems—are to 
second-order systems theory.”9
Though the possibility of such a redescription is both an implication of 
and an implicit influence on the account I give here, my choice not to follow 
this line explicitly in this particular chapter has two bases. First, especially 
given the context of this volume, in focusing on (self-)generalization, I hope 
to contribute to an understanding of the sense and role of the “general” in 
“general ecology”; and at the same time, to suggest that, if it can be argued 
that a (self-)generalizing tendency is endemic to ecological thinking, then 
the potential emergence of general-ecological thinking is always already 
germinal or incipient within it—and indeed subject to certain necessary 
constraints by virtue of this very fact. Second, as noted above, I want to 
point to the ways in which metafictionalizing may be considered a general 
mode of contemporary cultural thought, expression, practice, and one 
that is at least in some sense integral to (the thinking of) general ecology. 
Nevertheless, this role of the (meta)fictional, especially given the extent 
to which, as I argue below, it tends towards a coincidence with “world-
making” or poiesis, means that it too may ultimately be fed back into a 
second-order systems discourse, in which autopoiesis plays a central role.
From generic to general metafiction
To link literature to ecology is no longer anything new: the rise of informa-
tional and media-sensitized paradigms and approaches to literary narratives, 
under the influence of such diverse figures as Marshall McLuhan, Michel 
Serres, and Friedrich Kittler, has led to the widespread recasting of literature 
within a contemporary media ecology (or multiplicity of such ecologies).10 
To an extent this approach—literature as information, as mediatically 
in-formed—has superseded and swallowed up the paradigm of metafiction, 
which was at its most prominent in literary criticism and theory in the late 
1980s and 1990s. Though some of the insights and implications arising 
from analyses conducted through the lens of metafiction have now been 
taken up or reformulated in subsequent work, it is worth taking at least 
a brief look back at the metafictional approach in this period, for the 
potential it uncovered, but arguably failed to develop, regarding the wider, 
more general understanding of metafiction as an aspect of (post)modern 
culture, rather than a literary sub-genre or trend.
The term “metafiction” came into usage in the early 1970s, in reference to 
literary writing displaying certain characteristics—in particular, heightened 
degrees of self-consciousness and self-reference (in various senses), a 
foregrounding within the work of its status as fictional invention, the 
thematizing of and playing with the unstable boundary between fiction 
and reality, and the erosion of the distinction between literature / fiction 
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and criticism. Coinage of the term is generally attributed to William 
Gass,11 though its adoption by Robert Scholes seems to have been equally 
important to its dissemination.12 Other terms used before and since, such 
as “self-conscious fiction,” “surfiction,” “anti-fiction,” overlap with the 
term’s supposed meaning and have been applied to the same examples.13 In 
French literary academia, the term metatextualité has been used in closely 
related contexts, in association with writing employing mise en abyme, the 
nouveau roman and other literary output sharing many of the convention-
challenging strategies and themes which tend to be taken as typical of 
metafiction in Anglophone contexts.14
One of the most influential Anglophone texts in the field is Patricia 
Waugh’s Metafiction.15 Though rightly still regarded as a useful primer 
for the study of literary metafiction, Waugh’s book epitomizes two broad 
limiting tendencies found in various critical engagements with metafiction: 
first, a tendency to focus on describing the workings and key features 
of supposedly metafictional writing, at the expense of inquiring into the 
possible historical and cultural reasons for its emergence; second, a tendency 
to restrict the scope and application of the term to written fiction—i.e. either 
to “literature,” or to manifestations of a late twentieth-century mutation 
of / reaction against the literary tradition which would still be defined by 
their relationship to it—as Jonathan Culler puts it, to “works which, falling 
outside of established genres, would be treated as … ‘residual’ literature.”16 
Waugh posits a “sliding scale” of metafictionality, finding a “minimal form 
of metafiction” in novels which draw attention to the ways their characters 
“play roles,” citing as examples Muriel Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean 
Brodie (1961) and John Barth’s The End of the Road (1958), in which 
a character engages in “compulsive roleplaying” as a form of “mytho-
therapy.”17 A stage up from this are novels in which characters seem to 
be aware that they are following a script pre-determined by someone else, 
and thus “implicitly draw attention to the fictional creation / description 
paradox” (120). Then there are categories of what Waugh sees as more 
radical metafiction—employing “forms of radical decontextualisation,” 
rebuffing attempts to read them through naturalizing interpretation, and 
refusing to maintain any “stable tension” between fiction / illusion and 
reality / truth (136). Such categories are characterized by various forms of 
self-contradiction, paradox and the increasing incapacity of the reader to 
establish any stable frame of reference (e.g., ontological, epistemological, 
hermeneutic) for making sense of what they are reading, tending towards 
“total anarchy” through “intellectual overkill” at the extreme end of the 
scale (146).
Thus while Waugh considers a range of varieties of metafiction—from 
novels which “still implicitly invoke the context of the everyday world” to 
those which continually make radical shifts of context (115)—she never-
theless confines its application to “fictional writing which self-consciously 
and systematically draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to 
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pose questions about the relationship between fiction and reality” (2). 
Her text remains predominantly a survey and description of a literary (or 
counter-literary) phenomenon. In this, it reflects the convergent interests 
of several literary studies scholars in the 1970s and 1980s, and, along 
with Linda Hutcheon’s accounts of “historiographical metafiction,” paves 
the way for a number of subsequent studies employing metafiction as a 
paradigm for reading (post)modern experimental writing.18 Such accounts 
do not lose sight of the potential social functions of metafiction—indeed, 
critical readings carried out in their wake frequently emphasize the ethical 
implications and political effects of the works they study.19 Yet even so, in 
such cases the focus remains, in the tradition of critical reading, primarily 
on how the writing achieves its effects—with an emphasis on critical 
description at the level of the individual writer or text, just as Waugh and 
Hutcheon offer critical descriptions of the field of metafiction at a more 
generic level.20 In short, it is really poetics or literature, rather than the 
much broader category of fiction, which is at stake in such contexts.
Even where metafiction is recognized as a widespread contemporary 
phenomenon—one whose “ubiquity makes it impossible to see metafic-
tional self-consciousness as an isolated and introspective obsession within 
literature”21—critical discussions have continued to focus on the literary 
manifestations of this phenomenon. Where metafiction is seen as revealing 
the instability between literature and criticism, literary narrative and 
history, language and reality, it is nevertheless usually the techniques and 
devices by which metafictive writing is able to bring about such revela-
tions—rather than their implications—that are of primary concern.
Though these tendencies may be considered reasonable given the disci-
plinary contexts in which the discourses around metafiction emerged, 
they have the unfortunate effect of restricting the critical potential of 
the concept by confining it to the context of literature.22 Effectively, they 
treat metafiction as shifting the terms and frameworks of interpretation, 
meaning, representation which are conventionally used to seek to under-
stand a literary text, or indeed any phenomenon, textual, physical, social 
or otherwise—yet continue to approach their objects as though these 
frames remained intact, i.e., in a relatively traditional (albeit modern) 
form of hermeneutic literary criticism. In Erich Hörl’s sense, many of the 
(anti-)literary texts considered metafictional may themselves be said to 
acknowledge and enact a “technological shifting of sense” (or of meaning) 
[technologische Sinnverschiebung].23 Sometimes this may entail a thematic 
attentiveness to modern informational and technological processes and 
systems, seeming to filter through, as in Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying 
of Lot 49 (1966) or Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), to the levels of narrative 
construction and content, displacing conventions of meaning and sense. 
Elsewhere, equivalent effects are produced through disrupting the conven-
tional techniques and technologies of literary production, authorship, 
reading: John Barth’s now classic Lost in the Funhouse. Fiction for Print, 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   259 11/01/2017   14:28
260 GENERAL ECOLOGY
Tape, Live Voice (1968) provides a wealth of examples, from “Menelaid”’s 
use of multiple quotation marks to indicate concentric narratological 
layers within layers, to “Life-Story”’s frequent invitations / demands that 
the reader “fill in the blanks” where information is omitted, to “Frame-
Tale”’s transformation of the “codex” structure of the leafed book into the 
substrate-medium for an infinite, virtually content-less code, in the histori-
cally ancient (but perhaps also contemporary) sense highlighted by Kittler, 
according to which code itself literally means “displacement.”24 As Bruce 
Clarke writes, “framed narratives suggest the embedding of worlds within 
worlds,” and stories within stories even more so, such that whatever sense 
they might make cannot be considered “independent of the medium.”25 
Yet literary-critical accounts of metafiction, while acknowledging this shift 
away from hermeneutic and representational categories as necessitated by 
such works, seem to a large extent to have ignored its further implications 
in the modes by which they approach them: that is, their appreciation of 
the above-mentioned “creation / description paradox” does not extend to 
the level of their own criticism, which proceeds as though its objects could 
still reasonably be subjected to analysis within relatively conventional 
critical frameworks of representation, classification, and description. Even 
if for understandable, practical, and professional reasons, such approaches 
treat metafiction as though it could remain contained within a cage of 
“literature” whose extreme fragility it has already exposed.
It is here that we may identify a key aspect of the relationship between 
metafiction and general ecology. For what I have discussed so far as recog-
nized traits of metafiction may be considered to amount, as I will shortly 
elaborate, to a tendency to generalize certain characteristics and modes 
inherent to fiction, that is, to expand its scope beyond the confines of 
“literature” or indeed any other frame or context in which it is operative. 
Such a tendency, I will argue, can be said to characterize ecology as 
both mode of being and mode of thought. But if the literary criticism of 
metafiction has been marked by a tendency (inadvertent or not) to curtail 
this generalization, the concept and thought of general ecology initially 
avoids making an analogous restriction, in seeking to outline an ecology of 
ecologies, ecology as a general, contemporary mode of thought and being, 
rather than as a descriptor for certain specific phenomena and localized 
fields of study. Yet at the same time, the task of thinking general ecology, 
of thinking ecology ecologically, faces what is in a sense an inverted version 
of the challenge and danger faced by literary studies of metafiction: for 
while it acknowledges as a starting-point the general-ecological character 
of our time, as something beyond any given discursive or epistemological 
account of a particular ecology, it may risk losing something of its own 
critical and creative potential if it loses sight of the way the generalizing 
tendencies it seeks to grasp, think and develop, are already immanent 
within those restricted ecological contexts which it seems to situate itself 
beyond. For as every restricted ecology possesses the potential for its own 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   260 11/01/2017   14:28
 METAFICTION AND GENERAL ECOLOGY 261
generalization, so every image of general ecology necessarily retains its 
own particularities.
Generalization
In order to develop the above claim and set of concerns, it is worth first 
considering a little more carefully what kinds of “generality” and “gener-
alization” are at stake here. I suggested above that, to a large extent, 
metafiction may be understood as characterized by a generalizing (or auto-
generalizing) tendency. In the works of Borges and Pynchon, of Raymond 
Federman and Donald Barthelme, among many others, we observe what 
might be characterized as an aspiration, often seemingly belonging to the 
text or narrative itself, to enter or rejoin “the world at large,” the world 
beyond literature and beyond fiction (narrowly proscribed)—not in the sense 
of providing an accurate representation of some dimension of “objective” 
social or political reality (in the sense of the realist novel) or an adequate 
onto-cosmological reflection of the world (as embodied in what Deleuze 
and Guattari named the “root-book”)26—but in the sense of recognizing 
themselves as always-already part of that world, responding to, affected 
by, and shaping it, as part of it, whether in minor or major ways. Or, as 
Clarke puts it, “narratives connect to worldly systems not in their putative 
representational verisimilitude—especially if the narrative is fantastic, 
speculative, or science-fictional—but in the ways that, at their deepest levels 
of abstraction, they allow the construction of functional homologies to real 
processes of life, mind, and society.”27 Sometimes this entails characters 
and / or narrators becoming aware of their fictionalized status, as in Borges’ 
“The Circular Ruins,” where the protagonist’s desire “to dream a man … 
with minute integrity and insert him into reality” ends with the recognition 
that “he too was a mere appearance, dreamt by another.”28 Elsewhere, 
the book or characters seemingly attempt to interact with the narrator / 
author, as in Flann O’Brien’s At Swim Two-Birds (1939); or the story-text 
itself attempts to incorporate the reader within it, as in Willam H. Gass’s 
Willie Masters’ Lonely Wife and Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a 
traveller (1979); or characters come to perceive the fictionalized nature of 
their world and attempt to cross the diegetic boundary to reach that of the 
reader, as in Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the High Castle (1962).
This may be considered a generalizing tendency in that it constitutes, in 
various forms, an attempt to move beyond a particular perception of reality 
(e.g., that which is implicit in the construction of a narrative’s diegesis) to 
a more general perspective that would encompass that local perception, 
along with a multiplicity of others. In other words, they seek to make 
their environment part of themselves, giving rise to new, larger system-
environment couplings. As such, it is a tendency whose generalization may 
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theoretically be continued indefinitely: the terrible realization (though also 
relief) of Borges’ wizard is one which his readers, as well as he as author, 
must supposedly countenance in relation to their own perceptions of 
reality, in which “The Circular Ruin” is “only” a short piece of fictional 
writing; and we may posit that any putatively godlike being for whom all of 
human life would have the equivalent ontological status and significance of 
a historical novel, a program running on a computer, or a cell culture in a 
laboratory Petri dish, might be subject to an equivalent subjective self-doubt, 
especially if prompted by observing it in her human subjects. Generalization 
is in this sense a means by which the diminished, the minor, is able to reach 
back up to, and affect, the augmented, the major—a means by which the 
insignificant makes itself significant. A narrative which observes or draws 
attention to the technological, psychological, social, ontological condi-
tions of its own construction, almost inevitably invites consideration of the 
effects of such conditions on any perception of reality. By using the narra-
tive’s literal role in constructing the reality experienced by its character as a 
vehicle connecting different levels (intra- and extra-diegetic), a metafictional 
work generalizes the character’s specific set of experiences, and at the same 
time renders them contiguous with the real—no longer considered as the 
world beyond the fiction, but as the world which constitutes and is partially 
constituted by that fiction.29
This characteristic can be said to approach what Clarke describes as “the 
contextual or holistic impetus in the best cybernetic thinking,” whereby 
explanation is always sought by moving upwards through (in Bateson’s 
phrase) the “hierarchy of contexts within contexts.”30 This proximity to 
(second-order) cybernetics should already alert us to the possibility that 
the same (not only analogous, but homologous) generalizing process 
may be found in the study and thought of ecology. In Adventures of 
Ideas, Whitehead suggests a distinction between two types of generali-
zation belonging to science and philosophy respectively: whereas science, 
broadly conceived, draws “inductive generalizations” from “observation of 
particular occurrences,” giving rise to ways of classifying things according 
to their functioning, philosophy places emphasis on the intuition of 
generalizations that aspire to “universal application.”31 Yet the kind of 
generalization involved in the thinking of general ecology, it seems, would 
need to be situated between these two, borrowing something from each: at 
first glance, it seems to arise through an intuitive effort, and is conceivably 
applicable (or connectible) to an infinite range of aspects of existence 
(though without going so far as to regard this as an aspiration to what 
Anglophone analytic philosophy terms “absolute generality,” i.e., of the 
variety producing statements that are supposed to apply to “absolutely 
everything there is”32); yet at the same time, it seems unlikely that it could 
have become thinkable without the emergence of a wide range of particular, 
local, “restricted” ecologies. We might think of the generalization that 
characterizes its relation to these other ecologies, rather than inductive 
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or universalizing, as “associative” or “relational.” That is, the intuitions 
that give rise to something like the generalization of ecology seem often to 
appear in passing, alongside and in connection with, rather than as a logical 
consequence of, the study of particular ecological phenomena or contexts, 
or indeed in connection with projects belonging to seemingly different 
epistemological spheres entirely. In this, we might already recognize 
the specifically recursive nature of the generalization that is at work in 
ecological thinking—in that it is characterized by the modes of relationality 
and connectivity which it studies.
In contrast to the general ideas Whitehead identifies, which are firmly 
situated within the history of culture and thought—for example, slavery 
as a dominant and determining idea for classical Mediterranean culture, 
or freedom as having a thorough-going and determining influence on his 
own33—we would have to recognize that in the case of ecology, we are 
dealing with an idea that already in itself incorporates or implies something 
like a generalizing process, even, if not most vividly, in its most “restricted” 
contexts. The history of biological or zoological ecology is the history 
of the study and theorizing of the processes connecting an individual or 
organism to its wider environment. Though we might more often refer to 
such processes using terms such as extension, connectivity, environmentali-
zation, they nevertheless entail an appreciation of the ways one localized 
situation is connected to and affected by a larger, more general sphere that 
contains it alongside and connects it with multiple other such localized 
situations. If, as François Neyrat suggests, the “principle of principles”—
the “metaprinciple,” we might say—of ecological thinking is “everything 
is interconnected,”34 the pursuit of environmental connections will always 
be expansive, always a proto-generalizing tendency that moves any set of 
phenomena or system into relation with what is beyond the initial sphere 
of its observation or consideration.
Hence whenever one examines an account of such expansive, at least 
nominally generalizing tendencies at work in the phenomena observed 
within a particular sphere of restricted ecology, it is possible to observe 
these same tendencies effectively at work in the thinking that examines 
them. For example, Jakob von Uexküll’s Umweltforschung thinks the 
individual organism in relation to the environment it innately constructs 
or selects from all physical possibilities, made up of those elements that 
are significant to it: “As the spider spins its threads, every subject spins 
his relations to certain characters of the things around him, and weaves 
them into a firm web which carries his existence.”35 In attributing to each 
type of creature its own world, Uexküll’s schema seemingly restricts the 
environment to a local set of relations with a given individual, which he 
figures as a “soap bubble” in order to depict how “the spherical Umwelt 
circles around and contains the limits of each specific organism’s life”36—yet 
situates the uncountable complex of connected soap bubbles as “a harmony 
composed of different melodic and symphonic parts” in which, through 
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their Umwelten, “organisms express themselves outwardly in the form of 
interlacing and contrapuntal relationships.”37 As Agamben puts it in The 
Open, from the postulation of an “environment as a closed unity in itself,” 
and the “reciprocal blindness” among individual organisms or actors with 
their own closed environments, emerges a “paradoxical coincidence,” 
among worlds that are at the perceptual level “absolutely uncommuni-
cating” yet nevertheless “so perfectly in tune.”38 Uexküll’s schema already 
implies a movement in the direction of a general ecology, in its recognition, 
for example, of the “highly contradictory” roles played by nature for the 
astronomer, the marine biologist, the chemist, the nuclear physicist, and 
the student of air waves and the musician, the behaviorist, and the psychol-
ogist: “Should one attempt to combine her [nature’s] objective qualities, 
chaos would ensue. And yet all these diverse Umwelten are harbored and 
borne by the One that remains forever barred to all Umwelten.”39 The 
generalizing tendency continues today, as, following though by no means 
in direct lineage with the varying influences of Uexküll’s thought on a range 
of subsequent thinkers (including Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, and 
Agamben), the apparent closure of this broader harmonious system of 
nature as a whole is being broken down in turn and opened up to myriad 
other ecologies, not least among them ecologies of technology and media.
Thus from the starting-point of considering one restricted environment, 
we are invited to consider one that would have to be considered more 
general—with respect to the first, a kind of meta-ecology, though also 
simply an ecology in its own right. The thinking of ecology gives rise to 
ecological thinking, as the thought of any given environment leads to the 
thinking of others that go beyond and include it without being identical 
with it (including that thought itself). We could trace such a tendency in 
various more recent examples of ecological thinking—such as, to name just 
three of the more prominent, Gregory Bateson’s ecology of mind or ideas, 
with its diverse application to “the bilateral symmetry of an animal, the 
patterned arrangement of leaves in a plant, the escalation of an armaments 
race, the processes of courtship, the nature of play, the grammar of a 
sentence, the mystery of biological evolution, and the contemporary crises 
in man’s relationship to his environment”;40 Félix Guattari’s “ecosophical” 
account of the interpenetration of social ecology, mental ecology and 
environmental ecology, which he refers to as a “generalized ecology”;41 or 
Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock’s Gaia theory, which draws on insights 
from thermodynamics, cybernetics, and information theory in producing an 
account of the earth’s atmosphere as regulated by life itself, and later by the 
whole earth system.42
Thus if we can conceive a “general ecology,” it will always necessarily 
engender a generalizing tendency that is already operative within ecological 
thinking and ecological systems. Hörl’s coinage of the term recalls Georges 
Bataille’s opposition between a restricted and a general economy: at its 
simplest, the notion of general ecology thus indicates a thinking and 
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approach to ecology that would be beyond the concerns of the particular 
biological and environmentalist discourses and projects from which the 
term first acquired its scientific, political, and popular currency. Yet the 
implications of this are anything but simple, entailing nothing less than “a 
momentous redefinition of our entire objective condition and the place that 
we as subjects occupy therein … a fundamental ecological reorientation of 
the mode of cognition and being, whose contours we are only just beginning 
to recognize.”43 If this theoretical or conceptual project first and foremost 
reflects (and invites us to recognize) an already ongoing, wide-ranging set of 
transformations of contemporary existence, under the effect of what Hörl 
calls our “technological condition” [technologische Bedingung]—trans-
formations of the relations between humans and nonhumans, technology 
and culture, each and every identifiable system and its environment, every 
subject and object—then these changing conditions are no less significant 
for the task of thinking such transformations than they are for the transfor-
mations in themselves.44 Thus in relation to general ecology, as in relation 
to metafiction, it seems we are dealing with a particular kind of generality, 
in that it must bear within it a recursive relation between the particular and 
the general.
For the same reason, if the notion of general ecology dispenses with the 
biological-environmentalist binding of ecology to a certain understanding 
or image of nature, it still does so to a large extent on the basis of this prior 
binding, whose salient features are not left behind in this move, but reincor-
porated, reconstituted and indeed reimagined: what a restricted ecology 
attempts to highlight in terms of the predetermining relation between 
organism and environment, humanity and the so-called natural world, or 
between biosphere, geosphere and atmosphere, general ecology attempts 
to highlight in terms of any and all such predetermining relations—indeed, 
in terms of the predetermining nature of relationality as such.45 Thus if it 
implies a radically different notion of ecology from those in which ecology 
remains tied to a particular conception of nature, it also does so as a kind of 
extension of those restricted modes it seems to leave behind, paradoxically 
continuing their immanent tendencies towards their own outsides.
The poiesis of ecological thinking
One of the implications of this recursive generality is that, in Bateson’s 
sense, and in the sense of Maturana and Varela,46 no essential separation 
or discontinuity can be maintained between the thinking and the things 
thought (be they phenomena, processes, relations, systems, objects, 
organisms, environments, and so on.) Furthermore, if in the case of ecology 
what is thought consists at least partially (and crucially) in the ongoing 
formation of new connections or relations, then the implications of this 
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for the thought of ecology ought to be taken into account, by a general 
ecology most of all. That is, if general ecology is to remain attentive to the 
“creation / description paradox” acknowledged and yet curtailed in studies 
of literary metafiction—here recognized as pertaining to any relation to 
reality or world, including and especially the general-ecological relation—it 
must grasp the productive, creative dimension of ecological thought, both 
in restricted or particular contexts, and in its own operations.
In order to better expose what is at stake in this challenge—and at the 
same time, to further develop the convergence of ecology and metafiction—
it will be helpful to reflect on the ways such descriptive-productive processes 
must already be considered, at least in some sense, fictionalizing—though 
in the sense in which metafiction reveals all fictionalizing to be, to varying 
extents, worldmaking.47 In their hyper-connected (ecosytemic) and hyper-
connective (environmentalizing, rhizomatic) tendencies, both ecologies 
and the ecological thinking that seemingly borrows such characteristics 
from them, must be considered productive of world(s), of ever more and 
newer relations among things, and of ever more “things” emerging from 
the growth of relations. To separate such productivity into physical and 
perceptual (or material and ideal, real and fictional, concrete and imaginary) 
categories is only possible within older, representational paradigms which 
(general-)ecological thinking—in parallel with the general thinking of 
metafiction, and in the wake of a host of twentieth-century developments, 
from cybernetics to poststructuralism, from process philosophy to posthu-
manism, from hermeneutic to posthermeneutic literary, cultural, and media 
studies—necessarily attempts to move beyond.
There are numerous recent and contemporary thinkers to whom we 
might turn in order to support and develop the notion that fictionalizing is 
a constituent aspect of any consideration of or belief in reality—that any 
perception or notion of, or indeed, relation with anything that might be 
termed “world” should be considered something that is produced in that 
process—fictionalized not in the conventional sense (implying illusory, 
false, purely imagined, unreal), but in the metafictive sense which effec-
tively erodes any form of fiction / reality distinction.48 Nelson Goodman’s 
Ways of Worldmaking concisely elaborates this process as immanent to (at 
least human) existence, without requiring either a return to purely idealist 
paradigms of philosophy, or having recourse to any of the various contem-
porary forms of social constructivism.49
By taking it as “hardly debatable” that there are many different, and 
somehow co-existent world-versions—and taking the question of “worlds-
in-themselves” as “virtually empty” (4)—Goodman sets out to consider 
not “an ambivalent or neutral something beneath these versions but … an 
overall organization embracing them” (5). He considers a number of ways 
in which we engage in worldmaking processes—such as taking-apart and 
putting-together existing perceived elements of worlds, “weighting” this or 
that element over others, or applying various modes of “ordering.”50 Salient 
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for us here in Goodman’s argument is that these ways of worldmaking all 
involve making use of, or constructing from, aspects of existing worlds 
(those that we have already “built” or come to accept):
The many stuffs—matter, energy, waves, phenomena—that worlds are 
made of are made along with the worlds. But made from what? Not 
from nothing, after all; but from other worlds. Worldmaking as we 
know it always starts from worlds already on hand; the making is a 
remaking. (6)
In this sense, worldmaking as what we might otherwise call fictionalizing—in 
everyday contexts the choice of the latter term generally connotes merely that 
a particular made world has not (yet) come to be habitually treated as real, a 
point I will expand on below—is already akin to metafiction. Our “worlds”—
realities as we perceive them—are produced through a kind of poiesis—but 
one which is always working with the “many stuffs” on hand taken “from 
other worlds.” This may also be viewed as a form of ecological productivity 
(it bears more than a little resemblance to the framework developed by 
Uexküll, whose argument regarding the constitution of Umwelten could 
be considered a “ways of worldmaking” oriented towards the animal 
as opposed to human organism, the harmonious arrangement of “soap 
bubbles” paralleling Goodman’s “overall organization” relating multiple 
co-existent worlds). But if so, we would have to consider it characteristic of 
the ways not only “we” build worlds, but, in an era in which nonhuman, 
individuating and individuated constellations of all shapes and hues are 
recognized as active, productive, even creative forces, of the ways ecologies 
of various kinds themselves build new systems, new ecologies, out of existing 
ones. This may be exemplified in the media-ecologial operations of artistic 
production, intensified and heightened in the information era, as identified 
and explored by Matthew Fuller, among others.51 But we could consider 
the ways all sorts of systems or collections of processes and phenomena 
we identify as ecological may display this property—continually re-making 
themselves through connections with other ecologies, which may seem to 
produce stasis much of the time (the stable ecosystem) but which may also 
allow new ecologies to form—even if they will only be recognized / observed 
to the extent that they are considered relevant / significant.
Goodman’s framework has the virtue of allowing us to emphasize how 
worldmaking (effectively always in some sense a meta-worldmaking, in 
its constant employment of the “many stuffs” of other worlds to hand) 
coincides with (meta)fictionalizing, which is relieved of its conventional 
opposition to the real in the same degree (in fact, at the same stroke) as 
“world” is relieved of its association with the absolutely concrete or real. 
This means that fictionalized worlds, including those framed in narrative 
terms, or fleshed out in a particular medium, are worlds like any other—
the only difference being our habitual tendencies to treat some worlds 
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or world-versions as more real than others: “for reality in a world, like 
realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit.”52 This reference to habit 
might suggest (if only by a certain philosophical habituation) that in fact 
we needed to turn to no one more recent than David Hume in order to 
find a strong justification for such a position—though the Hume-version or 
Hume-world that would be most suited to this task is perhaps made more 
perceptible through the lens of Deleuze’s reading.
The significance of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, at least for 
Deleuze, lies in his highlighting of the roles of belief, affect and habit—but 
also, of the imagination—in the nature of reality as we perceive and under-
stand it: every relation of cause and effect is fictionalized in the sense and 
to the extent that it is believed in and affects those beings which perceive 
it, despite having no absolute necessity which pure reason can access. 
The perception that the existence of one thing (e.g., an effect) depends on 
another (e.g., its putative cause) can be affirmed only through belief, which 
is accrued “by custom or a principle of association.”53 Or, as Deleuze puts 
it, “causality is felt. It is a perception of the mind and not a conclusion 
of the understanding.”54 But in addition to highlighting how Hume raises 
the question of the roles of relations, affect and belief as key elements of 
our existence, Deleuze also highlights, if seemingly in passing, a further 
aspect of importance for us here: the notion of a general idea—and specifi-
cally, the recursive form of generality that is at stake in such (perhaps all) 
non-rationalist thinking.
At the end of the first part of the Treatise (following his first treat-
ments of relations, modes and substances) Hume provides an argument 
in support of Berkeley’s position according to which “all general ideas are 
nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term, which gives them 
a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other 
individuals, which are similar to them.”55 In Deleuze’s account of Hume’s 
“associationism,” it is the easy passage among ideas, brought about by 
relations (one idea introduces another), substance and mode (several simple 
ideas combine to form a more complex one) and the general idea, which 
produce the mind (or “human nature”) as a set of tendencies. But if, as 
Hume argues, any particular idea may take on the role of the general, and 
no idea is by itself intrinsically general, then every general idea must be 
considered as an instance of the recursive generality discussed above. More 
crucially for us, since relations are necessarily beyond the grasp of reason 
alone, and yet are perceived, they must in some sense be imagined: “Hume, 
in fact, observes that general ideas must be represented, but only in the 
fancy, under the form of a particular idea having a determined quantity 
and quality.”56
If we apply this reasoning to the thinking of general ecology, the impli-
cation is that any image of the general ecology we construct will ultimately 
fall short of full generality by virtue of its own particularity. On the one 
hand, this may indicate that the general idea (of ecology) can never fully 
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dispense with the particular ideas from which it has arisen. On the other 
hand, to the extent that, through these processes, the thought of a general 
ecology does present something other than, beyond, or in excess of every 
restricted ecology, we would still have to recognize that every presentation 
of this thought will have its own particularity, will give rise to a particular 
image. No two presentations of this idea will be exactly alike, any more 
than two metafictions (or even two accounts of metafiction as a general 
idea, category or genre) will, as emphasized by the differences between 
Cervantes’ and Pierre Menard’s Don Quixotes.58
This should not be considered a flaw or impasse for the thinking of 
general ecology, however. For if the image or representation of a general 
idea has a particular form in the imagination, the operation of a general-
ecological mode of thinking may consist in a constant or reiterative 
liberating of the generalizing potential in every such quasi-stable form. If 
every particular or restricted idea of ecology has a tendency towards (or at 
least, an immanent potential for) its own generalization—and if this general-
ization tends towards something which can only be thought, in some sense, 
through imagination—then the thinking of general ecology may, perhaps 
paradoxically, rediscover the generalizing tendency it seeks to grasp in the 
process of approaching, describing, producing, using each particular image 
of ecology—not only those of existing examples of (restricted) ecological 
thought, but in the particularity of its own general images.
Ecological metafictions
The thought of general ecology may thus be considered a metafictional 
mode of thinking in the sense that it retools a generalizing, worldmaking 
potential operative in any local ecology or its study (as literary metafiction 
rediscovers and illuminates the strange, boundary-crossing capacities of 
fiction per se), and extends this potential in the course of its own world-
making activity.
Metafiction—understood now in terms of processes operative well 
beyond the sphere of literature, perhaps even central to our psychological 
and material existence—is not invoked here as the basis for a mode of 
relativist constructivism: in particular, the products of fictionalizing are 
seldom neutral. My concern with a generalized idea of metafiction, while 
seeking to move it beyond the restricted / restricting scope of literary 
criticism, is no less particular than any image of a general ecology (or 
of any “general” idea). While the idea of metafiction could be used to 
support a perspective aspiring to neutrality, whereby its main purpose 
would be to show that—and to help describe how—all reality is (all 
worlds are) produced through the fictionalizing (worldmaking) use of 
elements of existing fictions (worlds), for me at least, such a perspective 
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is only worth developing in connection with a consideration of the 
kinds of worlds we want. As Goodman puts it, “recognition of multiple 
alternative world-versions betokens no policy of laissez-faire. Standards 
distinguishing right from wrong versions become, if anything, more 
rather than less important.”58 Recognizing the ongoing, productive role 
of fictionalizing in any world is a first step towards actively engaging in 
worldmaking processes, and is arguably crucial in our dealings with the 
ecological.
We cannot embrace everything—every set of connections and relations, 
every putative emergent ecology—any more than we can track or observe 
it: nor should we want to, if we want to retain any political agency, as 
Neyrat’s call for an “ecology of separation” in Chapter 3 of this volume 
makes clear; or as Steven Shaviro suggests, in parallel manner, in light of 
the contemporary tendency to see everything (computers, rainforests, intel-
ligence, the capitalist economy) as a network, and under constant pressure 
to integrate oneself ever more fully in the network society, “the problem is 
not how to get onto the network, but how to get off.”59 To recognize that 
there is critical and political value in disconnection, separation, restriction 
in this context, it is enough to acknowledge that capitalism has its own 
general-ecological modes, as do the control society (e.g., as elaborated in 
Tiqqun’s “cybernetic hypothesis”60), the network(ed) society, or the late 
modern global form of domination named “Empire” by Hardt and Negri.61 
Their ecological character is perhaps most discernible in their tendencies to 
connect with and encompass one another, even as they extend their reach 
ever further into the psychological, material, biological, and social struc-
tures of existence, whether we figure this in terms of Guattari’s “integrated 
world capitalism”62 or Foucault’s biopower. The residual and recurrent 
particularism of every image or thought of general ecology, coupled with 
a grasping of its metafictional potential as a collection of worldmaking 
processes—grasping not simply in the sense of understanding, but of 
taking-hold, making ready-for-use—may well be crucial to its capacity 
to curb these other general-ecological proliferations, both “in the fancy” 
(at the level of its critical-epistemological engagement with them) and, by 
contiguous passage, in concrete, material existence and experience.
Examples from apparently restricted, nature-bound contexts of 
ecological thinking may reveal how metafiction has already played 
key roles in the strategic generalization of ecology in response not 
only to the threat of environmental disaster, but in light of numerous 
ongoing and long-established forms of political and social violence which 
operate ecologically, both through steering hyper-connective proliferation 
in particular directions, and by their imbrication with the processes of 
environmental change. For environmentalism can no longer be considered 
“purely” a question of nature, or even politics, in an era in which, as 
Michel Serres suggests, pollution (including pollution through noise and 
images, as well as in physical forms of waste and excrement) becomes a 
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means of activating “perfectly conscious and organized plans by owners 
for waging open war to invade the world and occupy space”;63 and in 
which, as Adrian Lahoud puts it, the struggle over an issue such as global 
carbon capacity becomes “in very real terms a war, but a war whose 
agents, weapons, and theater of operations bear little resemblance to the 
conflicts of the past.”64
To take a concrete example, the Whole Earth Catalog of the late 
1960s and 1970s can be understood as a metafictional enterprise aiming 
to counter a certain dominant image of a future global society rationally 
organized and efficiently managed through the application of technology 
and underpinned by faith in scientific progress. The Catalog’s famous cover 
image of the “Earthrise” photograph of the earth seen from space—for 
most people offering a radically new perspective—brought the planet as a 
fragile, interconnected, shared system into popular consciousness: yet this 
perspectival shift should be seen as a key element in the literal construction 
of a new fiction or world (following Goodman) through the reappropriation 
of central elements in the pre-existing fiction or grand narrative of scientific 
and technological progress—including space travel, military technology, 
and Cold War capitalist ideology. In discussing their recent exhibition on 
the influence of the Catalog, Diedrich Diederichsen and Anselm Franke 
highlight the ways this thinking, and the image, emerge from effectively the 
same paradoxical situation in which metafiction arises (i.e., that of being 
simultaneously inside and outside of a world or system, fostering aporetic 
modes of self-reference):
DD: The image of a planet, just like a system, is something you watch 
from the outside. But at the same time you’re also inside it. And this is 
the aporia of the system, because the system always tells us: you can’t 
look at a system when you’re part of it. But you’re always part of it.
[…]
AF: … whenever you look at or talk about this image, you are actually 
surfing a sort of schizo-meridian, a borderline between being part of it 
and being on the outside of it.65
The almost intrinsically metafictional situation of a particular ecological 
perspective—in this case, the human subject’s self-observation as both 
within and outside the planetary ecology—gives rise to further metafic-
tionalizing (or worldmaking) strategies. This is seen in the wealth of 
information, advertising and imagery contained in the Catalog, which 
continues the re-appropriation of the dominant elements of technocapi-
talism by offering the reader (or user) access to knowledge and tools, both 
practical and educational, that may allow her to participate in and foster 
an agriculturally attuned, self-sustaining way of life, “to conduct [her] own 
education, find [her] own inspiration, shape [her] own environment, and 
share [her] adventure.”66 In short, environmentalist concerns are already 
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imbricated here within questions of social and mental ecology in ways that 
anticipate Guattari’s “ecosophy.”
Instances of what may be considered strategic metafictionalizing in 
various (restricted—but generalizing) ecological contexts, even if not 
directly identified as such, are discussed in a number of essays collected 
in the recent volume Forensis, many of which attend to the complex 
interrelations between natural, technological and material environments 
in contexts of political and social violence.67 For example, the metaphor 
of the “hole” in the ozone layer, as Eyal Weizman writes, though the 
product of meterological and geophysical observation and analysis, was 
“constructed as a concept and an image in order to call for action,” and 
subsequently mobilized in debates against climate change skeptics’ denial 
of the gradual depletion of ozone levels in the stratosphere.68 Meanwhile, 
Paulo Tavares discusses the complex ecological, political, historical and 
legal circumstances surrounding the recognition, in Ecuador’s new consti-
tution of 2008, of the rights of nature.69 The legal theory behind this 
development has its roots in Christopher Stone’s argument, originally put 
forward in 1972, that, in light of the numerous “inanimate rights-holders: 
trusts, corporations, joint ventures, municipalities” which are recognized 
through the convention of “legal fictions” as “persons” or “citizens” for 
various “statutory and constitutional purposes,”70 we should “give legal 
rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called ‘natural objects’ in the 
environment—indeed, to the natural environment as a whole.”71 Following 
Ecuador, Bolivia’s passing of the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth in 
2010 actualizes this suggestion, combining the much older, mythologically 
inflected apostrophization of Nature with the modern legal technique of 
assigning personhood, in upholding the rights of Mother Earth as “a living, 
dynamic system composed of the indivisible community of all systems of 
life and living beings, interrelated, interdependent and complementary, that 
share a common destiny.”72
Such examples may seem a far cry from the (residually) literary metafic-
tions with which we began. One might argue that they constitute a 
rhetorical deployment of metaphor and imagery in ecological discourse 
that is closer to Hayden White’s account of the narratalogical character of 
historical writing than to the strange, paradox-embracing, frame-shifting 
constructions of Borges, Pynchon, or Barth.73 Yet they arise from and 
perpetuate the same deconstruction of fiction / reality, truth / illusion 
boundaries: the ozone layer and Mother Earth are both fictional and real 
phenomena, components of worlds which we are both inside and without. 
Furthermore, their acknowledgment of the complex, nonlinear relations 
which characterize ecological systems gives rise in post-Humean fashion 
not only to an appreciation of the roles of affect, belief, habit, imagination 
in the perception of (especially causal) relations, but to attempts to engage 
these roles in the mobilization of alternative world-versions against those 
habitually dominant in everyday perception or promoted by the grand 
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narratives of modernity.74 If such complexities require relatively simplistic 
fictions in order to be rendered more conceivable and communicable, these 
are nevertheless underpinned by the deeper level of invested fictionality 
underpinning all perception of relations, which the thinking of general 
ecology both grasps and mobilizes in its own recurrent particular forms.
The generalization operating in the notion of general ecology moves 
it even further beyond the associations with nature which continue to 
characterize most of the ecological examples I have discussed here—which 
could be said to be “residually” natural in the way Culler, as noted above, 
described certain metafictional texts as residual literature. Yet among the 
present and future tasks of thinking the general ecology, it seems to me, is 
the challenge of recognizing these characteristics across ecological thinking, 
to produce a generalization of generalizations, a metafiction of metafic-
tions—and at the same time to recognize that this in turn will never attain 
to absolute generality, to universality, but will always bring with it new 
blind spots, such that every image or thought of general ecology will have 
its own particularities, at various levels, from the historicity of its termi-
nology and vocabulary, to the political and institutional contexts of its 
production, to its visualizations of possible current and future realities—its 
ways of worldmaking. The challenge is to activate this residual particularity 
as a worldmaking property—which is to say, reality-building, creative, 
metafictionalizing capacity—as opportunity rather than limit: to combine 
the recognition of the shapelessness enabling every shape, the processes and 
relations prior to every form, with the ongoing capacity to make shapes and 
forms, a capacity that is also an ineluctable necessity.
For if the idea of a general ecology, at least to some degree, shares the 
particularity of the restricted ecologies it considers, even as it seeks to move 
beyond them, extending their immanent potential for moving beyond their 
own epistemological and ontological milieus, and, further, acquires its 
own particularity in each image or reflection, this residual and recurrent 
particularity may ultimately form a valuable means of restricting—in a 
different sense—of reshaping and affecting, even if in minor ways, the forms 
of general ecology that are already exercising their worldmaking capacity 
upon us.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
An ecology of differences
Communication, the Web, and the 
question of borders
Elena Esposito
Environments of systems
The debate about ecology, as we understand it here, has a specific history 
that separates it from the rather organicist discourse concerning the 
relationship of living beings with their environments (since the second half 
of the nineteenth century). Ecology deals with the environment, but here we 
look to a generalization and an abstraction of the concept that have been 
emerging more recently (since the 1950s). We speak of general ecology. And 
we look for a sharper problematization of the idea of environment—not 
as a “given,” to which an organism or system must adapt, but as a multi-
faceted and flexible reference, which changes with the way it is observed 
and with the perspective of the observer.
In this sense, the environment is not an assumption, it is a problem. It 
is not the environment in itself (a notion which doesn’t make much sense), 
but the environment of someone or something. There are many environ-
ments, and one has to specify to which one is referring. In our discourse 
on general ecology the environment is a multiplicity of environments that 
are intertwined and complement each other, where you look for reliable 
(although presumably neither final nor stable) references—not only the 
natural environment, but also the social environment, the psychological 
environment (or the billions of environments of the different minds), the 
environment of machines and the machines in the environment, the media 
environment, and so on. Which environment includes all these environ-
ments, and from what vantage point can we observe it?
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A reference model is often found in Gregory Bateson’s reflections on 
Mind and its relationship with Western epistemology, developed within 
systems theory and cybernetics.1 It is not by chance that these reflections 
were developed in the very creative context of the Macy Conferences and 
of the seemingly disparate issues addressed there: from feedback mecha-
nisms to perception, from neural networks to memory, to learning, to 
communication and many other topics.2 In fact all these problems and the 
ways they are dealt with, even in their diversity, rely on some common 
underlying issues, which formed the background of all discussions during 
the Conferences. These issues continue to qualify reflection on ecology, and 
it will be useful to briefly recall them.
First the question of borders, which has always been the crucial issue 
of systems theory. The concept of system itself was intended to identify 
specific objects able to dynamically interact with the environment—systems 
that produce a continuous exchange of materials and energy with the 
outside world (inputs and outputs).3 This exchange, however, presupposes 
a distinction: what becomes open? Input and output from what? How 
can you detect the identity of a system under or through such continuous 
processes of exchange? To study openness you first have to find a way to 
indicate what it is that is open (this being the system that the theory is 
named after)4—or more specifically the boundary that determines what’s 
in and what’s out. As indicated by the controversial debate on autopoiesis 
since the 1980s, the issue is far from trivial.5
The second question of the ecological approach is the problem of 
control: how is the relationship between inside and outside regulated, how 
do exchanges proceed? Is it possible to indicate, in a non-arbitrary way, 
how the processes constituting the system and its environment operate? As 
we know, these questions gave rise to cybernetics, founded explicitly as the 
science of control in all possible areas (in animals and machines, according 
to Wiener’s original formulation in 1948)—an understanding of control 
that quickly formulates it as an issue of communication. How can internal 
processes influence external ones and vice versa? What kind of contacts can 
exist between the two sides of the border?
The fascinating (and extremely fruitful) response of the time was the 
concept of feedback, which retains the whole complexity of the problems 
but provides operational indications. The ingenuity of feedback is that the 
boundary is assumed in order to be neutralized—the separation serves to 
indicate the forms in which the operations of the system make it fluid and 
allow for a constant, reciprocal influence between inside and outside. But 
the separation must exist, otherwise there could be no influence and every-
thing would get lost in indeterminacy. Think of the thermostat, the classic 
example of feedback, which works very well to keep the room temperature 
adjusted and presupposes the distinction between the machine, with its 
programming, and the environment, with its temperature. It starts with 
a separation. But it’s not a univocal relationship: is it the thermostat that 
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controls the room or is the room that controls the thermostat?6 Does the 
thermostat, which gives indications, result in the temperature of the room, 
or is it the room that triggers the thermostat (which is activated when the 
room temperature drops below a certain threshold)? The question remains 
open, and with it appears the indeterminacy of the ecological approach: 
the separation between system and environment is needed in order to study 
their interrelations, not to neutralize them.
In cybernetics, control does not have the purpose of canceling differences 
(making the aim coincide with the end)7 but of multiplying them.8 The 
linearity of the traditional interpretation of causality folds into a complex 
series of circular relationships, and it was exactly these which interested the 
heterogeneous participants in the Macy Conferences, and from which the 
ecological approach begins.
The double loop of cybernetic objects
Let us return to our primary topic. What has changed since the Macy 
Conferences? Why do we feel the need to expand the approach to a “general 
ecology”? Beyond the origin of the concept, when today in daily commu-
nication we speak of cybernetics we do not refer primarily to control or to 
the Greek kybernētēs—rather, we first think of computers. This is not really 
a distortion, not only because computer science is an indirect result of the 
same context, but also because the architecture of computer systems is itself 
an application of the concept of feedback in complex hierarchies of inter-
twined loops.9 In this sense, however, the situation is more complicated, 
and requires a revision of the basic concepts, including the issue of borders.
Over the past few decades, but more clearly in recent years, the focus 
has shifted from the single computer to the connection, from the isolated 
machine to the web. We had the transition to the Web 2.0 and maybe to 
the semantic web, the explosion of social networks, the spread of cloud, of 
smartphones and tablets, of the Internet of Things and of smart environ-
ments: all are developments that call into question the simple distinctions 
between the computer and its environment and between machine and 
user. The consumer of media content, as we know, is at the same time the 
producer of content (prosumer), while the information processed by the 
machine is often produced by the network itself. With complex procedures 
of data mining and profiling, the “intelligence” elaborated by the system 
seems to be distributed outside and inside its borders, in the system and in 
its environment.
In this transformation, the classic loop of feedback circuits becomes a 
double loop—and as such, much more complex and difficult to deal with. 
The observer observes a system facing its environment, and discovers 
himself to be involved in the object he observes: the web user gets 
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information from the network, which also depends on the user’s own search 
for information and has a corresponding form—a different user would get 
different information, and in general all available information depends on 
the fact that there are people looking for information (we will return to this 
circularity later). The observation of feedback between the environment 
and the system produces a second feedback circuit between the observer 
and his object. The interaction with the web imposes in practice the model 
of second-order cybernetics,10 in which an observer observes a world that 
not only operates circularly, but to which he himself belongs, and he knows 
it. How can the ecological approach account for this complexity and 
produce a correspondingly complex concept of environment?
It is not surprising that the spread of the web and of various compli-
cated forms of mediated communication increased the level of interest in 
a series of concepts (or quasi-concepts) that try to reflect this condition: 
that is, a confrontation with quasi-objects that are at the same time inside 
and outside, natural and human, technical and social, presupposed and 
constructed. For example, the term “dispositif”: a heterogeneous ensemble 
made of material objects, philosophical and moral discourses and social 
institutions.11 Or consider Callon’s socio-technical devices and Latour’s 
“hybrids”: human and nonhuman agencies beyond the opposition between 
nature and society, revealing a technological reality that is at the same 
time as immediate as nature and as constructed as society and language.12 
Keeping in mind the question of environment, we could say that there is 
an increasing interest in concepts that seem to consider this new condition 
of reflection and exchange between the environment and the system, where 
the system can be found in the environment and the environment seems to 
penetrate to the interior of the system.
Although not always explicitly declared, all these examples deal with 
the problem of defining and observing the distinction system / environment 
and its forms (which is in my understanding the basic problem of every 
ecology).
Usually one starts by questioning the idea of system, maybe replacing 
it with concepts that seem more flexible, like network. The borders are 
opened to allow it to include entities that previously seemed to belong to the 
environment: typically nonhuman entities like machines, artifacts, bodies, 
but also animals or institutions. Inside the network what is considered an 
actor is what works as an actor: persons and social groups, devices and 
technological objects. “Actors are network effects.”13 Actor and network 
are mutually constitutive: the network exists in its elements and its elements 
cannot act outside it.14 This is why the human or nonhuman nature of the 
elements (actors) makes no difference, because there is no reference to any 
external instance: neither the subject, nor society, neither nature nor God—
everything is reconstructed a posteriori.15
The same step, however, could be taken in a symmetrical fashion in 
reference to the environment, which also loses its “distinctness” and is 
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permeated by the system. The Internet of Things indicates a new mode 
of ambient intelligence, which appropriates a typical feature of systems 
(specifically of consciousnesses). In becoming agents, animated or inanimate 
objects alter their nature and enter into a different relationship with the 
system (or network) that defines them—the environment itself becomes part 
system, the objects become part subjects. Hence one could thus also start by 
questioning the concept of environment.
Maybe, however, one should take a different approach, and this could 
be the real reason for the recent interest in ecology and in the complex 
debates of the 1940s and 1950s, with their attention to borders and 
their consequences: to start not from one of the sides of the distinction 
(system or environment) but from the distinction itself. Here general 
ecology comes into play, which I understand as reflection on the difference 
system / environment and its transformations, with all their consequences—
for example the issues of second-order cybernetics with its double feedback. 
Is this reflectivity in the environment or in the system (in nature or in 
society, in the network or outside it)?
Hybridization and double contingency
This decision, which I will elucidate in the following pages, has very precise 
consequences. For example, it requires a strategy opposite to the popular 
approach of actor-network theory (ANT),16 which, faced with new forms 
of circularity in the relation between system and environment, chooses to 
blur the distinction and start from mediators (hybrids) in order to recon-
struct the way in which the two poles (natural and social) are the result of a 
typical modern “purification.”17 This blurring would be the starting point, 
not the evolution of the distinction. I propose instead to make the opposite 
choice: don’t blur the distinction but radicalize it, sharpen it, so you can 
use it even in circular and reflective configurations. Only if you are able to 
indicate clearly what’s in and what’s out, what belongs to the system and 
what is part of its environment, will you also be able to study the complex 
forms produced when the inside reflects the outside and vice versa.
One then has to deal with forms of re-entry in the sense of Spencer 
Brown,18 which show the ability of a distinction to admit even the 
distinction inside itself, without losing its determination. This entails a 
situation in which a system has such a strong identity and distinctness 
from the environment that it can also reflect upon its distinction from 
the environment without getting confused. In this case the environment 
re-enters the system as observed object, but the system knows that what 
re-enters is only its own reference to the environment, not the environment 
per se (even and precisely when it deals with it as something autonomous 
and independent).
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This ability allows for the study of complex circular configurations (like 
the current medial landscape) considering the subjective side of objects 
and vice versa (the intelligence of the environment or the materiality of the 
system)—but not because they are hybrid entities that are at the same time 
subjects and objects, internal and external. On the contrary: it can deal with 
them precisely because it’s so clear what is inside and what is outside that 
you can also consider how the two sides affect and reflect each other.
In order to do this, however, the approach of cybernetics and systems 
theory needs to be extended to the study of society and its forms. Only in 
reference to society, as we will see, does the issue of the openness / closure 
of a system’s borders acquire a clear operative reference. It is not individuals 
that are inside and outside society at a given time. Society is not made of 
individuals and can therefore accomplish its specific form of closure.
This step, together with the theoretical developments of recent decades, 
needs to clarify some points that were already present in Bateson and in the 
debate of the 1950s, in particular the distinction between different levels of 
system. Bateson proposed an articulation in terms of individuals, societies, 
and ecosystems, each with their own homeostatic cycles and all gathered 
together in the higher cybernetic system originating the ecological issue: the 
Mind or the overall comprehensive system (or ambience).19 The relation-
ships between the various levels would be governed by a hierarchy of logical 
types modeled on Russell and Whitehead’s type theory.20
We know now that the double feedback of second-order cybernetics 
inevitably leads to an entangling of the hierarchy of logical types, producing 
paradoxes and undecidability. But the underlying problem is a different 
one. Bateson’s model provides for a sort of encapsulation of various types 
of systems (and environments): individuals are combined into societies that 
give rise to ecosystems, in an overall ordering that goes all the way up to an 
all-encompassing system that collects them all. The sociological approach 
requires much sharper attention to the differences and to the necessary 
separation between levels: by empirical observation it is not realistic to think 
that individuals are part of society, or even that their relationships could be 
collected in a supreme order. This is Luhmann’s sharp and much disputed 
decision, which also has great importance for our ecological problems.21
In the approach of social systems theory, individuals (psychic systems 
or consciousnesses) each have their own environment that also includes 
society, but are themselves in the environment of society: the relationship 
between the two levels is not one of inclusion but of mutual exclusion. 
There is no broader environment including the smallest environments: the 
environments are all different and strictly speaking incompatible. Society 
is not made of individuals: individuals are outside society, and due to 
this separation are indispensable for its operations. Society is made of 
communications that do not coincide with the thoughts of the participating 
individuals, although they require that there are individuals thinking about 
what is communicated (said, read, broadcast).22
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The meaning of communication is not what people think, which remains 
their exclusive and incommunicable property (made by their history, their 
experience, their unique and unrepeatable perspective on the world)—it is 
something different, allowing each participant to interpret communication 
in his own way, getting information which the speaker did not have in 
mind and which differs from that of any other participant (including when 
communication is successful). The separation between individual systems 
and between different types of system is very clear, and this (rather than 
an alleged confusion of boundaries) explains the evolution of increasingly 
complex and unlikely forms of organization.
The key concept for explaining the emergence of communication from a 
nebula of thoughts that remain separate and directly inaccessible is double 
contingency, initially formulated by Talcott Parsons.23 Double contingency 
describes the encounter between two black boxes (individuals) that remain 
opaque to one another, but depend on each other and know it (each also 
knowing that the other party knows it).24 Ego and Alter are both contingent, 
meaning that they are free to decide their own behavior (they can do or 
not do something, or do something else), but double contingency occurs 
because the contingency of the one reflects the contingency of the other and 
conditions it. Double contingency does not mean here simple contingency 
multiplied for the number of systems involved, but the circular condition in 
which the possibilities of each one depend on the possibilities of the other 
one, who is in the same condition—contingency duplicated inside itself. So 
a condition of indeterminacy arises because nobody has the information 
necessary to decide: “I do what you want, if you do what I want”—and of 
course nobody does anything.25 A typical paradoxical condition arises, in 
which one side of a distinction refers to the other one and vice versa, in an 
oscillation which makes decision and action impossible.
Actually, however, pure double contingency is never experienced. The 
only possible transparency, and the starting point for putting in motion 
a social dynamic, is generated not because everyone knows what the 
other thinks and wants (an unrealistic and even disturbing perspective), 
but because each knows that the other, like them, decides what to do 
depending on the behavior of its counterpart. It starts from dependency. 
That something happens (a greeting, a communication, a gesture) is enough 
to create an engagement both can refer to, initiating a dynamic of mutual 
influence. An order arises in which the selections of a partner circularly 
depend on the selections of the counterpart; that is, each acts in referring to 
the other, without a need to know what the other thinks or wants.
Communication is the operation which practically (not conceptually) 
solves double contingency, giving rise to a new dynamic whereby each 
communication is followed by a further communication which in turn 
generates other communications. Luhmann explains in this way the 
emergence of a new level of system (a social system made of communica-
tions) from the mutual intransparency of partners—from the inaccessibility 
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of their thoughts and from the incomparability of the reciprocal environ-
ments. The system of communications will have its own environment, 
which in turn will be different from that of the participants and incom-
parable with it (as shown by the fact that communication can go on with 
minimal participation, even if the individuals do not express many of their 
thoughts and feelings).
Like ANT, this approach allows the possibility of nonhuman agencies. 
Indeed, it relies on an even more radical anti-humanism,26 because 
independence from human meaning is not the exception but the rule. The 
reference to the “human” aspect (the sense intended by individuals) never 
explains the sense of communication, which processes its own information 
and produces its own sense, the latter being open to being understood by 
others in ways completely different from the initial meaning intended by 
the issuer. This makes possible all kinds of nonhuman agencies, if and 
insofar as they contribute to the production of a communicative sense 
circulating through the operations of the system and producing further 
communications. If in ancient societies natural phenomena like lightning 
or the burning of a bush were seen as divine communication, the corre-
sponding objects actually acted as agents in the circuit of communication: 
one could communicate with bushes or through the flight of birds. Today 
our society (the system of communications) normally does not contemplate 
the possibility of communicating with God through natural objects—but 
deals with hybrids and socio-technical devices. As ANT maintains, it is 
communication that decides who and what acts as an agent, depending on 
their ability to activate a condition of double contingency.
Communicating with machines
The question that remains open is how this approach can be used with 
reference to the issues we face today: does the concept of communi-
cation based on double contingency allow us to usefully explain today’s 
forms of internet-mediated intelligence? Does it facilitate explanations 
of the production of information by agencies relating to machines or 
other technological constructs? And does it help to clarify our ecological 
problems? Does it require a blurring of the boundary between society 
(made of communication) and (smart) objects in its environment?
What happens when, in communication, there is a computer, which 
by its nature is and must be a machine that does not know randomness, 
uncertainty, and contingency? The computational and operational advan-
tages of computers are connected directly to the fact that they are machines 
processing a particular kind of object (data), but operating as machines, 
hence not on the basis of meaning but on the basis of algorithms—no 
matter how complex, flexible and capable of a specific form of learning. 
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From neural networks and genetic algorithms to the semantic web, 
computers have also simulated their own mode of evolution, changing 
programs depending on the sequence of operations and apparently incor-
porating unpredictability and uncertainty.27
But the latter is still a “domesticated” version of uncertainty—an unpre-
dictability predicted and anticipated by programmers, even if they don’t 
know in detail the form it can take at any given time. It is a kind of extrinsic 
uncertainty, applicable for an observer who cannot anticipate the changing 
behavior of a machine over time, but not for the machine, which always 
decides in a completely determined way. Its unpredictability has been 
envisaged in its initial set-up. As von Foerster already noted, a historical 
machine can be absolutely unpredictable, but is no less determined.28 
Computers do not know uncertainty, and can therefore perform calcula-
tions and computations with a speed and efficiency that were unthinkable 
for a consciousness, which is always burdened by contingency, by possi-
bilities and by meaning—but also capable of operating in ways inaccessible 
to a machine that remains determinate (albeit in a very complex way).
What kind of communication can be realized with a machine of this 
kind, which develops and produces complex and structured information, 
but only knows data? Can computers really communicate? It is clear 
that communication with a computer can be enormously informative for 
the user, who can even develop an emotional and affective relationship 
with digital devices. Sherry Turkle looked at the kind of attachment that 
children and elderly people appear to display toward “robotic pets” such 
as Furby or Aibo, which respond appropriately to external stimuli, need 
care, and develop their relationship with the user depending on how they 
are treated.29 The user clearly communicates with the device—much more 
doubtful is whether the device communicates with the user.
What we can observe is an unprecedented unilateral communication, 
which produces its own form of contingency, sufficient to evolve the 
relationship but devoid of the circularity of double contingency. The 
contingency of Ego duplicates in communication, but not because Alter (the 
device) is authentically contingent, rather because it has learned to absorb, 
reflect and elaborate the contingency projected by the user. The digital 
object “feeds” on the contingency of the user and returns it (to him or to 
others) in an elaborate, unrecognizable, and always surprising form. In this 
version of contingency the behavior of the counterpart will be endlessly 
unpredictable, because it absorbs the inexhaustible unpredictability and 
variety of the behavior and perspective of the users.
What the user is interacting with through digital technology is his 
own reflected and revised contingency. In a sense the user communicates 
with himself in an unrecognizable and surprising form—but he does not 
face the complexity of authentic double contingency, with its paradoxes 
and its openness. We can talk of a form of virtual contingency that like 
virtual reality is not simply a fake reality (and the computer is not a fake 
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consciousness).30 It produces a true alternative reality, but needs an original 
reality projected in it (just as the reflection in a mirror, the first example of 
virtuality, needs objects to reflect).31 The computer acts as an alternative 
partner only if genuine partners (communication participants) provide their 
contingency and allow the machine to process it in its unpredictable forms.
This applies at the individual level (Turkle’s robotic toys), but also 
and especially at the communicative level, where it produces the huge 
variety and specific forms of web intelligence. Indeed, one could say that 
the authentic novelty of the Web 2.0 (and presumably of 3.0) is not so 
much personalization, but rather the inclusion and use of virtual contin-
gency, which “feeds” on user contributions and actively exploits them to 
increase its own complexity—and also the efficiency of communication. 
In the Internet of Things and in ambient intelligence the network becomes 
enormously clever, and in this sense it is plausible to see it as the outcome 
of decades of Artificial Intelligence projects, starting with the Dartmouth 
Conference and the prophetic visions of Vannevar Bush,32 but precisely 
because it gives up, consciously or not, the idea of building a machine that 
is itself intelligent.33
Artificial intelligence on the net does not imitate human intelligence: it 
doesn’t understand but calculates, doesn’t interpret but reflects, doesn’t 
remember but records. It is able to take advantage of the computing 
capability of machines to multiply contingency, acquiring its own struc-
tures—and thus an unprecedented form of intelligence, based on the fact 
that machines work in a different rather than similar way to humans. 
According to its inventor, the world wide web makes human improvization 
(contingency) coexist with the operations of machines (computation).34
More concretely: where does virtual contingency operate in the Web 2.0? 
Can we observe specific examples of this form of complexity processing? 
We find them first in the practices of “googlization”:35 tools that solve 
in a seemingly counter-intuitive way the classic problem of “information 
overload” generated by the contrast between the (limited) human forms 
of information processing and (virtually unlimited) availability of data. 
Google’s amazing effectiveness relies on its ability to transform the classic 
problem of information overload into an advantage, exploiting virtual 
contingency: when the amount of data grows, the engine works better, not 
worse. The PageRank algorithm notoriously bases the classification of sites 
on the number and relevance of links made by the users: Google “feeds” on 
the past selections of users in order to orient present selections.36 The more 
selections there are, the more the classification is refined—a quantitative 
and computational mechanism that is radically different from the human 
modes of selection of information, which nevertheless allows human users 
to sort information. Basically the search engine does not select anything (it 
does not have its own intelligence), but combines and multiplies the selec-
tions made by users, obtaining a kind of logic that it applies to the network 
as a whole.
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But there is not only Google. Filters have such a central role in the web that 
some observers consider them its defining feature: according to Anderson 
we are leaving the “Information Age” to enter the “Recommendation 
Age,” whose central issue is not the ability to get information (always 
available and always in excess) but to know how to select it.37 These filters 
are all of a cooperative and collaborative type—that is, they are based on 
the user’s behavior, which is reflected and elaborated in order to selec-
tively orient the subsequent behavior of the user.38 The mechanism can be 
voluntary (as when users spontaneously produce evaluations and reviews, 
e.g., on Amazon or on TripAdvisor), but in most cases is automated: a 
communication is derived from users’ choices, yet the users did not mean 
to communicate anything. Google works this way, but so do Amazon’s 
algorithms, suggesting books based on the similar choices of other readers, 
who never meant to make recommendations, and especially the wide variety 
of sources of the Internet of Things (mobile phones, GPS navigators, super-
market loyalty cards and many more). The “machine learning” used in the 
techniques of profiling (for commercial, legal or other purposes) is based 
mainly on “ex-post” models in order to establish patterns of correlation in 
data:39 it acquires from the web the schemes that are used to scour the web. 
The most effective filters are “post-filters” that were not designed by anyone 
and do not try to predict users’ behavior, but direct it by registering past 
behavior, reflecting it and amplifying it.40 They direct contingency without 
knowing it, reflecting the contingency of users.
Reflexive environment
These are complex and fascinating issues. But we must return to our topic: 
what are the consequences for ecology and its generalization? How can the 
study of the relationship between system and environment adequately take 
account of these developments?
In this dynamic of mutual reflection between double contingency and 
virtual contingency, a form of communication (or quasi-communication) is 
realized, one which doesn’t imply any hybridization: subjects increasingly 
operate as subjects and objects as objects, and this radicalization of the 
difference produces a specific form of intelligence. Not only do programs 
explicitly give up on the idea of reproducing the human form of information 
processing, but subjects need less and less to understand how the machine 
works (this is the increasing opacity of technology already observed by 
Husserl). They conform less and less to operations in the environment. 
There is no risk of confusion between communication and its environment, 
even and especially when the users can communicate with robots without 
even realizing it: it is the system that processes these operations, and 
manages to do it very effectively—either one communicates or one does not 
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communicate. The problems are diverse: difficulties in the management of 
memory,41 which can no longer resort to the “structural amnesia” of earlier 
forms of communication;42 privacy issues, including the risk of flattening of 
the future onto the past reflected in virtual contingency;43 problems with 
the management of explicitness and with the hypertrophy of the present, as 
it occurs in social networks—but in all cases problems that depend on an 
increasing capacity of communication to include more and more different 
forms, not on a weakening of the differences.
As in Bateson’s days, we are dealing with ecological problems—problems 
of control and of management of the borders of the system, but in the form 
of double feedback (or autology). Observing the others (its environment), 
communication finds itself and its operations (that is, once again, the system) 
in the reflected and elaborated form of the machine. Facing its environment 
the system finds itself in a different way. Complexity increases, but because 
differences increase, not because they are erased.44 The ecological issue 
becomes increasingly central—not as an opening to the environment, but 
as an understanding and management of differences.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
Specters of ecology
Timothy Morton
They talk to me about civilization, I talk about proletarianization 
and mystification.
—AIMÉ CÉSAIRE1
Specter: a word that itself is spectral, by its own definition, since it wavers 
between appearance and being. It could mean apparition, but it could 
also mean horrifying object, or it could mean illusion, or it could mean 
the shadow of a thing.2 Specter floats around, like a specter. This chapter 
summons them, because as it will show, such a convocation of specters will 
aid us in imagining something like an ecocommunism, a communism of 
humans and nonhumans alike.
A specter is haunting the specter of communism: the ghostly presence 
of beings not yet formatted according to the kind of “nature” that Marx 
is talking about: the human economic metabolism of things. Things in 
themselves haunt data: this is possibly the shortest way of describing the 
continental philosophical tradition since Kant. Marx’s version of it is that 
use value is already on the human metabolic side of the equation: the spoon 
exists insofar as it becomes part of how I organize my enjoyment, which is 
just what economics is, when we take the capitalist theological blinkers off.
Perhaps communism is only fully thinkable as a coexisting of humans and 
nonhumans—and as we will see, this does strange things to the thought of 
communism. Because what is required is to think a radical being-with that 
is now de-anthropocentrized. This coexistence drastically lacks something 
that we hear in the fifteenth chapter of the first volume of Capital, with its 
imaginative architects and mechanical bees, namely the sharp distinction 
between human being and everything else that Marx inherits from Kant, 
and in which Kant is still haunted by the specter of Descartes and his 
substance ontology of purely extensional lumps connected mechanically. 
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Such an inclusive communist thought would also need to correct the 
lopsided (though at least half true) correlationism (also from Kant) in which 
a (human) decider, in Marx’s case human economic relations, makes reality 
“real,” “‘realizes’ it” as one might realize a script in the form of a movie.
The more we think ecological beings—a human, a tree, an ecosystem, 
a cloud—the more we find ourselves obliged to think them not as alive 
or dead, but as spectral. The more we think them, moreover, the more we 
discover that such beings are not solidly “real” nor completely “unreal”—in 
this sense, too, ecological beings are spectral. In particular, ecological beings 
provide insights into the weird way in which entities are riven from within 
between what they are and how they appear. Another way of putting this is 
that beings, as a possibility condition for their existing at all, are specters.
So many specters, so little time. In this chapter I shall outline a way of 
proceeding into a thinking of ecological beings as necessarily spectral. In 
order to do this, we need to consider what it is to encounter an ecological 
being. The encounter as such is a moment at which I encounter something 
that is not me, in a decisive way, such that even if this being is obviously part 
of me—say, my brain—I do not experience it as part of the supposed whole 
that makes up “me.” Ecological thought is Adorno’s ideal of thinking as 
the encounter with non-identity.3 When it is not simply a cartoon of itself, 
pushing preformatted pieces around, thought meets specters, which is to 
say, beings whose ontological status is profoundly ambiguous, and perhaps 
irreducibly ambiguous—and how can we even tell?
Given the precedent of Derrida’s Specters of Marx so clearly evoked in its 
title, one should perhaps not be surprised that this is the eventual conclusion 
of this chapter. For if communism is a specter that is haunting Europe, then 
ecological awareness—not to mention theory and political praxis—is a 
specter in many kinds of sense that most definitely haunts communism. 
Either communism is big enough, or can grow big enough, to accommodate 
it; or communism is now up against an internal limit easy to identify in an 
era of global warming and mass extinction. Simply put, communism may 
have a space for nonhumans—or not. Ecological awareness is a specter that 
haunts communist theory with the possibility either of its undoing, or of its 
expansion. And given the uncertainty between undoing and shifting change, 
the choice itself is spectral.
Furthermore—and this is the most general concluding point—if ecology 
names relations between beings, then these relations are spectral. And 
since I hold that relationality just is what we call causality, stripped of its 
metaphysical, pre-Humean junk, we had better accommodate ourselves to 
the fact that causality is spectral, or better, what we call the spectral is in 
fact the causal, whether we like it or not.
To encounter an ecological entity, then, is to be haunted. And although 
I must use this term metaphorically for now, it will become clear that 
haunting is a very precise term for what happens in ecological thought. 
For now we can try for some kind of detail, nevertheless. Something is 
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already there, before I think it. When we talk about haunting, then, what 
we are talking about is what phenomenology calls givenness. Givenness is 
the condition of possibility for data (the Latin for what is given). There is 
already a light in the refrigerator before I open the door to see whether or 
not the light is on. The light’s givenness—it’s a light, not an octopus—is 
not something I have planned, predicted, or formatted. I cannot reduce this 
givenness to something expected, predictable, planned, without omitting 
some vital element of givenness as such. Givenness is therefore always 
surprising, and surprising in surprising ways: surprisingly surprising, we 
might say. Yet in haunting, the phenomenon of the disturbing, surprising 
given, whose surprise cannot be reduced, also repeats itself.
Each time givenness repeats, according to the logic I have sketched out 
here, there is no lessening of surprise, which is perhaps why givenness is 
surprisingly surprising. Repetition does not lead to boredom, but rather to 
an uncanny sense of refreshment. It is as if I am tasting something familiar 
yet slightly disgusting, as if I were to find, upon putting it to my lips, that 
my favorite drink had a layer of mold growing on its surface. I am as 
it were stimulated by the very repetition itself: stimulated by boredom. 
Another term for this—one made familiar by Charles Baudelaire—is 
ennui. Ennui is the sine qua non of the consumerist experience: I am 
stimulated by the boredom of being constantly stimulated. In ennui, then, 
I heighten the Kantian window-shopping of the Bohemian or Romantic 
consumer.
The experience of vicarious experience—wondering what it would be 
like to be the kind of person who wears that shirt—itself becomes too 
familiar, slightly disgusting, distasteful. I cannot enjoy it “properly,” to 
wit, I am unable to achieve the familiar aesthetic distance from which to 
appreciate it as beautiful (or not). Disgust is the flip side of good taste in 
this respect: good taste is the ability to be appropriately disgusted by things 
that are in bad taste. I have had too many vicarious thrills, and now I find 
them slightly disgusting—but not disgusting enough to turn away from 
them altogether. I enjoy, a little bit, this disgust. This is ennui.
Since in an ecological age there is no appropriate scale on which to 
judge things (human? microbe? biosphere? DNA?), there can be no pure, 
unadulterated, totally tasteful beauty. Beauty is always a little bit weird, a 
little bit disgusting. Beauty always has a slightly nauseous taste of the kitsch 
about it, kitsch being the slightly (or very) disgusting enjoyment-object of 
the other, disgusting precisely because it is the other’s enjoyment-thing, 
and thus inexplicable to me. Moreover, since beauty is already a kind of 
enjoyment that isn’t to do with my ego, and is thus a kind of not-me, beauty 
is always haunted by its disgusting, spectral double, the kitsch. The kitsch 
precisely is the other’s enjoyment object: how can anyone in their right 
mind want to buy this snow globe of the Mona Lisa? Yet there they are, 
hundreds of them, in this tourist shop.
Since beauty involves me in organizing enjoyment, it is (as Derrida 
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would again have argued, slightly differently) a profoundly economic 
phenomenon. And in the interesting sense that its use value has not yet 
been determined. Beauty, in other words, strangely gives us a way to 
think economics that crosses over the correlationist boundary a little bit, 
the boundary between things and data, between what things are and how 
things appear. Beauty, in that case, provides a channel through which the 
nonhuman specters haunting the specter of communism can enter. They do 
not have to be left out in the prefabricated “nature” of bourgeois ideology, 
with its unquestioned metaphysical assumptions. Ecology, in other words, 
does not have to be excluded in advance from the New Left project as “a 
hippie thing” unlike race and gender (actual statement by actual New Left 
Review contributor).
Beauty is the nonhuman footprint of a nonhuman. And ennui is when 
we allow beauty to begin to lose its anthropocentric equalization. Now in 
ennui I am not totally turning my back on this sickening world—where 
would I turn to anyway, since the ecological world is the whole world, 360 
degrees of it? Rather, ennui is, and this is as it were the Hegelian speculative 
judgment of this chapter (though I am far from a Hegelian), the correct 
ecological attunement!
The very consumerism that haunts environmentalism—the consumerism 
that environmentalism explicitly opposes and indeed finds disgusting—
provides the model for how ecological awareness should proceed. Moreover, 
this model is not dependent on the “right” or “proper” ecological being, and 
thus not dependent on a necessarily metaphysical (and thus illegal in our age) 
pseudo-fact (or set of facts). Consumerism is the specter of ecology. When 
thought fully, ecological awareness includes the essence of consumerism, 
rather than shunning it. Ecological awareness must embrace its specter.
With ennui, I find myself surrounded, and indeed penetrated, by entities 
that I can’t shake off. When I try to shake one off, another one attaches 
itself, or I find that another one is already attached, or I find that the very 
attempt to shake it off makes it tighten the grip of its suckers more strongly. 
Isn’t this just the quintessence of ecological awareness, namely the abject 
feeling that I am surrounded and penetrated by other entities such as 
stomach bacteria, parasites, mitochondria—not to mention other humans, 
lemurs, and sea foam? I find it slightly disgusting and yet fascinating. I 
am “bored” by it in the sense that I find it provocative to include all the 
beings that I try to ignore in my awareness all the time. Who hasn’t become 
“bored” in this way by ecological discourse? Who really wants to know 
where their toilet waste goes all the time? And who really wants to know 
that in a world where we know exactly where it goes, there is no “away” 
to flush it to absolutely, so that our toilet waste phenomenologically sticks 
to us, even when we have flushed it?
Consider the infamous “Spleen” poems of Charles Baudelaire, poet-
consumerist par excellence, bohemian inventor of the flâneur, or rather, the 
one who christened this quintessential, “Kantian” mode of consumption; 
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and furthermore the poet who originated the notion of ennui. I quote the 
poems in their entirety for various reasons. First because I am not so much 
interested in analyzing particular poems as I am in tracing a more general 
structure of feeling across the poems. Second, because the provocative 
titling—exactly the same (“Spleen”) for four poems in sequence in The 
Flowers of Evil—compels us to read them together, as if the same affect 
were collapsing, or going to sleep, then queasily restarting each time. 
Third, because the very form of the poems as such—as individual poems, 
without doubt, but also as a sequence, as the point about restarting 
is beginning to make—suggests being haunted, in the sense of being 
frequented, of an event occurring more than once. We all know how 
repetition is intrinsically uncanny: in other words, how there would be no 
such thing as the uncanny without the notion of repetition. Freud’s essay 
on the uncanny, for this very reason, is a startling exegesis of the puzzle 
of repetition.
Here in sequence are the four “Spleen” poems of Baudelaire:
The month of drizzle, the whole town annoying, a dark cold pours from 
its urn in torrents on the pale inhabitants of the adjoining cemetery and 
over the mortals in foggy suburbs.
My cat, looking for a tile to sleep on, fidgets restlessly his thin mangy 
body; the soul of some old poet trundles down the rainspout with the 
sad voice of a chilly phantom.
A bumblebee moans, the smoking log backs up in falsetto the congested 
clock; meanwhile in a game reeking with sordid perfumes—
Mortal descent from an old dropsical dame—the handsome jack of 
hearts and the queen of spades make sinister small talk about their 
defunct loves.
(Baudelaire, “Spleen,” The Flowers of Evil)4
I’ve more memories than if I were a thousand years old.
A big chest of drawers, cluttered with bank statements, poems, love 
letters, lawsuits, romances, thick locks of hair rolled up in receipts, 
contains fewer secrets than my sad brain, a pyramid, an immense vault 
holding more corpses than a paupers’ boneyard.—I am a cemetery the 
moon abhors where, like remorse, long worms crawl across my favorite 
dead. I am an old boudoir full of faded roses, strewn with a jumble 
of outmoded fashion, where only plaintive pastels and pale Bouchers 
breathe the odor of an unstoppered flask.
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Nothing’s as long as the limping days when, under thick flakes of snowy 
years, ennui—fruit of bleak incuriosity—takes on immortal propor-
tions.—From now on, O stuff of life, you are mere granite wrapped 
in vague terror, drowsing in the depth of a fog-hidden Sahara; an old 
sphinx unknown to a heedless world, forgotten from the map, whose 
savage mood harmonizes only with the sun’s rays setting. (76)
I am like the king of a rainy country, rich but powerless, young and yet 
very old, who having tutors contemptuous of curvets suffers ennui with 
his hounds, as with other beasts. Nothing can cheer him, not game, not 
falcon, not his people perishing under his balcony. A grotesque ballade 
from his favorite fool no longer relaxes the brow of this cruel invalid; 
his lilied bed becomes a grave and his ladies-in-waiting, for whom every 
prince is a beauty, can no longer dress indecently enough to draw a smile 
from this young skeleton. The mage who makes gold for him has never 
managed to expunge the corrupt element in his makeup, and in those 
baths of blood that come to us from Rome and which the powerful bring 
to mind in their final days, he cannot rekindle that dazed cadaver which 
runs, not with blood, but with the green waters of Lethe. (77)
When the sky, low and heavy, weighs like a lid on the groaning spirit, 
prey to long ennui; when from the full encircling horizon it sheds on us 
a dark day, sadder than our nights;
when earth is changed into a damp cell, where Hope, like a bat, beats 
timid wings against the walls and bumps its head against a rotten ceiling;
when the rain’s immense spouts imitate prison bars and a mute 
population of vile spiders constructs webs at the base of our brains,
bells burst out suddenly in fury and hurl skyward a frightful howl, like 
homeless wandering spirits raising a stubborn whine.
—And long hearses, without drum, without music, file off slowly within 
my soul. Hope, conquered, weeps, and atrocious Anguish, despot, upon 
my bowed head plants his black flag. (78)
This is Keats left in the refrigerator too long and accumulating mold. 
Everything slips into the uncanny valley, even the difference between 
consumerism and ecological awareness. The breakdown of well-ordered 
poetry into something like prose is the deliquescence of lineation, writing 
as plowing. The narrator tells of being surrounded, permeated, by other 
beings, “natural” and “unnatural” and “supernatural,” willy-nilly. The 
narrator is an abject ecosystem. The Sphinx, that monstrous hybrid, 
returns from death. Living and dead things become confused and weigh 
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on the narrator, depressing him. Isn’t ecological awareness fundamentally 
depressing in precisely this way, insofar as it halts my anthropocentric 
mania to think myself otherwise than this body and its phenomenological 
being surrounded and permeated with other beings, not to mention made 
up of them?
Which is to say, isn’t ecological awareness a kind of spectrality that 
consists of awareness of specters? One is unsure whether a specter is 
material or illusory, visible or invisible. What weighs on Baudelaire is the 
specter of his bohemian, Romantic consumerism, his Kantian floating, 
enjoyment tinged with disgust tinged with enjoyment. The specter is 
called ennui, badly translated merely as boredom. It is being enveloped in 
things, like a mist. Being surrounded by the spectral presence of evacuated 
enjoyment.
Ecological awareness is not unlike the attitude of the narrator of 
Baudelaire’s “Spleen” poems. When thinking becomes ecological, the 
beings it encounters cannot be established in advance as living or non-living, 
sentient or non-sentient, real or epiphenomenal. What we encounter instead 
are spectral beings whose ontological status is uncertain precisely to the 
extent that we know them in detail as never before. And our experience of 
these spectral beings is itself spectral, just like ennui. Starting the engine of 
one’s car isn’t what it used to be, since one knows one is releasing green-
house gases. Eating a fish means eating mercury and depleting a fragile 
ecosystem. Not eating a fish means eating vegetables, which may have relied 
on pesticides and other harmful agricultural logistics. Because of intercon-
nectedness, it always feels as if there is a piece missing. Something just 
doesn’t add up, in a disturbing way. We can’t get compassion exactly right. 
Being nice to bunny rabbits means not being nice to bunny rabbit parasites. 
Giving up in sophisticated boredom is also an oppressive option.
Science does not do away with ghosts. Rather, it multiplies them. As the 
human–nonhuman boundary and the life–nonlife boundary collapse, more 
and more specters emerge.
Art since 1800—since the inception of the Anthropocene—has been 
about allowing specters in. With whom or with what are we coexisting? 
How can we prove that a who isn’t in fact a what? Photography’s 
emergence in the nineteenth century gave rise quite rapidly to a fasci-
nation with photographing ghosts. The desire arose to see, in the flesh, 
rather than in the mind’s eye, some kind of material ghost, imagined as an 
ectoplasmic, anamorphic being. Anamorphic means not simply distorted, 
but “unshaped.” Not exactly without a shape altogether, but in a process 
of liquefaction, such that any discernible, obvious shape is collapsing. Why 
this fascination with the anamorphic specter? It is significant to say the 
least that the ability to imprint paper with photons reflected from actual 
things immediately suggests the possibility of seeing the unseeable, as if one 
could glimpse oneself from beside oneself. But isn’t this the basic drive of 
science—to see what cannot (or indeed should not) be seen?
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The emergence of specters becomes very vivid in the transition from 
Romantic to Expressionist and other forms of atonal music. Strukturklang 
is the serialist composer Anton Webern’s term for the sound of the whole 
structure of a musical work. Yet if we think about it, this “sound” is an 
impossible, inaudible sound, or rather it is not a sound at all if by sound 
we mean musical note. What if, in some bizarre and disturbing way, we 
were to hear this inaudible yet pervasive sound? It would be a disturbing 
dissonant ambience that haunts the entire work, heard, for instance, in the 
vast reverberation of the piano at the end of The Beatles’ “A Day in the 
Life.”5 Strukturklang, far from being an abstract pattern, is nothing other 
than the resonance of the actually existing physical entities in collaboration 
with which humans make music: pianos, sitars, gongs, voices.
The traditional term is timbre. Its etymology has to do with drums, but 
the sound evokes “timber” and hence the Greek hyle, which means matter 
and also wood. The history of European and American music since the start 
of the Anthropocene has been the story of the gradual liberation of these 
physical entities from their slavish role in telling human-flavored stories 
about human-flavored emotions. Instruments have become non-instru-
mental, insofar as they are left to vibrate, twang or otherwise “express” 
their physicality without an obvious human story. Atonalism liberated the 
notes while serialism in turn liberated musical form in which the notes 
were played. Students of Schoenberg liberated the instruments themselves, 
from Cage with his prepared piano to his student La Monte Young and 
his use of whole number tunings (Just Intonation), tunings that allow for 
maximum harmonic depth and lucidity and minimum storytelling. Human 
stories disappear, and the timbre of the instrument manifests, because 
modulating between keys to symbolize emotion is impossible unless you 
bind the instrument to Equal Temperament, slightly fudging the ratios 
between the notes to make them shallower and blunter, as if one were 
seeing an old sepia photograph. Young domesticates this sound within the 
conceptual apparatus of Hindu devotion and its arts of the drone. Without 
this conceptual frame, what is heard is a spectral resonance, precisely the 
fullest possible spectrum of an instrument’s timbre.
The encounter with this strange reverberation is, once again, spectral, 
insofar as it’s an encounter with something already present (givenness) that 
was nevertheless suppressed in European and American music: the physi-
cality of things and the necessary (and therefore ecological) collaborations 
between humans and nonhumans such as flutes, silicon chips, and valves.
But the inception of the spectral in modern art surely occurs at a moment 
we could call the Baudelaire Moment. In the decades of the nineteenth 
century before this moment, there had occurred a mapping of almost 
every move within the possibility space of consumerism. In particular, 
the top level of consumerism had become the subject of art itself. This is 
“bohemian” or Romantic consumerism, a Kantian version in which one 
doesn’t consume anything, per se: what one consumes is the pure possibility 
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of consuming, without purpose or purchase.6 This is reflected in the activity 
of the flâneur, later the window shopper, later still the surfer.
Romantic consumerism takes an already reflexive mode—the ism of 
consumerism gives this away—and bends that reflexivity back on itself: the 
reflexivity of reflexivity.
Part Two
In the hall of mirrors of Romantic consumerism—the reflexivity of 
reflexivity—a very strange thing happens. It is not simply the case that 
there is a dizzying spiral of pure ideality, or idealism, with its physical flip 
side, an “I can do anything to anything” sadistic joy. For in this hall of 
mirrors, the mirrors themselves become appreciable as entities in their own 
right. And this in turn allows for the appreciation of other entities in their 
own right.
Of all people, it was Darwin who opened the gate to the spectral world. 
Reason, jumping to a dimension at which emergent forces such as evolution 
could be discerned, was the force that opened it. When one collapses the 
life–nonlife boundary and relaxes the human–nonhuman boundary, all 
kinds of spectral creatures start to be seen, nightmarish beings that scuttle 
about. They are not categorizable. Yet they exist. They look like nightmare 
beings because of the extreme pressure they exert on existing frames of 
reference, existing categorial boxes.
But when the boxes dissolve, are these beings intrinsically horrifying? 
Is the Gothic view of these beings the only view, for the rest of time, or is 
it a temporary effect of the pressure that such beings place on categories 
such as life and nonlife? The spectral realm is an uncanny valley into which 
more and more beings begin to slide. Here I am using a concept in robotics 
that explains why people have negative reactions to lifelike robots, and 
more pleasant reactions to less human-looking ones such as R2D2. The 
more lifelike the robot, the more it approaches the condition of a zombie, 
an animated human corpse, that is to say, a being exactly like us, yet not 
alive—a being that suggests that we ourselves might also be some kind of 
zombie.
But what happens when everything is in the uncanny valley? In other 
words, when the valley is no longer a valley, but has transmogrified itself 
into a gigantic charnel ground with no center and no edge?
The valley is uncanny because it is familiar and strange, and strangely 
familiar—and familiarly strange—all at the same time. Beings we recognize—
a human, a fruit fly—start to flit around outside the categorial boxes of 
human versus nonhuman, and of life versus nonlife.
The uncanny valley is precisely not a void. One of the things under 
pressure in the modern period is precisely the empty container, the void, 
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in which things sit. Such empty spaces fill us with dread (Pascal), they 
are the objective correlative of Cartesian reason, and are inferred by 
Newtonian laws. This kind of void is objectively present. To put it in its 
most paradoxical form, this kind of void lacks nothingness. It is not void 
enough, in a sense.
A feature of beings in the uncanny valley is nothingness. We should 
draw a strong distinction between nothingness and void. This distinction 
emerged in the long history of the assimilation of Kant, that fragmentary 
distorted echo of the start of the Anthropocene. Kant opened up the 
Pandora’s box of nothingness, by discerning an irreducible gap between a 
thing and its phenomena.
Is horror is truly the most adequate attunement to the discoveries of 
the Anthropocene? The Pascalian dread of the infinite void is perhaps, 
we might surmise, only a temporary reaction to the discovery of spectral 
beings and the uncanny valley. If we replace the void with nothingness, we 
may need to replace horror. Nothingness is not intrinsically horrible. It is 
intrinsically weird.
H. P. Lovecraft’s insane otopoid god Cthulhu is evoked many times to 
describe the putative “horror” of speculative realist philosophy. Why is 
horror the compulsory philosophical affect with which thought confronts 
reality, which is to say the spectral? The horror of the story of Cthulhu is 
an attempt to contain the nothingness. Cthulhu dwells in a non-Euclidean 
city under the ocean. This is the precise inverse of the universe according 
to relativity theory. In this universe, Euclidean spaces are small-enough 
(human scaled) regions of spacetime that appear to lack the general, 
mollusk-like ripples and twists in the universal fabric. Yet they only appear 
to do so. It is more accurate to say that human space occupies a small 
region of Cthulhu’s universe.
If the initial reaction to this fact is horror, then it is only because one’s 
habitual conceptual frame has been pointed out in its narrowness and 
arbitrariness. Horror is the feeling of void giving way to nothingness—of 
premodernity giving way to modernity. But what happens after modernity?
If we act to reduce carbon emissions, we will never know whether 
global warming science was totally accurate or not. Unverifiability is built 
into the theory of global warming. There is a weird dance between science 
and mystery, which we are not expecting. We were expecting science to 
demystify. But reason itself finds itself driven slightly mad.
What seems trivially the case—the Muppets and Michael Jackson and 
Olympic opening ceremonies remind me daily—the fact that I am human; 
is this fact not actually the most phenomenologically distant thing in the 
known universe, more distant than the supermassive black hole at the 
center of the Milky Way? And isn’t it precisely this thing, the fact that I 
am human, what I must reckon with if I am to understand my role as a 
geophysical force on a planetary scale? Yet to think my human being is the 
task of ecological awareness.
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The category human is, like all other modern categories, spectral. 
The human inhabits the uncanny valley. When one thinks the human, 
the category collapses into all kinds of entities. Humans are made of 
nonhumans—gut bacteria, mitochondria, “Left over parts from the apes.”7 
They also derive from nonhumans—as Richard Dawkins is fond of saying, 
one’s million times great grandfather was a fish. And closer to the arrival of 
humans, there are all kinds of hominids and hominins. Then there are other 
species of human, such as the Neanderthals. As we approach the human, 
these entities become more and more obviously uncanny.
Let us return to the idea that spectral beings emerge when the life–nonlife 
boundary collapses, along with the human–nonhuman boundary—behind 
which is lurking the (human) subject–object boundary. The long history 
of the Anthropocene so far has been the history of the emergence of these 
specters, which can also be said this way: the uncanny valley into which 
beings slip begins to cover a wider and wider range, so that it ceases to be 
a valley.
Miljohn Ruperto’s 2014 exhibition at the Whitney in New York 
exemplifies how the spectral is an intrinsic part of thinking ecology. In 
Voynich Botanical Studies, pages from the weird, indecipherable (but is it?) 
Voynich Manuscript (composed in fifteenth-century Italy) depict nonexistent 
(or are they?) plants. We might call them ghost plants. Ruperto reworks 
these illustrations into three-dimensional, black-and-white renderings that 
almost look like photographs. Again, recall that within the first few decades 
after the beginnings of photography, photographers became fascinated with 
capturing ghosts on film. Modernity is not about disillusionment, despite 
what it keeps telling itself.
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says that man is somewhere between a plant 
and a ghost. Between a plant and a ghost: Nietzsche means that a human 
flickers between what she is and how she appears. Doesn’t the idea also 
suggest a kind of scale in which you could be 30 percent plant, 70 percent 
ghost, or 40 percent plant, 60 percent ghost, and so on? Doesn’t this in turn 
suggest the possibility that a plant could be a ghost?
And also—there is something not human about being human. When you 
look at a human, you are looking at a gap between things or within a thing.
The ghostly images of plants on the right-hand sides of the Voynich 
Manuscript bring out something that is intrinsic to being a plant. A plant’s 
DNA exploits its appearance to attract pollinating insects. A plant’s 
appearance is not a plant, but a plant-appearance for some other being, 
such as a bee. A plant emits a sort of ghost of itself, an uncanny double.
What is called Nature is a forgetting of this ghostliness, this necessary 
doubling, the way in which a plant is haunted by its appearance, or the way 
in which a physical system such as DNA is also a semiotic one, and that 
there is a strange disconnection between these levels.
Digital images of plants, made with electrons and silicon: mineral 
monsters. Monsters that are metaphors for humans, wavering between 
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plant and ghost. In an era in which nonhumans press on our glass windows 
ever more insistently, get stuck in our machines, caught in our webs of 
fate—in this ecological age, such a strange peeling apart of the human into 
its ghostly nonhuman components is necessary.
Another work of Ruperto’s at the exhibition is called Elemental 
Aspirations. Different minerals are molded to the shape of a gold nugget. 
Elemental Aspirations is about the conversation that takes place within a 
thing between the past and the future, or to put it another way, between 
phenomenon and thing. The form of a thing is what happened to it. The 
form of a thing is the past. The essence of a thing is what is not-yet fully 
revealed. The essence of a thing is the future. This not-yet is irreducible, 
such that there is a fundamental, wavering unpredictability about being a 
thing.
A thing is a sort of train station in which past and future slide against one 
another, not touching. This sliding has sometimes been called nothingness. 
Nothingness is not absolutely nothing at all, but rather a flickering, 
sparkling play of presence and absence, hiding and revealing. A thing is a 
platform where ghosts glide past.
The gold nugget’s form is the past: it provides the cast for the liquid 
metals, the alchemical beings we call lead, iron, copper, tin, silver, mercury. 
But what are these strange forms, these twists of metal? Every answer we 
give will not be them. If they could speak, what they would say would not 
be them. They haunt us like ghosts, ghosts of minerals future.
They are not just lumps, these little spools of metal. They look like 
candies in twisted wrappers. They look like drills. They look like heads. Or 
ducks. Or rabbits. They aspire: they are breathing, as if exhaling simulacra 
of themselves, into the realm of appearance.
Elemental Aspirations is a conversation between Aristotle and post-
Humean science; that is, the way science is done is in the light of Hume. 
Mineral Monsters talks about how the aesthetic has been sidelined in 
contemporary theories of physical things such as plants, rocks and ducks 
or rabbits. Yet I’m going to argue here that post-Humean (that is to say, 
contemporary) science might also be aesthetic in a strange and surprising 
way: a way that is not acknowledged by scientism, which is a tactic to 
prevent just this thought. By illegally reducing the world to bland substances 
or bland extension, scientism covers over the anxiety lit up by Hume and 
the continuing conflagration called Kant, who explained the deep reason 
why Humean skepticism works: there is an irreducible gap between a thing 
and how it appears. This means that for Hume and his successors—the 
scientists in their white coats—we live in a world of phenomena, of data, 
without direct access to things in themselves. We live in a world not unlike 
the world of art, where things appear mysterious and withdrawn, where we 
are confused and bedeviled with the octopus ink of appearance.
To re-enchant the world—to discover its necessarily aesthetic 
comportment, which I can’t peel away from the world without damage: this 
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is Miljohn Ruperto’s project. How do you re-enchant the world without 
just saying anything, without resorting to the kinds of statements that just 
ignore science? And without recourse to primitivism or to Nature?
When you reintroduce Aristotle, it seems as if you are regressing. But 
Aristotle is in front of contemporary materialism, which illegally reduces 
the world to sheer stuff, sheer extension, despite the impeccable constraints 
placed by Hume and Kant on doing just that.
How can you know, after Hume and Kant, a thing in itself? You can’t. 
You know data. You know statistical correlations, not causes and effects. 
You know ghosts, impressions of things: a pattern in a cloud diffusion 
chamber; a map of weather changes in a high-dimensional phase space; 
hundreds of monkeys who react the same way over and over again to some 
stimulus. And yet, and yet … this doesn’t mean that there is nothing. This 
doesn’t mean that there are only atoms. This doesn’t mean that only the 
subject decides on reality. All these trusty positions are reactions against 
the explosiveness of the founding assertion, that when I try to find out 
whether the light is on in the refrigerator, I have to open the fridge, and thus 
change the fridge. There is no way to get at a thing in itself. But we don’t 
just have appearances. We don’t just have stuff plus illusory appearances. 
We don’t just have the subject’s decision as to what counts (or history’s, or 
economics’, or whatever kind of Decider you want, George Bush included).
Materialism is a way to avoid the panic that ensues when the gap 
between what a thing is and how it appears becomes clear. Materialism 
comes in two basic flavors: regular, and new. The regular flavor is inhabited 
by rather square minds; the new flavor is decidedly groovy. It’s strange, 
this new materialism, this new solution to our modern anxieties. Aristotle 
had already refuted reductionism to sheer matter, over two thousand years 
ago. Aristotle understood that things could not be reduced to sheer matter. 
Aristotle understood that to be a thing is to have a certain specific and 
unique form (Greek, morphē). But for Aristotle a thing is substantially, 
constantly “there.” Hume shows us that there is no way to assert this, 
because all we have are data, not things themselves. We have sparkling 
rocks, we have twists of metal, we have the evidence of eyes and ears 
and measuring devices of all kinds. Yet this is precisely evidence of just 
this nugget of stone. It’s not a popsicle. It isn’t just any old thing. New 
materialism likes to think there is an underlying substance, something fluid 
rather than something solid, as if being fluid were the solution to all our 
problems.
What is seen in modernity is not matter. It is specters.
The solution to our problems is to realize that there is no solution to the 
intrinsic weirdness of a thing. In what does this weirdness consist?
Yet another part of Ruperto’s exhibition is an animation of a duck 
morphing into a rabbit, a time-lapse version of the duck–rabbit illusion. As 
an old, cryptic joke puts it: What is the difference between a duck? One of 
its legs is both the same. The duck–rabbit is dying, but not dead. Yet not 
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fully alive, whatever that means. A spectral duck–rabbit with a strangely 
startled expression, weirded out by its own uncanniness.
To be alive just is to be a duck–rabbit. To maintain one’s existence is to 
maintain a necessary rift between what one is and how one appears. In this 
respect, death is the reduction of a thing to consistency. To be alive, without 
imposing a concept of life rigidly opposed to death, is to be undead. To be a 
specter. This is already the afterlife, in the sense that what wriggles around 
here cannot be categorized according to the long tradition of concepts of 
life.8
Death is the end of spectrality. When I die I become my appearances. 
There are some notes in a wastebasket, some memories in your mind, a 
corpse. The difference between me and these appearances has evaporated.
Life is inconsistency. Existing is inconsistency. Being a thing is incon-
sistency. There is a fundamental, irreducible gap between being me and 
appearing to be me. I am a duck–rabbit.
Which means that I am a sort of weird, true lie. It is perfectly logical to 
allow some things to tell the truth and lie at the same time. You can tell 
it’s logical, because if you try to eliminate true lies, you get worse true lies.
Consider the sentence This sentence is false, which is both true and a lie 
at the very same time. It is true that it’s a lie, so it’s telling the truth, which 
means that it’s false. And so on. A spectral sentence.
Imagine you can make a rule that goes “This sentence is false” is not a 
sentence. But someone can make a new sentence that blows up your rule: 
This is not a sentence. How come they can do this? Because it is okay for 
some sentences to be contradictory. Because things are contradictory. To 
be a thing is to be a duck–rabbit. Trying to exorcise the specters that haunt 
logic only results in more specters. There is a simple conclusion: something 
about reality is spectral, so that something about the structure of logic is 
spectral, incapable of being categorized as true or false.
A certain kind of person (not to mention a certain kind of social structure, 
a certain kind of ideology) wants to contain these double-truthed things, 
these dialetheias. This would be someone anxious about the spectral 
nothingness opened up by Hume and Kant, the flickering nothingness we call 
modernity. Someone like that wants to draw a line, to say, for instance that 
there are can be no mineral monsters. To draw a line between the living and 
the nonliving, like Georges Canguilhem, for instance. But there is nothing in 
the data to prove that this thing, palpitating before me, is alive, or sentient, 
or conscious, or a person. Even when that thing is my own reflection.
The default condition of being a person is being paranoid that one might 
not be a person: to be a puppet, a thing manipulated by some external, 
demonic force. You can stave off the anxiety of this thought by concluding 
that being a person is a pure illusion—there is only matter, or there are only 
relationships between systems, or what have you. This is scientism.
Miljohn Ruperto’s conversation with medieval minerals and alchemy is 
a way to talk to scientism, not to regress from modernity to an older, safer 
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age where things meant what they said they meant, but rather to channel 
something from the future. A future in which we have somewhat made 
friends with the anxiety that things are, and are not, as they appear. To 
bring back Aristotle and Ptolemy in this light is not to block one’s ears to 
the modern, but to try to open them a little bit wider.
A tiny, tiny piece of metal breathes. When you isolate it by cooling 
it close to absolute zero in a vacuum, you can see it vibrating and not 
vibrating at the same time. This tiny, tiny piece of metal is ever so much 
bigger than an electron or a photon or other things that we often associate 
with quantum theoretical effects.9
What does this mean? It means that quantum effects (such as vibrating 
and not vibrating at the same time) are possible because to be a thing at 
all is like that. To be a thing is to be a breathing duck–rabbit, living–dying, 
moving–still.
Modernity has allowed us to open to the possibility of connecting to 
the nonhuman without a conceptual framework. Can I prove a plant is 
not sentient? Can I prove that there can be no mineral monsters? Isn’t 
monstrosity installed at the mineral level, since to be a monster is to be on 
display (Latin, monstrare)?
In other words, to be a mineral is to have an appearance that floats 
weirdly in front of a thing, lying and telling the truth at the same time. 
There can be mineral monsters, and the same modernity that generates the 
phobic reaction to its most strange discovery is also capable of thinking 
this thought.
Thus to be a monster is to be a distortion that is also true. The distorted 
metal nuggets, the ghostly plants, the dying duck–rabbit, all proclaim this 
distortion. To be is to be monstrous.
This is why the experience of beauty is also an experience of something 
slightly disconcerting, to say the least, and monstrous, when its contours 
become more explicit. Beauty tells me that a thing cannot be grasped in its 
essence. A thing exceeds my capacity to grasp it. There is an inevitable gap 
between how it appears and what it is. A thing is not smooth. This was 
true in the Kantian age, but it is more explicit in an ecological one. There 
is no authority that orders me to like this and not that. I have to look for 
the rule in my inner space, but when I look there, I encounter this spectral 
not-me, something about which I am uncertain. Furthermore, since there is 
no accounting for taste for Kant, the idea of a single recognizable standard 
seems spurious from the start, and Kant’s attempts to police what he means 
by beauty are symptoms of that. In an ecological age, that there is no one 
scale on which to judge anything becomes ominously clear. Which scale 
should we use? Microbe? Human? Biosphere? Planetary? In the absence 
of an authoritative scale, all art sinks into the uncanny valley called kitsch: 
the slightly (or hugely) disgusting enjoyment-objects of the other, who for 
some bizarre reason like this particular ceramic horse. Disgusting because 
of the other.
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   317 11/01/2017   14:28
318 GENERAL ECOLOGY
Thus a specter haunts the specter of communism: the specter of the 
nonhuman, or we might now even say, with Derrida, the specter of 
spectrality as such—and I hope I’ve shown how this is indeed the same 
thing as the nonhuman.10 No longer able to exclude them with a straight 
face, thought is confronted with its anthropocentrism. It simply cannot be 
proved, as Marx wants to, that the best of bees is never as good as the worst 
of (human) architects, because the human uses imagination and the bee 
simply executes an algorithm.11 Prove that I’m not executing an algorithm 
when I seem to be planning something. Prove that asserting that humans 
don’t blindly follow algorithms is not the effect of some blind algorithm. 
The most we can say is that human architects pass our Turing Test for now, 
but that is no reason to say that they are better than bees. It is instead to 
assert that we can’t prove whether humans are executions of algorithms or 
not, casting doubt on our certainty that bees really do execute algorithms 
blindly, since that certainty is only based on a metaphysical assertion about 
humans, and is thus caught in fruitless circularity.
Bees and architects are important, because for Marx, in the lineage of 
Kant, there is a Decider that makes things real. For Marx, the Decider 
is human economic relations. But ecological relations without doubt 
subtend human relations of all kinds (let alone economic); and ecological 
relations extend beyond them throughout the biosphere. Human economic 
relations are simply general ecological relations with arbitrary pieces 
missing—huge numbers of them. Either Marxism can be thought in a 
way that includes this irreversible knowledge, or it can’t. If it can, then 
communism must involve greater and better relations with nonhumans. 
As Marx says in the chapter on machines in Capital, capitalism produces 
the misery of the worker and the depletion of the soil.12 And soil is 
decomposing lifeforms and the bacteria whose extended phenotype these 
lifeforms are.13 In short Marx implicitly includes nonhumans, while 
explicitly erasing them.
What is called Nature is also a way to blind and deafen oneself to this 
strangeness. Ecological awareness, now occurring for everyone on earth, is 
a way to take one’s hands away from one’s ears, to hear a message that was 
transmitted loud and clear in the later eighteenth century, a message that 
not even its messengers wanted entirely to hear.
Kant blocked his own ears, limiting the gap he had discovered to 
the gap between human beings and everything else. It is time to release 
the copyright control on this gap. The name of this release is ecological 
awareness. Ecological awareness is coexisting, in thought and in practice, 
with the ghostly host of nonhumans. Thinking itself is one modality of the 
convocation of specters we summoned at the beginning of this chapter. To 
this extent, one’s “inner space” is a test tube for imagining a being-with that 
our metaphysical rigidity refuses to imagine, like a quaking peasant with a 
string of garlic, warding off the vampires. Like Adorno, we need to brave 
the encounter with non-identity.
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This doesn’t have to be considered as a bizarre stretch. Recall that 
commodity fetishism means that a table, a piece of fruit, a cloud of carbon 
dioxide begin to operate like computer programs, chattering with one 
another about their exchange values, and that this is far stranger than if 
we accepted that they could act in a paranormal way, which is to say, a 
“magical” way outside of normative modernity, by dancing around. That 
is precisely what Marx says about commodity fetishism:
A commodity appears at first sight an extremely obvious, trivial thing. 
But its analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, abounding 
in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. So far as it is a 
use-value, there is nothing mysterious about it, whether we consider it 
from the point of view that by its properties it satisfies human needs, or 
that it first takes on these properties as the product of human labour. 
It is absolutely clear that, by his activity, man changes the forms of 
the materials of nature in such a way as to make them useful to him. 
The form of wood, for instance, is altered if a table is made out of it. 
Nevertheless the table continues to be wood, an ordinary sensuous 
thing. But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing 
which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the 
ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, 
and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful 
than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will.14
The future thought that Marx can’t quite articulate himself is right there, 
not exactly in the argument, but in the imagery. This future thought is 
quite easy to decipher. In commodity fetishism, spoons and chickens don’t 
have agency: they become the hardware platform for capitalist software. 
It is far easier to allow in to thinking the host of dancing daffodils that 
Wordsworth talks about, the dancing tables of Marx, let alone dancing 
chimpanzees. Allowing this spectral, paranormal supplement of modernity 
to enter the thought of communism, does not mean that capitalism flirts 
with the spectral, but that capitalism is not spectral enough. And in not 
being spectral enough, capitalism implies a substance ontology that sharply 
divides what things are, considered to be “normal” or “natural” fixed 
essences (extensional lumps without qualities), from how things appear, 
defanging the spectral and “demystifying” the thing, stripping it of qualities 
and erasing its data, resulting in nice blank sheets or empty hard drives. The 
extent to which any given form of Marxism retweets this metaphysics is 
the extent to which it cannot imagine an ecological future. But this requires 
accepting that some forms of mystery are not so bad.15
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J. Wenner, John M. Martinis, and A. N. Cleland, “Quantum Ground State 
and Single Phonon Control of a Mechanical Ground Resonator,” Nature, 
464 (2010).
10 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of 
Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: 
Routledge, 1994).
11 Karl Marx, Capital 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 
283–4 (Ch. 7).
12 Marx, Capital 1, 638 (Ch. 15).
13 Richard Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
14 Marx, Capital 1, 163.
15 This thought is strangely akin to what Aimé Césaire (as cited at the 
beginning of this chapter) argues about the colonized person—she or he 
needs to be remystified: “They talk to me about civilization, I talk about 
proletarianization and mystification” (Discourse, 82).
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Devastation
Matthew Fuller and Olga Goriunova
In this chapter we want to try to address the force, in the context of a general 
ecology, of devastation. What we refer to as devastation is not solely a kind 
of becoming of nothing in which the nothingness is produced by this or 
that becoming of some thing, neither are devastations simply diminutions 
of the stock of entities in the world or the finite number or range of things. 
Some aspects of devastation are captured in describing it as attenuation or 
diminution of the virtual, but such figurations are too extensive to address 
the recalibration of the virtual that devastation presents, and what we 
propose to do here is to map such shifts through general ecologies.
Devastation operates and couples with, protrudes from, and dissolves 
certain other kinds of becomings that are biochemical, military and 
economic, socio-political, technical and mediatic, among other things. 
General ecology is inclusive of the three Guattarian ecologies of the mental, 
social, environmental—ecologies beyond “nature”—but today it also takes 
on the overtones of and relates itself to the debates around such events as 
extinctions, their threatening immediacy and increasing intensity.1 General 
ecology faces the need to recognize and explicate anxious humans, the strat-
egies of modern warfare, calculations of probabilities, a rainbow of waste 
molecules in water, carcinogens, plastic- or high fructose corn syrup-packed 
bellies, oil spills, the proliferation of dross disguised as information, among 
many other layers and registers. Devastations cut across these to produce 
something that exceeds their categorical limits.
It seems that in the discussions of extinction, taking place for instance 
in the accounts of deforestation or other examples of the destruction of 
natural habitats, the Aristotelian model of genus and the forking paths of 
classification (and with them, primary and secondary substances and lasting 
identities) adhered to in the Linnean classification still have significant 
traction on the public sense of the diminution of the variety of species, 
in turn endangering the ecological and social horizons of possibility. But 
something more is occurring. In conditions of devastation it is not a set of 
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things becoming extinct under a category or idea that is thus itself trans-
formed, affecting the others in a cascading logical fashion that uncannily 
follows a tree-like formation, but it is the concept as an existing multiplicity, 
a differential, that fails to actualize, a potentiality that is wounded in a way 
that makes it implode, that makes it actualize a devastating becoming.
Deleuze draws upon the example of a lens in Bergson, where the virtu-
ality of all colors in white light are actualized to offer a range of shades; 
one could ask what happens to color if the blue of the sky is no longer 
actualizable because the atmosphere has changed or disappeared.2 What 
changes in the concrete universal of light that passes through the lens when 
there is no blue of the sky?
Blueless
The philosophies of desire and of process wrote themselves out of the 
condition of subordination reinforced by the Hegelian tradition in terms 
of ideology, history, false consciousness and the like, by emphasizing 
becoming and difference rather than being and identity. Rather than a 
universe of “final perfection with static existence”3 as Whitehead abbre-
viates that of Descartes, one could say that they replaced the ontology of a 
mechanical universe, in which the machine can fully come to a stop, with 
that of an ecology—of non-linearity.
In the preface to Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze talks about the 
problem of rendering the argument for affirmation in relation to discussions 
of the negative, predicated upon more traditional philosophical tools such 
as doubt, criticism, opposition and so on.4 The figure of the Beautiful Soul, 
in this account, sees only the gorgeously ever-differentiating oneness of it 
all, and is able to deduce neither a mode of living nor a reading of politics. 
Drawing on this fissure, for the purposes of measuring philosophy on the 
scales of a form of politics, this is a line of enquiry developed by Benjamin 
Noys in The Persistence of the Negative.5 Our tack is different here, in that 
we want to develop a discussion of how what is often seen as negative, 
inimical, may operate by means of dynamics that are often rendered—when 
it comes to the figurative capacities of text-based thought—as belonging 
more properly to the anthropically beneficent fluctuations of nature in 
vitalist thought. Thus we are faced with an oxymoron: a lively, devastating 
vitalism, the becoming of obliteration, dark vitalism.
The conditions of the genesis of the actual are grounded in the virtual, 
which is a differential infinitely saturated with change, infinitesimal or 
infinitely large, multiple. The virtual is real but not yet actualized. The 
virtual is also fully immanent6 and is affected by the actual, too; otherwise 
the virtual would operate as an eternal transcendental idea, unattainable 
and unthinkable. In what follows we seek to create an ethico-aesthetic 
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vocabulary for devastation as performing the process of actualization, the 
manifestations of the virtual–actual continuum which in turn involute the 
virtual.
Devastation is a kind of ontological flexure on the process of actual-
ization and change. Devastations may not necessarily diminish complexity, 
and their effect is larger than the calculation of possibility, on the planetary 
or cosmic scales. There is no point arguing whether devastation only affects 
the domain of Eukarya or also Prokaryotic microorganisms; it does not 
necessarily only affect cellular forms of life while leaving chemical and 
physical structures intact. We also do not want to get stuck in the well-
trodden paths of discussion centered on the reflexive subject, affective body, 
trauma, or death.
A metaphysical devastation, a devastation of the virtual, arises from a 
concatenation of shearings at multiple scales. Actual devastation doesn’t 
create the virtual by way of resemblance, but necessarily feeds into it. 
Devastation in general ecology does not imply that there is an end to 
becoming or a negation of affirmation, but that there is a change to virtual 
becoming. Devastation seizes, eliminates or radically changes the condi-
tions of other becomings. The tendencies of devastation are not, however, 
necessarily anti-organismic or entropic and as such faithful to the order 
of thermodynamics. Devastation can generate novelty and complexity 
outside diversity. Complex devastational forms include the dynamic 
behaviors of new auto-immune diseases, harmful molecule compounds, 
cancerous growths, radiation, accumulations of carbon dioxide, which do 
not eliminate complexity and wholeness in favor of randomness or a flat 
lack of differentiation, but radically redistribute the shares of potentiality, 
shape planes of activity and tangle with, impersonate and swallow other 
processes of change. The active growth of devastation is not the individ-
ually unthinkable scope of the death of the individual or the overwhelming 
absences of pure nothingness, it is something to the side of such things, 
being devastatingly vital, active, and productive.
The Chernobyl disaster thirty years on is a relevant example: the socio-
political effects engendered by radiation seem to have ensured a lack 
of anthropogenic factors within the exclusion zone, contributing to its 
relatively higher biodiversity, with rare animals being spotted there. There 
is a window of instability in such radioactively charged biodiversity that 
allows certain elements to prosper for a while amid other unfoldings: the 
biochemical effects of radiation interfere with the microbial and fungal 
ability to process biological decay, thus leading to the conservation of the 
dead.7 As a result, thousands of trees lie undecayed in the same spot where 
they fell. This interference with the dead is of a different quality to that of 
work attributed to the afterlife: it is an arrest of death.
Jean-Hugues Barthélémy has written on Simondon’s formulation of 
“deadening,” which “is contemporaneous with each vital operation as 
operation of individuation.”8 He suggests that the Simondonian view of 
9781350014701_txt_print.indd   325 11/01/2017   14:28
326 GENERAL ECOLOGY
death as a deposit can be altered to reflect an understanding of death as 
“the very heart of life,” a position he finds confirmed by contemporary 
biology, where “cellular suicide plays an essential role in our body in the 
course of construction.” At the scale of cells, the death of certain of their 
number in a developing embryo is a precondition for growth as a process 
of the separation of bones, digits, orifices. In a related sense, Ray Brassier 
notes the way in which cellular specialization occurs in evolution when 
a primitive organism “sacrifices” a part of itself to protect the rest from 
the external environment and to functionalize itself, thus making death 
an origin of life, the death that can not be repeated in death itself.9 Such a 
form of death, as part of an endosymbiotic becoming,10 a link in a chain 
of becoming, or an excluded and unthinkable attraction at the core of 
being, is radically altered in devastation. Devastationary death leads to 
something other than further life and the recouping of material resources 
into linked systems, the becoming of other states or the pull of originary 
death. Devastationarily arrested deaths are multiplex, cutting across scales 
of interpretive frameworks or capacities of knowing.
At another scale, devastation as ecological event can be characterized as 
involving complex and manifold interactions across and within multiple 
kinds of entities and systems. The earth’s history is marked by a number of 
massive, planetary-scale events. We know that there are ages on the earth 
when many things die, such as ice ages. The evolution of photosynthesis 
created the atmosphere, whose interaction with the rays of the sun created 
the ozone layer, and so life could evolve. Things (like free oxygen molecules) 
have qualities that can be destructive for other entities, and electro-
magnetic radiation is perfectly “natural” as part of matter. Devastation 
does not simply amount to the existence of destructive qualities themselves 
or destruction per se. Devastation relates to changes in the conditions of 
becoming and can be of a form of very active production, reconfiguring 
the relations between stability and change, expansion and contraction, 
wreaking havoc in chains linking habitats to cosmologies, such as those that 
move from the destruction of forests to the extinction of the languages of 
those that live in them, resulting in a loss of ability to think in certain ways.
Above we differentiated devastation from a pair of other conditions. 
Death in devastation is not the traditionally understood part of the cycle 
of life and death, and patterns of growth and decay, nor is it the polar 
attractor of the death drive. Certainly, both of these conditions may take 
part in devastations. But devastations take things out of cyclical or deter-
mined states into proliferating conditions of involution. In the case of 
Chernobyl, the afterlife and growth of radiation as the result of the disaster 
drastically deplete fungal and bacterial operations, resulting in among 
other things the non-return of nutrients to the soil. Such change delinks life 
from its source in non-life or other forms of life and alters the processes of 
becoming. This is not simply a deferral of the usual process, whereby trees 
are “stored” for later decay, but an effect of radiation’s arrest of death in 
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life that is itself a kind of growth, a propulsive unfolding of things, for 
which we have no available ethico-aesthetic figures. One possibility for 
these trees is that they maintain this dry, unrotted state, constituting an 
expanse of excellent kindling, until the advent of a forest fire whose smoke 
and ashes would spread the radioactive material they store far beyond the 
current exclusion zone. This would be a growth, an affirmative becoming 
for radiation as a kind of devastation.
Melancholia of obliteration
In the discourse of natural history TV extravaganzas, as Donna Haraway 
puts it, “knowledge saves”11 via conservation, scientific understanding, and 
popularization. Mediation of survival is one means of ameliorating condi-
tions of devastation. In the case of Lars von Trier’s film Melancholia however, 
there is nothing to be done.12 A rogue planet is on a fatal and implacable 
collision course with earth. One is obliterated, we are obliterated, they are 
obliterated, everyone and everything is obliterated, along with the planet. 
There is no possibility for reflection afterwards and no prospective capacity 
to understand or sense obliteration. Perhaps the unknowable void, like air, 
water and other things is also a precious commons?
Is Melancholia just a scary occurrence of the impossibility of thinking 
the earth beyond human extinction or does it recount a differentiation 
in and from devastation: the differentiated becoming of the perishing of 
human species, animals, forests, flows, continents, the earth as a totality of 
its destruction, or as a subset of those of planets as a whole? Melancholia 
obliterates earth as a living planet, but it doesn’t cancel out its physical 
matter, which is scattered in space and possibly left to drift as atomic 
rubble. Are we tempted as humans to simply bemoan the obliteration of 
the virtual that we equate with earthly human potentiality or is it indeed an 
imaginary act of thinking the perishing of the virtual of all matter, echoing 
in some way that of the ultimate fate of the universe and the ontology of 
dark energy?
Obliteration thus sets out the other margin from that of natural cycles 
within the bounds of which devastations become manifest. Obliteration 
brings us to the question of the void, finitude, the vastness of nothingness, 
and questions of cosmology, states and conditions that we do not pursue 
here but use as a point of approximate measurement. Such conditions are, 
as writers such as Schopenhauer and Thacker explicate, rather tricky to 
make observations about.13 At the same time, and as such, they act as a 
rather convincing limit to what we can describe as devastation.
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Spills
One of the most obvious and egregious of devastating abundances is that of 
oil spills, from grounded and broken tankers, faulty and unguarded valves 
on oil rigs, and the collateral damage inseparable from the development of 
new techniques such as fracking. By such means, the earth, all surface, gets 
in touch with its inner self. How is it possible to enter into knowledge of 
such events?
The becoming of the Deepwater Horizon event, the momentous leak 
from a BP rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, for instance, is interrogated by 
a range of mechanisms, including risk discourse as epitomized in insurance 
contracts and legal liability; the articulation of claims of environmental 
stewardship, and the diminution of what the stakes of such might be; the 
technical language of oil-spill management, and the attendant withering 
of the terms of the precautionary principle; the media responses of the 
various companies involved, distinguishable by the variety of their more or 
less inept and mendacious quality. All of these produce their own kind of 
grasp on and amplification of the event, even when they try to smother it. 
Indeed, perhaps the urgency of a reckoning of devastation is partially driven 
by how such conditions are supposedly resolved by such discourse, such a 
resolution holding it at bay, boxing it off, rather than attempting any more 
sustained understanding which might risk fundamental implications for oil 
as a commodity.14
Oil is tragic because at the same time as providing enormous power it 
poisons those associated with it, however remotely. Indeed, part of the 
complexity of oil is its profound corruption of the discourses, persons, 
and institutions around it as they work with the impact of this immense 
energetic and toxic force. Such work includes the stabilization of certain 
forces (capacity for getting energy) and the harnessing of others for certain 
kinds of gain or utilization, and at the same time entails the marginalization 
of the recognition of certain of its consequences (climate change).
The tragic nature of oil is apparent in the frequent reports of the 
results of deliberate or accidental ruptures of oil pipelines in Nigeria and 
elsewhere, this compounding the baleful consequences of large-scale gas 
flaring and the generally haphazard and negligent treatment of its ecological 
effects.15 Spills are regular, obliterating the use of land for farming and as 
spaces of ecological succor. The abundance of such oil indulges a disregard 
even for its wastage, not to mention the differential withering and bloating 
effects on local life on the part of the colonial powers of the oil companies.
When spills occur in the slums and shantytowns, people collect some of 
the oil in whatever containers are to hand. Frequently these spills result in 
conflagrations, killing and burning all those that had gathered to collect the 
oil in their meagre containers. Each such event is a catastrophe, but their 
ongoing form, and the negligence with which they are handled renders their 
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qualities those of devastation, in that their proliferation goes unchannelled. 
As devastation, such spills populate entire ecospheres. They change the 
capacity of parts of the surface of the earth to sustain life by smothering 
it in a substance from beneath its surface, one composed, of course, by 
decayed organisms.
One of the significant contingent factors about the way in which devas-
tations mesh with human societies is that their unfolding is frequently 
gamed, manipulated or gambled on for political advantage. Devastations 
are political, and are drawn upon by meshings of rhetorical, calcu-
lative, juridical, economic, and socio-political forces and interests. This is 
something readily observable in the brinksmanship passing for advanced 
statecraft in the negotiations over climate change. Perhaps because oblit-
eration is unimaginable, unrepresentable, that which edges towards it is 
not yet it. Devastation becomes the negotiable continuum. The void is 
unimaginable, therefore it acts as some solid, finite limit as a basis for 
non-negotiation, as a state that we have not yet reached. Tap-dancing on 
the rim of an abyss that cannot be seen looks all the more convincing if 
the dancers themselves cannot see the edge. What should be a convincing 
limit, is seen as a foundation upon which what is imagined to be political 
and economic advantage can be made. A moral, if not conceptual or specu-
lative limit, thus provides the basis for speculation on its transgression, on 
the understanding that gambles will be made on the idea that it cannot be 
transgressed.
Devastation as personification
Discussing brain injuries and drastic neurological conditions, Catherine 
Malabou posits a “destructive plasticity” to describe physiological events 
in the brain that fundamentally change a person, such as advanced 
dementia in Alzheimer’s disease, severe strokes, split identities and other 
phenomena. Malabou asks a double question founded in negativity, for 
which she aims to recoup the possibility, both in reason and in the capacity 
to recognize as fact. “Is there a mode of possibility attached exclusively to 
negation? A possibility of a type that is irreducible to what appears to be 
the untransgressable law of possibility in general, namely, affirmation.”16 
For her, the trick whereby one cannot avoid the regime of affirmation, since 
even to recognize the negative is to affirm it, is to avoid the difficulty of 
making a recognition of the negative.17 The structure that makes possible 
this trickery of affirmation, of this double negative that always pulls an 
affirmative out of its empty hat, is partially the effect of language in which 
a “no” always has a presence. In a certain sense this is a related problem 
to the unrepresentability or the unknowability of the void, of nothing. 
Destructive plasticity instead marks a break, a fundamental event around 
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which there is no possibility for a flickering of meaning between a positive 
and a negative, but instead a snuffing out of what had been. For Malabou, 
“destructive plasticity deploys its work starting from the exhaustion of 
possibilities, when all virtuality has left long ago.”18 In this work, Malabou 
provides a significant means for the recognition of the devastations within 
the scale of a person, itself a thing unfolding on many scales: within the 
brain; at that of memories; behavior; motoric function and so on. There 
is no inherent limit to the virtuality of a person other than its constituent 
coupling with actuality. What Malabou maps so well, although using a 
different conceptual vocabulary to us, are the modalities of damage that 
may constitute such actuality at the scale of the brain.
Devastation in common
At another scale, as Elinor Ostrom notes, devastations occur to commons19 
and are not limited to any particular scale, size or location. Devastation, in 
fact, may sometimes be the only common we are left with. One example 
is the waste commons of the North Pacific Gyre. Plastic, plastic-particular 
waste and microplastic waste (used in substances such as deodorants) have 
been found even in the rather more remote and more disconnected Southern 
Ocean.20 As the waste enters into the bodies of fish or albatross, there is the 
generation of a set of second- and third-order poisonings, and first-order 
throttling and blockages, as the plastic objects take up space in stomachs, 
making them unable to fully digest food.21 With the entry of this relatively 
new kind of entity, ecologies become unstable, yet difficult to map due to 
the redistribution of life and non-life, related—with no obvious counter-
factual—to the question of the proof of an absence, of the new forms of 
death and life.
In relation to a commons of devastation, such as that of Bhopal, where 
those structurally least able to bear the burden of pollution have been 
gifted with the opportunity to freely have it absorbed by their flesh, water 
and children, new political subjects may arise. There is a certain resonance 
here with the way in which uncanny or alien forms may flourish in the 
Zone, as described by Boris and Arkady Strugatsky in Roadside Picnic. 
The devastated Zone has another mode of becoming and its potency as 
a mutational field is what is most stunning in Stalker. Such a response 
to devastation is part of what art often offers, a material imagination of 
adaptation, mutation, or horror—an aesthetic parallel to evolutionary 
models of symbiosis, commensality, and parasitism that allows for such 
conditions to be sensed.
But the problem with human culture in relation to the manifestations 
of devastation is that it is so often stuck in the positive, the little twinkle 
of redemption at the end of every 35mm apocalypse. There are very few 
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aesthetic figures (film director Kira Muratova is an excellent counter-
example) that can contemplate the dark without drawing a resolutely 
positive lesson, but taking the time to stare without jerking back. Perhaps 
this is a lasting legacy of Judeo-Christianity, transformed into the Anglo-
Saxon gift of compulsive optimism; and perhaps in turn the belief in the 
intensive and vital capacity of change has something of fantasy or of 
wishful thinking to it; one that is less that of a conceptual and aesthetic 
imagination enacting and invoking new worlds, and more that of a soothing 
tale of things sorting themselves out in a jolly cosmos where irresolvability, 
futility, and meagre meaning do not figure.
Poor human
Writing about devastation, it is impossible to waltz around the human. Like 
a grand piano in a bedsit, the human gets in the way in so many special 
ways: with abstract thought and the question of the obliterating destruction 
of the transcendental, the question of the empirical, as the cause of climate 
change, as the late subject of history and in all the luxurations of woe in 
what has been linked to some of the powerful figurations of the subject. 
Ecology as a whole can be seen as an increasingly tensile condition in what 
has come to be called the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the 
impact of humans, often dated from either the start of agriculture or from 
the industrial revolution. There is a depletion of biodiversity, and a homog-
enization of ecospheres, that is, in the latter case, due to the generalization 
of certain kinds of organisms around much of the planet.22 The distinct 
quality of devastations, however, is the generation of erasures as well as the 
formulation of novel admixtures, interactions and objects.
If we’re to take Kerry Whiteside’s analysis that there has been a divide 
in Anglophone ecological thought between the anthropocentric wing that 
regards nature as a value-laden notion whose meaning is renegotiated in 
relation to human needs, and those arguing for a nonhuman view of nature 
as “wilderness,” then we can contend that the concept of the Anthropocene 
displaces these tensions. What the idea of the Anthropocene does is recenter 
such debates, providing for a few tensional foci: the threat to the human 
(framed in ontological terms), the danger poised by the human (susceptible 
to social, political, and ecological analyses), and the condition of ecology, 
where nature is historically evolving earth in its wider cosmic position 
in the Milky Way. By including the human within the term itself, the 
Anthropocene assigns more (negative) value to the anthropos.
After all the efforts at de-anthropologizing theory, and all the various 
phases it has gone through, this is a bizarre situation: the human is not the 
center of creation, but yet is its transmogrifying if not annihilating force. 
By becoming less central, removing itself from the position of dominion, 
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the specter of finite and full objectivity, the rule of reason, where such 
positions are in turn occupied by mathematical models, algorithms, data 
patterns, international agreements, the human also becomes a small 
schizophrenic element, sleepless, exhausted and—most importantly—
responsible. Humanity becomes an objective force changing the planet: the 
Anthropocene is the age in which the human is both the most powerful and 
central, and simultaneously the least so.
The concept of the Anthropocene has enjoyed somewhat garrulous 
popularity and has been criticized for, for instance, generalizing humans 
into a single block of a species and failing to account for differences 
in “biophysical resources, cultural perceptions and global power struc-
tures.”23 Perhaps a detour to Dostoevsky and his idiot Myshkin could 
provide another way of looking at this exercise of assigning responsibility: 
in Myshkin’s sensorium, he is ready to take responsibility for all acts and 
events in the world onto himself. This is an ethico-aesthetic gesture, an 
ontological structure of feeling that is in tune with the condition of devas-
tation: being implicated, being inside. Writing about the Anthropocene, 
Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests that “species thinking”—posited as occurring 
at the moment when a human needs to understand herself as a species—is 
untenable, both because it entails a return to essentialism, and is also a 
condition that it is impossible to experience.24 Writing about the concept 
of species more broadly, Manuel De Landa also notes the necessity to 
think species and individuals in a non-homogenous way across scales—a 
statement founded on a Deleuzian critique of Aristotelian generalization 
in favor of the virtual-actual distinction, with the virtual common to all 
animals.25 A non-Linnean and non-Aristotelian thinking of species and 
ecology as well as a generalized ecology in some way relate back to the 
conundrum outlined by Chakrabarty, involving natural history in relation 
to a history of modernity and capitalism and calling for thinking in both 
chronologies, traversing between “capital and species history.”26 Since 
species history is fundamentally a site of contestation and invention, in 
addition to the marking out of chronologies, such a call means working out 
a whole range of new conceptual vocabulary.
How can difference be contaminated by too much difference? How 
might a philosophy of difference account for plastic in albatrosses’ bellies? 
The cross-cutting of systems of stratification that yield plastics and yield 
albatrosses—the behavior of pelicans and the territorial life of plastics, 
given that just a few of these intersections create devastating conditions 
with an intensive character or networking of scales—does not bring 
transition to another state such as a deterritorialization, but an inflection of 
actualization that, while destroying the actual, also metastasizes the virtual.
Devastation is not always a catastrophic event. It can be slow and 
pleasant (sugar dumps in bodies) or unnoticeable; it can be cumulative, 
mutative, familiar. The non-linear causality of devastation holds but does 
not create complex things of wonder, as various machines of evolution, 
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or thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium are said to do. It creates 
something for which we have no image. Science has no teleology and the 
philosophy of difference proposes complex models of causality and yet the 
processual unfoldings of evolving life are supposed to be right, true, and 
wonderful. So what about when they are not?
Witnesses and warfare
Such a condition suggests something that deserves to be recognized. As it 
moves across scales, devastation requires a sliding subject, some abstract 
form of thought following scales, registers, atoms, organisms, habitats, 
languages, chemical compositions, pain, hunger, changes of structure. 
Malabou asks, what might be a phenomenology of damage? And in this is 
nested a clutch of questions. Within the scales of destructive plasticity and 
the richly varied susceptibility to damage of the brain, who or what, and 
with what instrumentation and sensitivities, is there to make an account of 
such an event? Since there is not always an other who can make an account 
of the ways a devastating change becomes manifest, or even a self marking 
the ways in which it becomes other to itself, what modes of witnessing are 
adequate to devastation? Is devastation always happening to an entity to 
which such an undergoing can be delegated and deferred?
In materialist ontologies the suffering, diminution, pollution, cancerous 
growth, changing ph levels, melting ice have scales and modes of existence 
larger than humans can conceive, experience, and project. Just as there 
is to life, there is an incomprehensibility to devastation. A problem for 
ecological science today is trying to comprehend—from experience, from 
imagination, from a fastidious testing of samples (of core ice, of tree rings, 
of atmospheric gases, of climatic records); trying to understand the roots, 
conditions, and counterfactuals of this incomprehensiveness. The problem 
of who or what is thinking and watching the devastation and for whom and 
at which scale it occurs, means also trying to establish the means by which 
such accounts can be elicited, at the same time as recognizing that a full 
unfolding of the condition is unknowable.26 The simultaneously empirical 
and abstract status of devastation is a problem! It is one that calls for an 
abstract empiricism, one capable of making a reflection on the constitution 
of such a problem on multiple levels and scales. Perhaps, it is one that might 
resonate with the versions of the multiverse in quantum mechanics, string 
theory and modern cosmology,27 in which the myriad of existing universes 
all require their own observers or poets, only a few of which happen to 
be constituted by a species that habitually speaks in terms of an “us.” But 
this is not simply a problem for thought, and its iteration on a solely philo-
sophical or scientific-technical level. As devastation may not be so evidently 
extreme, nor about immediate finitude, and can be differentiated from 
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obliteration at the far end of its continuum, it is devastation that becomes 
employed as a political tool, performs as rhetorical playground, as data to 
be calculated, is objectified into things to be traded, such as toxic waste, 
and is regarded as something from which some value can still be extracted.
Deleuze proposes, instead of the viewpoint of the Beautiful Soul attended 
to above, a Nietzschean affirmation of aggression and selection played out 
in differential terms, which may involve a sophisticated ability to work 
with what Bernard Stiegler calls the Metis of politics, an art of war that 
is neither walled off from metaphysics nor naturalized by it.28 Perhaps 
articulating something of this condition, there is a certain confluence of 
operations between warfare, or the exercise of violent power (with or 
without the monopolies of the state), and the dimensions of the unthinkable 
manifest in abstract empiricism. Both are condemned to undertake opera-
tions within certain kinds of fog.29 As such, the recognition of devastations 
is rendered partial by their inexplicable sense, in the same way that one 
must distinguish between the climate and the weather as operative at 
different though interlinked scales. The ethico-aesthetic and medial dimen-
sions of the condition of devastation are significant and yet difficult to 
recognize as they are folded within various rationalities and shielded by 
epistemologies. One kind of devastation is certainly an occurrence without 
an ostensible aesthetics, since there is nothing left to sense it. Such sensing 
unites the question of the thinking subject or sensitive entity with those of 
the empirical, sensible, and the aesthetic as well as with those wars where 
devastation is deployed as a force.
Legendarily, the destruction of Carthage is one such occasion, like a 
curse extending to the seventh son of the seventh son, one that outlasts 
our capacity to imagine or to remember it since by the time such a curse 
is half-done its root is forgotten. The story of Carthage was that it was 
destroyed by the Roman army of the Third Punic War and then broken 
down, brick by brick, with even the ruins ruined, not as Alfred Jarry would 
have it by making beautiful new buildings, but by an irrevocable and 
omnipotent dismantling, and with the land being ploughed over with salt, 
rendering it forever unfarmable. Yet the devastation of Carthage as a site 
for human life, at least in terms of the poisoning of the land with salt, turns 
out not to have occurred. The historian Appian’s description of the annihi-
lation of the city, in revenge for the victories of Hannibal, makes clear the 
Romans’ aim of total obliteration. No one left to recall the life of the city or 
what it was like to be its victim, yet there are some grounds, it appears, for 
its history, since at least it was written. This operation on memory is part of 
the condition of devastation. The problem with thinking about devastation 
is multiple. Such an enquiry occasions the problem of the witness: not only 
in terms of the question of what, if anything, remains to constitute a sense 
of an account, but also in terms of understanding the becoming of nothing 
or a radical change—how can such phenomena be recognized, if at all, and 
how is knowledge about them produced?
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The concept of the witness endows sensing with primary importance. It 
is not about thinking (philosophy) or measuring (science), or gathering and 
giving evidence. Witnessing unites sense with memory, where evidence rests 
in bearing witness—a process that can be performed by a subject as well 
as by an object, e.g., a stone, a log. In turn, both science and poetry unite 
in attempting to elicit modes of witnessing, or better, chains of witnessing, 
from an event, to its registration in a change in certain molecules, 
substances, or capacities, to an instrument that is sensitized to them, to a 
mode of description and comparison that is adequate to them. Yet, as has 
been described in numerous ways, to witness is also an act.
Devastations move both between the ecological and political scales and 
across standard notions of both object and system. They are something 
that happens that renders the tabulations of positive and negative and the 
perspectival limits they imply, perhaps operative at certain scales, trans-
ductable into such formats at certain times and from certain perspectives 
or scales, but moot at others. Here, the problems of mediation, intellection, 
perception, shift, combine, and re-sort.
Ecology is intimate to humans in every conceivable manner, and indeed 
composes them both over evolutionary time and in the lifespan of an 
individual, but is also the condition in which they find themselves stuck. 
There is a certain degree of intolerability to the finitude of a planet, particu-
larly one in which climate damage has become a kind of political and 
military gaming field, one operated upon largely by an infuriating indif-
ference that is voluminous in its churning of its own impressive incapacity 
to act. One of the conditions then of the current sense of devastation is a 
generalized claustrophobia produced across the immensity of the earth as it 
hangs amid this fog of a climate.
Part of this claustrophobia is a sense of strife turned, against its nature, 
into a force of conjoinment. As a People’s Liberation Army strategy 
document from the last decade entitled “Unrestricted Warfare” noted, 
furthering Clausewitz, ecology has become a means of waging war—one 
unlimited in its scope.31 Perhaps it is this systemic factor that is becoming 
significant in the present era—the ineptitude of established political or 
economic forms being their designated means of addressing and imagining 
a clever exploitation of the situation. The means by which this war is to be 
fought are in the processes of figuring themselves out and are to be found 
in the domains of energy and fuels; water and pollutants; the morphological 
manipulation of terrains via ice-melt such as that of the northern coast of 
Europe and flooding, such as that of all low-lying countries; and several 
other means. Following on from the consideration of their strategic usage, 
and the problems associated with them, leading to the adoption of the full 
range of both negligence and opportunism at the level of states’ reactions 
to ecological crises, devastations also impose particular kinds of conditions 
for knowledge about them in terms of the kinds of cunning required for 
their exploitation.
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What are the means to speak of the becoming of different kinds of 
devastations, of blossomings that obliterate? Some, indeed most, things 
cannot be known by organized forms of knowledge because there are not 
only so many of them, but also due to the problem of scaling second-order, 
observational knowledge—coming up with the techniques of inference, 
hypothesis, experiment, and modeling, among others. This condition in 
turn causes problems of proof, leaving precious moments of doubt available 
for exploitation by those with an interest in maintaining it. In order to close 
down the operative parameters science produces instruments and methods 
and practices that fillet reality for its juicy bits, taking part at times in this 
systemic occlusion, and at other times articulating fundamental condi-
tions of multi-scalar inter-relations. Devastations operate in the condition 
that Rachel Carson notes in Silent Spring: “Seldom if ever does nature 
operate in closed and separate compartments.”32 A characteristic mode 
of devastation for instance is that found in the exponential increase in 
concentrations of poisonous chemicals as they move through a food chain. 
Samples of poisoned predator and prey species can be subject to biopsies, 
but, echoing the relation between species and individual, not the entirety of 
the population concerned.
As with the case of Carthage, devastations are, among other things, an 
operative component in systems of war. The capacity for them, the carelessness 
with which they are handled or flaunted, the opacity with which they are left 
as the world moves on, characterize, their strategic value. Such a form of 
becoming of munitions is, for instance, active with the residual and freshly 
seeded crops of landmines, chemical and biological weapons, cluster bombs, 
nuclear weapons and their equivalents in industrial accidents: a constituent 
part of modern warfare in both its implemented and threatened states, as 
part of its operation as calculus, trauma, and frenzy. Each of these forms of 
weapon gains part of its power from the violation of ethics that they imply, 
and also for the unknowability of the violation of the future that their use 
unleashes. The calculation of the cost–benefit ratio of landmines for instance 
sees them deployed widely and rapidly as a means of asserting control over 
a territory, making it impassable. The condition of wild-seeding of such 
weapons sees them left in the ground for decades, a momentary tactical or 
strategic advantage lasting in swathes of unfarmable, impassable land. The 
deployment of nuclear weapons triggers the exercise of devastations as the 
actual settles into a state of strategically engineered “irresolvability.”
The political plastic, as Eyal Weizman calls it, is generated out of the 
interaction of forces, potentials, and the affordances of entities such as laws 
turned into calculuses of the permissible and the bendable; the reach of 
weapons systems; landscape measures; and also out of potentials of retali-
ation, of destruction and modelizations and the analyses of such.33 Indeed, 
the international history of the Cold War could be written through the 
interlocking systems for devastation and the mechanisms for making them 
implicit but calculable, known but ineffable, operative yet unused.34 What is 
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interesting about such plasticity is that, like that discussed by Malabou, but 
operative at different scales, it has its limits, yet these are only discovered 
or used as momentary tropes within a larger set of fixings and changes in a 
sort of parametric emergence of a situation out of things without measure. 
The question of devastation in relation to sense, witness, and warfare can 
be seen as a question of measurement and is treated with a remedy of 
calculability. Calculation of the unknown extinction is one artifact of this 
condition and should perhaps be recognized as crystallizing the dire condi-
tions of devastation in relation to the problematics of knowledge. These 
kinds of try-outs of little devastations, calculated and modeled diminutions, 
a training and development system anticipating the larger-scale devastations 
to come actually presuppose a condition of general calculability which in 
turn is a response to, or forms a conceptual pair with, the condition of 
irresolvability.
What is notable however about the question of devastation is that 
the techniques of observation that attempt to capture its characteristics 
proliferate according to context, but, as methods, need to be repeatable in 
order to gain greater traction on the problem. But since devastations often 
operate by the becoming of loss as well as by the growth of something 
unknown, they are paradoxical, since what we are able to recognize of 
them is both a form of presence, and an absence, producing a version of 
the logical problem of the evidence of absence. How do you prove the dissi-
pation of the virtual? You may need a vivid imagination, or perhaps you 
may simply need to be glacially cold, painstaking. Perhaps indeed the latter, 
since devastation is, in a certain sense, the knife-edge upon which present 
social forms find their seat.
Dumps in bodies
Certain ideas about nature have a tendential form of operation in that what 
is sectored off as nature becomes non-conceptual, passive, overwhelming. 
There is a certain overlap between emphasizing the awesomeness and 
unknowability of the sublime and the idea that nature can absorb all that 
is thrown into it.35 The mighty and eternally flowing river Yangtze makes 
a perfect chemical dump. The North Sea can be overfished, it is imagined, 
in perpetuity. The steppe stretches so far that it can absorb anything. 
Overcome with the power of nature, coupled with the operations of other 
ineffable mechanisms that condition knowledge, such as markets, the 
unknown is used as a dumping ground. If we are to think of the media 
of ecology then, the earth is a means of mediation, a pretext, a hyper-
absorbent nappy for an incontinent humanity.
As well as dumps in seas and in landscapes, there are other kinds of 
volume being exuded, but into the flesh of human bodies: surplus production 
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that must be forever devoured, regurgitated, chewed, and gorged. As is well 
known, there is an epidemic of obesity in the world in which human bodies 
become the sites for the dumping of certain kinds of surplus. Obesity itself 
becomes an ecological crisis since it involves an increase in the volume of 
gross human biomass.36 (Based on 2005 figures from the WHO, increasing 
population fatness is projected as having the same implications for world 
food energy demands as an extra half a billion people living on the earth—
you need more food to sustain higher weight.)
Causes are multiple and of varying kind and interpretation. Aside from 
the variable genetic predispositions of individuals this situation of growth 
is characterized by: changes in food and access to quasi-foods; increased 
mediation of food into a signature of surplus that is yet unmatched by 
homo sapiens’ ability to devour and offload it; lack of food and abundance 
of access to foods with high calorific value and lack of other kinds of 
nutrition; the persistence of a kind of body evolved in the context of 
hunter-gatherer forms of life into conditions more suited to species able 
to benefit from high quantities of sugar.37 Generally, more physiologically 
simple species, such as slimes, bacteria, and algae are more directly able to 
translate such abundance into reproductive activity.
This in turn can be figured as a form of devastation. What we find with 
obesity however is that more structurally complex organisms can be said 
to internalize and mediate certain devastations at the same time as they are 
the grounds of them. This condition of the internalization and mediation 
of economically and politically expedient surplus is what characterizes the 
obesity epidemic as a peculiarly contemporary devastation.
Obesity has many factors but they are conjoined in the particularities 
of the way humans articulate more general biological characteristics. Food 
is mediated within the body by hormones, particularly the homeostatic 
factors, such as ghrelin, which helps signal hunger, and leptin, which 
signals the state of satiety. These hormones may interact with dopamine, 
released by the ingestion of food found to be delicious, yet decreasing in the 
amount yielded the more is consumed. Since the obese have less dopamine 
receptors, its activity becomes less capable of producing the required effect.
Within the body, multiple other systems are involved, such as the activity 
of fat cells, which are not simple warehouses for energy, but are also 
productive—generating fatty acids and hormones, among other things.38 
In turn, conditions such as diabetes, cancer, stroke, liver failure. and heart 
disease also have their particular capacities of formation.
As Guattari notes, systems of endocrine regulation may hold “a deter-
mining place at the heart of assemblages”39 giving a particular stubbornness 
or lubricious ease of implementation to certain social configurations. Such 
capacities of the body can be hooked into by particular substances and 
the assemblages around them, for instance generating what appears to be 
a virulent conatus between an agricultural policy, political tactics, human 
appetites, and the condition of obesity.
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Richard Nixon’s need for the support of farmers (in the run-up to the 
1971 election) generated, via the promise of federal funds to grow the 
crop, the intensification of the farming practices of the American Midwest 
around corn. The achieved surfeit of corn required its uses: most obviously, 
in feeding to a glut of cattle and in manufacturing high fructose corn 
syrup (HFCS) for the American, and thus global, diet.40 Once a product 
and a market was created, it persisted, as did the federal subsidies. HFCS 
is found in soft drinks, processed meat products, bread, sauces, cereals, 
and many other food and foodlike substances. In those in which extensive 
processing has decreased flavor or substances used as food in which flavor 
is not naturally occurring, it is useful as an additive. Eating or drinking 
HFCS represses leptin, and thus the eater’s capacity to recognize that it 
is full or sated. Such a process need not occur with the full knowledge of 
what is occurring in any of the participant humans, nor in the agencies, 
markets, instruments, glands, intestines, brains, plants, policies, political 
intrigues, taste organs involved. Such a conjunction is sorted, amplified, 
ablated, contused, digested, and stored by the interactions of the predilec-
tions, intent and desires of the particular systems brought together in the 
ensemble.
Human bodies are places for regular substance panics (such as those 
associated with acrylamides, saturated fats, Bisphenol, plasticizers, etc.) 
in which ecologies of complex chains of media from the instruments and 
recording devices of labs, the persuasion mechanisms and institutions to 
which they are attached to those of televisions and the mechanisms falling 
under the scrutiny of communications couple with those ecologies tangled 
and forged inside organs and food and logistics systems. Characteristic 
of these is the reaction to the discovery that human milk becomes toxic 
when it concentrates chemicals such as PCBs stored in the mother’s adipose 
tissue throughout her life (obesity perhaps being a necessary requirement 
of contemporary life in that we need sufficient space to store all the 
toxic chemicals we are exposed to; our other commons). The agency of 
such chemicals, residues of mindlessness towards matter, turns the body 
inside out, rendering moot the question of the scale to which it is most 
fundamental.
Here, the question of movements of dissipation and concentration of 
chemicals in a dispersed set of states and sites within an ecology becomes 
crucial (whether such materials are ideally to be recycled or warded off) and 
ties in with the question of energy—how much energy is needed to gather 
all that must be recycled, or to recoup all the matter that has spilled into 
a condition in which it is poison.41 Beyond a certain point, which is not 
always so far, there is a devastating becoming which makes certain kinds of 
known lives untenable.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Virtual ecology and the 
question of value
Brian Massumi
All compasses—economic, social, political, moral, traditional—
have gone off the tracks, one after the other. It has become 
imperative to reforge axes of value, the fundamental finalities of 
human relations and productive activity. The ecology of the virtual 
is thus just as urgent as the ecologies of the visible world.
—FÉLIX GUATTARI1
Value resembles a dance, not a statue.
—RAYMOND RUYER2
The ecological urgency of a dance of value. It’s hard to imagine such a 
thing in the framework of our received notions of value. As designating 
“fundamental finalities,” values are most often presented as carved in stone. 
The most widespread phrases in which the word currently occurs in the 
West today are cases in point: “family values” and “democratic values.” 
Both, in different ways, equate values with inalterable norms vouchsafed 
by a transcendent power, God in the first case, the State in the second. 
Both posit these norms as universal and absolute. On the other hand, as 
orienting “productive activity” value takes on two predominant figures, 
both integral to capitalism: use-value and exchange-value. Use-value subor-
dinates value to function, making utility the arbiter of value. Thus mapped 
to an external criterion, value is deprived of coordinates of its own, and 
is emptied of any intrinsic power to determine the norm. Exchange-value 
empties value in a different way: by quantifying it. Value is subordinated to 
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a general equivalent: money as universal standard of measure enabling all 
things, however singular, to be compared. Mapped onto a general equiv-
alent, value glosses over the singularity of what it measures. Both use-value 
and exchange-value are more moving than a statue. This is due to the fact 
that they are hinged to another order—capitalism—with its own operative 
logic and line of variation. For example, what counts as “useful” changes 
as capitalism motors on. And the use-value of exchange-value is to oil the 
gears of perpetual circulation, concurrent with a constant fluctuation of 
prices. Move they may. But do they dance?
It is evident that when Guattari speaks of the imperative to reforge the 
axes of value, he has none of these dominant connotations of the word 
in mind. To understand what his revalued “ecology of the virtual” might 
be, the very concept of value will have to be reforged, beyond the normal 
compass. For Guattari, this means outside the framework of capitalism, but 
without returning to the appeal to a transcendent realm of absolutes. Value 
would then no longer equate with the norm or any manner of universal, 
and would not hinge on an external order to whose logic it is subordinated. 
It would re-ally itself with the singular: with what is such as it is, positively 
all of itself. It would re-ally with the singular, while somehow still providing 
a compass.
“That which is such as it is, positively all of itself.” The phrasing echoes 
C. S. Peirce’s definition of his category of Firstness, also known as Quality.3 
What would a theory of value look like that held to the singular and dwelt 
in quality, rather than laying down the norm or ascending transcendent?
Abiding time
Colors dance across surfaces. At sunset, they dance in the air. The red 
dancing on the horizon is wholly and only this red, such as it is, just thus: 
pure positive character, resplendent in its own singularity. Raymond Ruyer, 
who along with Alfred North Whitehead is among the twentieth-century 
thinkers who place the theory of value most prominently at the center of 
their thinking, began his major treatise on value with an analysis of color, 
extrapolating from there to the axiological level proper.4 Whitehead, for 
his part, articulates his theory of value through his signature concept of 
qualities as “eternal objects.” For him as well, the explanatory touchstone 
is color. What follows will work between these two thinkers, also from a 
start in color, moving in the Guattarian direction of a virtual ecology of 
values as orientational qualities of existence.
Ruyer enumerates four points on which the theory of color and the 
theory of value overlap. Things get complicated from the very first.
The first point is that qualities “are subjected to no temporal ‘perma-
nence.’”5 In making this point, Ruyer alludes to a passage in Whitehead 
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where he writes that “a color is eternal. It haunts time, like a spirit. It comes 
and it goes.”6 Colors do not exist so much as they “subsist” outside of 
time, Ruyer observes. “For an indeterminate period red can go unperceived 
by any one.”7 But then it will return. Where was it in the meantime? In 
potentiality, Whitehead will answer.8 When red is not being perceived, it 
isn’t simply absent, and it isn’t in some other world. Neither has it merely 
withdrawn, as object-oriented ontology would have it. “It neither survives, 
nor does it live.”9 It subsists, not surviving. Unliving, it “abides.”10 Its not 
being perceived is its abiding power to come again to paint the world in 
vivid hues. “It appears when it is wanted,” to revivify the world.11 A quality 
of experience is a positive power of appearing that bides time outside 
experience, poised for its own return, over any length of time and across 
any distance in space. The fact that it only appears when it is wanted in no 
way detracts from its status as a positive power. “Where it comes, it is the 
same color.”12 No wanting as attached to a particular experience has this 
abiding power. Occasions of experience do not abide, they become, and 
what becomes no sooner “perishes.”13
This explanation itself raises a number of problems. A first question 
concerns the apparent contradiction between the revivifying dance of color 
as it appears in a sunset and Whitehead’s statement that where red comes, 
it is the same color. Doesn’t a quality of experience “dance” precisely 
because it is continually changing, painting the dusk with the nuances of its 
own spellbinding transformation? And doesn’t every instance of red carry 
some defining peculiarity, owing to some circumstantial detail, an accident 
of illumination, for example, expressing itself in an errant shimmer, that 
makes it different from all other rednesses? Isn’t every this red singular: 
only thus, such as it is? Wouldn’t sameness across appearance be not only 
unliving, but downright deadening?
In order to reconcile this question it is necessary to rethink what we 
mean by the “same.” A potential, which is what a color is outside any 
particular instance of it, is poised to be any instance of it. It is ever on 
the verge of coming again, in any number of instances. It is this poising 
for “anyness” that abides. The potential for red is ever-poised to give 
itself over to variation, as many times and wherever it is wanted, in an 
ongoing series of appearances that is inexhaustible. The “same” potential, 
in its abiding outside the time of any particular appearance of it, must be 
conceived as already tending toward different variations on its own theme. 
The potential always and already includes in itself the infinite variety of its 
own appearings. In any given occasion of experience, a set of these varia-
tions will successively appear, in time. For the circumstances in which it 
appears are constantly shifting. The conditions under which red appears 
in the sunset sky cannot stand still. This compulsive restlessness applies to 
all circumstances in which color appears (in which any quality appears), in 
different forms and to varying degrees. Sunset red runs through a series of 
variations on itself, within the limits of the sky’s wanting it. The “any” of 
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the potential is realized in the some of this limited series of rednesses. In 
other words, the potential mutually includes infinite variety on an indefinite 
spectrum. The sky’s wanting red realizes a certain limited arc selectively cut 
from the whole cloth of the color. That “same” full spectrum is given to the 
circumstances for selective expression. The same of a potential is singularly 
multiple, in the anyness of its abiding as in the someness of its appearing.
Given to decision
The relation between the singular-multiplicity of the abiding potential and 
singular-multiplicity of its actual appearing is the relation between “any” 
and “some.”14 In other words, it is a relation of selective determination. The 
circumstances want what they want (red), and it is they that decide which 
red(s). The potential gives “what” might come: the character or qualitative 
variety that will exhibit itself. The circumstances decide “which” of the 
“what” does come: they take hold of a limited set of variations on the 
potential’s abiding power to appear. The relation of “any” to “some”—of 
potential to realization (in Whitehead and Ruyer’s vocabulary) or of the 
virtual to the actual (in Deleuze’s vocabulary)—is that of givenness to 
decision. This can also be stated as the relation between an abiding of 
variety, whatly indifferent to which it will be (“impassive,” Deleuze says15), 
and an appetitive taking-hold of a wanted variation (“prehension” in 
Whitehead’s vocabulary). Or again: between a select narrowness of realized 
experience, and the breadth of potential experience.
The lesson is that every singularity, as in potential and as actualized, 
is constitutively multiple.16 This has far-reaching philosophical implica-
tions. The readymade category that seems most suited to potential is one 
that was shunted aside in the inaugural gesture of this chapter: that of 
the “universal.” The problem with the concept of the universal is that in 
its most widespread usages it employs an unvarying notion of the same, 
mapping to the “general” side of the “general-particular polarity. Both 
sides of that polarity connote singleness (being one), if on different levels 
and in different ways. They both understand “this” to mean “not those”: 
single as opposed to multiplicitous. In Ruyer, Whitehead, and Deleuze / 
Guattari’s accounts, there is no determination that does not involve a multi-
plicity. “Any” to “some” is not reducible to the opposition between “this 
one” versus “those.” Qualitative thisness necessarily involves a spectrum. 
Qualities keep company, potentially and decisively. It is always a question 
of mutual inclusion. The issue is its width: what arc of the spectrum is 
wanted? The “universal-particular” couplet only makes sense within a logic 
privileging a notion of substance, and considering the relations between 
substantial entities to be governed by the principle of the excluded middle. 
In other words, it privileges a privative logic (mutual exclusivity). The 
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qualitative, as opposed to substantialist, logic of potential and its reali-
zation is fundamentally convivial (appetitively so). It is all about degrees of 
mutual inclusion. The unsuitability of the universal-particular distinction 
has important political implications for the theory of value when it comes 
to the properly axiological level: a shift occurs in the logic of the quali-
tative from difference as a privative relation between mutually exclusive 
samenesses (general identities or particular cases) to a spectrum of differen-
tiation involving a conviviality of appetition.17
Excess of character
Ruyer’s second point about color and value concerns a notion that has 
quietly slipped into this discussion along the way: the circumstances. 
According to Ruyer, the circumstances of an actualization, the condi-
tions calling for a potential’s appearing, are not sufficient to explain the 
quality that appears.18 You can describe what conditions are necessary 
for the appearance of red until you’re blue in the face, and you will still 
not be able to convey to a color-blind person what red is, such as it is, in 
contradistinction to orange, yellow, and green. The bodily conditions of 
a color-blind person’s vision do not “want” any red. They “some” the 
color spectrum otherwise. Red’s power of appearing abides them. Colors 
are akin to pornography: you only know one when you see it. Qualities 
of experience are subjective, but not in the sense of belonging only to a 
subject or occurring in a mind. They are subjective in the sense that they 
have a character. They are their character. There is nothing to explain about 
“what” they are other than that character, such as it is. Their appearance 
tells all. There is nothing “behind” the qualitative character exhibited in 
their appearance that would explain what they are any better than the 
appearing of the character explains itself. In fact, explanations of what 
lies behind the appearance are more apt to lose the quality than present 
it better. A complete account of the physical and physiological conditions 
behind the appearance of red includes many things—red excluded. This 
is for the simple reason, as Whitehead observes, stating the obvious, that 
the wavelengths of light around which the physical side of the explanation 
centers have no color in and of themselves.19 The same could be said of the 
physiological side of the equation: electrical nerve impulses are no more 
colorful than photon streams. This last point is crucial, because it extends 
the argument to all qualities of experience. Every quality of experience 
self-explanatorily exceeds its empirical conditions. This means that a scien-
tific explanation, although true as far as it goes, does not fully account 
for the occasion. An empirical explanation is a reductive abstraction that 
focuses on only certain of the elements involved (those capable of being 
quantified with the regularity of a law). Empirical explanation selects for 
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how the occasion is quantitatively. The “how” of empirical explanation is 
a selective focus on a lawfully select “some” of the factors involved, arrived 
at precisely by subtracting the defining character of the occasion from it: 
the scientific explanation of the red of the sunset begins by bracketing 
redness, the qualitativeness of red. It takes red’s qualitative nature for self-
explanatory—which it is. But what it forgets is Whitehead’s fundamental 
point that the occasion as explained by that defining character is more 
concrete than the scientific fact extracted (abstracted) from it.20 Who would 
even think of explaining red scientifically if they had never seen it? The 
empirical explanation “hows” itself into an acquired color-blindness. When 
it sees red, it just sees red, such as it is—and proceeds to explain away that 
experiential fact with an abstractive explanation of how it came to be. The 
implications of this for neuropsychology, and its humanities cousins like 
neuroaesthetics, are grave. Also grave are the consequences for historical 
analysis, to the extent that it fashions itself an empirical enterprise, for 
example employing a linear cause–effect framework for “how” things 
came about modeled directly or indirectly on scientific notions of causality. 
History has to acknowledge that subjective and the qualitative are always 
wanting, and that the concrete facts of history exhibit a qualitative form 
of self-explanation. Any explanation bracketing this qualitative reality is 
deadeningly incomplete, because to explain away the qualitative factors of 
experience is to explain away potential.
The fact that a quality of experience appears under certain requisite 
conditions in no way detracts from its being such as it, positively all of its 
subjective itself. The myriad circumstantial factors of an occasion come 
together in such as way as to call to, and call forth, a defining qualitative 
character. But they do not make the quality. When red appears here, it will 
always already have appeared elsewhere, at another moment of time, and 
will no doubt appear elsewhen in another place. In its abiding power of 
appearing, red is ubiquitously unmade. It is always-already (in potential). 
It does not emerge from its conditions. It appears for them, when called. 
It fills their want with its self-explaining. In fact, its self-explaining is in a 
sense more concretely explanatory of the circumstances than they are of it: 
the red of the sunset makes apparent what this occasion is all about. The 
character red characterizes the complete occasion.
Now for the first time (always having been)
Whitehead insists on the idea that eternal objects, qualities, do not 
emerge.21 To say that they emerge would be to say that something has been 
created ex nihilo. Color would then have come from an absence of color. 
In the fullness of the complete fact, color has not come out of nowhere. 
It has come out of its own abiding. It has come out of potential. It is odd 
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to say so, but theories of qualitative emergence (such as most theories of 
consciousness as arising from material interactions) in fact write potential 
out of the equation. So doing, they self-destruct. Nothing comes of nothing. 
And without abiding potential, that’s just what there is.
But surely, there was a time before rods and cones. Didn’t color emerge 
with the evolution of the retina? Weren’t certain periods in the history 
of art characterized by the abrupt appearance of a new quality of color, 
such as the ultramarine so beautifully characterizing medieval painting?22 
Where was ultramarine before the secret of purifying it from lapis lazuli 
was discovered? To say that it was abiding is getting a little old at this 
point. More to the point, the appearance of a quality carries its own time 
signature. It instantiates its own time of potential. If potential is outside 
time, its abiding cannot be thought of as waiting around in the wings for 
the cue to enter the stage. To say that a quality carries its own time means 
that when it appears for the first time, as Guattari suggests, it appears 
abruptly “in the mode of always having been.”23 The “eternity” of the 
eternal object is not a waiting off-stage in the wings of time. It is for this 
reason that Whitehead dubs it an “eternality”24—a quality of eternity—that 
comes with character. The eternality of a color “subsists” here and now. 
Now, for the first time, as always having been: this is the temporal mode of 
appearance of a qualitative character. This singular time signature arrives 
on the wings of the appearance (rather than the appearance waiting on the 
wings of time).
This means that a quality is nothing outside its actual expressions, even 
though it cannot be contained in any one occasion in which it occurs, or 
even in their sum total. Whitehead’s way of saying this is that everything real 
exhibits itself somewhere, sometime (and really subsists, for elsewhere and 
elsewhen). This is in fact his definition of “real.”25 This ties the definition 
of the real to an unabsorbable excess of what appears. For the theory of 
value this is key. In the experience of a value, a moreness of the world 
appears, as always having been, heralding as yet undetermined elsewheres 
and elsewhens. A more of potential appears, selectively enveloped in a 
defining qualitative character. The defining character is experienced as the 
affective tonality of the occasion: the “color” of the occasion as a whole.26 
Every qualitative experience is an experience of the world’s moreness, a 
lively sense of potential that is immanent to the situation’s singularity even 
as it exceeds it. This immanent self-exceeding of the situation is experi-
enced as a sense of vivacity over and above the determinate character of 
the affective tonality enveloping it: as a vitality affect carrying and carried 
by the affective tonality.27
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The immanent beyond
The importance of this for the theory of value is that it does away with 
transcendence in any normal sense of the word. Every experience is 
immanently self-transcending—to the exact extent to which it is lived quali-
tatively. Transcendence is done away with—but not the lure of a moreness 
to life that makes the idea of transcendence compelling. Paradoxically, 
what ultimately completes the concrete fact of an occasion’s occurrence is 
the promissory note of incompleteness it envelops, in excess over its deter-
minate character. That excess packs the occasion with potential for other 
occasions to avail themselves of. It stuffs it with immanent multiplicity. It is 
promissory in the sense that it betokens here and now vivacities of qualities 
to come. Every appearance of a quality is vivifying of the situation in which 
it appears, in direct proportion to the promise it carries for the vivification 
of others. Every quality is such as it is, excessively. It is positively all itself in 
the manner in which it vividly carries, immanent to itself, its own beyond.28 
More or less vividly: the vivacity a situation carries in virtue of its defining 
character will be proportionate to the intensity of its vitality affect. In 
passing, it is worth noting that this requires a non-quantitative theory of 
intensive magnitude as a necessary concomitant to a theory of value.29
The formula for the time of the qualitative, “now for the first time, 
as always having been,” enables a necessary articulation: between the 
making of circumstances and the unmade of the qualities of experience 
that characterize them. The becoming of an occasion of experience covers a 
span. It proceeds through phases, and comes to a climax. It has a duration. 
The occasion’s triggering into duration requires a coming-together of 
circumstances. The coming to a conclusion of the arc of this becoming 
requires something more: an activation. It requires a syncretic, synthetic 
working-together of diverse contributory factors. This must in fact be a self-
activation, for the principle of syncretic synthesis must arise from within the 
occasion’s stirring toward its own conclusion. The conclusion, Whitehead 
says, is felt before it is arrived at. It is felt as a “lure.”30 The lure is precisely 
the qualitative character that will crown the occasion’s becoming, coming 
to definitively characterize it. The feeling of the lure energizes the occasion, 
pulling it forward through its own self-synthesis. It provides it a direction: 
a compass. It vectorizes the occasion toward its own achievement. The 
qualitative lure stands in the occasion’s becoming for its own outside. It 
is and remains effectively virtual. For the achievement of the becoming’s 
completing characterization is the precise moment of its perishing. It has 
exhausted itself in its own decisive achievement. Its activity recedes, as its 
becoming cedes to what the now-altered circumstances may want next. The 
quality stands in the occasion for a self-achieving, one with its exceeding. 
The quality’s role is that of the lure of the virtual beyond, immanent to the 
occasion’s coming to pass.
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The lure of subjectivity
In describing this cooperation of the actual circumstances and the virtual 
lure of complete characterization, a decidedly subjective vocabulary has 
settled in. What is being described is the occasion’s appetition (for itself): 
its “wanting” quality of experience. The occasion, Whitehead says, begins 
“objectively”: from a basis in a coming-together of disparate circumstances 
that have been bequeathed to the occasion by the passing of others before it. 
But these given circumstances are not enough. Nothing would click without 
the energizing of a synthetic working-together-toward-a-conclusion. It 
is the quality, operating as a virtual lure, or as an eternal “object,” that 
“gives” the potential for this arcing of the occasion in the direction of its 
completion. The donation of potential activates the occasion’s appetitive 
self-activity toward an end. The lure of the potential subjectifies the 
occasion. The occasion snaps into its own vivacity. It decides, from the 
infinity of potentials, which virtual terminus it will take as its compass. 
It cuts into the spectrum of potential, and orients itself by the selective 
beacon of that virtual light.31 The sunset cuts for red. Its self-synthesizing 
“decision” to be finally characterized by red bears witness to a degree 
of subjectivity—operative even on a level with the movements of matter 
(which henceforth can no longer be qualified as “dumb” and lifeless).32
Braided causality
This matters for the theory of value because it requires a very different 
account of causality. The usual conception posits a linear progression 
from cause to effect on the same level of functioning (that of mechanistic 
action-reaction). Here, on the contrary, there are two lines of causality 
operating on different levels, criss-crossing in the middle of becoming. One 
is actual (including but not limited to mechanism), the other virtual (really, 
luringly, effectively so). One pushes the occasion from behind with the 
force of inherited circumstance demanding conformity to given objective 
conditions; the other calls from ahead, pulling the occasion toward the 
future it will have been when it has done its all. The theory of color models 
causation for the theory of value as a braided causality.33 Objective and 
subjective factors, actuality in motion and impassive virtuality, braid into 
the directional unfolding of the occasion toward a conclusion. The braiding 
is nothing like a mechanical part-to-part connection. It is a co-operation, 
across the differential between the objective and the subjective, and the 
actual and the virtual, that brings the occasion to life, by catalyzing a 
transfer of character. The objectivity of the circumstances becomes subjec-
tively self-deciding, under the attractive force of the quality of experience. 
The occasion’s self-deciding takes upon itself the characterization donated 
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by the “eternal object” operating as virtual lure.34 The causality in play is 
more than mechanical: it is transductive (transferential in this processual 
sense, not at all in the psychological sense).35
In the braided causality conditioning the transduction, it is ultimately 
impossible to assign an unambiguous status of activity or passivity to the 
factors involved. The circumstances come to the occasion passively, as 
a heap of leftovers from past becomings. But they activate, acquiring an 
appetite for qualitative completion.36 The virtual terminus that awakens 
that wanting and orients its unfolding “acts” virtually, with the impassivity 
of a lure. Whitehead is careful to retain this productive indecision between 
activity and passivity. The given circumstances, he says, are “patient” 
for the quality with which they actively seek to complete themselves.37 
The qualitative lure “energizes” the occasion’s self-forming duration, as 
an exercise of its power to bide time and abide as potential. The word 
“conditioning” is a handy way of nominating the braided causality of the 
transductive process, avoiding the usual linearizing connotations of the 
word “causality.”
Given and constructed
The transduction happens in a braided zone of indiscernibility between 
activity and passivity. This “indecision” between activity and passivity 
is a positive resource for the theory of value. It makes it possible to say 
both that the occasion makes itself, and that it is made. For example, 
the circumstances of medieval life provided the objective conditions for 
the appearance of ultramarine. These circumstances were seized upon, 
and synthesizing procedures invented for its manufacture. But it was not 
this blue per se that was fabricated. What was fabricated were the trans-
ductive conditions ripe for ultramarine to express its power of appearing. 
In other words, what were fabricated were the conditions for ultramarine 
to donate itself as a quality, such as it, all and positively as it is. What 
medieval industry invented was the singular coming-together of circum-
stances and working-together of factors requisite for just this blue to 
give of its potential. Medieval industry invented its historical patience for 
ultramarine. Thus ultramarine can be considered to have been both given 
and invented: constructed as an “eternal” factor of nature. Qualities of 
experience are made to exercise their sovereign power to appear in the 
mode of always having been. What “emerges,” according to Whitehead, 
are the comings-together and workings-together patient for that self-
appearance. The arrived-at qualities do not emerge. They just “appear,” of 
their own power.38 They make their appearance when the wanting is ripe 
for them. An occasion of experience is at once a recipient (of the objective 
conditions), a patient (of potential), and an agent (the subject of its own 
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synthesis).39 None of this is in any way contradictory. Recipient, patient, 
and agent are roles: modes of activity, in an extended sense unsubordinated 
to the active / passive dichotomy (“activity” in this sense is different from 
“action”). Modes of activity need not observe the law of the excluded 
middle. They may relay, overlap, interplay, and reciprocally inflect. They 
co-occur.
Activist philosophy
Ruyer’s theory of value insists that the cornerstone concept for axiology 
is activity.40 Axiology is activist philosophy. This frees the theory of value 
from the statuesque imperative of prescription overshadowing occasions of 
experience from the pedestal of a lofty “ought”: an end, an aim, carved in 
stone. In the theory of value as understood here, there is no ought. There 
is appetition, energized, aiming at the virtual terminus of its own self-
completion. The aim might be off. The arrow of becoming might miss its 
mark. Circumstances intervening en route may deflect the becoming toward 
another defining quality.41 More radically, the occasion may “decide” 
on the fly to self-deflect toward a different terminus. It may cut off on a 
different track. It may invent its own lure. It may improvise on its wanting, 
developing an emerging appetite for a different conclusion. It may self-
recondition. In this theory of value, there is no ought—only potential and 
invention. Potential and invention, objectively conditioned and subjectively 
reconditioned. The difference between a quality like a color and a value 
proper, according to Ruyer, is precisely this: value comes into itself axiologi-
cally when activity turns “self-transforming.”42 This way of conceiving of 
value allies axiology to the invention of the new. It forcibly uproots it from 
its anchoring in the imperatives of tradition.
Force and value
Forcibly: the term is not gratuitous. “Between force and value,” Ruyer 
writes, “there is an identity of nature.”43 He is using force in a sense beyond 
its mechanistic meaning, in a way consonant with the braided causality 
just described. “A phenomenon of force,” he continues, “is both a fact 
and more-than-fact, a given and more-than-given, for force directs itself, 
beyond its present existence, toward a state it itself will produce.”44 Force 
is not a matter of the adequation of cause to effect, as mechanism would 
have it. More fundamentally, it is a question of what Erin Manning terms 
the more-than.45 Force pertains to the braided causality of patience, crossed 
with terminal allure, cutting across an occasion’s energizing, given over to 
the aim at self-completion, in a direction of selection.
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Ecology of values
The inescapability of the concept of force for the theory of value points 
to the impossibility of insulating an axiological domain from the political. 
What the concept of force itself “wants” is a correlative concept of power. 
Value does not inhabit some pure moral domain. It is active in the world, 
alive with appetition and self-transformation. The political question neces-
sarily intervenes on the ethical level of how the appetitions running toward 
self-fulfilment cohabit their shared circumstances—how they jostle and 
readjust to each other, or battle and elbow each other out; how they 
mutually intensify each other’s run, or curtail one another’s force of self-
deciding. It is here that the ecology of values poses itself as a problem. That 
ecology is an ecology of the virtual in light of the energizing and orienting 
contribution of potential by qualities of experience in their conditioning 
role as character-building virtual aim attractors. The question raised earlier 
of the distinction between difference and differentiation finds its full force 
here. The politics implied by this theorization of value will give axiological 
priority to the more-than-given, the more-than-fact, beyond recognized 
constituencies and the fact of their belonging to given identity categories. 
It gives priority instead to their belonging to an ecology that forcefully, 
formatively hinges on the virtual.
Norm and value
Ruyer’s third point about how the theory of color proper prepares the 
foundation for the theory of value is germane to this ecological question. 
It states that a quality of experience like a color is “at once subjective and 
transsubjective, relative and transrelative.”46 Ruyer himself glosses this 
phrase in a more traditional way than will be the case here (“subjective” in 
the sense of being in a subject, transrelative in the sense of obeying a “strict 
normativity”47). The erasure of the ought from axiology does not erase 
normativity. But it does change the role of the norm, in a way signaled by 
Simondon.
For Simondon, the norm is not a model of behavior demanding 
obedience. It is neither a law of behavior, nor the regulative ideal of an 
identity. It is a rule of operation maintaining activity within certain param-
eters. When the becoming of one occasion of experience (or in Simondon’s 
vocabulary, “individuation”) perishes and another comes in its wake, 
the following occasion can seize the bequeathed conditions in a way that 
wants to follow in the footsteps of its antecedent. This occurs when there 
are germinal forms left by the antecedent occasion among the detritus of 
its passing, which then resprout as the new occasion self-energizes, and 
are selected by it to be determining of its course. Whitehead calls these 
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germinal forms “common elements of form.”48 The successor occasion 
subsequently unfolds in a way that makes its becoming analogous to that 
of its predecessor. Stated in a way that takes into consideration the undecid-
ability between action and passivity, this analogized resprouting can be 
called “conformal becoming” or “transmitted self-rule.” It constitutes 
what Whitehead calls a “serial order”49 or “historic route.”50 Under these 
conditions, the occasions along the route remain within average modes of 
operation, reproducing certain shared values more than they invent new 
ones for themselves. In other words, they are homeostatic. What they 
collectively want is to calibrate their becoming for equilibrium, and to pass 
the equilibrium-seeking down the line. The operational parameters favoring 
this are norms. By this definition, norms function immanently to every 
occasion, sprouting anew in each subsequent becoming. They “rule” from 
within occasions’ self-deciding. They are achievements, of sorts. Limitative 
achievements, it is true, but achievements nonetheless. As immanent to 
occasions’ becoming, they retain a certain newness. The occasions are 
serially enlivened by repeated appearance of their shared defining character. 
They each “enjoy,” as Whitehead would say, its serial return.
A value, in contradistinction to a norm, is in Simondon’s words “the 
capacity for amplifying transfer contained in the system of norms.”51 
In other words, the norm itself becomes a given circumstance for an 
intervening transduction that amplifies the becoming. By “amplification” 
Simondon means seizing upon factors also present in the given circum-
stances over and beyond the conformal germs regulating the norm. These 
factors are made to count as formative factors for the becoming. Their 
magnifying rise into importance shifts the appetitive focus. They bring into 
focus alternate orientations, shepherded to completion in different qualities 
of experience than those “normally” decided for. This “magnifies” the 
occasion in another sense. It packs its becoming fuller with virtual lures. 
It intensifies its wanting with alternate routes to alternate ends. This is the 
nonquantitative sense of intensive magnitude the theory of value requires. 
Greater qualitative intensity is packed into an occasion’s becoming in the 
form of contrasts between alternatives held together, in their difference, in 
the occasion’s unfolding.
Struggle and invention
This means that there is an ecology of value implicated in each occasion’s 
self-decision: a virtual cohabitation that disturbs the equilibrium, neces-
sitating struggle or invention. Or both struggle—the jostling and mutual 
readjustment of wanted qualities of experience or perhaps, that failing, a 
battling it out—and invention. Here, invention is the appearance of a new 
finality, an eternal object appearing for the first time: an alluring virtual 
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terminus never before felt, for all time. The occasion’s completion will 
carry the birthmark of the ecological struggle of its reaching its end. In 
the end, it will appear as a complex quality of experience patterned by the 
contributing contrasts.52 Value proper concerns the amplifying appearance 
of patterned intensity, predicated on inherited norms but inventively 
exceeding their conformal rule, with an “abnormal” avidity of appetition, 
energized in a way that leads far from equilibrium.53
Transsubjective
The process of valuation, Ruyer was quoted as saying, is both subjective 
and transsubjective, relative and transrelative. In the terms of the present 
account, actual occasions of existence are subjective in the sense explained 
earlier: self-deciding in their transductive patience for quality of experience, 
and achieving their own singular character. Subjectively, they are self-
completing. They come to a peak, where their defining quality (contrastive 
complex of qualities) appears, no sooner to perish. In is only they that 
partake of their peaking and perishing. They are alone in their own self-
enjoyment. This is the atomistic aspect of the process of valuation that 
Whitehead notes.54 The atomistic completion of the occasion envelops all 
of its contributory factors, all of its self-deciding, in the singular (multiple) 
appearing of the crowning quality of experience, such as it has come to be, 
positively all itself. The singularity of the completing quality that finally 
characterizes the occasion abstractly wraps everything that prepared its 
appearance into its crystalline being-such-as-it-is, all and only that, now for 
all times. It is this atomic singularity, virtually shimmering with fissional and 
fusional potential that can only come to full expression in other, successor, 
occasions, that gives the occasion its monadic character. An occasion of 
experience is not merely atomistic. It is monadically so, including its own 
others in its being such as only it will have become. In this other-including 
monadic aspect, the occasion is what I have elsewhere called, riffing on 
William James, a “little absolute” (so immanently different from the grand 
absolute of the universal and transcendent).55 There is a necessary aspect of 
transsubjectivity in-forming subjective becoming.
Transrelative
Whitehead’s way of talking about a monadic occasion’s virtual inclusion 
of its own others in its singularity, or what was called earlier its immanent 
self-transcendence, is that it includes its own “beyond” in its constitution. 
“It belongs to the essence of each occasion of experience that it is concerned 
with an otherness transcending itself.”56 What this means is that the “little 
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abolute” of every occasion is not absolute in a static or statuesque sense. It 
is virtually stirring with the potential for other occasions, other appetites, 
other patterns, other intensities, other ecological struggles and adjustments. 
In other words, its monadic aspect contains an other aspect. The occasion 
is crystalline in its singularity—but its facets are turned toward alterity. 
Guattari makes the equation: MONADISM = TRANSMONADISM.57 The 
“little absolute” of the occasion is transrelative. It is impassively ashimmer 
with the potential nexts in the transductive series. It is to these next others 
that it bequeathes at its peak the intensive pattern it has invented. In its 
coming to completion, it has become now, for all times. Its intensity, its 
pattern, its invention, will be available as a given for ever more. It now 
always will have been a potential—even for past times where the wanting 
of its intensity spectrally stirred but did not peak in that alternative (now 
for the first time, in the mode of always having been, haunting time).58 In 
this theory of value, the stolid “ought” of morality and normative ethics is 
trumped by the prospective should of the abiding promise. This is “should” 
as an auxiliary verb in the subjunctive mood (as in “should such a thing 
come to pass …”). The difference is between beckoning enablement and 
prescription, promissory opening and correctness of closure. The “should” 
in this subjunctive sense designates the eternality of potential, for invention, 
beyond the norm. It marks the auxiliary abiding of the appetite for the 
amplified intensity of experience, luringly appearing now and again in new 
axiological achievements.
To sum up: The sense in which the occasion is “transsubjective” is that 
the potential that reappears along the transductive series may always be felt 
and taken up into the singularity of an other occasion. The potential will then 
re-peak, subjectively again, for that occasion. When the occasion singularly 
perishes, it will continue to haunt the transductive series like a spirit. An 
occasion, Whitehead says, is “immortal” in this sense.59 Its potential moves 
through the little-absolute subjectivity of others’ becomings. This toggles us 
back from the transmonadic aspect to the monadic. Paradoxically, in spite 
of their final status of little absolutes, it is with respect to their monadic 
aspect that occasions are “relative.” Their initial becoming-into-themselves 
is relative to the inherited conditions from which they emerge—and from 
which they free themselves to the extent that they self-decide for their own 
singular character. It is in this initial bid for freedom that they are relative.60 
Upon their self-completion, as they peak, they are transmonadically fully 
determined once (now) and for all (for a virtual infinity of others). They 
move from the relativity of their beginnings through their little-absolutely 
subjective becoming to the transrelativity of their bequeathing.
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Surplus value
Excess. The immanent beyond enveloped in the qualitative just this, thus, 
positively all of itself of self-achieving experience has now entered the 
core of the theory of value. The shift from a theory of “pure” quality 
like a color to an axiological value proper was said to revolve around the 
concept of activity. The concept of activity was said to concern activity of 
self-completion virtually including its own others, to which it bequeathes 
a newly invented pattern of qualities of experience. Virtually haloing that 
complex pattern is a wider complex of qualities on which the occasion 
turned its back, selecting them not to appear. These unselected alternatives 
form the virtual background against which the achieved pattern stands 
out—and without which it would lack the experiential emphasis that 
enables it to assert its being just what it is. The backgrounded complex 
of alternatives can be distinguished from the qualitative complex that 
emphatically appears against its virtual background by calling it, borrowing 
from Guattari, the occasion’s complexion.61 The occasion of experience 
bequeathes to its successors this extended complex composed of the 
actual pattern and its virtual complexion. It is this extended nexus that is 
bequeathed to the world as a proposition for a next occasion’s bid for its 
own freedom.62
The key point here is that an occasion always proposes for the world a 
surplus of patterned potential. A next occasion makes good on the surplus, 
selecting its own alternatives. It recomposes the pattern. It re-colors the 
halo. It invents new patterns in its bid for freedom. Process turns on this 
serial realization of surplus value. The theory of value does not just extend 
to surplus value. It is essentially concerned with it. There is no theory of 
value, in its properly axiological sense, without a theory of surplus value. 
This means that the theory of value can reach no final resting point. It 
must follow the process of the becoming of values. That process revolves 
around the perpetual turnover of excess potential. Each self-completing 
achievement absorbs excess and reimparts surplus. When this process runs 
in the direction of the intensification of experience, in the qualitative sense 
discussed above, it achieves what Whitehead calls progress, which is synon-
ymous for him with adventure: the intensifying aim “toward things not yet 
realized”63 passing down an historic route. This is a non-teleological notion 
of progress as process in continual turnover that invents its own ends—and 
perpetually exceeds them.
Revaluation
The red of the sunset is a “pure” quality, little-absolutely enjoying its 
own achievement, wanting nothing but this, thus as it is. This is red in its 
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monadic aspect, assimilable to Peirce’s Firstness. But the same red is no 
longer a “pure” quality but a properly axiological value when it is taken 
up, for example, by an artistic experience that decides the red should return 
other-thus, in another this: as a pigment pattern on a canvas. The painting 
takes up the proposition of red differently, reinvents its achievement, 
and reimparts it haloed with a different complexion of alternatives (in 
this case, likely to be expressed by the ultimately untenable distinction 
between “natural” quality and “cultural” value). The entering of red into 
a transductive series of revaluation corresponds to Peirce’s Thirdness, or 
relation. This is the adventurous, transmonadic aspect. A crucial question 
now arises for the theory of value. The entire process is one of immediacy 
of experience becoming to self-enjoy the expression of its own intensity in 
the crowning achievement of the appearance of a completing quality of 
experience, complexly patterned and virtually complexioned. This means 
that relation is experienced as such, in all immediacy. In Peircean terms, 
there is a Firstness of Thirdness. This question of the direct experience of 
relation forbids the theory of value from straying into the ethereal realm 
of ideal universals (or into the abyss of withdrawn objects). It must remain 
faithful to effectively appearing singular multiplicities of experience. These 
are essentially subjective, but cannot be contained in the subject (the single, 
particular subject) owing to their transsubjective, transrelative participation 
in a transductive series, the whole, infinite spectrum of which is in some 
way felt in every completely determined, atomistic link in the braided chain. 
The theory of value must cleave to the experiential in this extended sense. 
In other words, it has a date with radical empiricism (defined by James as 
resting on the premise that relations are immediately real and really experi-
enced).64 The concepts of affective tonality and vitality affect introduced 
earlier provide useful takes on the immediate experiential reality of relation. 
But as Whitehead emphasizes, relation is already built into the concept 
of qualities of experience, for which he suggests the name “relational 
essences.”65
This radically removes the theory of value from the spheres of tradi-
tional moral philosophy and normative ethics, which revolve around the 
fulcrum of “the” subject and its choices. From the axiological perspective 
suggested here, this traditional subject-centeredness amounts to so massive 
a reduction of the relational complexity of the process as to constitute 
a falsification. The concept of choice is a pale shadow of the selective 
becoming of the axiological process as understood here. The complexly 
decisive bid for freedom at the processually selective heart of becoming begs 
for an integral rethinking of what we mean by freedom.
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Capitalist surplus value
Moral philosophy and normative ethics are not the only nemeses of the 
theory of the value as inseparable from a philosophy of becoming. The 
capitalist process has put its trademark on surplus value. Capitalism’s 
singular take on surplus value is more defining of capitalism than either 
use-value or exchange-value (which are not unique to it, and figure in other 
systems). Surplus value is different from profit. Profit is a realization of 
surplus value in a measurable quantity: an actually appearing economic 
value. Capitalist surplus value is defined in contradistinction to profit as the 
capacity to generate a future profit. Surplus value is the excess of economic 
value, over and beyond any given share of profit, that runs through 
the process. Surplus value is produced in the turnover of profit, used as 
investment capital toward greater profit. It is the quality of economic 
value under quantitative increase. It may seem odd to say it, but capitalist 
surplus value, like all surplus value, is fundamentally qualitative. It is the 
qualitative intensity of the quantitative process of accumulating capitalist 
value. Profit is the monadic aspect of capitalism. Surplus value is its 
transmonadic aspect: its other-addressed invention of economic potential. 
Surplus value is the virtual halo of profit. It is the processual complexion 
of the capitalist system. As virtual, it is actually immeasurable.66 Although 
capitalist surplus value is qualitative, as is all processual excess, the trans-
ductive series it haunts is pinned to the atomistic realization of quantities of 
value. Seen from this angle, capitalism is a worldwide machinery for quanti-
fying qualities of experience. No dimension of life escapes capitalism’s 
appetite for converting qualitative surplus into an endless accumulation of 
quantified shares of value.
From the point of view of the theory of value developed here, capitalist 
surplus value is but a species of surplus value. It is not the model for surplus 
value, but an impoverished image of it. The theory of surplus value in the 
richest sense concerns the singular vivacity of a quality’s appearing such as 
it is, just this, and the revivification this thus potentially bequeathes: it is 
a theory of surplus value of life. Capitalist surplus value is surplus value 
glutted to the point of qualitative starvation by its dependence on the 
continual reduction of quality to the accumulation of increasing quantity. 
Surplus value of life, for its part, refuses to starve its realizations with the 
wrong kind of excess. It subsists across the transductive series in order to 
insist on the immediately qualitative nature of each appearing valuation. 
Its process revolves around the directly qualitative intensification of 
experience: its increasing qualitative magnitude, as opposed to magnitudes 
of increasing quantity. Surplus value of life is in essential tension with 
capitalist surplus value. There is an implicit anticapitalism in the enriched 
theory of value. The playing out of this tension is the most crucial struggle 
involved in the self-decisions occasions of experience must make as they 
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bootstrap themselves into the bids for freedom that will potentially, provi-
sionally, complete them.
The axiological anticapitalist struggle is the most crucial because the 
voraciously reductive process of accumulation associated with the turnover 
of capitalist surplus value has reached the point of endangering life itself. 
The actual ecologies Guattari refers to in the opening quotation have been 
brought to the point of collapse. There is an urgency to rethink the theory 
of value in a way that shifts the emphasis away from value production 
revolving on the quantification of value back to an essential concern for 
intensities of valuation that have (are) values in themselves: such as they 
are, postively all of themselves; such as they other potential onward for 
similarly intense, unabashedly qualitative, revaluations to come. A take 
on the virtual ecology is a necessary part of any response to the crisis of 
actual ecologies. For it alone is capable of haloing present realizations with 
anticapitalist potential.
Systematic anomaly
Fittingly, Ruyer’s fourth and final point about how the theory of color 
overlaps with the theory of value concerns ecological complexity. He states 
it in terms of “system.”67 This is related to the point made earlier about 
the complexity of appearing and the complexion of the background of 
potential against which it appears. A color is a little absolute. Under one 
aspect, it presents its atomistic appearing such as it singularly is. But under 
its concomitant transrelative aspect, its appearing carries a systemicity. 
Red is red in virtual contrast to its complementary color, green. There is a 
system of colors. The contrast is everywhere active where red appears, even 
when it appears alone. Red’s complementary values haunt it. If you stare 
at a monochrome red display and then turn your gaze away, the world 
turns green. If you focus on the shadow of a red object, it appears not grey 
but greenish. Where red appears, green subsists—poised to appear as the 
circumstances want. Green dances with red’s circumstances. Red carries 
an ecological engagement with potential for greenness. Green is the most 
proximate other-value in the ecology of red. Red is always already virtual 
green.
This ecological systematicity of color is, oddly, considered invariant in 
traditional theories of experience. This is because its systematicity is indeed 
invariably passed down in the germinal forms in-forming the individuation 
of animal bodies (the genes). Or is it? It is not in fact entirely invariant—as 
any color-blind person will tell you. But as Ruyer off-handedly observes, 
people who are color-blind do not struggle with those who are not over 
redness68 (they may struggle over inclusion and accommodation, but not over 
redness per se). When a value system is considered, however wrongly, to be 
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an invariant, the complementary contrasts missing from some realizations of 
the system are apt to be dismissed as a simple anomaly. In other words, this 
alternate realization is not treated as a value in itself. It is seen as a simple 
lack of the predominant value. It is only considered important if the variation 
interferes with the normative functions built into the human environment (for 
example, the effectiveness of signage). But surely, the lack of red is not just an 
anomalous absence. Surely, it has it own systematicity. It is not a simple lack, 
but the presence of an alternate system of color. Must not this alternate system 
carry intensities of experience that can be lived as values in themselves? Seen 
from this angle, color-blindness is a potential for adventure in its own right 
(as is autism, to take a culturally salient example for our time).
Domination and neurodiversity
In light of the earlier discussion of variety and variation, the theory of 
value owes it to itself to eschew invariants and counter their relegation of 
variations to the status of insignificant anomalies. It has to throw the staid 
conceptual baby of the invariant out with the normative bathwater. The 
social and political struggles of the last forty years have revolved around 
the affirmation of diversity. Variations of race, gender, ethnicity, and 
able-bodiedness have been at the political center of axiological struggle. 
Politically, the fundamental problem raised by the theory of value advanced 
here relates to the status of invariably dominated groups. When the 
dominating invariant is in operation, the singular variations associated with 
these groups tend to be construed as anomalies worthy at best of tolerance, 
or if they’re lucky benevolent accommodation to the norms.69 The invariant 
of invariants, the putative universal, the preeminent standard of existence, 
is, of course, the human. The examples of color-blindness and autism add 
the factor of neurodiversity to the political mix. In view of the preeminent 
role played by the imposed standard of the human, it can be argued that 
the issue of neurodiveristy cuts across and exceeds such struggles as those 
around race, gender, ethnicity, and able-bodiedness, extending to all 
manner of variations in experiential complexion. As Erin Manning argues, 
this makes it a necessary strategic axis for a revaluated theory of value 
and its associated politics, arcing across the full experiential spectrum 
of potential.70 There should be struggles over redness. There should be 
struggles over autistic perception in Manning’s sense of the term.71
Ecological struggle
The point is that the theory of value, to live up to its potential adven-
turousness, must approach the ecological systemicity of every value, 
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however seemingly hardwired, as a question of virtual variety: ecologies of 
systemic contrast and complementarity. It should grasp these diversities of 
experience from the angle of their capacity to enter into the adventure: that 
of intensifying variation occurring as part of a process of revaluation.72 It 
must see diversity as carrying whole new ecologies, promising the invention 
of qualities of experience worthy of struggle.
The theory of value as developed here does not stop at human neurodi-
versity. More far-reachingly, its ecological aim extends beyond the human 
brain to nonhuman modes of experience. This is not only meant in the 
sense of attending to nonhuman entities as part of the ecological complex 
and its complexions. It entails an integral revaluation of values, opening 
onto new vistas of surplus value of life and new, as yet indeterminate, fields 
of struggle. This process hinges on adventures of axiological invention. 
It does not content itself with the self-congratulatory pat on the back of 
the feeling of being oh-so tolerant and accommodating, or the smug satis-
faction of getting it morally “right” by the prevailing standard. The process 
of invention avails itself of excess: the qualitative surplus value of life of 
the more-than-human haloing every predominantly human occasion of 
experience with an infinity of “other” potentials.73
It should be evident by now that the “actual ecologies” Guattari refers 
to in the opening quotation are not limited to the environmental. The 
overall ecology of values can be parsed into three reciprocally presupposing 
systems of complementarity, or virtual mutual inclusion: the environ-
mental, the social, and the mental (the abstract).74 The theory of value, as 
suggested by the singular vivacity of the quality of the experience of color, 
aims less at these systems per se than at their processual turnover into each 
other, and together into new postcapitalist patternings of experience, each 
a value in itself, such as it is, as well as carrying other-onward an immeas-
urably augmented intensity of virtual complexions, red ripe for experiential 
adventure beyond the human compass.
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19 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: Free Press, 1968), 
132–3.
20 Alfred North Whitehead, Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1964), 3, 171–3, and Science in the Modern World, 36, 
66–7, 84, 87.
21 On the idea that potentials do not emerge and thus of themselves lack 
novelty, see Whitehead, Science in the Modern World, 103, and Process 
and Reality, 22. On appearance as opposed to emergence, see Alfred North 
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Free Press, 1967), 209–19.
22 Philip Ball, Bright Earth: The Invention of Colour (London: Penguin, 2001), 
260–82.
23 Félix Guattari, The Three Ecologies (London: Athlone, 2000), 45; Félix 
Guattari, “From Transference to the Aesthetic Paradigm,” in A Shock 
to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari, ed. Brian Massumi 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 244.
24 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 80, 176.
25 Ibid., 46, 59.
26 Ibid., 176–7, 180.
27 On the concept of “carrying” as a processual mutual envelopment of 
different qualities or modes of activity, see Erin Manning, The Minor 
Gesture (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 131–64. On vitality 
affect, see Brian Massumi, Semblance and Event (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2011), 43–4, 112, 115, and Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach Us 
About Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014b), 9, 25–30.
28 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 69–70, 163–5.
29 See Bergson’s critique of quantitative notions of intensity in Time and Free 
Will (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001), Ch. 1.
30 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 25, 85, 87.
31 “The whole gamut of relevance is ‘given,’ and must be referred to the 
decision of actuality” (Whitehead, Process and Reality, 43). “The word 
[decision] is used in its root sense of a ‘cutting off’” (ibid., 44).
32 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 127–69.
33 This is a reference to Foucault’s characterization of Deleuze’s theory of 
causality in Difference and Repetition as “stitched causality”; Michel 
Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” in Language, Counter-Memory, 
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Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 173. In Logique du sens 
(1990), Deleuze characterizes the causal contribution of the virtual side as a 
“quasi-causality.”
34 I am departing here from Whitehead’s vocabulary. For Whitehead, the 
“eternal object” is indeed an object. But this is using object in the technical 
philosophical sense of something given. The eternal object gives potential 
(abstractly given; “abstract” in the sense of dodging confinement to any one 
occasion); the circumstances give the initial conditions for the occasion’s 
becoming bequeathed by past occasions (what Whitehead defines as the 
physically given). An eternal object is not an “object” in any normal sense 
of the word. Neither is it “eternal” in any normal sense of the word, as 
discussed in the treatment above of its paradoxical time signature, which 
prevents it from being in time. Whitehead uses “eternality” as a hedge 
against the usual connotation of “eternal” as endlessly enduring in time. My 
characterization of the misnomer that is the “eternal object” as “subjective” 
is a conscious inflection of Whitehead’s concept of the eternal object by 
Peirce’s concept of Firstness. Firstness in Peirce is subjective in an absolute 
sense, as requiring nothing else but itself for its reality, and being definable 
only in reference to itself (coming with the self-evidence of the “you know 
it when you see it”). Below, the occasion of experience as transferentially 
characterized by the “eternal object” is styled a “little absolute.” The 
apparent opposition between the “objective” as applied to the given 
circumstances that initially condition an occasion, and the “objective” 
givenness of the eternal object as the potential subjectively characterizing the 
occasion’s becoming, in fact falls away when it is considered that Whitehead 
specifies that what the formative factors making ingress as part of the initial 
circumstances donate is their subjective form: their pattern of activity. From 
this point of view, they figure as complex eternal objects making themselves 
felt as the initial or “primary” phase of the occasion’s becoming, and from 
which that becoming departs rather than toward which it is lured. They are 
the potential already given in presupposition, rather than the potential given 
as a proposition for the occasion’s attainment. The notion that the formative 
factors inherited in the circumstances donate subjective form ultimately 
dissolves any notion of objectivity in the normal sense as a factor in the 
process of becoming, earning Whitehead’s philosophy its status as a radical 
“panexperientialism.” The distinction between the object and the subject are 
distinctions between roles in the process of subjective becoming. The entities 
in Whitehead’s metaphysics can be characterized as subjectivities without 
a subject whose determination requires no object, in the sense in which 
that term is understood either in everday life or traditionally in philosophy, 
against which their subjectivity would stand in opposition. For more on 
subjectivities without a subject, see Massumi, What Animals Teach Us 
About Politics, 40–1, 69–70, 96–7.
35 This is building on Simondon’s sense of transduction; Gilbert Simondon, 
L’information à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information (ILNFI) 
(Grenoble: Million, 2005), 32–3.
36 This is a reference to Whitehead’s concept of “reenaction,” which 
complicates the associated concept of “conformation of feeling” or 
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“conformal inheritance.” The latter concept states that an arising occasion 
of experience begins by inheriting the form of energy and vectored 
momentum bequeathed to it from the immediate past. However, each 
occasion is also said to “perish” as it reaches its completion. It would 
seem that the only way to reconcile these two propositions—perishing 
and reenaction, conformal inheritance and new arising—is to posit an 
imperceptible threshold or infnitely thin interval of activation at the hinge 
between the immediately preceding occasion leaving itself and its successor 
coming into itself. This threshold coincides with the impact of the lure 
proposing itself to feeling. On conformal inheritance and reenaction, see 
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 163–6, 237–8.
37 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 192.
38 “The organism [another word for the occasion of experience] is a unit of 
emergent value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal objects, emerging 
for its own sake;” Whitehead, Science in the Modern World, 107. See note 
21 above for the non-emergent nature of potential’s appearing.
39 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 316.
40 Ruyer, La philosophie de la valeur, 61–9.
41 This is Whitehead’s category of Conceptual Reversion: “There is secondary 
origination of conceptual feelings [the registering of the aimed-at quality 
of experience] with data which are partially identical with, and partially 
diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the primary phase”; 
Whitehead, Process and Reality, 249.
42 Ruyer, Le monde des valeurs, 11.
43 Ruyer, Le monde des valeurs, 48 (emphasis added).
44 Ibid., 142 (emphasis added).
45 Erin Manning, Always More Than One (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2013).
46 Ruyer, Le monde des valeurs, 12.
47 Ibid., 13
48 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 34; Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 
203. The structure of DNA is the obvious example in the case biological 
individuation. But it is by no means the only kind of germinal form 
contributing to life. Simondon speaks of the “germs” of crystal formation 
as a model for his theory of indivuation (ILNFI, 75 note). It is important 
that it in the case of DNA it is its structural quality that is the “germ.” 
What characterizes DNA in its formative activity is this complex eternal 
object. Whitehead specifies that his “common elements” are complex eternal 
objects. Common elements or germinal forms are smaller-scale transductions 
embedded in a larger transductive becoming. Transduction, according to 
Simondon, is by nature analogical (pertaining to the transfer of characters), 
at whatever scale.
49 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 202, 205; Whitehead, Process and Reality, 
34.
50 The corresponding term in Simondon is a “transductive series” (ILNFI, 
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211, 216–17. Whitehead refers to “historic routes (of inheritance)” 
throughout Process and Reality.
51 Simondon, ILNFI, 331.
52 The concept of patterned contrasts is central to Whitehead’s theory 
of value, whose highest value is “beauty” understood as the “mutual 
adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of existence” in a way 
that intensifies the experience (Adventures of Ideas, 252). This mutual 
adaptation is the patterning of contrast. Beauty is a value in itself: “any 
system of things which in any wide sense is beautiful is to that extent 
justified in its existence” (265); “beauty is left as the one aim which by its 
very nature is self-justifying” (266). Although Whitehead equates beauty 
with “Harmony,” what we normally call harmony is actually a sterile, 
lowest degree of it by Whitehead’s reckoning. The most intense beauty, that 
which energizes transductive series of becomings, must have an element of 
“Discord” (256–66, esp. 266) and imperfection (276).
53 This is analyzed in Massumi, What Animals Teach Us About Politics as a 
“supernormal tendency” traversing animality.
54 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 286.
55 Massumi, Semblance and Event, 20–1, 179, 181–2. On the “minutest” 
occasion of experience including its “own others,” see William James, A 
Pluralistic Universe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 271–2.
56 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 180. Or again: “The aboriginal data in 
terms of which the pattern weaves itself are the aspects of shapes, of sense-
objects, and of other eternal objects whose self-identity is not dependent on 
the flux of things. Wherever such objects have ingression into the general 
flux, they interpret events, each to the other. They are here in the perceiver; 
but, as perceived by him, they convey for him something of the total flux 
which is beyond himself. The subject–object relation takes its origin in 
the double role of these eternal objects. They are modifications of the 
subject, but only in their character of conveying aspects of other subjects 
in the community of the universe. Thus no individual subject can have 
independent reality, since it is a prehension of limited aspects of subjects 
other than itself” (Whitehead, Science in the Modern World, 151).
57 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 113.
58 This is Whitehead’s theory of negative prehension: “A negative prehension 
is the definite exclusion of that item from positive contribution to the 
subject’s own real internal constitution. This doctrine involves the positi on 
that a negative prehension expresses a bond … those eternal objects 
which are not felt are not therefore negligible” (Process and Reality, 41). 
All eternal objects contribute to each occasion of experience, anywhere 
along the timeline, however vaguely or faintly. This is allied to the notion 
that alternate routes are enveloped in each occasion of experience: “Each 
perspective for any one qualitative abstraction such as a number, or a 
colour, involves an infinitude of alternative potentialities” (Whitehead, 
Modes of Thought, 66–7).
59 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 193.
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60 On life process as a bid for freedom, see Whitehead, Process and Reality, 
104.
61 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 112, 114. This is a somewhat different take on 
Guattari’s concept of complexion than the one in Massumi, What Animals 
Teach Us About Politics, 78–9, 85–6).
62 On the infinite background of potential and the proposition, see Whitehead, 
Process and Reality, 112. See also Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 281. 
The equivalent concept is Ruyer’s work is that of the “theme”; in Raymond 
Ruyer, La genèse des formes vivantes (Paris: PUF, 1958), 11–48 and passim.
63 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 279.
64 For a treatment of this question of the direct perception of relation, with 
an attention to the question of value, see Brian Massumi, “Envisioning 
the Virtual,” in The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality, ed. Mark Grimshaw 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 55–70. For the concept of radical 
empiricism, see William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1996).
65 The relational is essentially double. It involves other qualities in potentiality, 
as well as other actual realizations, and does so in a way that does not belie 
a quality’s Firstness, or little-absoluteness: “An eternal object, considered 
as an abstract entity, cannot be divorced from its reference to other 
eternal objects, and from its reference to actuality generally; though it is 
disconnected from its actual modes of ingression into defninte occasions. 
This principle is expressed by the statement that each eternal object is a 
‘relational essence’”(Whitehead, Science in the Modern World, 159–60). On 
relational essence, see also Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 68. Specifically 
on color: “We do not perceive disembodied colour or disembodied 
extensiveness: we perceive the wall’s colour and extensiveness. The 
experienced fact is ‘colour away on the wall for us.’ Thus the colour and 
the spatial perspective are abstract elements, characterizing the concrete way 
in which the wall enters into our experience. They are therefore relational 
elements between the ‘percipient at that moment,’ and that other equally 
actual entity, or set of entities, which we call the ‘wall at that moment.’ But 
the mere colour and the mere spatial perspective are very abstract entities, 
because they are only arrived at by discarding the concrete relationship 
between the wall-at-that-moment and the percipient-at-that-moment. This 
concrete relationship is a physical fact which may be very unessential to 
the wall and very essential to the percipient”; Alfred North Whitehead, 
Symbolism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1985), 15–16. See also 
Whitehead, Concept of Nature, 149–50. Whitehead formulates the basic 
tenet of radical empiricism, without using that term: “the relations holding 
between natural entities are themselves natural entities, namely they are also 
factors of fact, there for sense-awareness” (Concept of Nature, 14).
66 Toni Negri, “Twenty Theses on Marx,” in Marxism Beyond Marxism, ed. 
Saree Makdisi, Cesare Casarino, and Rebecca E. Karl (London: Routledge, 
1996), 151–2.
67 Ruyer, Le monde des valeurs, 13.
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68 Ibid., 11.
69 The application of the norm and the standard judgment of insignifance 
vis-à-vis “anomalous” variations plays out, of course, in much more 
complicated ways than this brief sketch is able to express. For example, the 
dismissal of the anomaly can flip over into an affirmation of the “exception.” 
This is seen, for example, in the popular culture trope of the autistic savant 
and their IT prowess, or in the older stereotype of the “good” racial minority 
(the exceptional individual who has overcome their “social handicap” to 
succeed in life and become one of “us”) or the “good cripple” (who doesn’t 
make the able-bodied feel awkward when they don’t know how to respond 
to their being in a wheelchair). Discussions within the neurodiversity 
movement often focus on this dynamic, pointing out that there are only 
“exceptions” because there is still the rule. These tropes are falsely inclusive 
strategies for saving the dominance of standard in the face of demands for a 
radical revaluation—feel-good strategies for neurotypical saving face.
70 Manning, The Minor Gesture.
71 Manning, Always More Than One and The Minor Gesture.
72 For an analysis of the difference between system and process, see Brian 
Massumi, “National Enterprise Emergency: Steps Toward an Ecology 
of Powers,” in Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 41–3.
73 Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach Us About Politics; Manning, Always 
More Than One.
74 Guattari, The Three Ecologies.
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